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ABSTRACT
With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent loss of United States
bases in the Philippines, the forward presence mission ot the United States
military is moving into to a new phase. With fiscal restructuring at home and
lebs unitv ot purpose among the nations of Asia, the United States is moving
to a strategv ot "places not bases' in maintaining its presence in Southeast
Asia. For such a strategy to succeed, it is necessary to find like-minded
partners in the region who will allow open access to regional facilities to
provide the support needed for the United States military to operate globally.
The Republic Singapore has been the most vocal advocate among
Southeast Asian nations for a continuing presence of United States forces in
the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean. In consonance with its views, Singapore
has offered the United States military expanded access to its excellent facilities,
agreeing to allow the stationing of a limited number of U.S. Military
personnel in the Republic. As such, it behooyes U.S. policy planners to
understand the nature and views of the Government of Singapore. This
thesis explores institutional development in Singapore, detailing the
evolution of its political, economic, diplomatic and defense structures. As a
background study, it attempts to give an appreciation of the way in which
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Executive Summary
With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent loss of United States
bases in the Philippines, the forward presence mission of the United States
military is moving into to a new phase. With fiscal restructuring at home and
less unitv of purpose among the nations of Asia, the United States is moving
to a strategv of "places not bases" in maintaining forward presence in
Southeast Asia. For such a strategy to succeed, it is necessary to find like-
minded partners in the region who will allow open access to regional
facilities to provide the support needed for the United States military to
operate globally.
The Republic Singapore has been the most vocal advocate among
Southeast Asian nations for a continuing presence of United States forces in
the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean. In consonance with its views, Singapore
has offered the United States military expanded access to its excellent facilities,
agreeing to allow the stationing of a limited number of U.S. Military
personnel in the Republic. As such, it behooves U.S. policy planners to
understand the nature and views of the Government of Singapore. This
thesis explores institutional development in Singapore, detailing the
evolution of its political, economic, diplomatic and defense structures. As a
background study, it attempts to give an appreciation of the way in which
Singapore views the world and defines its unique national interests.
An independent nation only since 1965, Singapore has become
synonymous with success and efficient management of both its economy and
its society. While Singapore's success has become a model for others seeking
\ in
rapid economic development, its methods for organizing its society have
been contentious. A democracv in form, if not in fact, Singapore has come
under criticism for its autocratic and paternalistic government intrusion into
the lives of its citizens and suppression of political dissent.
As opposition to communism has departed the world geo-political scene
as a central organizing principle for securitv rationales, the United States has
placed the support of democracv and human rights specifically in its securitv
agenda. The idea that countries with shared values would be unlikelv to go to
war with one another seems to the core of the argument for this new priori tv.
In Asia, the notion of shared values is being challenged bv governments who
hold do not necessarily share the view that liberal democracv, as defined bv
the West, is necessarily the best way in which to organize societies.
Singapore is a classic example of this contrast. This thesis argues that
while Singapore mav not provide democratic government, from a western
perspective, it does provide good government. In a world of many cultures
and differing values, the United States must base its policies on shared
interests rather than shared values. When examined from this perspective,
the interests of Singapore and the interests of the United States correspond to
a sufficient degree to make a productive relationship between the two nations
advantageous to each. To make a productive relationship possible, it is
essential that United States policy planners understand Singapore's history.
With such a perspective, the intentions and the constraints that shape the
national interests of Singapore will become apparent. It is the purpose of this
thesis to provide such a study for United States policy.
IX

I. Introduction: Singapore, A Tale of Two Cities ?
A. A Country' of Contradictions: The View from the West
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the
epoch of incredulity, it was the reason of Light, it was the season of
Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had
everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to
heaven, we were all going the other wav.
'
In the \V:r York Times columnist Anthony Lewis borrowed the title of
Dickens' novel in describing the tinv island nation of Singapore in his
column, entitled "A Tale Of Two Cities."- This is indeed a curious and
decidedly western view of the island city-state. Dickens highlighted the stark
contrasts between the squalor and misery of the life of the "have-nots" against
the splendor and comfort of the aristocracy. Lewis, in attempting to use the
analogy, highlighted the subtle contrasts that Singapore presents to the
western observer.
(To the observer arriving at modern Changi airport, consistently rated as
one of the world's best among business travelers, and traveling bv a spotlessly
clean (and inexpensive) taxi to the gleaming citv of waterfront high rises, it
must seem the season of light and the spring of hope: Singapore as the best
planned and most perfectly maintained citv in the world; Singapore's clean
streets and efficient and modern mass transit; Singapore as a model of public
housing where 85% of the citizens live in government subsidized high rise
1 Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities, Cited in Tite Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1Q7Q ), p. 183.
^Anthony Lewis, "A Tale Of Two Cities," Tlie New York Limes, August o, 1993: Sect. A p.15.
apartments, the vast majority of them home owners; Singapore with
negligible unemployment, crime and a largely drug-free society. ][° some
western observers, steeped in the traditions of liberal democracy, who looks
below the surface at the government apparatus that has wrought the
remarkable changes mentioned above it mav seem the season of Darkness
and the winter of Despair: an autocratic government regulating its citizen's
lives in the tiniest detail; a government intolerant of any threat to its power; a
government with the power of detention without trial3 ; a government which
will break an opposition politician, ruin him financially, and destroy his
career on the pretext oi misuse of $130 of university funds4 ; a government
which limits the circulation of foreign publications which criticize it and
refuse to publish, in full, the government's rebuttals to such criticism'.
All of this praise and criticism contains truths and, from a western
viewpoint, create the paradox that is Singapore. The key point that Lewis
seems to miss in applying the Dickens' analogy in the case of Singapore is
results. The political world is littered with the remains of authoritarian
governments which enriched themselves at the expense of their citizenry and
drove their respective countries to ruin. Those who remain in power and
continue to operate in such a manner find themselves imperiled and
teetering on the brink of oblivion, Cuba and North Korea being two obvious
examples from the former mighty communist world. South Africa, losing its
grip on the enforced system of minority rule, is one from outside the
See Stan Sesser, "A Reporter At Large, A Nations of Contradictions,'' Jlio New Yorker,
January 1 3 1«Q2, pp. 37-68.
'See "The heart oi the matter in the Chee soon [uan arfair," Uie <!ratt* Times Weekly
Overseas Edition, April 24, 1993, p. 15.
ie Philip Shenon, "2 Faces of Singapore: Censor and Communications Center," TJtc New York
rimes, August 5, 1 QQ 3, p. Ao.
communist bloc. One can find ample evidence to give credence to Lord
\ctons assertion in 1887, just eight vears after the death of Dickens, that
Toner tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.'6
While the leadership in Singapore does not possess absolute power, the
People's Action Party, which has ruled the island nation Mitce its inception in
1965, comes as close to meeting that criteria as any in countries which
regularly hold elections. How then, from a western viewpoint, does one
account for the fact that the government of Singapore is widely recognized as
the least corrupt in Asia and the entire developing world?
In the wake oi the cold war, as the West searches tor a new ideologv to
replace its moribund anti-communist notions of the "free world" versus the
"evil empire," the widely touted success of Singapore presents a particular
ideological problem. If the centerpiece of American foreign policy in the post-
cold war era is to be the promotion of democracy and universal human rights
in the tradition of western liberal democracy, then we shall certainly find
ourselves at odds with the leadership of the tiny island nation. The highly
authoritarian regime in Singapore, and its unabashed promotion of its view
that the notions of western democracy are not the single model of universal
political and economic development receive an increasing amount of
attention in the developing nations of the world. As James Schlesinger
argued when discussing America's quest for a post-cold war security policy:
... there may be some conflict between the introduction of democratic
institutions and the pursuit of rapid economic growth. Many of the states
now seeking new directions in economic policy quite simply reject the
"Lord Action, in a letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton, Cited m Hie Oxford Dictionary of
Quotations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p.l.
American variant of unfettered capitalism. For much of Asia the preferred
model is Lee Kuan Yew, not Margaret Thatcher. 7©*
These sentiments are echoed, loudly, throughout the booming
economies of East and Southeast Asia. In its earlv existence, immediately
following independence, the tiny city c tate looked for_ models to base its
policies on to ensure its survival. Examples are the Israeli model for defense
and the Swiss model for economic development. With the outstanding
success that Singapore has enjoved in its short twentv-eight vear historv it has
now become the model that others seek to emulate, particularly among
regional neighbors in Southeast Asia.* E.K.Y. Chen writes, discussing the
future of Asian economic development:
"impressive achievements in social and economic development over
the past two decades have made Singapore, as a country, one of the most
outstanding models of development."9
The Singapore model, far from being limited to small, non-agricultural,
predominantly urban countries like itself, is receiving attention even in great
centers of power seeking a path to greater modernization and economic
development. Nicholas D. Kristoff, New York Times Beijing correspondent
for the past five years, commented, upon his return to the United States, on
the current economic-political models being discussed in the People's
Republic of China (PRC). With the shift from the days of Mao to the late era
' lames Schlesinger, "Quest For A Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," Foreign Affair? , America and
the World, 1992-1993, Vol. 72 No. 1, p. 24.
^Jonathan Rigg, Southeast Asia A Region In Transition, (London: Unwin Hvman Ltd.. 1991), p.
187.
9 Chen, E.K.Y. "The Newly Industrializing Countries in Asia: Growth Experience and
Prospects," in Asian Economic Development: Present ana Future, R.A. Scalapino, S. Sato & Lim
Siang I in eds. (Berkeley : Institute oi East Asian Studies, 1985), p. 4.
of Deng when, suddenly, to get rich is glorious," Singapore is viewed as a
credible example of success:
Mao once talked of China's becoming another Soviet Union; Mr. Deng
reserves his highest praise not for a socialist country but for that bastion ot
capitalism, Singapore.
The attraction of Singapore is that it has achieved Western living
standards without being infected bv Western political standards. Singapore
is a paramount leader's paradise, tor it is populated bv clean-cut, law
abiding citizens who obligingly use their ballots to keep their rulers in
power.
"China's dream is to become another Singapore,'' a Western diplomat
noted... 10
This does not just represent praise from afar, Goh Keng hwee, a
founding member ot the People's Action Party (PAP) and the first architect ot
Singapore's industrial transformation and economic development following
his retirement from government in 1984, was retained as a consultant by the
PRC. 11 Kristoffs assertion that Singapore is a paramount leaders paradise,
however, would be challenged bv Lee Kuan Yew. As Lee has said.
If I were in authority in Singapore indefinitely, without having to ask
those who are being governed whether they like what is being done, then I
have not the slightest doubt that I could govern much more effectively in
their own interests. 12
Bv any account Singapore's journey from tenuous independence to its
emergence as one of the dynamic Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC's) is a
remarkable story. The white-hot crucible of political and racial heat and the
intricate mix of factors that have each played a part in shaping the nation that
^Nicholas D. Kristoff, "China Sees Key to Future In New 'Market Leninism'," Tlie Nerv York
Times, September o, 1QQ 3, Sect. A. p.l.
Hjames Minchin, No Man is an Island
,
(Svdney: Allen & Unwm, 19S6), p. 51.
12LKY, off-the-cuff speech to the Royal Society of International Affairs, London, May i Qo2.
Op. cit. in Minchin. p. 2.
is modern Singapore provide a fascinating study of the emergence of a
modern and successful multi-racial nation-state from the ashes of World War
II.
While the journey of Singapore would be of interest to any student of
political and economic development the interest of the United States in
Singapore continues to increase as the new century approaches. The United
States is the largest foreign investor in a Singaporean economy which is very
dependent on foreign capital. In Southeast Asia, Singapore is the United
States' largest trading partner. There are more export related jobs in the
United States linked to Singapore-U.S. trade than with that of any other
Southeast Asian economy. In the defense sector, from 1987 to 1991
Singapore's arms imports were valued at (US) 51.276 billion. Of these
imports, $1,031 billion, or over 80% came from the United States. 13
The interests of those in the Department of Defense in Singapore go far
beyond military sales. With the fate of U.S. Philippine bases still in the
balance, Singapore offered the United States military expanded access to
military facilities in the island republic. Pollowing the failure of the
Philippine base talks. President Bush and Singapore Prime Minister Goh
Chock Tong signed an agreement whereby the U.S. Navy's Logistic
Command from Subic Bay would be moved to Singapore, despite the
difficulties of explaining such an arrangement to its regional neighbors. The
government has consistently maintained a strong support position for the
maintenance of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific. Singapore has become a vital
link in the support of the U.S. military facilities in Diego Garcia, a key base for
iiJGerald Segal, "Managing New Arms Races in the Asia/ Pacific,'' Washington Quarterly, Vol.
1 5 No. 3, Summer [9°2. p. 89.
b
the US in the gulf war strategy. There are presently more United States
military personnel and their dependents in Singapore than in any other
Southeast Asian country. As the U.S. moyes to a strategy of "places not bases'"
as elucidated by the Commander of U.S. Pacific Forces, Admiral Charles R.
Larson 14 , Singapore has arguably become the key "place.
"
Singapore has been the most strongly supportive Southeast Asia nation
of the continued presence of the United States military in the Asia-Pacific and
Indian Ocean regions. The Goyernment of Singapore's vocal support for the
US role and its offer of expanded access to facilities have encouraged regional
neighbors, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, to offer such support as is
politically acceptable in the context of their own national interests and
international positions.
B. Singapore's Foreign Policy Terrain, The Nation, Its People and Its Place in
the World.
N. Ganesan, a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Singapore describes the "foreign policy terrain" of a country as a
set of imperatives or constraints that implicitly or explicitly are factored into
the decision making process. 13 The terrain in which Singapore acts in the
foreign policy arena is derived from a mixture of sources. In Ganesan s
model, these include the country's own unique resources, experiences and
the state of international relations in general. Ganesan's tool provides a
useful introduction to the land and the people of Singapore and the "terrain"
in which they operate. The four constraints addressed by Ganesan as
14
"Places, Not Bases," Far East Economic Review, April 22, 1993, p. 22.
15N. Ganesan, "Singapore's Foreign Policy Terrain," Asian Affairs, Vol. 1 Q No. 2 Summer 1Q92,
p.o7.
constituting Singapore's foreign policy terrain are: 1) vulnerability and the
sovereignty principle: 2) demography; 3) strategic location and; 4) the resource
base or lack of it. 1 "
Vulnerability and the Sovereignty principle
One of the most distinctive features of Singapore in comparison to the
rest of the world's nation-states is how small it is. The Republic of Singapore
is a small island group featuring one main island and a group of some 5S
islets situated at the base of the Malay peninsula. The total land area or
Singapore is about b36 square kilometers. The mam island is 42 kilometers
long, 23 kilometers wide and is connected to peninsular Malaysia bv a 1,200
yard causeway. Its topography is mainlv low-lving, with broad central plateau
and hills reaching 155 meters in the center of the island. Singapore is
constantly "growing,", as extensive land reclamation projects continue along
its coasts. Located almost on the equator, at one degree north latitude, the
climate is tropical. The weather is hot and humid year round with heavy
rainfall throughout the year, the heaviest period being November to January
during the northeast monsoon. The heat is moderated by ocean breezes and
proximity to the sea.
The majority of the population of nearly 2.8 million (July 1992) live on
the main island. As such, land use is a constant challenge. Only 7% of the
land is arable and a meager 4% is under cultivation. As the former Prime
Minister was fond of reminding his people, 'even' grain of rice we eat must
be paid for with foreign exchange." There is no meadow or pasture land on
Ihe island. While the central plane contains a reservoir and water catchment
l6Ibid, p.o8.
areas, Singapore is not even self-sufficient in water. The majority of its supply
comes from the southern Malaysian state of Johor, \ia pipeline across the
causeway.
Singapore's economy is it pride. The per capita income ot Singaporeans
is 513,900 (1991 figure, US dollars) second in Asia only to Japan and the oil
rich Sultanate of Brunei. While Singapore unquestionably possesses a
growing economy, featuring yibrant service and manufacturing sectors, it is
highly dependent on direct foreign investment (this is especially true in the
manufacturing sector) and access to export markets. With its prosperity linked
to that of the world economy. Singapore is probably the most trade dependent
nation on earth. The value of its foreign trade is three times its GDP. 17
Without access to markets and open air and sea lines of communication
Singapore would be unable to survive as a sovereign nation. Singapore's
largest trading partner is the United States, which accounts for 20% of its total
trade.
After achieving its independence in 1965 by being expelled from the
Malaysian Federation, the ability of Singapore to survive as an independent
nation was questioned bv many. The former Prime Minister himself had,
prior to Singapore's independence, called the notion of an independent
Singapore a political, economic and geographical absurdity.
'
1S With
contentious relations with its northern neighbor, Malaysia, due to the
political difficulties that resulted in its expulsion from the Federation, and a
hostile giant in Indonesia to its south, Singapore was born in a situation
where survival was the first priority. While the "survivalist phase'' of
" Guv Toremans, "The Republic of Singapore NFavy," Naval Forces, Vol. XXI No. 1, 1992, p. 9.
1-Op. cit. in Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew, (.Singapore, Asia Pacific Press, 1971) p.!3Q .
Singapore's existence is over, the notion of vulnerability, real or perceived,
has not changed. 19
Demography: The Factor of Race
Singapore's racial composition is an important factor in both internal
politics and regional relations. The unique colonial history or the island
resulted in the highest concentration of ethnic Chinese anywhere apart trom
the PRC, Taiwan and Hong; Kong and a significant ethnic Indian population,
from both the subcontinent and Sri Lanka. The racial mix of 76% Chinese,
15% Malavs, b.5% Indians and a catchall categorv of others (Eurasians,
Europeans and other Asians) has remained fairlv constant ince
independence and governmental policy is designed to maintain such a mix.
With a varietv of languages, religions and lovalties, the ethnic mix has
made the task of creating a national identity for "Singaporeans' a daunting
task. Singapore's approach to building a multi-racial, multi-cultural society
has involved extensive social engineering efforts in the area of housing,
language and educational policy.
Demands for political power equitable with their numbers in the
Federation of Malaysia is the primary factor why predominantly Chinese
Singapore was expelled from the Federation. The ruling People's Action Party
is a multi-racial part}' and specifically attempts to be inclusive of all races.
Their multi-racial approach to politics contrasts starkly with the politics along
racial lines as practiced in Malaysia. It is not surprising that a minority group,
as the Chinese were in the federation, would appeal for a political order that
was not constructed on racial lines. That Singapore has maintained such an
**{ lanesan, p.73.
10
approach since independence indicates its recognition that if the country were
to move forward, racial and cultural issues would have to be constructively
addressed. The external dimensions of such a policy are significant. Singapore
is careful to identify itself as a part of Southeast Asia, it is important to its
leaders that Singapore not be viewed by its neighbors as "Chinese island in a
Malay sea." Malay nationalism in Malaysia and Indonesia is sensitive to
Singapore's own Malay minority.20 The refusal of Singapore to accept a
significant number of refugees from Vietnam, many of whom were ethnic
Chinese, and the deliberate policy of being the last ASEAN government to
recognize the PRC are examples the external elements of these ethnic
constraints.
Strategic Location
Strategic location is the reason for Singapore's existence. Recognized bv
the British as an ideal location to establish a trading post for the growing trade
between Europe and the Orient Singapore grew rapidly as a free port after its
establishment in 1819. Singapore is the world's busiest port, in terms of total
shipping tonnage handled annually.21 Located at the nexus of east-west and
north-south shipping and air routes, Singapore plays a critical role in both the
regional economy and in defense plans of the worlds global powers. The
gateway to the Indian Ocean for westbound traffic and the Pacific for
eastbound traffic, access to the Malacca Straits is of vital importance to both
United States defense and economic interests. The Malacca Straits are perhaps




Middle East via the Straits and uses the route to transport its exports to
Europe. As the Chinese economy expands, fueled bv exports to the G-7
countries, their interests in secure sea lines of communication are increasing.
Higher defense spending for the Xavv and recent indications that the Chinese
are assisting the Burmese in establishing naval facilities on the Andaman
coast are indications of this expanding maritime interest.22
What this equates to in Singapore is a realization that there is no chance
of remaining isolated from the global interests of the great powers.
Singapore's leaders have always held a more realvolitik view of the world
than their regional neighbors.- 3 Indonesia, still in the shadow of the "spirit oi
Bandung" has tended to follow a foreign policy line which attempted to
minimize the influence of the great powers in the region. Malaysia's
Mahathir, now the self-styled spokesman for the interests of the
"south"(developing nations) versus the "north" (the developed nations), also
attempts to promote policies that would minimize the influence of the more
developed nations in regional affairs.
The Malaysians were also the original proponents of the concept of
Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) adopted
bv ASEAN in 1971. The initial proposal for the Zone called for the
neutralization of the area to be guaranteed bv the great powers, the United
States, the Soviets and the PRC. It was opposed bv the Indonesians as going
"hat in hand" to the great powers to seek security guarantees, thereby
violating their principle of non-alignment and inconsistent with Indonesian
"Wayne Bert, Chinese Policies and U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia, \smn Survey, Vol.
XXXIII, No. 3, March, L993, pp. 324-327.
TO _
--"lames W. Gould, Vie United Slates and Malaysia, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University
Press, L969),p.219.
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concept of national resilience. Singapore's pragmatic assessment was that,
however well intentioned, it stood little chance of changing the course of
traditional power politics. Singapore maintained that the great powers would
alwavs have an interest in the region, and advocated a policv of maintaining
the regional balance bv a judicious involvement of all the great powers. The
ZOPFAN proposal was watered down significantly and became merely a
statement of intentions.^4 Singapore has consistently maintained an active
foreign policv which successfully operates in the realpolitik milieu.
Resource Base or the Lack of It
Singapore has no natural resource base. While its ASEAX neighbors
have extensive resources and large primary or agrarian sectors in their
economies, Singapore is distinguished bv the absence of such sectors. The
absence of natural resources leads to Singapore's reliance on other countries
for survival. Already noted is Singapore's dependence on the water resources
of Malaysia and the necessity to import almost all its food and pay for it with
foreign exchange.
Singapore's assets, or resources, are its location, its excellent deep water
port and the skills and talents of its people. To utilize these assets to
maximum advantage, Singapore is dependent on participation in the world
economy. The dependence extends to the capital and labor factors. Singapore's
developmental strategy has relied on foreign capital and expertise in the
manufacturing sector. Political measures that have been criticized bv the west
as draconian have been justified bv the government as necessary to provide
24Zainal Abidm A. Wahid, "The Problem oi Secuntv in Southeast Asia, Is Neutralization the
Answer?," Nusantara, January, 1 Q72, p. 137-138.
13
the needed political stability and labor discipline to attract the investment of
Multi-National Corporations (MNC's). Singapore augments a disciplined but
small labor force and fills low wage or temporary jobs by the judicious use of
truest workers. This limits the need to extend government services to the
entire labor force and is a useful tool to battle unemployment in times of
economic downturn. Singapore also encourages foreign nationals with
needed skills to operate from Singapore and to be employed bv local concerns
if they contribute to the success of their enterprises.
While government strategies may come under criticism from western
political scientists and labor leaders and domestic economic nationalists, they
have been successful in their intent of providing an environment in which
investment is attracted and industry grows. The lack of a resource base is a
constraint that can not be wished away. As such, government policies that
ensure that the skills and talents of its people will be mobilized to serve the
good of society as a whole will continue. With a tiny domestic market and a
legacy as a free port, Singapore will be one of the Asian nations which will
continue to argue for free trade in the world economy. Government policies
to continually press the economy up the value-added ladder, extend its
international connections and remake its economy to adapt to the
information age will characterize their economic policy.
C. Research Question and Methodology
The Lewis" editorial in the New York Times, raises a significant question
for U.S. policy planners. How should the United States view the government
of Singapore and its somewhat novel approach to democracy and market
economics? A lack of understanding can potentially damage the bilateral
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relationship between the two nations. This was amply demonstrated by the
recall of an American diplomat the so-called "Hank Hendrickson affair. * in
[988. The recall (or expulsion) came at the request of the Singapore
government which had accused Hendrickson of meddling in Singapore'sO cor
internal affairs. 2j
The hypothesis of this <tudv is that only by understanding where
Singapore has come from can we hope to understand the nature of the society
and political economy present in the island republic today. The question to be
answered is: how did Singapore become the nation it is today? By examining
the historical forces which shaped Singapore, the genesis of the strong its
survivalist mentality becomes clear. Policies that appear repressive, by the
standards of larger western nations, are yiewed by tiny Singapore as essential
to its survival. Singapore views itself as operating on a razor's edge, due to
the constraints of the "terrain" in which it operates. There is no room for
error. The exhortations of Lee Kuan Yew, uttered in 1966, shortly after
independence remain operative in Singapore today:
How do we ensure our interests are not prejudiced in this situation? I
would say that our best chances lie in a very tightly-organized society.
There is no other way. Many other small societies like ours have
survived... Societies like ours have no fat to spare. They are either lean
and healthy or they die... But if a soft' society is developed then we cannot
survive. If you are easily rattled and panicked and it is manifest to others
that this is a population that can be rattled, that can be panicked, then the
options at my disposal are limited.
25 For an extensive discussion of the Hendrickson affair as well as alleged human rights
violations in both Singapore and Malaysia see Recent Developments in Singapore and
Malaysia. 1988 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International
Organizations of the U.S. Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs. (.Washington: GFO,
1988)
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What is required is a rugged, resolute, highly trained, highly
disciplined community. Create such a community and you will survive
and prosper here for thousands of years. 26
In our relationship with Singapore, we are dealing with a government
which is far more concerned with results than process, but process is still
respected. Singapore is the onlv country in Southeast Asia that has
consistently held free elections since independence and also has not resorted
to the imposition of military or "emergency" rule27 While it routinely
returns to the ballot box, its claim to legitimacy is its performance not its
popularity. The success of the country and the growing political awareness of
its increasingly educated and sophisticated population has led to an ironic
situation. Singaporeans want more political pluralism and are increasingly
resentful of the government's paternalistic and high-handed methods but
onlv trust the PAP to govern the country. 28 This is the major challenge the
government faces as the twenty-first century approaches.
The bilateral relationship between the United States and Singapore and
is based on mutual advantage and shared common interests. It is not based on
friendship, cultural affinity, or shared philosophical values however much
these may exist in certain instances. In international relations there are no
friends, only interests. Armed with an understanding of the creative process
of the "rugged society" in Singapore, that is still ongoing, those charged with
representing the interests of the United States in Singapore, including an
increasing number of Department of Defense personnel, can avoid potentially
25Lee Kuan New, Op. at., in loser, p.330-331.
-'R.S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, Singapore The Legacy of Lee Kuan Yew, (Boulder C o.:
Westview Press, l^O), p. 4.
[egional I Hitlook: Southeast Asia 1993-94. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
L993), p. 17.
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damaging political and diplomatic missteps that might damage or fracture the
relationship.
The methodology to be employed is an historical analysis of the
development of modern Singapore. The history of Singapore and the region
before the arrival of the British will provide the background for this inquiry.
Beginning with the founding of Singapore in 1S19, its history will be divided
into critical periods during which different forces shaped its destiny. The first
period is that of British supremacy which was effectively ended when
Singapore fell to the Japanese in 1942. The second period is the transition
phase of Singapore s history from colonial rule to independence which
actually began with the Japanese occupation and ended with Singapore's
expulsion from Malaysia in 19fc>5. The next period begins at independence in
1965 and end with Lee Kuan Yew's retirement as Prime Minister in 1990.
Institutional development in Singapore in the areas of economics,
politics, diplomacy and defense will be examined in each historical period.
Following the historical analysis, a section will examine Singapore as the new
century approaches, with the intent of determining what, if anv changes,
have occurred or may be anticipated in the post-Lee Kuan Yew era.
Singapore's institutions will be examined in an attempt to update the reader
on more recent trends and issues.
The final section juxtaposes the special interests of the United States in
Singapore with the place of the United States in the national interests of
Singapore. This examination will highlight areas of consensus and identify
possible areas of conflict.
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II. Before Singapore: The Emergence of Malaya and the East Indies on the
World Scene
A. The Rise and Fall of Sri Vijaya.
The history of Insular Southeast Asia, of which Singapore is
geographically the center, is one of geography stimulating trade and trade
stimulating migration. The location of Malaya, the Indonesian archipelago
and the strategic straits of Sunda and Malacca, coupled with the monsoon
winds, had defined the region as a center of trade and meeting place of
empires from before recorded history begins.
The geography and climate of the tropics endowed the region with rich
natural resources. In earliest times the treasures of the region were the spices
of the Moluccas, the islands to the east of Java. The first spices from the
Mollucas found their way to China by sea where they were traded for silks
and other items produced by Chinese artisans. Some of these spices
eventually found their way to Europe over the Silk Road bv caravan.
The huge profits that these spices brought in the European market
encouraged the Arab traders, who were the middlemen in this commerce, to
yenture eastward bv sea in search of the source of the spices. Initial voyages of
these early traders brought the Arabs to India, where many of them settled. Bv
the fourth century successive generations of Arabs had learned the secret of
the monsoon winds. Blowing from the southwest in the summer as the
continental land mass of Asia was heated bv the summer sun and reversing
their flow to northeasterly in the winter, these winds enabled the Arabs
navigators to reach the South China Sea and the spice islands of the Moluccas
by wav of the Strait of Malacca, between peninsular Malaya and Sumatra.
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Here thev conducted their trade and awaited the changing winds to return
with their cargoes to the ports of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
This path to the east became known as the spice route, the maritime
counterpart of the famous Silk Road through central Asia. The Arabs were
followed bv Indian traders from the Coromandel coast in southern India. The
Indian traders came in huge ships capable of carrying hundreds of tons of
cargo. Bv the tenth century the Chinese had begun to vovage to the south, also
in search of trade, and the region had trulv begun to acquire Ihe status as the
crossroads of Asian trade.
As these traders plied this new route thev would put in along the
western coast of Malava and the northern coast of Sumatra to take on water
and provisions. There thev found riverine settlements of the Malays, the
"native" racial group of the region. The bountv of the tropics provided the
coastal Malays with a relatively secure existence, subsisting on fishing and
gathering, relatively free from want. There were numerous aboriginal groups
throughout the Malay peninsula, Java, Sumatra and the remainder of the
archipelago. The Malays, as we know them today, are the result of
intermarriage of migrants from the Asian mainland with the tribes in the
islands of the archipelago, and later with Indians and Arabs.
As the trade expanded, year after year, merchant ships coming from the
east and west frequented the villages which provided secure anchorage and
reliable resources for re-supply. The vagaries of the monsoon winds and the
growing commerce encouraged permanent settlement of a merchant, or
trading-agent class, in order to coordinate the east-west commerce between
the Indians and Arabs of the west with the Chinese junks coming from the
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east. A number of trade ports began to develop which featured a more or less
permanent commercial community. The once isolated and fragmented
peoples that inhabited the peninsula and archipelago were exposed to the
world at large, the great civilizations of the Arabs, the Indians and the
Chinese. Until the arrival of the Portuguese in 1509, the region would
flourish under these influences and develop institutions modeled and
Influenced bv these great Asian and Middle Eastern civilizations. The simple
lives these tribes lived along the rivers were to come to an end forever.
While there were three groups of traders active in the region, not all
equally influenced the early development of regional institutions. The Arabs
and Chinese were more strictly commerce oriented and did not mix with the
native groups to the extent that the Indians did. Whether this was the result
of geographic proximity, cultural chauvinism, racial affinity or the more
organized and exportable social system of the Indian civilization in the pre-
Muslim era is unclear. What is clear is that the Indian political system of
government bv rajas and caste system was clearly the earliest imported
organizational system which was ascendant in the region. Indian merchants
who came to Malay ports lived among the Malays, intermarried and raised
families. The social organization of the time in Malay villages provided entry
into the village hierarchy system of "headmen" by marriage29 , and doubtless
many of these Indians, because of their relative wealth and superior level of
knowledge, gained access to local leadership in this fashion. Coming from a
tradition of centralized leadership of the rajahs in India, these Indians
•avid P. Chandler, William R. Roff, [ohn R.W. Smail David foe] Steinberg, Robert H.
lavlor, Alexander Woodside, David, K. Wyatt, In Search Of Southeast AsiaL ed., David Joel
Steinberg, d (onolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p.2o.
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acquired more prestige in local societies and began to follow the pattern of
expanding their influence, consolidating their control over strategic ports.
This was a strategy to generate a base of wealth to support a court system like
that they had known in India. The first Indians who arrived in the region
were Buddhists who brought priests to the region to teach the religion. These
were later followed bv Hindus who brought Brahminism. with its veneration
of the rajahs as gods, to the region. Using Indian warriors, who could easily
dominate the more backward native Malays, these emerging rajahs began to
build kingdoms centered around the commerce of the region. By controlling
the ports and anchorage the rajahs generated a comfortable existence by
levying customs duties on the ships using the ports and controlling the
businesses related to the service, provisioning and protection of shipping.
Competition and warfare among competing rajahs for regional hegemony led
eventually to the emergence of the only great Asian maritime empire, Sri
Vijaya.
Malay tradition relates that the cradle of the empire was Palembang, in
south Sumatra. Its rulers were styled Maharajah in the Indian tradition. One
of the earliest known specimens of the Malay language is an inscription in
the Venggi script of southern India, dated 682 A.D., which records an attack
on Java by the forces of Sri \ ljaya. Records of a seventh century Chinese
pilgrim, I-Tsing, record a visit to Palembang and the annexation of the
"Melayu" country (thought to be in the area of Jambi in northeastern
Sumatra) by Sri Vijaya. Sri Yijava was a Buddhist empire. A Sanskrit
inscription, discovered at Yieng Sa in southern Thailand records the erection
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there of Buddhist buildings in 775 A.D. by the order of the Maharajah of Sri
Yijaya, "of the dynasty of the king of the mountains."30
Independent accounts from Chinese, Indian and Arab records from the
early eleventh century7 indicate that Sri Yijaya, then at its height, dominated
the Malay peninsula, Sumatra, and extended its influence heavily into lava,
introducing Mahavana Buddhism to that inland. Sumr Dvnastv records
include the names of Sri Yijava rulers and mentions embassies from them to
China in 1003 and 1008. Chao Ju Kua, writing about 1225, tells that Palembang
claimed suzerainty over the majority of the Malay peninsula and as far
westward as Cevlon. 31 While the efficacy of these claims does lack clear
historical confirmation, what is certain is that the Sri Yijaya empire was a far
flung and great maritime empire that dominated the region of archipelagic
Southeast Asia for the better part of five centuries, until it declined in the late
fourteenth century.
At the center of the great empire lav a tinv island at the base of the Malav
peninsula. According to legend recorded in the Sejarah NLelayu {Malay
Annals), a Prince of Sri Yijava, Sri Tri Buana, on a vovage of adventure from
the court at Palembang through the Riau islands, landed on the uninhabited
island in 1299. Upon observing a beast that one of his attendants, based on the
legends of his youth, took for a lion, named the place Singapura, which
means "city of the lion." The Prince resolved to build a city and establish his
own court there. 32
J
° A 1 uluvti Die Straits Settlements and the federated and Unfederated Malay states, ed. R.O.
Winstedt, (London: Constable and Co, Ltd., 1 Q23), p.l2o.
31 Ibid, p. 127.
-^H.F. Pearson, . i History of Singapore, \ London: University of London Press Ltd., 1956), p.24.
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The late thirteenth and early fourteenth century witnessed an expansion
of trade over the spice route as "geopolitics" began to make itself felt,
however indirectly, in Southeast Asia. The Mongol conquest of China had
been completed, for the most part, bv the mid-thirteenth century. Under the
great Kahn's grandson, Kublai Khan, China became increasingly open to the
civilizations of the west. The journey of Marco Polo was but one of many
examples of the increasing accessibility to the once secluded "Middle
Kingdom." Although Marco Polo's travels to China are perhaps the most
well known, European contact with China under the Mongols was minuscule
compared to that of the Arabs in West Asia. 33 Both the caravan trade along
the Silk Road and the maritime commerce of the Spice Route exploded while
the Mongols controlled China. Kublai Khan sent out manv emissaries during
his reign, both overland and by sea. Marco Polo returned to Europe by sea
using the spice route, passing through the strait of Malacca and stopping in
the Riau Islands and Sumatra in 1292. 34
As sea commerce increased, the port cities of Malava and Sumatra,
including Singapura, prospered and expanded. More resources were
identified and exploited. Chinese records indicate that tin from Sumatra
became part of the expanding commerce. The Sri Vijaya empire, wealthy but
overextended through its vast but somewhat isolated coastal settlements,
began to come under pressure from the warlike Javanese kingdom of
Majapahit. No empire builders, the Javanese sacked the ports of Sri Vijava
and conducted piracv in along regional trade routes. Throughout the mid-
Ji;>Iohn K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, East Asia Tradition and Transformation, (.Boston:
Hought Mifflin, 198Q), p. 174.
-^ Pearson, p. 3o.
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fourteenth century the Majapahit continued to expand their radius of action
throughout the archipelago and along the peninsula. Singapura, which Had
been flourishing as a port in this era of expanding trade, was frequently
attacked and, according to some accounts, was sacked and destroyed in 1376.
As Sri Vijaya declined under pressure from Majapahit, it also came
under pressure from the Thai kingdom of Avutthava to the north, which was
expanding its influence down the Malay peninsula. During this time,
Singapura was rebuilding from the destruction of the city by Majapahit and
existed largely as a haunt of pirates. The island apparently became a nominal
vassal state of the Thai Avutthava empire, with a Thai installed ruler. The
Malay Annals record the arrival, around 1388, of a King Paramesvara, fleeing
from Majapahit attacks on Palembang. Granted asylum bv the ruler of
Singapura, the King subsequently murdered the Singapura ruler and seized
power. The Thais reacted rapidly to the murder of their vassal and destroyed
the city again in 1391, driving the population into the jungles of the island
and the southern Malayan peninsula in what is now the state of Johor. By
1400 the days of an Indian inspired empire in Southeast Asia were at an
end. 3
"
The decline of Sri Yijava through the fourteenth century occurred in the
same time period as the Mongol hegemony began to falter in China. Kublai
Khan died in 1294 and none of the leaders who followed him were able to
maintain the same degree of political control. Dv 1368 the Mongols had been
driven out of China and the Ming Dynasty established. The Mings isolated




under the Mongols had given the peoples of the west an appetite for the
goods of the Orient and stimulated the traders of the European nations to
-earch for a way to continue this profitable commerce. With the bilk road
closed, bv the fifteenth century the maritime spice route became the only way
to conduct east-west trade.
B. The First Malay Empire at Malacca, Islam in Southeast Asia.
The earliest reference to Malacca dates back to I32S with a reference to
the Majapahit capturing a prisoner at the fall of Iambi in Sumatra who was a
esident of the "Malacca lands." Siamese records dated in 1360 refer to
"Malaka" as a tributary vassal of the Thais. 36 Malacca was probably for many
years one of the trade ports of the region, founded sometime in the middle of
the thirteenth century, but not rising in importance unit about a hundred
years later when the refugees from Singapura arrived after the sack of the city.
During the latter part of the twelfth century, the Javanese Majapahit
dominated the Straits of Malacca. Only after the death of the great Majapahit
conqueror Havam Wuruk in 1398 did the Siamese begin to exercise more
influence.
The ruler of Malacca, as identified bv Chinese accounts as Permaisura is
probably the same King Paramesvara of the Malay Annals. The ruler and the
peoples there were mostly Hindu. Chinese records of the time record an
imperial mission to Malacca delivering gifts and a return tribute bv the
Malaccan ruler to the emperor of China. Malacca established itself as the new
center of regional trade, its people making their livelihood bv trade, fishing,
and mining tin. There were great warehouses built for the use of Chinese
^Malaya, p. 129.
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junks which brought porcelain, beads and taffetas. Malayan resin, camphor
and ebony were shipped from Malaya to China and the Middle East.
About 1409, one hundred vears before the coming of the first Europeans,
the ruler of Malacca converted to Islam. While Islam had been present in the
reeion for many years, indeed it had be noted by Marco Polo when he visited
Sumatra and the Riau Islands in 1292, it had apparently never received the
sponsorship of a significant regional leader. The first recorded instance of an
Islamic "sultan" in the area was the Sultan Maliku's-Salleh of Pasai a small
Sumatran port who died in 1297. Evidence from the tombs there indicated
that the first Muslim missionaries were from India.
The reason for the change of faith in Malacca is attributed bv many
analysts as being the result of the presence there of wealthy Indian Muslim
traders who converted the Malays to unify them politically. Once a degree of
Malay political unity was established the Indian trading community
encouraged the Malays to throw off the voke of Siamese rule.37As a result of
these developments Malacca became the undisputed center of the Malayan
trade as well as the spiritual center of the region. Malacca was the first truly
"Malayan" political unit and although it was a relatively short lived, the
influence it played in providing political and spiritual unity to Malays had a
significant impact on subsequent regional events.
Islam spread quickly and various Islamic political centers developed
along the western coast of Malava and northern Sumatra. The rulers took the
title of Sultan and these sultans grew rich on the customs trade. Bv all
accounts, although Islam provided an important unifying influence in the
37 lbid, p. 131.
2b
region, most Sultans were cruel, corrupt and despotic rulers.35 The Malay
A minis describe many instances of this cruelty; a young princeling slabbing to
death a plavmate because he had knocked off his hat, the murder of a noble
and aged minister who refused to offer his daughter to a sultan.
These earlv accounts of the arbitrary and absolute power these local
monarchs exercised almost six hundred years ago has its modern counterparts
in Malaysia where the Sultans remain largely aboye the law and incidents
such as a Sultan clubbing to death a caddie with a golf club without legal
recourse still remain.39 There are other accounts of corruption, intrigue and
cruelty that indicate that the prosperity that trade brought coupled with
islamic centralized authority resulted chiefly in a corrupt and indigent ruling
class and a decline of the industrious trader chiefs that preceded them. There
is speculation among historians that injustice, oppression and inefficiency
might have destroyed Malacca as the center of regional trade had it remained
under Malayan rule.40What might have been will never be known as the
advent of European influence was to bring changes to Southeast Asia which
would put an end to the brief period of Malay sovereignty and more broadly
Asian control and primacy for centuries to come.
Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, insular Southeast Asia was well
established as the center of regional commerce. The commercial
infrastructure was well established as was the resource base upon which this
°- For a detailed discussion of political organization under the sultans see David P. Chandler
et. al, pp. 76-82.
J
^For an account of questionable behavior on the part of modern sultans and ongoing efforts to
limit the power of the sultans in Malaysia see Michael Vatikiotis, "Bending the rulers," Far
East Economic Review (hereinafter FEER), December 24-31, 1992, p.lo and Michael Vatikiotis,
"Battle roval," FEER. January 21, 1993, pp. 10-11.
40Malaya, p. 132.
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Irade was based. Migration to the region bv the representatives of the great
east, south and middle Asian empires was similarly well established. Patterns
of political involvement on the part of these immigrants had also begun to
emerge. The Chinese remained largely apolitical, restricting Ihemselves to
commerce, living in small segregated metropolitan communities. This was
likewise largely true of the Arabs for the majority of the pre-European era.
The conversion of the indigenous Malays bv Indian Muslims and the
ascendance of Malacca as the regional spiritual, political and economic center
provided and important unifying element just prior to the arrival of the
Europeans.
It is important to note that the Islam of Malava is different from that of
the more fundamental groups in the Middle East. A large part of the
attraction of Islam as it was brought from India was its mvstic qualities. It was
introduced largely by Sufi mystics, who also brought with them a version of
the faith that included some of the Hindu qualities which had already been
introduced to the region before the time of Sri Yijava. The hints of
pantheism, worship of saints and their graves and mvstic incantations
undoubtedly made the acceptance of Islam easier for the superstitious Malays.
The Islamic tolerance for native custom, as long as it did not violate the basic
tenents of the faith, was in large part responsible for its rapid spread as well as
the unique version of the faith that still exists in the region. A regional saving
describes the situation succinctly, 'Scratch a Malay Muslim and vou will find a
Hindu; scratch the Hindu and vou will find an animist.
'
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C. The Europeans Before Raffles.
About the time of the founding of Malacca in Asia, the Portuguese were
rising to prominence in Europe and the great age of discovery and
imperialism was beginning. The Portuguese founded the first European
colony in Morocco. Portuguese sailors began to range further and further
from their shores, discovering the Madeira islands, the Canaries and the
Azores, enabling the exploration of the West Coast of Africa. In 1486
Bartholomeu de Diaz reached the Cape of Good Hope, so named bv the
Portuguese king because it represented the hope of reaching bv sea the famed
East Indies, their spices and the riches of the Orient.
At that time, of course, there was no direct sea route to the east. The
commerce of the Orient came either overland on the silk road, or bv partial
maritime routes either via the Indian Ocean thorough Syria and
Mesopotamia or via the Red Sea and to the Mediterranean bv way of Egypt.
As has already been noted, the expulsion of the Mongols from China severely
curtailed silk road traffic. Another geopolitical event, the expansion of
Turkish empire, further restricted European trade with the East. The fall of
Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 effectively closed that trade route,
leaving only the Red Sea commerce route open.
The time of the Crusades acquainted the Europeans with the commerce
of the East and the demand for products like pepper, cinnamon, cloves,
ginger, nutmeg and silks of the Orient, as well as Middle Eastern cotton, glass
and Persian rugs created opportunities for traders in the Middle East and
southern Europe. While the European nexus of trade remained in the
Mediterranean, Italy was in the most favorable position to secure the benefits
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of that trade. Venice had become the first great European trading citv bv
securing a monopoly of trade with the Sultan of Egypt. The fall of
Constantinople onlv increased the power of Venetian traders.
Twelve \ ears after the discovery of Diaz, Vasco da Gama reached Calicut
in India. In their press to the east, the Portuguese were harassed and hindered
bv the Arabs who were well aware of the threat to their monopoly of
commerce. The religious differences between the devout Portuguese
Catholics and the Muslim Arabs lent an ideological component to the
struggle that made the encounters between the parties particularly bitter, with
horrible cruelties practiced on both sides.
The first Portuguese viceroy in India, Don Francisco d Almeida,
envisioned only the establishment of commercial enterprise in India and
opposed dreams of Portuguese empire in the East, reasoning that Portugal,
with a population of only a million, lacked the human resources for such an
endeavor. D'Almeida was a advocate of seapower, reasoning that as long as
the Portuguese could control the sea their commerce would be safe. The
second viceroy, Affonso d'Albuquerque, was, bv contrast, an empire builder.
He advocated fortification of the Portuguese trading ports and the use of force
to coerce Eastern rulers to acknowledge Portuguese power. D'Albuquerque
laid the foundations of empire bv conquering Ormuz on the Persian Gulf and
Goa in India. 4l
A group of five Portuguese ships arrived in Malacca in 1509 under the
command of Diego Lopez de Sequeira. The Malay Annals recount the arrival
of the "White Bengalis" and the reaction of the residents there. The Annals
1
' Malaya, p. L34.
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recount that the residents crowded around the Portuguese, pulling their
beards, patting their heads and marveling at the steel helmets the soldiers
wore. The Portuguese captain exchanged gifts with a Malay chief, presenting
him with a golden chain, nearly causing an incident when he himself put it
over the head of the sacred chief. The chief's followers, to whom this seeming
familiarity was a great insult, reacted angrily, but were chastened by the chief
who instructed them to "Take no notice; for he is a person with no
manners."42
The Portuguese attempted to establish themselves in the Malacca trade,
building a warehouse (godown in the vernacular of Asian trade) for that
purpose. This provoked the ire of the established Indian and Arab traders in
the communitv. The leaders of the resident trading communitv apparently
encouraged the Malays to attack the Portuguese godown, killing and
capturing some of the Portuguese. De Sequeira, correctly assessing the relative
power equation in the face of the attacks, retreated with the remainder of his
forces to his ships and sailed back to Goa.
The Viceroy in Goa, d'Albuquerque, assembled a fleet of nineteen ships
on which he embarked some S00 Portuguese and 600 Indian soldiers to
avenge the treatment of De Sequeira. In the summer of 1511 the Portuguese
sailed into Malacca and demanded the return of the Portuguese prisoners.
When the Sultan delayed, the Portuguese burned some huts on the harbor
and some ships that lav at anchor. The prisoners were surrendered.
D'Albuquerque demanded compensation for the destruction of the godown
and permission to build a fortified godown to enter the regional trade. These
42 Ibidp.l34.
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demands were refused. On the first of July, 1511, the Portuguese forces landed
and after ten days of fierce fighting, claimed control of Malacca, driving the
Sultan and those of his followers who remained into the jungles of Johor.
The age of European imperialism had arrived in Southeast Asia.
The Portuguese fortified the citv and brought the "civilization"' of
Europe to Southeast Asia. Malacca became the center of the Portuguese
empire. D'Albuquerque minted a tin currency and brought a Catholic Bishop
to establish the church there. There was a palace for the Bishop and five
Catholic churches in the citv. Missionaries came and began to spread the faith
under the auspices of Francis Xavier, the lamed "apostle of the East", who
oversaw the effort from the church of Our Ladv of the Annunciation in
Malacca.
Under the Portuguese Malacca became the port of all trade with the
Peninsula and the archipelago and a port of call for all ships to and from
China. While the Malavs attacked Malacca on occasion, the Portuguese
garrison repulsed all these efforts and kept the Portuguese flag flving. From
Malacca the Portuguese expanded their trade, building godowns on Java and
Borneo and taking possession of the Moluccas and control of the spice trade.
The Portuguese took Macao as a base for China trade.
The Portuguese dominance of the Asian trade and its colonizing zeal did
fall prey to the very weaknesses anticipated bv the first Indian Yicerov. Their
small population's best men fell victim to conflict and tropical diseases. Once
again the geopolitical events influenced events in Southeast Asia. Spanish
ascendance in Europe was altering the balance of power profoundly. In 15S0
the Spanish seized Portugal and used her fleet as part of the great Armada
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which perished in the attempted invasion of England. With Portuguese
power and influence in precipitous decline and Spanish hegemony over
Holland on the wane as well after the debacle of the Armada, the Dutch and
the British began to expand their own trading efforts in Asian commerce.
The first Dutch voyage to the East Indies departed Amsterdam in 1595.
Four Dutch ships under Cornells de Houtman, after a fifteen month journey
of severe hardships, reached lava. In 1502 the Dutch East India Company was
chartered giving the company a monopoly of the Dutch trade in the East
Indies. The Dutch challenge to the Portuguese was immediate and profound.
In lb02 they established an outpost in Borneo and left a representative in
johor. Dutch navigator Jacob Van Heemskerk, who had delivered the Dutch
representative to Johor, wavlaid a Portuguese caraque returning from Macao
and took its cargo to Amsterdam where it fetched a reported price of three
million guilders. 43
The Dutch challenge to Portuguese supremacy gave them great prestige
in the eves of the Malays who had suffered mightily under Portuguese
aggression. The Malays viewed the Dutch as a potential ally in their battle
against the Portuguese. A Malay envoy was, in fact, sent to Holland to
negotiate and alliance but perished on the vovage. The Dutch dispatched
Admiral Cornelius Matelief to Malaya to conclude a pact with the Malavs. In
May of 1606 the Dutch concluded a treaty7 with the Sultan of Johor in which
the parties agreed to cooperate in expelling the Portuguese from Malacca,
which would go to the Dutch. The Malays were to receive the territories
adjoining the city and an assurance that no European would be permitted to
4oIbid, p. 13/
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land in Johor without the sanction of the Governor of Malacca. When
Matelief defeated the Portuguese fleet but failed in his attempt lo take
Malacca, the treaty was amended to allow the establishment of a Dutch
trading station in Johor. The center of Dutch efforts regionally was established
in Java at Batavia (modern Jakarta) and the arrangement with Johor was seen
as a "fall back'' position should the Batavia settlement fail. In the earlv IdOO's
this was still very much a possibility as the Acheen of eastern Sumatra, who
had assumed the mantle of leadership of the Malav-Muslims following the
fall of Malacca, were beginning to expand their influence regionally directing
their efforts atrainst the hated Portuguese Catholics.
The Acheen, in response to what thev perceived as collusion bv the
Johor Sultanate with the "Europeans" attacked and subjugated the Sultans of
the southern peninsula, leading the rulers of Johor, Perak, and Kedah into
captivity in 1613. In addition to the Muslim leaders, the Acheenese also
carried off the Dutch residents established in these courts. Following the
death of a great Acheen leader, Mahkota Adam, the Johor Sultanate revived
and in 1641 the Dutch and Malays besieged the fort at Malacca and the town
finally fell to their combined forces. 44
The fall of Malacca coupled with events in Europe led to a precipitous
decline in Portuguese power in the East Indies and the ascendance of Dutch
maritime and commercial power. For the hundred years following the fall of
Malacca, the Dutch were the leaders of European commerce in the region. In
1642 the Dutch treaty with the Raja of Kedah, on the northwestern coast of





kingdom at a fixed price and excluded traders from other nations without
Dutch permission. The Dutch concluded other such treaties with local rulers
in an attempt to gain a monopoly of the expanding tin trade. While the Dutch
had difficulty determining the exact political relationships which would
enable them to effectiyelv control the commerce of the region, they continued
to expand their trading network throughout the late seventeenth century and
early eighteenth century.
During the eighteenth century the Bugis, an island people from the
Celebes in the eastern archipelago, challenged the Dutch in Johor and in the
region of the Straits, capturing Riau and establishing themselves in Selangor
on the western peninsula. At the same time that the Dutch had to deal with
this indigenous challenge to their dominance, the English began to attempt to
secure a place in regional commerce.
The first Englishman to transit the Straits of Mallaca was Sir Francis
Drake during his circumnavigation in 1579. Following the return of the first
English privateer expedition to the region, which took Portuguese prizes in
the region of Penang and returned with their cargo of pepper and other spices,
the English East India Company was formed in 1600. Their first expedition to
the region landed at Acheh in Western Sumatra in June of that year and
concluded a commercial treaty with its ruler. The challenge of the British to
the growing Dutch monopoly of trade grew increasingly bitter. In 1622 the
Dutch massacred English traders in Ambovna in the Moluccas. The Dutch
ousted the British from the foothold they had established in Java to
coordinate their pepper trade. In the late eighteenth century, the last
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remaining English outpost was at Bencoolen in eastern Sumatra, a location
ideal neither for trade or the health of those posted there.
Among the manv disadvantages of Bencoolen was the inadequacy of the
harbor to protect ships there from the northeast monsoon. Francis Light, a
former Royal Navy officer who had taken employment with the East India
Companv, had established himself as the company's representative in Kedah
on the northwestern peninsula45 . The Sultan of Kedah, seeking protection
from the Bugis in the south and the Siamese from the north, indicated to
Li^ht that he would be willing to conclude a treaty grivine the English
exclusive access to the region in return for English protection. Enable at first
to conclude a satisfactory arrangement, the English, in 17S4, tried to establish a
settlement at Riau, to the south, but were forestalled by the Dutch. During
this period of England's history in the East, the British, having been recently
expelled from some of its colonies in North America, were in an expansive
mood in this theater of Empire. Lord Cornwallis, expelled by the upstart
colonists at Yorktown, had gone on to become the Governor in Calcutta and
galvanized the expansion efforts of the British in Southeast Asia.
In 1786 Light was able to get a grant from the Sultan of Kedah for Penang
Island, off the northwestern Malayan coast, perhaps by implying that the
English were in fact prepared to assist him against his enemies. Light
pressured the Sultan for a formal agreement to cede the island to the English
in exchange for monetary compensation, but the Sultan refused and tried to
retake the English outpost by force. Light and his forces defeated this attempt,




subsidy) and excluding all other European nations from settlement in Kedah.
The English had established a firm foothold on the peninsula from which to
challenge Dutch hegemony. -16
At the turn of the century ( ISOO), six years after Light's death, the Sultan
ceded a large part of the mainland across from Penang for an additional cash
subsidy as the company began to realize the value of the new outpost. Naval
officers extolled the virtues of its excellent harbor. A Colonel Welleslev, who
later became the Duke of Wellington, visited Penang in L7 C,7 while passing
through the Straits and upon his return to India highlighted the strategic
utility of the inland situated at the top oi the Straits. The companv upgraded
the status of the settlement in response to Welleslev's report and the first
Governor arrived in 1S05.
Even as the English began to expand their influence in Malava, events in
Europe again influenced events in Asia. The Napoleonic wars had driven the
court from Holland and the English occupied Malacca in 1795. The Dutch
remained in Riau and Perak (on the western Malay coast) but under the
control of the British crown. The peace of Amiens restored Malacca to the
Dutch in 1S02. When war again broke out in Europe the Company, under the
orders of the crown, reluctantly continued to maintain the settlement at
Malacca, aware it would eventually be handed back to the Dutch. Under
Company pressure, the English government agreed to the destruction of the
fortifications at Malacca and following that, the evacuation of the population
there to Penang.
46David P. Chandler et. al, p. 140.
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The order for the evacuation of Malacca aroused the sentiments of a
voung assistant to the Governor of Penang. Thomas Stamford Raffles had
come to Penang in 1S05 as assistant secretarv to the Governor. Raffles was a
visionary and a student of both regional historv and lan<:ua<re. Passionatelv
patriotic, Raffles was an empire builder, dedicated to succeeding in the
competition for regional commerce, Raffles deplored the idea of abandoning
the Malacca settlement, connected as it was with a prosperous agriculture
communitv. Raffles arguments proved persuasive and although the fortress
was destroyed, the evacuation order was rescinded.
When peace again came in Europe the Treaty of Vienna IS 16 again
returned Malacca to the Dutch.47 The Dutch returned first to Riau and in 1S19
to Malacca. It was in a strategic effort to win the irame of commerce that the
tiny island at the base of the Malay peninsula was to emerge from its 400 years
as a forgotten backwater and overgrown fishing village to rise to prominence.
The voung secretarv of the Governor of Penang, Thomas Stamford Raffles,
was to become a name long remembered for making a visionary dream into
dynamic commercial reality.
D. Summary of Events Prior to the Founding of Singapore.
Insular Southeast Asia by the beginning of the ninteenth century had
become the crossroads of the burgeoning trade between the Orient and
Europe. This role as a center of global trade was only an expansion of the
earlier role that it had played in a more regional trade confined first to East
Asia, then on to South Asia and the Middle East.
17 Ibid, p. 141
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Diplomatically, the region had witnessed a process in which regional
powers competed for the control of commerce, resulting in the rise and fall of
the only truly great Asian maritime empire, Sri Vijaya. The first "empire" in
Southeast Asia, Indian-inspired Sri Yijava had establibhed formal contacts
with the great Chinese Empire in the East and had brought a sense of unity to
a region that had previously had no regional identity. With the rise of
Malacca and other sultanates subject to it, the local leaders took to diplomacy
by treaty and attempted to secure the most advantageous results for their
kingdoms from the arriving Europeans. These early versions of power
politics and accompaning small ^tate survival tactics were precursors of the
situation that Southeast Asia would face from that time forward. While earlv
nationalism was nearly nonexistent or, at least, limited to the very
personalized concerns of the Islamic rulers and their immediate retinue, the
structures that would eventually grow to represent the these peoples
internationally had begun to appear.
Politically, Sri Vijaya united certain elements of archepelagic Southeast
Asia, introducing both Buddhism and Hinduism to the region and importing
the system of government bv rajahs. The decline of Sri Yijava in the face of
pressures from both Java and Siam eventually led to the first truly Malayan
political entity, under the banner of Islam, at Malacca. While the arrival of
the Europeans would have a profound effect on the relative power of the
competition for primacy regionally, the system of government bv sultans and
Islamic political influence and structures in these sultanates remains active to
this day in Malaysia, and to a much lesser extent, is active in Indonesia as
well. While the political order was confused and difficult to determine, as
39
evidenced bv the difficulties the Dutch encountered in trying to secure a
monopoly of the tin trade, it did contain the seeds of a real organic polity. In
this early phase of European involvement, notions of imposing European
type political institutions or government services had not vet been introduced
regionally. It would be the English who would demonstrate this proclivity in
the vears to come.
Economically, the gifts that nature endowed upon the region, the apices
of the Moluccas and the Indonesian Archipelago, the tin of Sumatra and
peninsular Malava and the hardwoods of the jungles in both regions, so
valuable for shipbuilders, had been identified and exploitation had begun.
The migratory patterns that would characterize the region were firmly
established. These patterns would expand remarkably as the region continued
to develop, requiring more labor to continue resource development and
extraction to the metropolitan centers which came to dominate the region.
Customs duties and control of maritime comerce, long the basis of empire in
the region, passed from the hands of local rulers to the control of Europeans.
In defense, the supremacy of military organization from outside the
region dominated the disorganized, fragmented and primitive Malays. This
first resulted in Indian dominance, albiet in the hands of local rulers,
followed by the dominance of the region by the technically superior
Europeans. Piracy and maritime commerce raiding, long a regional economic
enterprise was well established and was, in fact, abetted and participated in by
European invaders. While the introduction of European naval power
protected their ships from native raiders, to a certain extent, piracy and
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exploitation of sea trade remined a regional feature and a central focus of
defense efforts as did the defense of the critical ports of the region.
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III. 1819-1942:The Era of Empire
From Raffles to Percival
A. Introduction
Singapore was born to serve the commercial interests of the expanding
British empire. The discussion which follows will examine economics first
and how the economic utility of the tinv island at the base of the Malay
peninsula was recognized bv a remarkable British empire builder, resulting in
the founding of modern Singapore and its enduring tradition as a free port.
The development of the entrepot economv of the island during the era of
empire served as the British base for the expanding East-West trade. As the
riches of the Malav peninsula became the object of an aggressive breed of
entrepreneurs, the economv expanded explosively, and great fortunes were
made. It was truly wealth that built Singapore and Malaya, and the
distribution of that wealth has been a constant source of contention during
Singapore's history.
Bv the beginning of World War II, the structure of Singapore's economv
and its linkage to that of the world was firmly established. The infrastructure
to support the extractive economy and communication with the
metropolitan power was highly developed. The development of the
hinterland and the massive immigration of Chinese and Indians that came to
extract that wealth changed forever the demographic face of Malaya and
Singapore. This mass migration would result in a situation where the
distribution of economic power would starkly contrast with the distribution
of political power when the British finally departed.
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The political system that the British installed to run this new economic
powerhouse would be centered in Singapore and the coastal cities of the
Straits Settlements. As the peninsula was opened the British would develop a
-wstem of governance which protected the traditional Malay society and
strengthened its Islamic sultanates' legitimacy while effectively controlling
the administration of government behind a cloak of local leadership. The
Chinese would dominate the urban economic centers, particularly true for
Singapore but would exercise little political power, except when their interests
coincided with those of the British. The growing nationalism of China in the
twentieth century was felt throughout British Southeast Asia and was
repressed but not extinguished bv the colonial masters.
The geo-political importance of the colony and its position as the nexus
of the East-West trade routes permeated the affairs of the British as they
played "the Great Game" of world politics. Each event in the Empire and the
changes wrought in the world political scene had an effect on the tiny island
trading center. By the beginning of the Second World War Singapore would
come to represent the Empire east of India and the link to British interests in
China. The strategic location of Singapore and its small size would seem to
forever doom it to the status of pawn in the geo-political arena, the option to
not play in the chess game of world politics being removed in perpetuity.
Singapore has attempted to strengthen its position diplomatically and it has
been largely successful in becoming a much larger player on the world stage
than its miniscule size might otherwise have allowed. A pawn no longer,
Singapore exerts significant political influence regionally and internationally.
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The defense of the outpost of empire and its role in the broader defense
of the "Empire in the Far East" was firmly established when war broke out in
1941. The fall of Singapore, "seventy days conquest which amazed and
shocked the democratic world
"
4Smarked the end of the epoch of British pre-
eminence as a sea power. That the British failed so miserably to meet the
commitment to defend "fortress Singapore" destroyed the myth of European
superiority in Asian eyes forever. Though the British would return following
the war, the days of colonial rule were numbered. To their everlasting credit,
they recognized that fact which the French and Dutch did not.
The importance of this phase of Singapore's development cannot be
overestimated. It became a center of world commerce that it remains today. It
acquired its unique Chinese character and was set apart from its geographic
parent, the Malay peninsula. What had once been an unimportant and
forgotten part of Malaya became a tiny but important neighbor to Malaya,
differing in ethnic makeup, economic structure and political consciousness.
With the end of empire, the contradictions that the empire held within it
would become all too apparent.
B. Economics: The Crossroads of the East and the Riches of Malaya.
The foundation of Singapore was based on the factors that have
historically driven the development of its institutions, the economic utility of
the island's location at the nexus of East-West trade and its functional utility
as an entrepot for an extended regional hinterland. From the outset, Stamford
Raffles, the founder of Singapore, saw the utility and value of the tiny
4
'-Edward Maurice Glover, In 70 Days, The Story of the Japanese Campaign in British Malaya,
^ London: Frederick Mulier Ltd., l Q4o), p. 7.
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overgrown island at the base of the peninsula.49 Merchants from the Middle
East India and China, drawn to the area by the spices of the Moluccas, found
rich deposits of tin and hardwoods perfect for shipbuilding. The fabled spice
trade of the East that, in large measure, provided the impetus for the great
European age of discovery was simply the tip of the iceberg of the lode of
regional wealth.
Raffles also possessed an unprecedented vision, especially in Southeast
Asian terms, for ensuring the success of the new trading post. Raffles
describes his vision in an earlv report concerning Singapore;
Timber abounds in the island and its vicinity; a large part of the
population are alreadv engaged in building boats and vessels, and the
Chinese, of whom some are alreadv engaged in the smelting of ore
brought from the neighboring islands and others employed as cultivators
and artificers, may soon be expected to increase in number proportionate
to the wants and interests of the settlement. By maintaining our rights to a
free commerce with the Malay States and inspiring them with a
confidence in the stability of it we may contemplate its advancement to a
much greater extent than has hitherto been enjoyed. Independently of our
commerce with the tribes of the Archipelago, Singapore may be considered
as the principle entrepot to which the native traders of Siam, Cambodia,
Champa, Cochin China and China will annually resort. It is to the Straits
their merchants are always bound in the first instance.... One free port in
these seas must eventually destroy the spell of Dutch monopoly, and what
Malta is to the west that may Singapore be to the east. [Italics added]50
Raffles' vision is remarkable. It foresees the entrepot function that a
great regional port provides and outlines a strategy to make that port
Singapore. Previous traders, Arab, Indian and the first Europeans, the
49For an account of how and vvhv Raffles acquired Singapore for the British East India
Company, see the sections on politics below, p. 57 and diplomacy, p 76, respectively. While the
motivation for establishing an outpost at Singapore was primarily economic, the implications
of such a move had significance in both the local and international political order. The present
section will concentrate strictly on the economic motivations of the British and the economic
significance of the founding of Singapore.
5&Malaya, p. 10.
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Portuguese, had viewed the region as a place to extract from, not invest in.
This was true first of the spice trade and later in tin. A population dedicated to
commerce and wealth building was non-existent. The Malays, as tribal
riverine societies, living an isolated and relatively abundant life, had little
need for wealth accumulation and the drudgerv of work in the mines or on
plantations. The advantageous location of the region with regard to the
monsoon winds had developed it into a transshipment point for the goods,
developing a limited entrepot role, albeit largely based on goods from China
and the Middle East and the easily retrievable spices of the Moluccas.
Regional powers, Sri Vijava and Malacca, the lesser Bugis and the first
Europeans had looked upon commerce, if not directly in their control, as a
source of revenue bv customs extraction, piracy or privateering. The notion of
eliminating these duties and developing a free port was a truly revolutionary
concept.
The free port established in Singapore in 1819 was extremely successful.
Singapore and its trade expanded rapidly. Within a single year the settlement
was already earning revenue for the Company and by 1823 its trade had
exceeded that of Penang. 51 As Raffles had envisioned, a migratory influx
began. Malays from the peninsula, the Archipelago and the Bugis from the
eastern islands brought their trading goods to the island and some remained
as the settlement expanded. Arab traders, attracted by the free port, came and
established trading houses. Indian traders came, as did many other Indians as
'followers" serving the Company troops who came to defend the new
'"Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information, Singapore 1989, (Singapore:
Singapore National Printers Ltd.), p. 3°.
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settlement. And especially the Chinese came, to work growing gambier52
,
enroute to the peninsula to mine tin, to work as coolies on the docks or
transporting the products of commerce through the streets. Bv the time two
pivotal treaties of 1824 were signed, securing British control of Singapore and
its status as a free port, what had been a tiny overgrown jungle fishing village
of perhaps 130 Malays and a small number of Chinese had grown to a trading
center with a population of 11,000.53
Bv 1825 a new Malay leader, Temen<rgon<: Ibrahim, had taken control of
the land grants given his father on Singapore, with whom Raffles had
negotiated his original treaty for Singapore. Ibrahim encouraged the
establishment of plantations and Chinese and Malay small hold planters
experimented with number of different crops. Traditional crops such as
gambier and spices were planted. More unfamiliar crops such sugar cane and
cotton were tried, as well. The soil of Singapore eventually proved inadequate
for intensive agriculture but these early efforts and their limited success led
some of the Chinese planters to petition the new Temenggong for permission
to begin clearing and planting in southern Johor. By 1835 Chinese gambier
planters and others were active on the peninsula, clearing the jungle and
establishing plantations in a number of different crops.
The first record of American trade with Singapore occurs just after the
two treaties of 1824. Ships from the United States were restricted in their trade
with the possessions of the British Crown. American ships could only trade
in those ports specifically included in the Treaty of Ghent, signed in 1814,
ending the War of 1812. In the free wheeling trade that exploded in
™A plant used in tanning and medicines.
53Ibid, p. 39.
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Singapore, the political considerations of the crown held little sway over the
merchant community and the Governor of Singapore had been turning a
blind eve to the harbor when American merchantmen called. In 1825 a
captain of a British man-of war, who shared none of the merchant's affinity
with the upstart former colonists, boarded and seized an American ship
bound for Singapore, putting an end to "covert" American trade in violation
of the treaty. ,4
What resulted from this action was a system of trade with the Americans
putting in at the Riau islands of the Dutch and the merchants of Singapore
bringing their goods to them there by small ship, over the fourteen miles of
the Straits of Singapore. An American, Joseph Balestier, aware of the
opportunities available in the East Indies trade, set himself up as the self-
stvled Consul at Raiu' to represent the interests of American traders. By 1834,
Balestier, while still calling himself the Consul at Riau, moved to Singapore,
and, much in the manner of the earlier attitude toward American ships
trading in Singapore, the local authorities gave full credence to the story that
the Consul at Riau just happened to live in Singapore although he rarely (if
ever) visited his "office" in Bintan, the Dutch capital the Riau archipelago.
Balestier was a very popular figure in Singapore who took a particular
interest in the farmers and planters. Balestier encouraged land reform laws to
enable planters to develop the land. Balestier himself developed a small sugar
cane plantation on the island and built a cane mill to process the sugar.
Today, a legacy of the early American presence in Singapore is Balestier road
in modern urban Singapore that runs past the site of his sugar plantation.
^Pearson, p. 104.
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In 182b, the East India Company combined Penang, Malacca, Singapore
and Province Wellesley (a small area on the peninsula directly across from
the island of Penang) administratively as the Straits Settlements. The
Company moved the seat of government from Penang to Singapore in 1832.
This was indicative of its increasingly central role in regional commerce. Two
vears later the British Crown passed legislation ending the monopoly of the
East India Company in the China trade, resulting in a huge expansion of that
trade and resultant pressure on the reclusive Chinese empire. Pressure on the
Chinese to open their markets and the penchant of the British to finance their
trade with opium led to the Opium War of 1841. This resulted in the opening
of the treaty ports in China and acquisition of Hong Kong bv the British. With
the new outpost from which to conduct its China trade, mam' anticipated that
the role of Singapore in the East India Company's trade would decline. The
steamship, however, would more than make up for the trade that the new
settlement in Hong Kong diverted from Singapore.
In 1845, the Peninsula and Orient Steamship Company55 began service
on an eastern route, with stops in Ceylon, Penang, Singapore and Hong Kong.
The route represented a new kind of service, not primarily dedicated to trade
but rather to establishing reliable communications for the expanding empire.
The "mail steamers" as they were known were dedicated to fast and reliable
service carrying both mail and passengers to the important centers of the
Empire in the East.
The coming of the steamers, and, in particular, luring the Mail Steamers
to include Singapore as a distribution center for mail and passengers required
^"Peninsula" refers to the Iberian peninsula which was the regional tern-anus of the line.
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action on the part of the community leaders. The restricted harbor at the
mouth of the Singapore river that required the large ships to lie out and be
unloaded, loaded and provisioned bv smaller craft running back and forth to
the shore was inadequate for the quick turnaround times required to make
steam traffic profitable and to meet the stringent demands for on time
performance demanded by the mail steamers.
To relieve the local congestion, the P&O company bought land from the
Temenggong and set up a coaling station and wharf on the southern shore of
Singapore, across from the islands of Palau Brani and Palau Blakang Mati
(now Sentosa island). The deep channel between these islands and the main
island of Singapore was ideal for a deep water port and bv 1852 the facility,
known as North Harbor, had been completed. With this advance, Singapore
became established as one of the key communications centers for the British
Empire. That same year the company's service was extended from Singapore
to Australia.
In spite of the neglect of the East India Company, which was much more
concerned with the administration of India and trade in Hong Kong, the
coming of the P&O steamers stimulated further private development in
Singapore. In 1854, a Captain Cloughton, formerly the master of a trading
vessel in the Oriental trade, completed the first dry-dock in Singapore's North
Harbor, initiating the ship repair economic sector that still plays an important
part in the economy of modern Singapore. By 1863 a group of local
entrepreneurs had formed the Tanjong Pajar Dock Company and completed a
second dry dock at what is now Keppel Harbor, bringing competition to the
ship repair business.
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Singapore obtained the status of Crown Colony in 1867 and the Suez
Canal was opened in 1869. The shortening of the trade routes to the East,
combined with the spectacular growth of steamship traffic, greatly enhanced
the value of Singapore. Prior to the opening of the canal, the preferred route
was around the Cape route for large cargo carriers. This resulted in higher
traffic through the Sunda Strait that was well situated to handle the China
trade. The Red Sea route was extensively used, but the necessity to portage
goods across the desert between the ports of the Red Sea and the
Mediterranean limited its utilitv for moving bulk cargoes. While popular for
passenger traffic and the movement of light, time sensitive goods (such as the
mail), the Red Sea route was certainlv secondary as a commerce route.
The Suez Canal stimulated the commerce flow that returned the Malacca
Strait to the primacy it had previously enjoyed before the Portuguese
discovered the passage around the Cape of Good Hope. The opening of the
canal brought new vitality to Singapore and heightened the importance of the
island to the British Empire. New Harbor, first established to service the mail
steamers, became a separate township and expanded its cargo handling,
passenger and warehousing facilities.
By 1870 telegraph services reached both India and Singapore from
Europe and the communications revolution of the nineteenth century drew
the far flung Empire closer and closer to London. With the arrival of the
second Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Andrew Clarke, the long-
standing policy of non-involvement in the political affairs of the Malay States
began to change in an effort to open up the peninsular hinterland to
economic exploitation. By 1874 the British Government had executed a
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complete about face in its policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the
peninsula and was embarked upon a policv of "forward movement" geared to
pacifying warring factions to provide an environment that would enable the
aggressive trading, mining and planting interests to exploit the peninsula's
resources.
Closely coinciding with this decision to open the peninsula was the
introduction of a new economic factor into the regional economic picture.
The Government of India had been interested in exploring the possibility of
rubber planting in its territories since the mid-nineteenth centurv. In 1876,
Henry Wickham, the Director of the Royal Botanical Gardens at Kew in
London obtained some 70,000 Brazilian rubber seeds and cultivated them at
the gardens. Twenty-two of these seedlings were sent to Singapore where they
were taken to the Singapore Botanical Gardens that had been founded in 1860,
and taken over by the government in 1874.
The trees, which require at least five years of growth before they are
tapped, had been largely forgotten by the garden's staff until the arrival of
Henry Ridley from England. Ridley took charge of the Singapore Gardens in
1888. He had been to Brazil and was well aware of the economic potential of
rubber and familiar with rubber planting and tapping techniques.
Ridley tapped the trees in the gardens and tried to convince skeptical
regional planters of the economic potential of rubber with such zeal that he
became known in Singapore as "Mad Ridley."56 It took Ridley a number of
years to persuade anyone to take a chance on rubber planting, probably due to
the relatively long period of time between the planting of the trees and
'''Pearson, p. lo3.
52
economic returns. Two plantations started on the peninsula in 1896 and the
trees did very well in the tropical climate of Malaya. The planting of rubber in
Malava occurred at a time when the introduction of automobiles was in its
infancy and demand for rubber was just beginning to expand. While there
were rubber plantations planted on the island of Singapore, land availability
limited their economic impact. Rubber planting expanded rapidly in Johor
and throughout the peninsula and Singapore became the entrepot and
market for this new resource.
The introduction of rubber in Malaya had an explosive effect upon the
agricultural patterns of the region. By 1906 rubber had become the primary
agricultural export commodity, mainly due to the demand for automobile
products. Almost all the areas planted in rubber had previously been virgin
jungle, thus existing agriculture was not displaced by the new commodity.
The coconut palm, also an important agricultural commodity, was cultivated
in the alluvial soils of the coast. Native Malays, indifferent to the
consequences of the new crops, remained engaged in their traditional wet rice
production, due primarily to British colonial policy. Other crops, sugar, coffee,
tapioca, gambier, pineapples, spices, pepper, nutmeg, cloves, bananas and
other tropical fruit were also planted throughout the nineteenth century.
After 1906 the huge potential of rubber began to hearken less emphasis of
these products that were less profitable, more labor intensive and difficult to
market. Singapore, concurrent with its development of tin processing, did
become a center for pineapple canning in the early twentieth century, a
precursor of the large part that food processing would later play in the local
economy.
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The British succeed in pacifying Malay tribal wars and Chinese tang
wars" on the peninsula. Progress in tin mining was due largely to Chinese
capitalists, whose enterprises were characterized by small units of production
organized in partnerships or small companies with labor intensive-methods
made possible by large supplies of cheap immigrant labor. The Chinese
gradually modernized their mining methods using European steam pumps
but their enterprises remained organized fundamentally in the many-unit,
labor intensive pattern. 5 '
7
The Americans and Europeans began to enter the tin trade with more
capital in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This led to an
erosion of Chinese dominance in the tin trade. English and Australian
companies also introduced large riverine dredges further continuing this
trend. The first large scale smelter was built at Singapore in 1890, largely to
serve the growing demands of the American canneries. A similar facility was
built in Penang. Small scale Chinese smelting operators were driven out of
the business and bv the 1920s all tin smelting was being done in these urban
centers, further expanding Singapore's entrepot trade and enhancing its role
as a processing center for regional resources. Malayan tin exports between
1911 and 1921 consistently accounted for between 30% and 40% of total world
output. 58 By the mid-1930's the output of European accounted for two-thirds
of total tin production. Two sharply different patterns were firmly established,
the labor intensive small Chinese capitalists and the large scale, capital
intensive European operators.
,: David P. Chandler, et. al., p. 224.
'^.Muluyu, p. 1 Q 3.
54
The opening of Malaya and its rich resources stimulated an
unprecedented wave of immigration which in turn enabled further
development of the peninsular infrastructure. This changed forever the
demographic face of Malaya and Singapore. For example, during the two
decades prior to the census of 1901, the population of the Malav states of Perak
and Selangor increased from 130,000 to 600,000, including a huge number of
Chinese indentured laborers. The expanding tin trade, which grew from less
than half a million dollars to more than sixty million Straits dollars in 1900,
generated the revenue that stimulated and enabled the building of railroads,
roads, and other communications. Bv 1909 travelers and goods could go bv
train from Penang to Singapore, crossing the Strait of Johor bv railroad ferrv.
The Johor causewav, linking Singapore to the peninsula, was completed in
1923. From 1873, just prior to the change in British policy on the peninsula, to
1913, just before the Great War began in Europe, trade through Singapore
increased eight fold and Singapore well overshadowed all the other Straits
Settlements in the entrepot trade. 59
The Great War in Europe stimulated the local economy further with its
attendant militarv demand for rubber. One of the most significant aspects of
the remarkable economic boom in was the striking absence of Malav peasant
involvement in it. The British actively sought to shield the Malav peasantry
from the displacement attendant to the new economic order. Bv maintaining
the Malays in villages engaged in traditional wet rice production they ensured
continued food production and avoided the political consequences of a
disorganization of the peasant economv. Only a few Malavs entered the export
'^Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information, Shigapore 1989, (Singapore:
Singapore National Printers Ltd.),p. 39.
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economy through small hold rubber planting and began to receive access to
increased educational opportunities.50 The British introduced an elementary
vernacular educational policy that was designed to maintain the status quo
and to create "a vigorous and self-respecting agricultural peasantry."61 Due to
this policy of keeping the Malays down on the farm, so to speak, they played
an inconsequential part in the growing urban economic centers that
developed to service the booming export economy. In 1921 the Malays
constituted only ten percent of the urban population, a figure that would
correspond to roughly four to five percent of the total Malay population. 02
The structure of the British Malayan Territories and the Straits
Settlements economies as they would exist until the beginning of the Second
World War had been largely established bv the late 1920's. The economies of
British Malaya and that of Singapore following the Great War were linked to
the fortunes of the world economy at large. There was a post-war boom due to
rising tin and rubber prices followed by a recession beginning in late 1920 as
the prices for those commodities collapsed. In the mid-1920's rubber and tin
prices soared again and fortunes were made, almost overnight.63
The Great Depression of the 1930s checked the runaway expansion of
the regional economy, but caused no significant structural changes other than
the elimination of some marginal tin and rubber enterprises. The contraction
in the labor market gave rise to the first attempts to regulate the previously
unchecked alien immigration. As the world began to slowly climb out of the
60David P. Chandler, et. al., pp. 334-335.
61 Ibid, p. 335.
n2 Ibid, p. 33o.
"
1 ederal Research Division, Library oi Congress, Singapore a country study, ( Washington
D.C.: GPO, L991),p.32.
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depression prior to the Second World War, the commodity based economy in
Southeast Asia began to recover. The regional resources, especially the rubber
of Malava and the petroleum of Indonesian Archipelago would be the magnet
that would embroil Southeast Asia in World War II in a way it had avoided
during the Great War. A rising Asian power, Japan, would lay claim to the
resources of Asia, proclaiming an Asia for the Asiatics" that would be a part
of their "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperitv Sphere," encompassing East and
Southeast Asia. The Japanese prophecv of "a new dawn for Asia" ushered in
an era of darkness and deprivation that would forever alter the political face
of Southeast Asia and its attendant colonial economic order.
C. Politics: The Empire in Southeast Asia, The Politics of Race and Money.
The Temenggong, Abdu'r Rhaman, with whom Raffles negotiated in
Singapore, had been a faction leader in the Malav court in the Riau islands at
Bintan who had unfortunately been advisor to the leader of the losing
claimant to the throne. The claimant to the throne was Husain, to whom the
Temenggong was related by marriage. He was Husein's father-in law. In
choosing a new ruler for the court at Bintan, as was the common custom in
Malavan politics, succession was based on the established bureaucracy
choosing the most suitable member of a roval family to succeed to the throne,
hi the case of the Sultanate of Lingga at Bintan, suitability' may very well have
equated to that member of the royal family who was most controllable by the
dominant faction at court, then the Bugis from the eastern archipelago. The
eldest son, Husein, who went by the title of Tengku Long, had been bypassed
in favor of his younger brother in 1812. The Temenggong was the senior
advisor to Tengku Long.
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After the Dutch had established themselves in Bintan and the Bugis-
dominated court there had accommodated themselves to Dutch control of the
island's commerce, Tensrku Lon^ remained at court in Bintan without
influence, retained on a small pension. His father-in law, the Temenggong,
without the benefit of royal familv connection, withdrew from the court in
1818 after the arrival of the Dutch, moving first to Johor in southern Malaya
and finally settling in Singapore with a retinue of followers who maintained
themselves bv fishing, fruit growing, trading and occasional piracy. The
Temenggong also encouraged a small group of Chinese to plant gambier and
pepper on the island. The arrival of Raffles and the British soldiers who
accompanied him gave the Temenggong an opportunity to reestablish his
son-in law's political standing. He sent word to Bintan and Tengku Long was
brought secretly to Singapore where a treats* of friendship was concluded with
the British to allow the establishment of the British trading post.
Essentially, Raffles had granted British recognition to Tengku Long as
the rightful Sultan, and on the dav the treaty was concluded he was declared
Sultan Husain of Johor and the Temenggong installed as his advisor. By this
process, Raffles legitimized the deal he made for the trading post at Singapore
within the framework of the local political order. 64 By proclaiming Tengku
Long Sultan of Johor in the name of the Governor General Of India, this aim
was accomplished. This process of legitimizing a local claimant to political
power who would serve English purposes was a common characteristic of the
b4This is the first instance in Malaya of the British interfering in the local political order to
install a ruler who would accommodate their interests, it would be repeated many times on the
peninsula.
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strategy employed in Malaya. The Union Jack went up on Singapore on
February 6, 1819.
Difficulties did arise. Raffles, in an attempt to limit company
expenditures on the settlement left Major Farquhar, the first Resident, with a
minute budget. Given the free trade policy that precluded customs duties,
Farquhar turned to "sin taxes" to raise revenue. Gambling was legalized and
monopoly rights auctioned for the sale of alcohol and opium to extract the
revenue to finance public works projects." Maintaining law and order
among the rapidly growing and diverse population was very difficult. The
growing merchant community, in one of its first "self-help" initiatives
pooled its resources to hire night watchmen to augment the inadequate police
force.
Despite the fame Raffles now receives as the founder of Singapore, after
a hast\" departure following the initial treaty signing, he visited the settlement
only three more times, staying for a total of only one year. On January 1, 1823,
Raffles instituted the first town plan for the burgeoning city. His town plan
was based on separation of the races, with Hindus, Chinese, Europeans, Arabs
and Bugis each receiving land for their own kampong (Malay for village). A
Government quarter and a Merchant's quarter by the mouth of the river were
established as largely non-residential zones. The Malays were moved with the
Temenggong from the banks of the Singapore river to Telok Blangah,
southwest of the settlement.
As in Java, Raffles abolished outright slavery, but allowed debt bondage
to continue. He instituted laws and regulations for the preservation of peace
65Ibid, p. 13.
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and order. The judicial system included trial bv jury. Raffles eliminated some
of Farquhar's early initiatives, viewing the social costs as too extreme. He
closed down gambling houses and levied punitive taxes on liquor and
opium. Although Raffles tenure in Singapore was short, his energy and
determination were responsible for the settlement's establishment and left an
indelible imprint on the growth that would follow.
The Malay Sultan, Tengku Long and his advisor the Temenggong set up
court in Singapore, building a palace on the island and making Singapore the
seat of the Johor Sultanate. Unsatisfied with the remuneration they were
receiving from the East India Company and in accordance with the long-
standing local tradition of commerce extraction as a reyenue base, the Sultan
demanded that the traders who \ isited the port come to his palace to pay him
homage, including tributary "gifts."' The Sultan's increasing demands for
proper tribute began to eyolve into a de facto duty on trade. Political power
sharing was clearly imperiling the island's trade. The merchant community's
complaints resulted in action. Taming the Sultan to regain control of the
island's free port status was the task of the new governor of Singapore, John
Crawfurd, whom Raffles had installed prior to leaying Southeast Asia. He
negotiated a new treaty with the Sultan and the Temenggong which ceded the
island to the East India Company in perpetuity in exchange for an increased
pension and a cash settlement. Absolute English control dates from the
signing of this treaty on August 2, 1824. This treaty also represents the first
instance of the political power that could be exercised by the growing
merchant-trader group. This group would drive the political process for the
next century, cajoling the Company and later the Crown into implementing
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policies that largely served their interests. As is the rule in most political
power struggles, in Singapore, then in the Straits Settlements, and later with
the opening of Malaya, money would talk with the loudest voice.
Crawfurd presided over the initial period of rapid growth in Singapore,
remaining true to Raffles' vision. He continued to fight against piracy and
slavery. He did reverse Raffles closure of gambling houses, however, taxing
them once again to raise public works revenue. Perhaps the most important
of Raffles' initiatives that Crawfurd failed to carry through was in the area of
education. Raffles had envisioned Singapore as a center for the education of
Malays to train them as teachers and to enable them to enter the civil service.
One of Raffles' last acts was to leave an endowment for the establishment of
such an institution, which would hopefully attract the sons of regional rulers
and chiefs. Crawfurd convinced the company that the support of primary
education was a wiser course. The unfortunate result was that education at all
levels was largely neglected.
Following the conclusion of the Treaty of 1824 the East India Company
recognizing the unique economic position of its new Malayan territories, in
1826, combined Penang, .Malacca, Singapore and Province Welleslev as the
Straits Settlements, a separate Presidency, in the administrative jargon of the
company. The center of government for the Straits Settlements was initially
the long established settlement at Penang. This was the first time since its
founding that Singapore was not directly administered by the Supreme
Government of India. This new bureaucratic apparatus proved expensive and
difficult to manage and in 1830 the Straits Settlements saw its status reduced
to that of a residency, a subdivision of the Presidency of Bengal. Within tw7o
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vears the seat of government was moved to Singapore as a consequence of the
island's rapid growth and emergence as the center of regional trade.
In the 1840's the opening of China and the arrival of more and more
steamships resulted in explosive growth in Singapore. The growth of the citv
far outstripped the abilities of the clumsv government structure so local
merchants and trade associations had to depend on themselves to take care of
their needs. The Governor of the Straits Settlements was unable to convince
the Governor-General in India that further investment in the region would
pav dividends. The Governor-General in India passed a series of unpopular
fiscal measures in 1845 which included changing the local currency to rupees,
a Stamp Act for agreements and contracts to raise revenue and a measure to
collect trade duties on vessels using the port. The Singapore trading
community rose in opposition because of the damage these measures would
inflict upon its status as a free port. Already facing the prospect of losing
much of its importance as a transshipment for goods with China with the rise
of Hong Kong, this policy, implemented from afar in Bengal, seemed to
characterize for those in Singapore the attitude of contempt at the worst or
disinterest at the least with which the Straits Settlements were treated by the
East India Company.
The merchant community was successful in forcing the company to
rescind most of the hated regulations but this battle with the Company,
conducted largely in Singapore, Calcutta and London represents the genesis of
a local effort to win the status of crown colony for the Straits Settlements, free
of the Indian link.66
""K.s. Milne and Diane K. Mauzv, Singapore The Legacy of Lee Kuan Yew, (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1 OQ0), p. 43.
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The Governor-General of India, Lord Dalhousie, visited Singapore in
1851 and upon his return to India placed the Straits Settlements directly
under his administration in Calcutta. This move did little to satisfv the
complaints of the local merchant community, which felt increasingly
neglected as the rebellion reached its climax in India and left the Straits
Settlements on their own.
In 185b the Governor of the Straits Settlements instituted legislation
making Singapore a municipality. A city government was established
comprised of five Commissioners. Two Commissioners were appointed bv
the governor and three were elected by very limited franchise of influential
business figures. As small a change as the Municipal commission was, it
represents the first system of local political access in the history of the island
and was the predecessor of the city council that would later follow. A property
tax was enacted to finance strictly local projects.
The lobbying efforts of the Singapore merchant community bolstered by
arguments for the need for a place other than fever ridden Hong Kong to
station British troops in Asia eventually persuaded the government in
London to designate the Straits Settlements a Crown Colony on April 1, 1867.
The Government of the Straits Settlements was headed bv the Governor,
with the assistance of executive and legislative councils. The Executive
Council was comprised of the Governor, the senior military official in the
Settlements and six other senior officials. The Legislative Council included all
the former and added a chief justice and four non-official members appointed
by the Governor, drawn largely from the merchant/ trading community. This
government structure was dominated bv Singapore, much to the
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consternation of Malacca and Penang. As the number of unofficial members
of the government was gradually increased, Asian representatives were
recruited as their commercial interests and financial power expanded.
With the Straits Settlements established as a Crown Colony, the scene of
political action moved to the peninsula itself. While not directlv affecting the
political order in the Settlements, the British policy of "forward
movement 'on the peninsula would have far-reaching effects on the political
order and independence movements of post-war Malaya and Singapore.
In January 1874, the British introduced themselves into the local politics
of peninsular Malaya in a succession dispute in the tin rich west coast state
{negri in vernacular Malav)of Perak. Three groups met at the offshore island
of Pangkor: Malay chieftains, led by Abdullah one of three claimants to the
sultanate; the Chinese, represented by the leaders of the two strongest secret
societies in the Perak tin fields; and the British, led by Governor Clarke. The
result of the meeting was an agreement, known as the Pangkor Engagement,
by which the British recognized Abdullah as Sultan and provided for the
installation at his court of a British Officer, to be known as a Resident, "whose
advice must be asked and acted upon on all questions other than those
touching Malay Religion and Custom. "The collection and control of all
revenues and the general administration of the state was to be regulated
under the advice of the Resident. 67
This was the model for other sultans who would be assisted to gain of
secure their thrones in exchange for abrogating effective power in self-
government. This system spread rapidly to other negri and in spite of the
67David P. Chandler, et. al.( p. 1 Q7.
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fiction of self-government that both the Malay rulers and the British
continued to promote, it was the British, through the Resident and the
colonial bureaucracy who ruled and the sultans who reigned. When four of
the states were federated in 1S95, with the approval of the Sultans, it was
facetiously agreed that the new fedaration would not "in the slightest
degree. ..be curtailing the right of self-government which they presently
enjoy'' When later, in 1909, a Federal Council was created, the sultans were
still little more than the facade behind which the British continued to exercise
their power.6S
The natural rulers accepted the extension of British control primarily
because the British had the guns and money. The sultans had to settle for
what they could get. Commercial expansion enabled the British to pension
the rulers with an income that was commensurate with what they had
previously received from commerce exactions and taxation. The British
placated the Sultans by paving ceremonial homage, and constructing palaces
and other symbols of power. This provided more legitimacy in the eyes of
Malav society for their claim to authority, claims which, in the past, had been
largely de at re.
Thanks to British law and order, immigration boomed and two societies
existed side by side. The new European and Chinese commercial interests
coexisted with the traditional Malay society which reaped insubstantial
benefit from the new export economy. In the early twentieth century the the
British domain w7as expanded by territories acquired from Siam. These
territories were organized with others on the peninsula in what became
6SIbid, p. 198.
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known as the Unfederated States which retained some limited administrative
perogatives. By 1914, however, the entire peninsula had come under effective
British political control.
While the extension of British control over the peninsula served to
isolate the sultans from decisions that might interfere with the economic
progress on the peninsula, the latitude thev were given with regard to "Malay
custom and religion" led to a strengthening of this function and a consequent
proclivity on the part of the rulers to develop elaborate administrative and
judicial establishments for the governance of Islam. These bodies, which
became known as Councils of Muslim Religion and Malav Custom, reported
and were responsible directlv to the Sultans. Thev became conservative bodies
which were the repositories of traditional authority.
The Malav social aristocracy remained largely intact and after the turn of
the century became the sector of Malay society from which the British drew
candidates for special education to recruit for the colonial bureaucracy.
Although always employed in subordinate positions, these petty bureaucrats,
by the new authority conferred upon them by the colonial administration
coupled with their traditional status in Malav society, grew in power. The
colonial system reinforced their roles as authority figures and placed them in
a position to influence the nature of government when the British gradually
withdrew from their colonial position after the Second World War. Thus,
those who ascended to political power were extremely protective of Malav
rights and prerogatives and well grounded in the role of Islam in Malay
society. It was this elite value system that was to cause so many difficulties in
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the effort to include the overwhelmingly Chinese Singapore in the short
lived Malavsian Federation.
In Singapore, meanwhile, the late nineteenth century witnessed a rising
tide of organized criminal activity, including illegal immigration schemes,
most of it controlled bv rival Chinese "secret societies.'' Events in Singapore
in the late nineteenth century are similar to the immigration difficulties the
United States faces todav from organized gang racketeers exploiting the rush
of Chinese emigration. Open gang warfare resulted in legislation, beginning
in 1889-1890, to register, and later to ban, the societies. Neither effort was verv
successful.69
Efforts to control the secret societies, and the Chinese in general, actually
began in 1877 when a Chinese protectorate was established, headed by British
Officer William Pickering. The earliest Chinese immigrants to Singapore
were seekers of political asylum. These were Chinese who remained largely
resident permanently throughout Southeast Asia. The later tide of
immigration was comprised mostly of laborers who were overwhelmingly
transients, planning to stay only long enough to make enough mosey to buy
some land on the mainland and return home again. These Chinese who were
ruthlessly exploited, spending years paying back the secret societies for their
passage to Singapore, with little left over to send home and even dimmer
hopes of realizing their dreams. Pickering was the first British official
appointed to serve in Singapore who could speak and read Chinese. 70
Pickering did much to protect the growing community of Chinese
immigrants from exploitation by the secret societies in the form of
°9Milne and Mauzv, p. 44.
/uFederal Research Division, Librarv of Congress, p. 26.
indentured service and prostitution. The Chinese protectorate extended its
influence into the Chinese community, arbitrating disagreements concerning
labor, financial dealings and even extending to domestic disputes. These
efforts removed the secret societies from these functions, which had
traditionally been within their purview, somewhat weakening their
influence
This British "meddling" in Chinese affairs sparked riots of Chinese,
which led to the passage of the legislation banning the secret societies
beginning in 1S90. This actually led to increased criminal activity as the
Chinese were forced underground. Subsequently the increasing prosperity of
the settlement and the increasing sophistication of the secret societies reduced
their threat to public order. More personalized violence however, (threats,
extortion rackets and gambling) directed by Chinese against Chinese
continued. By the turn of the century, open gang warfare was no longer a
threat to public safety. The power of the secret society as a political base for the
Chinese was largely broken.
The Chinese in Singapore did not constitute a homogeneous
community. While most immigrants came from the maritime provinces of
southern China, they spoke different, unintelligible dialects and tended to
specialize in different sectors of the economy. The largest dialect group were
the Hokkien who were engaged largely in trade, shipping, banking and
industry. The second most numerous were the Teochiu, traditionally
predominant in the agricultural sector, in both planting and the food
processing industries. Cantonese came as both artisans or unskilled laborers,
both on the docks and in the tin mines. An industrious few made fortunes in
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tin. Two smaller groups, the Hakka and Hainanese were usually the least
skilled, earning a living as servants, unskilled laborers and crewing trading
ships.
As Chinese fortunes were made in Singapore, the wealthv Chinese
found their well being increasingly was tied to the same interests as those of
the Europeans. The Baba Chinese, descendants of earlv Chinese who took
Malay wives, developed a distinct communitv of their own, highly
jicculturated to local society and regarded bv most as a part of it rather than
tied bv affiliation to the mainland.71 This group placed its loyalties squarely
with the Colonial government and in ! Q00 formed The Straits Chinese
British Association which both promoted its own connection with the
Empire and drew in the ethnic Chinese who had been born in Singapore and
Malaya (Straits Chinese) into coalition with them as a group which pledged
its allegiance to the British Crown, eschewing its connections with mainland
China. This group took steps to assist the Chinese community with the
extension of public services in education and welfare.
While the Chinese elites became increasingly westernized, especially the
Straits and Baba Chinese, turbulent political events in mainland China
continued to affect the political order in Singapore. Restrictive emigration
laws in China, relaxed briefly during the 1870's and reimposed in 1893 gave
Singaporean Chinese, with the protection offered by British passports the
ability to travel back and forth to the mainland, maintaining their cultural
ties and often sending their children there for education or returning to find
their sons Chinese brides.
71David P. Chandler, et. al., p. 251.
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The political connection with the mainland, particularly of the non-Baba
or Straits born Chinese, was aroused bv the rise of Chinese nationalism in the
early twentieth century. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 ignited enthusiasm
in all of the centers of Chinese population throughout Southeast Asia for
modern education. Teachers for these schools were largely brought from
China. Study and reading clubs with political overtones and a flourishing
popular press also sprang up.72 Later, in the 1920's, Sun Yat Sen was
successful in convincing many successful China-born Singapore businessmen
to invest in Chinese industry and to donate large sums for the establishment
of more modern educational institutions in China. The Kuomintang (KMT)
^ent teachers and textbooks to Singapore and encouraged the use of Mandarin
in the Chinese schools there to standardize curriculums and provide a
unifying point for the disparate loyalties of the dialect groups (a precursor of
the "speak Mandarin" campaign the PAP would institute many years later).
The KMT-Communist struggle, resulting in a split in 1927, further politicized
the overseas Chinese and exacerbated the difficulties of the British in
controlling their Chinese subjects.
The British discouraged the use of Mandarin, aware of the growing left-
wing political bent of the Chinese schools. Anything nationalist, socialist, or
in any way revolutionary was considered left-wing. This effort proved
unsuccessful and bv 1935 Mandarin was the standard of instruction of all of
Singapore's Chinese schools. Following the KMT- Communist split, the
\anyang (the Chinese term meaning southern ocean, used to refer to
Southeast Asia73) Communist Party was established in 1928. In Singapore the
72Ibid, p. 253.
' ^Federal Research I )i\ lsion, Library of Congress, p. 305.
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party was proscribed bv the British and harassed bv the police. Reorganized in
L930 as the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), centered in Singapore, it had
some success in the schools, infiltrating teacher and student organizations
and staging some student strikes. British authorities, during a raid in 1931,
obtained some records of the party, which included membership lists and
evidence of its connection to the Eastern bureau of the Comintern in
Shanghai. Mass arrests followed which nearly destroyed the party.
The KMT, whose Singapore branch had grown rapidly through the
1920's was also proscribed by the British in 1929. Fund raising for the
mainland party was prohibited as well. The British imposed severe restriction
on immigration, censored the Chinese and Indian press and cut aid to
vernacular schools, both Chinese and Tamil schools in an attempt to stem the
rising tide of anti-colonial propaganda. Attempts to organize labor and
conduct strikes by both KMT and communist elements were suppressed.
When the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931, Chinese nationalist
sentiments were further aroused, as were anti-Japanese sentiments which
had first surfaced after the Great War due to the audacity of the Japanese
Twenty-one Demands. When, in 1936, the KMT-Communist united front
returned to combat the Japanese and the Sino- Japanese war subsequently
began in 1938, the Singapore Chinese rallied to the cause, spearheading relief
efforts for the beleaguered Chinese and organizing effective boycotts directed
at the Japanese.
The British, alarmed by the growing nationalist sentiments and
concerned by MCP infiltration in relief and support organizations such as the
Nanvang Chinese National Salvation Movement, tried to curtail the anti-
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Japanese movements by banning anti-Japanese demonstrations and banning
the importation of textbooks from China containing anti-Japanese
sentiments. Still bound by political alliance to the Japanese, the British
prohibited the teaching of anti-Japanese slogans and songs in the schools in
Singapore. None of these measures stemmed the rising anti-Japanese tide,
with its attendant nationalism and anti-imperialism. By 1940 the proscribed
MCP had 30,000 members on its roll. The competition between the MCP and
the KMT for control of grassroots Chinese organizations, while divisive,
encouraged widespread support for Chinese resistance to the onslaught of the
Japanese on the mainland.
The growth of the political consciousness of Singapore's other significant
"alien"' immigrant group, the Indians, follows a similar pattern of rising and
falling in concert with events in the homeland and reacting to events far
from Singapore. The Indians were far less numerous than the Chinese,
accounting for 16 percent of the population in the census of 1860 that counted
a total population of nearly 81,000. The Chinese, bv contrast, accounted for
61.9 percent and the Malavs only 13.5. 74The Indian population did not grow
as spectacularly and in 1880 the Indian population remained at around
12,000.75
As with the Chinese, assuming that "Indians'" meant a homogenous
group is a mistake. The classification included Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and
Christians both from the Indian subcontinent and Ceylon. Less secular than
the Chinese and with a wider variety of religious affiliation, the Indians were
more fragmented and tended to keep to their own groups, centered around
Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information, Singapore 19S9, p. 39.
' ^Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, p. 27.
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the mosque, temple or church. Immigrants from South India
characteristically sought employment as laborers, mainly on the docks or in
the rubber plantations, in local transport as river boatmen and ox cart drivers.
Some became small shopkeepers serving the local economy. Indians from the
North were generally wealthier, better educated and better connected with the
British. Thev often worked in the mercantile community as clerks, for both
British and Indian trading; houses. Many were traders and merchants
themselves. A great number of Sikhs came to Singapore and Malaya to serve
in a police capacity, both in the public police and in private security forces
assembled by the large trading concerns in Singapore and the tin mines of the
peninsula.
Probably the first mass immigration of Indians was the importation by
the British of Indian convicts to work in the first public works projects on the
island. In 1857 there were 2,139 convicts from India Ceylon and Burma in
custody in Singapore. St. Andrews cathedral, Government House and many
roads and buildings were constructed with convict labor.76 Many of these
convicts were released and settled in the Straits Settlements. On the
peninsula, following the "forward movement" policy change, the British
actively encouraged Indian labor to immigrate to provide the labor necessary
for the great expansion of the infrastructure of public works, railroads, roads
and to work the great rubber estates. Even more than the Chinese the Indians
were predominantly transients, expecting to work for a few years, make their
fortunes and return home. The Indians had little impact on the political
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Malavs as a community continued to grow, but their numbers and power
were dwarfed by Chinese immigration to Singapore. By the turn of the
centurv, the Chinese dominated the urban centers and approached equality,
in sheer numbers with the total Malay population. Leadership in the Malay-
Muslim community of Singapore was largely in the hands of the descendants
of Indian Muslims and Malay women who were known as the Jawi-
Peranakan and wealthy Arabs. The first Malay language newspaper, named
JazLU-Peranakan, began publication in 187b in Singapore. By the early
twentieth century other Malay journals had appeared, which proyided much
of the impetus for the Islamic revival movement regionally in that era. The
.Malays' political issues were limited to religious concerns and they were
much less a part of the economic success of the region, making their livings
as farmers, servants, laborers and petty shopkeepers. The fortunate few found
employment in the police or as religious teachers.
With Singapore's laissez (aire approach to business and trade, revenue
continued to be a vexing problem. Social services in Singapore lagged far
behind the remarkable economic progress. The gulf between the rich and
poor was enormous. The picture of today's modern Singapore give little
evidence of the squalor and poverty that was present in Singapore at the turn
of the century. Singapore's mortality rate in 1896 exceeded that of Hong Kong,
Ceylon and India. Malaria, cholera and rampant opium addiction all
contributed to this unhappy statistic. In 1900 opium continued to account for
half of the government revenue. Efforts to ban opium were successfully
defeated by the tax farmers who profited by it and business and trade lobbies
who were resistant to the income tax to replace the revenue opium provided.
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In a compromise of sorts, the government took control of all opium
manufacture and sales in 1910. This measure increased the revenue by
diverting the profit directlv to the government and eliminated the more
dangerous opium sold bv manv of the more unscrupulous distributors.
Education, one of the early visions of Raffles as a means to assist the
Malays, remained neglected. The vernacular schools of the Chinese, Indian
and Malay communities were poor. English-language schools, run
predominantlv bv Christian missionaries were better, but unavailable to the
masses who neither spoke the language nor could afford the tuition. English
language schools were largely reserved for the wealthy. Raffles Institution
began providing the onlv available secondarv education in 1S84. just after the
turn of the century, in 1902, the government finallv instituted an educational
plan, providing English-language primary schools and taking charge of
Raffles institution the following year. In conjunction with the Chinese, the
government opened a medical school in 1905 to address the severe shortage
of trained doctors. Bv 1920 it had become the King Edward Medical College,
which would form the basis for Singapore University. As English-language
education grew, the affluent of all races increasingly viewed this as the route
to prosperity for their children. More and more of the brightest of their sons
competed for the coveted prize of Queen's Scholarships, awarded to the most
promising Asian students for university education in Britain. The Asian
students who acquired an English-language education formed a new elite,
with access to government, professional and business employment
opportunities. They were a group apart, not British, but no longer holding to
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many of the traditional values of their ethnic origins. After the war, many
would provide the core of the nationalist movements that arose in its wake.
D. Diplomacy: The Geo-politics of the Great Game.
The founding of Singapore as a trading station of the English East India
Companv has its roots in the global economic competition and geopolitics of
the era. As Napoleon ravaged Europe in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century and the English were threatened by French power, the
crown directed the East India Company to take control of the Dutch
possessions in the East Indies. As previously indicated, the British had first
taken control of Malacca from the Dutch in 1795, restored it to them briefly in
1S02, only to have war break out again in Europe, forcing them to again take
control of the settlement. As discussed, a compromise solution, between
complete abandonment of Malacca and retaining it intact with the almost
certain prospect of its being returned to the Dutch following the war, was
accomplished on the recommendation of a young assistant secretary in
Penang, Thomas Stamford Raffles.
Raffles journeyed to Calcutta in 1810 to present a paper to the Asiatic
Society on the maritime laws of the Malays. While in Calcutta, he impressed
Lord Minto, the Governor-General in Bengal, with the depth of regional
knowledge he possessed and his vision for English expansion of commerce.
With the Dutch in disarray due to events in Europe, Raffles interested the
Governor-General in the project of taking control of Java, on the pretext of
denying the French an opportunity to make inroads in the Indies. An English
military expedition guided by Raffles took Java in 1811. He was subsequently
appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Java and served there for five years.
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During his tenure in Java, Raffles' policies contrasted markedly from those of
the Dutch. He introduced laws which allowed the native Malays and
immigrant Chinese more autonomy and control of their economic destiny.
Farmers and planters, who had been severely exploited under Dutch rule,
were encouraged to expand their operations by allowing them to keep more
of what they produced and by freeing up the local market. With a ^olid
grounding: in regional history and fluent in Malay, extremely unusual for anv
colonial official, by all accounts Raffles was an admirer of the Malays and
brought an attitude of respect for local culture to a region that had hitherto
know nothing of the kind. During his years in Java, Raffles undoubtedly
entertained notions of permanent British supremacy in the East Indies and
was attempting, through his cooperative policies with the indigenous peoples
to create a political base for just that purpose. As Lieutenant-Governor of Java
Raffles abolished slavery and torture, instituted trial bv jury and devised an
equitable land reform system.78
Following Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the treaty of Vienna
restored to the Dutch their possessions in the East Indies. In 1816 Raffles
returned briefly to England. It is interesting to note that his trip to London
was necessitated largely due to charges against him by fellow officers of the
East India Company, some of whom resented his high-handedness in
pressing forward so aggressively his own vision of empire in the east.79 The
tradition bound society of England engendered a rigid hierarchy in the East
India Company and the meteoric rise of Raffles undoubtedly took place over
the heads of many who must have thought themselves more deserving.
' ^Malaya, p. 265.
' ^Pearson, p. 57.
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Raffles successfully refuted the allegations and intrigues directed against
him and was, in fact, knitrhted by the Trine e Recent for his service to the
crown in Java. While the recognition bv the crown was gratifying, the
Company was apparently less well disposed toward Raffles somewhat
unconventional approach during his tenure in lava. His next assignment is
indicative of this displeasure. Assigned to Bencoolen in south Sumatra as
Lieutenant Governor, this probably represented a desire on the part of the
company, as diplomatically as possible, given his new status as Sir Stamford,
knight of the realm, to relegate him to the periphery of influence. Never a
very successful trading outpost, Bencoolen, with its poor position and
dreadful climate, was a malaria ridden backwater that was truly the end of the
earth in the British Empire. It was to take a terrible toll on Raffles' family.
Following the return of Malacca to the Dutch in 1818 the British position
in Southeast Asia returned to one of extreme disadvantage. The war years
had whetted Raffles appetite for, if not British dominance of the East Indies
trade, at least equality with the Dutch. The post war settlement essentially
gave the Dutch complete supremacy in the East Indies, controlling the Sunda
strait from Batavia and commanding the Malacca strait when they reoccupied
Malacca. The two British settlements, Penang and Bencoolen, could be cut off
from the trade of the east by the Dutch. Their locations, further from China
and the Moluccas, put them at a severe disadvantage compared to Batavia
and Malacca. Despite the despondency that Raffles must have felt, given the
course of events, his drive and ambition never faltered. In 1818 on a trip to
Calcutta, Raffles persuaded the Governor-General of India, then Lord
Hastings, that he should back him in a mission to find a suitable port south of
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Malacca and north of Batavia to serve English interests in the trade with the
Archipelago and China and forestall the Dutch monopoly.
Early in 1819 Raffles, with an appointment from Lord Hastings as his
agent to the Indies, sailed south from Penang with a fleet of five ships in
search of a new English outpost. Although he made a number of stops along
the peninsula and in some of the coastal islands after slipping past Malacca,
there is some speculation that Raffles, as a serious student of Malay history
and legend, had the ancient citv of Singupura, described in the Malay Annals,
firmlv in mind from the time he conceived the venture.
Raffles five ships anchored off St. John's Island, five miles from the
southern coast of Singapore on January 28, 1819. The following dav his ships
proceeded to the mouth of the Singapore River, anchored, and Sir Stamford
and a small party went ashore. There, in the small fishing village at the
mouth of the river, thev negotiated with the Malav chief, the Temenggong
Abdu,r Rhaman, and established their rights to establish a trading post on the
island as detailed above.
The Dutch protested the British action, as thev viewed Singapore as part
of their sphere of influence, subject to the Malav rulers in the Riau islands
with whom thev had a treaty. Lord Hastings in Calcutta rebuffed the Dutch
protests, citing earlier high-handed maneuvering of the Dutch vis-a-vis the
British in Riau (the British had earlier concluded a treatv with the Riau
rulers). The British government was unsettled at the possibility of conflict
over the island, but Lord Hastings' arguments proved persuasive and
Singapore was retained. An instant success, Singapore and its trade expanded
rapidly.
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Although his tenure in Singapore was short, Raffles energy and
determination were responsible for the settlement's establishment and left an
indelible imprint on the growth that would follow. R. O. Winstedt puts it
succinctly writing in 1923:
By the foresight and efforts of Raffles alone Singapore, now the
seventh port in the world, was chosen for the British empire, despite the
hostility of the Dutch, the jealously of Penang, the apathy of the Calcutta
government and the timorousness of India House. s °
The statue of Raffles which stands proudly over Victoria Square near the
mouth of the Singapore river portrays a classic English gentlemen, robust and
strong, the visionary empire builder. It celebrates the role described by
Winstedt. Still an heroic figure in Singapore today, this depiction of Raffles
stands in stark contrast with the reality of his life after leaving the East Indies.
Such a contrast, concerning so influential a figure, is worthy of comment.
Raffles is a tragic figure in the history of the British Empire, a man who
built the empire and was broken by it as well. He lost his first wife and all but
one of his children to tropical fevers in Bencoolen. He departed Malaya for
England in 1824 aboard a ship loaded with an extensive collection of
zoological and botanical specimens (a veritable Noah's Ark as Winstedt
describes it) and extensive manuscripts detailing his knowledge of the region
The ship burned and Raffles lost everything. He attempted to recreate the
collection as best he could before sailing two months later for England,
arriving there in August of 1S24. While he thought briefly of a Parliamentary
career, his health after years in the tropics was frail, and although only forty-
five, his body was that of a man of many more years. In England he was a
s°Malaya, p. 2o5
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founder and President of the London Zoo, where his bust was placed,
appropriately, in the lion house. Farquhar even attacked his claim as founder
of Singapore and the East India Company made claims against him for over
20,000 pounds. A Calcutta company, with whom he had left sufficient funds
to meet these very debatable claims, went bankrupt. Worn by illness and beset
by anxieties, Raffles died suddenly of apoplexy in 1826.
Formal agreement on Dutch and British spheres of influence was
concluded 1S24, shortly after Raffles' departure from Singapore. The Anglo-
Dutch Treaty of March 1824 was designed to bring the competitive battling of
the two European commercial powers to an end before it resulted in open
warfare, a prospect relished by neither of them after the long European Wars.
The treaty ceded Malacca to the British and recognized British suzerainty over
Singapore. The Dutch were given Bencoolen and the British renounced any
claim to the territories in Sumatra and Java.
The difficulties of the Americans trading at Singapore continued for
many years following the seizure of the American vessel in 1825 by the Royal
Navy. The ship was taken to Calcutta where the American captain was tried
for the treaty violation. Although he and his ship were eventually released, a
period of many months passed before the matter was resolved. This
effectively discouraged further direct trade with the new settlement.
Even with the difficulties of trading through Riau, the Americans
continued to come. Once again, the mercantile interests in Singapore
collectively brought pressure to bear of the local leaders and petitioned the
crown for an end to the restrictions on American trade. King William the
Fourth ended the restrictions in 1837 and Joseph Balestier's charade ended as
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he was officially recognized as American Consul in Singapore that same year.
Official American connection with Singapore dates from 1837, the same year
in which Victoria ascended to the British Throne.
In 1S35, Sultan Husain died, precipitating a succession battle for the
Sultanate of Johor. Sultan Husain had left Singapore and lived in Malacca on
the pension provided bv the British for the rights to Singapore. Much in the
manner of previous sultans prior to the arrival of the Europeans, Husain was
happy to lead a life of leisure and was not much concerned with increasing
his power or wealth, provided that he was assured a comfortable life.
Upon the death of Sultan Husain, Ibrahim, the new ambitious new
Temenggong (son of Abdu'r Rhaman), who had long cooperated with the
British and courted British influence, expected them to support him in his
desire to be named Sultan of Johor. The British, for reasons that are only
known to them chose to support Ali, the son of Sultan Husain, as the new
Sultan of Johor. Ali was another weakling in the mold of his father and
perhaps the British thought that he would bend to their interests more easily
than the ambitious Ibrahim. Ibrahim's followers were also known to be
engaged in piracy in the region, which probablv soured the British as well.
While the Temenggong failed in his bid for the Sultanate, the British did
recognize him as Temenggong of Johor in 1841, legitimizing his place in the
Malay hierarchv. It was he, and not the Sultan who exercised the most
effective control in Johor. It also set the stage for his son Abubakar, would
fulfill his ambition manv vears later.
Abubakar is an example of a high born Malay who cultivated contact
with the British and educated himself in the British tradition to increase his
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acceptability to the British as an acceptable ruler. Abubakar was educated by a
British missionary and cultiyated the lifestyle of an English gentleman. He
played cricket and recited poetry. When he finally succeeded his father upon
his death in 1862, Abubakar had built an extensive network of British contacts
which he continued to cultivate with his new title. He built a new palace at
Tversall on the outskirts of Singapore and entertained Prince George there.
He visited England and met Queen Victoria. In 1S83, several vears after the
death of Sultan Ali, Temenggong Abubakar had so ingratiated himself with
those in power in Britain that he was recognized as Sultan of Johor. Abubakar
went on to found the city of Johor Bahru, just across the strait of Johor from
Singapore which was key to the development of the southern Malay
peninsula. Johor once again had its own capital.
Throughout the early nineteenth century more and more English
adventurers arrived in the region as trade with the Orient expanded. In 1839
English adventurer James Brooks began his opening of Borneo and had been
named Raja of Sarawak by 1841 by the Sultan of Brunei for the role he and his
mercenary troops played in putting down local rebellions and securing the
Sultan's rule.
In 1840 the British fleet, including many of the new steamships passed
through Singapore on their way to the China coast. The Opium War and the
settlement of the conflict bv the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 had far reaching
effects on the burgeoning English trading Settlement in Southeast Asia.
The Opium War resulted in the opening of the treaty* ports in China
(Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai) and ceded Hong Kong to
the British. With a new outpost from which to conduct its China trade,
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Singapore became a vital link in the communications system of the growing
empire.
Events outside Singapore once again proved to impact significantly upon
the political order in the dominions of the British in Asia. The Sepoy
Rebellion in India in 1857 served to highlight the difficulties of the
continuing rule of the East India Company. When order was restored, the
Crown, in 1858, opted to take control of India as a crown colony, installing a
Queen's Viceroy in favor of the Governor-General of the East India
Company. As has been described above, the change which ended company
rule in India brought renewed vigor to a regional movement to give the
Straits Settlements the same status as a crown colony with direct rule from
London. On the first of April 18b7 the representative of the Viceroy of India
presided over the ceremony at the Singapore Town Hall at which control of
the Straits Settlements passed from the Viceroy of India a the newly
appointed Queen's Governor.
The opening of the Suez canal in 1896 and the extension of telegraph
services by 1870 to both India and Singapore from Europe drew the far flung
Empire closer and closer to London. The ability to conduct nearly direct
liaison with the Colonial Office in London was probably the most
instrumental change that enabled diplomatic efforts such as the policy of
"forward movement'' to be undertaken.
There was, however, another event that perhaps stimulated the
"forward movement" policy shift, that had little to do with the improvement
in communications and more to do with geopolitics. In 1871 the British
concluded a treats' with the Dutch which recognized the right of the Dutch to
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extend their sovereignty over the whole of Sumatra in return for equal
treatment of British merchants there. The Dutch were, at the lime, trying to
subdue Aceh in western Sumatra and were concerned that the British might
offer them aid. Western Sumatra had experienced the same tvpe of intertribal
warfare and roadblocks to commerce that were occurring on the Malav
peninsula. The treaty essentially sealed Aceh's fate, though it took the Dutch
some thirty vears to stamp out all resistance. Given the actions of the Dutch
in Sumatra and the terms of the treaty, the expectation that British interests
in Malava should receive similar protection was to be expected.
In the late ISSO's, British concerns over possible Russian designs on
India began to have an impact on Singapore. Concerned over the possible
expansion of the Russian Navy into the Pacific and embroiled in the "Great
Game" politics and military maneuvering in central Asia and Afghanistan,
the British expanded their military facilities in Singapore. Following Japan's
defeat of the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese war and the impressive use of
naval power they displayed, the British saw an opportunity to balance the
Russians in the Far East with the Japanese. This strategy led to the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, a treaty concluded in July of 1902. When the Russo-
Japanese war broke out in 1904, the British denied the Russians use of both
the Suez Canal and ports under their control, including Singapore. When the
Baltic Fleet finally reached the Orient, after a difficult Cape passage, it was
destroyed by the Japanese at the battle of the Tushima Straits. Until World
War II the British were as unmolseted in their control of Singapore and
Malaya as the Americans were in Manila and the Philippines.
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E. Defense: Fortress Singapore and the End of Empire.
The initial English position in Singapore was tenuous at best. Aware that
the Dutch would be enraged when they learned what had taken place, the
small detachment on the island expected that Dutch forces might attempt to
forcibly eject them from the island. On further orders from Lord Hastings for
an urgent mission in Acheen in western Sumatra, Raffles had departed with
some of the ships immediately after the treaty ceremony. Major Farquhar,
with force of about one hundred and fifty and six small cannon, was left to
defend the island. Farquhar sent word to Penang requesting reinforcement, as
local informers led him to belieye that the Dutch were indeed preparing to
assault the island. The Governor of Penang, Colonel Bannerman, was either
unable to reinforce the fledgling settlement or perhaps reluctant to support
what many considered a fools errand, and suggested he abandon Singapore
There is speculation among historians the Bannerman was "jealous alike of a
rival settlement and Raffles, and put every obstacle in his way."81
Major Farquhar, who had been the British Resident in Malacca and was
familiar with its peoples and conversant in their language, must have shared
the vision of Raffles. He ignored the advice from Penang and prepared for the
defense of the new outpost with the assets at his disposal. When the
anticipated ships arrived, they were British, not the expected Dutch attackers.
Raffles, anticipating Dutch designs on the new settlement, had sent word to
Bencoolen when he reached Sumatra for reinforcements to be sent to
Singapore. Now heavily garrisoned, no attack from the Dutch was
forthcoming. Major Farquar was promoted colonel and remained as Resident
si Ibidp. 2o?.
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in Singapore from 1819 until 1823. Following the conclusion the Anglo-Dutch
treaty of 1824, the threat of the Dutch was largely removed.
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the gravest threat that
Singapore faced was not the possibility of invasion, but the threat of piracy to
its commerce. The few patrol ships assigned to the suppression of piracy by
the East India Company were simply not up to the task. The boldest pirates,
the Illanun, from Mindanao and Northern Borneo, sent out fleets of 50 to 100
armed prahu, and attacked even the large Chinese and European sailing
vessels. The problem was not solved until the late 1860's. With the coming of
steam, more and more Royal Navy ^lips began to patrol the area. The steam
ships, able to maneuver upwind, attacked the piracv problem with deadly
effectiveness.
The defense of Singapore and more pointedly, who would pay how
much for it, had always been a bone of contention between London and
Straits Settlements. From the time of its designation as Crown Colony in 1867,
it took nearly thirty years to settle on the amount of its military contribution.
As previously mentioned the Afghan war and fears of Russian adventurisim
in India or the Pacific led to an increase in military construction and in more
port fortifications in Singapore. In the latter 1880's the government proposed
doubling the Colony's defense levy to finance the new requirements. The
merchants argued (apparently ad infinitum) that Singapore was a critical link
in the defense of the entire eastern empire and as such should be subsidized
in its defense expenditures by the London Government. While the defense
levy did not double as originally proposed, the Colony was forced to
significantly increase its defense contributions. Bv 1895 agreement was
87
reached and the lew for defense was fixed at 17 and one-half of it total
revenue.82
The first World War touched Singapore only peripherally. The German
cruiser Emden appeared in the Bay of Bengal in September of 1914 and
conducted commerce raiding against British merchantmen and for a time
closed the sea routes west. In October of the same year she attacked in a rather
daring raid on Penang. When, in November, the Emden attacked the cable
station in the Cocos Islands, she was found by an the Australian ship Sydney
and destroyed. The Indian Ocean trade routes remained open for the rest of
the war.
The pressing needs of the Turopean theater led to the British regiment in
Singapore being called to duty there, leaving a regiment of Indians to defend
the island. The regiment, made up entirely of Punjabi Muslims, was at odds
with the British over the conflict with the Muslim Turks. In an effort to
forestall difficulties in the largely Muslim region, the British ordered the
regiment to Hong Kong. Prior to departure, a rumor spread among the troops
that they were, in fact, going to be sent to Prance or Turkey. Before their
equipment was taken for loading, on the fifteenth of February, 1915, the
Indians mutinied, killing the officer coordinating the collection of arms and
besieging the Senior British Officer's house. They spread through the city in
roving bands terrorizing the civilians and killing all the British officers they
found. Those officers they did not find evacuated British women and
children to ships in the harbor and with the cooperation of the Sultan of
Johor's Malay troops
,




Volunteer Corps., and even* European sailor thev could press into service,
organized a group to combat the mutineers. The effective core of the mutinv
was broken bv the eighteenth although it took another week to round up all
the mutineers. s3 Thirtv-six of them were shot in public executions. The
remainder were imprisoned or if found innocent of charges, sent for dutv
elsewhere.
Following the First World War, Singapore's importance in the defense
of the eastern empire increased. The Washington Naval Treaties of 1922, in
addition to placing restrictions on battleship construction, also limited the
fortification of Pacific Naval bases in order to win concession from Tokvo on
the 5-5-3 ratio on battleships. This prohibited the British from fortifying Hong
Kong and left Singapore as the logical choice as the base for the British fleet in
Asia. si
The pre-war defense planning in Singapore and the subsequent Japanese
campaign against Malaya in 1941-42 that eventually resulted in the fall of
Singapore are important to understand as thev provides important lessons
that continue to inform securitv planners in Singapore todav. While the
proposals to center the British Far East defenses on naval power based in
Singapore emerged in British defense writings as earlv as 1921, even after the
Washington Naval Conference, there were still factions that opposed the
scheme and favored basing an Asian fleet in Svdnev instead.* 5 Even after the
decision was made to base the fleet at Singapore, funds for construction of the
Naval Base and strengthening the islands defenses were slow in coming. In
SoPearson, pp. 168-lo9.
"Milne and Mauzy, pp. 44-45.
S5Russell Grenfell, Main Fleet to SingaporeL (Singapore : Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 47.
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1923 the Cabinet set a goal of ten years for the completion of the post-war
defense establishment reasoning that there would be no significant global
threats to the war weary world prior to that time. After Winston Churchill
became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1924, the ten \ ear goal became a
moving window, so that each vear the date for full preparedness receded one
year into the future rather than coming one vear closer. The British service
Chiefs were left helpless in the face of a hostile Treasury on their requests for
increased funds.''
When the London Naval Conference convened in 1930, the Labor Party
was in power in Britain, and the Admiralty, hamstrung by the restrictions of
the 1920 Washington treaty, looked forward to an opportunity to put its
shipyards back to work. The Labor Government, never in favor of large
defense budgets, agreed to a further standstill in battleship construction for six
years and to include cruisers and destroyers under the ratio system.
Even with the new restrictions to fleet size the passage of the main fleet
to Singapore continued to be the strategy for the defense of the territory well
into the mid-thirties. With the difficulties in Europe, the rearmament of
Germany, the German-Italian Axis and the Japanese denunciation of the
Washington and London Naval Treaties by 1937 and activity in China mam
observers began to question publicly the ability of the Government to
despatch sufficient fleet strength to Singapore in the case of a threat in the
East.^
I he seaward defenses of Singapore were completed bv the late thirties. 15
inch guns protected the harbor and airfield capacity had been dramatically
s,
Mbid, p. 08.
s7 Ibid, p. 70.
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improved. The only things these marvelous facilities lacked were ships and
modern aircraft in sufficient numbers. The Commander in Singapore in 1937,
General Dobie, began some tentative efforts to fortify Johor in Southern
Malaya, which he viewed as vulnerable to amphibious assault. This was the
first indication that any military commander appreciated that the Naval Base
could not be held by defending the sea approaches alone. Defenses were
limited to Johor, as the assumption at the time was that the French would
maintain Indo-China, making landings further up the peninsula impractical
due to lack of land based air cover.
When the new commander, Major-General L.V. Bond assumed
command in L93Q , the plan for the defense of Singapore underwent a drastic
change. The estimated time for the fleet to reach Singapore in a crisis
situation was extended from 70 to 180 davs. This demanded a reconsideration
of the standing policy of naval defense. With the outbreak of the war in
Europe, followed by the rapid expulsion of British forces from the continent,
the strateg}' for the defense of Singapore in 1940 took an abrupt about face.
The decision was made to reinforce the Roval Air Force in Singapore to
combat the expected seaborne Japanese threat. Estimates bv the General Staff
were that the Japanese could field 713 aircraft in an attack in Southeast Asia.
British estimates of the number of aircraft to defend against such a force were
estimated, by the on site Commander, at 556 and by the Chiefs of Staff in
London, at a meager 336, based on what they assumed to be inferior aircraft
and pilots. When the Japanese attacked in 1941, there were less than half this
number in theater, which would cost the British dearly in the fight for
Malaya.
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In .March and April of 1941, there were conferences in Singapore,
including representatives from the United States and the Netherlands East
Indies. Plans for cooperation in the event of a Japanese attack in East Asia
were formulated. The principle outcome was a scheme wherebv the United
States Asiatic fleet would retire to Singapore if the Philippines were lost, and
become an integral part of its defense. The US Asiatic fleet at the time
consisted of the cruisers Houston and Marblehead, thirteen destroyers and 17
submarines. At this conference the British also announced that a British
Eastern fleet would be dispatched to Singapore. The time from departure
from Britain to arrival in Singapore was set at 80 davs.
The British received further assurances from the Americans in
Washington in March of 1941 that the Pacific fleet would be used to conduct
offensive operations against the Japanese if war broke out to relieve any
Japanese pressure on Singapore. Under the Anglo-American agreement,
signed in Washington on March 27, 1941, the decisive theater was defined as
Europe. The strategy in the Far East was to be defensive. As Russell Grenfell
remarks however, a defensive strategy of this kind implies or should imply a
successful defence'(authors italics). ss
When the Japanese moved into Indochina with the permission of the
Vichy govern lent and the Germans attacked Russia in June of 1941 the
situation became even more grave. It is at this point that the actions of
Churchill became intolerable in the eyes of those charged with the defense of
Malaya. With the Japanese now possessed of airfields capable of staging land
based attacks on Singapore and the peninsula, the theater was still desperately
88Ibid, p. 80.
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short of modern combat aircraft. Rather than send the required air strength to
Singapore, Churchill embarked upon the defense of Greece in the face of the
German invasion, an unsuccessful enterprise that cost the British 209 front-
line aircraft. Even more surprising, Churchill opened the floodgates for
Stalin, sending aircraft and pilots to aid the Russians. Speaking to the House
of Commons in 1942 Churchill said:
...that the main strategic and political decision to aid Russia ... and to
accept a consequential state of weakness in the then peaceful theater of the
Far East was sound and will be found to have played a useful part in the
general course of the war, and that it is in no wise invalidated bv the ...
heavv forfeits which we have paid and shall have to pay in the Far East-
While this may have been arguably true for those living in the British
Isles, to Malayans and Australians, the policy represented an abandonment of
the British commitment to their defense. What was finally committed to the
defense of the Far East was a hastily assembled Naval Squadron of two capital
ships, Repulse and Prince of Wales and five smaller ships, two of which were
detached from the Mediterranean squadron in questionable states of repair.
The squadron arrived in Singapore on December 2, 1941. Upon reaching
Singapore, the great battleships instilled a sense of confidence and comfort in
a population which had been growing more apprehensive as the days passed.
Although this was far from the "main fleet" which had figured so
prominently in the pre-war plans for the defense of Singapore, there was a
sense in those on the island that their defense was now more solid and able to
deal with any eventuality. General Percival recalled feelings in later writings:
s9Ibid, p. 80.
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...of the thrill it gave us all as we watched those majestic ships steaming
up the eastern channel of the Johor Strait and coming to anchor."
When the Japanese attacked in the early morning hours of December 8,
bombing Singapore and conducting landings on the east coast of the Kra
Isthmus, the British found themselves at the mercv of overwhelming
Japanese air superiority. Without an aircraft carrier, and with only minimal
support from land based air, Repulse and Prince of Wales, under the
command of Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, steamed out of Singapore on the
evening of the eighth to attempt to disrupt the Japanese landings. The time
had come for the Roval Navy to defend the Eastern Empire. The plan was to
engage the Japanese on the morning of the tenth, if they were able to make
their approach undetected. When they were detected by Japanese aircraft on
the evening of the ninth, just before darkness which would have shielded
them, the decision was made to retire to Singapore. Bv 1320 the following day
both battleships had been sunk bv Japanese aircraft operating from airfields in
Indochina. Admiral Phillips was among those who were lost.
One can arguably date the end of the great era of Britain as a world naval
power as December 10, 1941. It had perhaps shared its place at the top with the
United States for the twenty years preceeding the nearlv simultaneous
bombing of Singapore and Pearl Harbor. Prior to that, British pre-eminence at
sea had been a forgone conclusion for over a hundred \ ears. This
ignominious defeat, British Naval Historian Russell Grefell maintains, was
the culmination of two centuries of naval prowess that had enabled the
island nation to prevail over one maritime rival after another.91 E.M. Glover,
'J0Op. Cit. in Grenfell, p. 97.
91Ibid, p. 20Q.
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a British journalist in Singapore, recalls his reaction when he received the
news over the telephone:
I put the receiver down, and for a moment could not control mv
thoughts which dashed off at tangents in all directions -- the cream of our
naval defence in the Far East already at the bottom of the sea; why there
was nothing left to stop the Japanese from landing troops anywhere on the
Peninsula. I began to see mv world crumbling beneath my feet. -
With any threat to their landing force removed, the Japanese continued
to land troops and equipment. Throughout December and Januarv 1942 the
British Army in Malaya was steadily forced back. The Japanese outfought the
British and Australian defenders bv using jungle warfare tactics of
infiltration. Thev often dressed themselves in the traditional native garb of
the native Malays and the Chinese and approached advanced upon the
defenders in small groups. Newly-arrived colonial troops were often unable
to tell them from the natives. Faced with Japanese armor with none to
oppose it and absolute Japanese air superiority, the British forces fought
valiantly, but were unable to stem the tide of Japanese advance. Despite
Japanese control of the air over Malacca strait, the Sunda strait, which
remained open, enabled reinforcements to arrive, consisting of Indian and
British troops, some armor, anti-tank units and, woefully late, fighter aircraft.
On January 29, the last of the British forces withdrew to Singapore and
destroyed the causeway link. With an eighty-thousand man armv crowded
into Singapore along with thousands of civilian refugees who had fled the
peninsula the problem of keeping people alive and coordinating defense of
the island became more and more difficult. With the water from Johor cut
^Edwin Maurice Glover, In 70 Days Hie Story of the Japanese Campaign in British Malaya,
(London: Frederick Muller Ltd, lQ4o), p. Q6.
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off, the Japanese paused a week, conducting their first landings on February
8th. One week later General Perch al surrendered, ending 123 years of British
control of Singapore.
One of the kev factors that many critics of the British defense policy for
Singapore highlighted in the many attacks upon it that followed the fall of
Singapore was their failure to enlist its Asiatic population in the colony's
defense. Whether this was due to cultural arrogance, racism, or simply a lack
of foresight is unclear. What is clear is that the British assumed responsibility
for the defense of the region, spurning offers of assistance from the local
community, and then failed to meet their obligations. This was something
that the people who liyed through the occupation would neyer forget. The
disillusionment of the British ciyilians in Singapore and the Asian British
subjects who endured the defeat and their feelings of abandonment were
profound.
E.M. G lover again, on these points:
I repeat, the Japanese overran Malaya, not by the weight of heavy
artillery or by using thousands of tanks; they succeeded by the simple
expedient of utilizing man-power, skilled in the use of small arms in
jungle warfare. We had the natural defenders of our country in our midst
but we failed to accept their offer of service. Given a little training and the
necessary small arms (which should have been made in the thousands in
the country as part of our war effort from 1939 onwards) they could, and I
believe would, have beaten the Japanese at their own game. Thev were
willing to do their bit, and it is inconceivable that our administration was
such that all offers of co-operation were turned down.
This is the real reason why Malaya fell.
The siege of Singapore from the mainland... might never have begun
had we utilized the services of our own Asiatics, and a seaborne attack on
the island would have been a vastly different proposition... The island's
east coast defences, with their sixteen inch guns... could have blown the
biggest ships approaching from the southeast out of the sea. To the best of
9b
mv belief those guns never fired a shot — they were pointing the wrong
way.
If, as I have been assured, two hundred and fiftv modern fighter planes
could have saved Singapore, it is inconceivable that a government which
had ^pent si\tv-eight million pounds sterling creating a colossal naval base
with the object of guaranteeing Empire possessions in the Far East, could
not have arranged such air cover to protect it. "
General Percival met Japanese General Yamashita, the "Lion of Malaya"
in the Ford Motor Works, a symbol of the Western industrial prowess that
had driven the development o\ the colony to serve the industrial appetites of
Europeans and Americans, and signed the instrument of surrender on
February L5, l q42. When he did so, he brought to an end the era of British
supremacy that Stamford Raffles had inaugurated back in 1819. When
Percival was led into captivity with his troops in the infamous Changi prison,
the myth of European supremacy, cultivated so assiduously for a hundred
and twenty three years, went with him. While General Percival was released
at the end of the war, the myth had died with his captivity.
>Ibid, pp. 11-12.
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IV. 1942-1%5 Transition To Independence
A. Introduction: The Occupation and its Legacy
The British had presided over a society in Malaya and the Straits
Settlements designed to serve their economic interests, suppressing nascent
nationalism that might threaten the colonial order. The colonial
administration controlled the political life of urban centers overwhelmingly
populated bv immigrant, Straits born and Baba Chinese, as well as lesser
numbers of ethnic Indians from the subcontinent and Ceylon. Their control
extended into the Malayan peninsula bv a mutuallv profitable alliance with
the traditional Malay rulers whereby the British, bv economic pensioning and
outward deference, maintained the position and prestige of the Malay rulers
in exchange for the right to exploit Malaya's resources by the means of
immigrant labor. The Sultans' waning political power in the administrative
affairs of state contrasted with increasing power within the shielded Malay
communitv as the repository of all power concerning religious and cultural
affairs. Referring to this, one thoughtful observer commented, "What the
protectorate system protected most of all was the shape and structure of
traditional society from the top down.
"
94The result was a Malay society not
sharing in the booming export commerce and living in a separate and
unequal, if tranquil, social system. 95
^Cited in Stanlev S. Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore The Building of Neco States,
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1 Q7S), p. 37.
95 Ibid, p. 37.
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The Second World War and the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia
changed this arrangement rapidly and dramatically. While the Japanese were
harsh and brutal overlords, the humiliating defeat that they inflicted upon
the European powers that dominated the region bince the arrival of the
Portuguese destroyed forever the myth of the superiority of the 'white man."
Lee Kuan Yew, the primary architect of modern Singapore, was at the time a
young man of sixteen. He later described the immediate transformation the
defeat caused:
| the Europeans | were stripped literally naked as prisoners of war, and
became ordinary people. It was the Japanese ten-cent storeman who,
backed bv Japanese military might, suddenly became the big boss who
occupied the big house and had the better life.
The creeping nationalism on the peninsula and in Singapore had
previously attached itself to events in the homelands of immigrants,
primarily Chinese, and, to a lesser extent, the growing anti-colonial sentiment
among Indians. The occupation of Singapore and Malaya, by localizing this
nationalism, would draw ever more sharply the communal lines that caused
the dilemmas of the post war struggles for self-determination.
Owing to the long and bloody struggles of the Japanese in mainland
China, the Chinese in Southeast Asia came in for the most bitter treatment by
the Japanese. The viciousness of the Japanese occupation owed its origins not
only to events in China, but also to the fact that the Chinese on the peninsula
formed the core of most of the resistance efforts there. Only the MCP was
organized sufficiently to carry out armed resistance. The predominantly
' 6Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for Merger, (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, n.d.), pp. 10-11.
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Chinese MCP withdrew to the Malayan jungles, forming the Malayan Peoples
Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). By the end of the war the MPAJA, with
assistance and arms proyided by the British, built itself into a substantial, well
trained and armed guerrilla force, drawing support and sustenance from the
Chinese community. While never carrying out extensive operations against
Japanese forces, their harassment and hit and run tactics tied down a large
number of Japanese forces in Malay a. -'^
The Chinese who remained in Singapore experienced a vicious purge
just after occupation, destroying any chance of willing cooperation between
them and their new masters. Those who collaborated found themselves
loathed. The Straits Chinese and Babas, already distanced from the Chinese
community by language and affiliation, faced persecution and contempt on
two fronts, from the Japanese as colonial lackeys of the British and from the
China born Chinese for trying to hold on to their position and privilege
under the Japanese. 98 As the core of the business and commercial
communities, neither the Japanese nor the immigrant Chinese community
nor, for that matter, the Malays, could do without them. Variously exploited,
loathed, and courted by all these interests, the Straits Chinese and Babas had
to walk a verv fine line throughout the occupation to survive. More often
than not, thev found themselves facing the conundrum of trying to serve two
masters, often associating closely with the Japanese and using that the fruits
of that association to channel assistance to the Chinese community.
x)/
For an account of the activities of the MPAJA during the war see F. Spencer Chapman, The
lungle is Neutral, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1 Q51)
Slmcrun, p. 32-33.
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With regard to the Malays, the Japanese conducted themselves much in
the manner of the British, going them one better bv including them more in
the civil governance of the state. In 1943 the Japanese instituted district
advisory councils in Malava composed mainly of Malavs, increasing their
-ense ot participation in government and their confidence in their ability to
do so. In that vear thev adopted a policy on the peninsula similar to that of the
British in dealing with the bultans. This obtained their acquiescence, if not
their enthusiasm for the changes under the occupation." 1 As part of their
increasing reliance on Malavs in civil administration, the Japanese relied
heavilv on a mainlv Malay police rorce to suppress the Chinese, a disaster for
race relations. The impact of this preferential treatment was even more
divisive in Singapore (renamed bv the Japanese Syonan, or light of the South)
where the Malavs were a much smaller minority. 100
A small group of left-wing Malays, suppressed by their own conservative
leadership prior to the war, actively cooperated with the Japanese. Elements
of an early Malayan nationalist party the Kesatuan Melayu Munda (KMM),
formed in 1937 on the twin principles of throwing off colonial rule and
bringing about a united Greater Indonesia or Greater Malava to encompass all
the Malay races in one nation or Melayu Raya, had aroused the ire of both the
traditional Malay rulers and the British. Never a mass movement, its
leadership was nonetheless an unpleasant thorn in the side of both power
centers. In 1940, just prior to the war, the KMM published some articles
containing strong criticism of British colonial rule in the expanding




its leaders and some of its tiny membership. When the Japanese released the
detainees, they resumed their political activity. The Japanese eventually
proscribed the KMM in favor of an organization they could exercise more
control over called PETA {Pembela Tanah Ayer or Our Country's Avengers).
This was an armed militia under the command of the founder of KMM,
Ibrahim Yaacob, a Malay whom the Japanese-appointed a lieutenant colonel.
As the War began to go badly for the Japanese, PETA reorganized itself as
Kesatwan Ka'ayai Indonesia Semenanjong (KRIS, or Union of the
Indonesian Peninsular Peoples) and attempted to have Malava included in
the Declaration of Independence the Japanese had promised to Indonesia.
Discussions held with Hatta of Indonesia negotiating with the MCP in
Taiping, and Sukarno negotiating with the Japanese High Command in
Saigon, failed to produce the desired results. The scheme, thwarted bv the
rapid and unconditional surrender of the Japanese and demands bv the MCP
in Taiping that the Malavs be disarmed, produced no lasting political
result. 101The movement, quashed quickly when the British returned in 1945,
saw its leaders either imprisoned for collaboration or fleeing to exile in
Indonesia. Out of its ashes The Malayan Nationalist Party (MNP) would later
arise, the only ethnic Malay organization to flirt seriously with communism
and associate with the MCP.
As for the Indians, the Japanese sought to harness them, with other
Indian expatriates in the conquered territories, into an anti-colonial army to
assist in the task of driving the British from India. Subhas Chandra Bose, the
militant anti-British Bengali, headed this Indian National Armv. Twice
101Minchin, p. 36.
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during the war years the base for his force was Singapore. 102 A provisional
Indian Government-in-exile called Azad Hind also established itself under
Mr. Bose. Collaborators, attracted either bv enthusiasm or expediency, were
the onlv Indians not driven underground. As the war progressed, the
Japanese sent non-collaborating Indians north in increasing numbers as slave
labor on the Siamese "Death Railway'' and Japanese-Indian relations became
more and more contentious. The British also quashed all the pro-Japanese
Indian organizations upon their return but the heightened sense of political
awareness remained.
With the sudden end of the war the British returned to Malava and
Singapore with plans to re-impose their rule, albeit in a new more
"progressive manner."' The twin prongs of the new British policv were first,
separating Singapore from Malaya to be ruled as a separate crown colonv and
second, incorporating Penang and Malacca into a new Malayan Union with
common citizenship for all Malayan born, regardless of race. The latter policy
provoked an emotional reaction in the Malays. Long shut out of the political
and economic life of their homeland, the Malays were eager to assert their
political and economic rights to counter years of what they rightly viewed as
exploitation by both the British and the immigrant Chinese. The political
climate the British found upon their return, however, was far different from
the one that had prevailed prior to their defeat at the hands of the Japanese.
James Minchin describes the effect of the end of the occupation and the
"parting gift" of the Japanese:
102The Indian National Army never became a significant force and had no impact on the war,
except as a propaganda tool of the Japanese against British imperialism. As the Allies
advanced in Southeast Asia, Bose fled the area, seeking protection from the Japanese. He died
in August 1945 when a plane taking him from Formosa to Japan crashed.
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Almost overnight the political center of gravity moved across the
Causewav from Singapore. The island began to look more like a Chinese
Gibraltar than the headquarters of the peninsula, with organic control of
its economic, administrative and military affairs. From that time, attempts
to bring Singapore back into Malaya or to intensify the contradictions of
Malayan society and consolidate the struggle of urban or rural poor could
be frustrated bv the threat of racial tension. The government in power
could also have a ready-made excuse to delay reform and justify
suppression.
The parting gift of the Japanese to the British was a Pandora's box not
just of anti-colonialism but of heightened communalism. u1?
The post war years were headv times with the struggle for freedom from
colonial rule played out throughout Southeast Asia. The rising tide of
nationalism and the emergent battle of the communist and non-communist
world placed Southeast Asia at center stage in this new drama. The blurring
of these two movements, nationalist and communist, and confusion
concerning their linkage was the cause of tremendous strife in Southeast
Asia. Malaya and Singapore were no exception. Among the results of the war
was the fact that there existed in Malaya a well armed and organized
communist fighting force, mostly Chinese, looking for inspiration to
mainland China and a more politically aware Malay population, eschewing
the communist line (viewed by Malays as the "Chinese" line) but impatient
to take control of their own destiny.
Singapore, at the base of the seething peninsula, echoed or reacted to
these events in various ways as it matured politically. In the first phase of its
existence, economics, controlled bv Europeans and benefiting both the
colonizers and the Chinese, had driven the events that shaped Singapore. In
10: Minchin, p. 37,
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Ihis new post-war era, politics would take the wheel and drive events that
eventually led to an unlikelv end, the birth of the independent Republic of
Singapore, an island nation of barelv 240 square miles, with no natural
resources and without sufficient water to keep its population of some two
million supplied with the most fundamental substance for maintaining life.
It would also be the crucible from which would emerge one of the most
remarkable politicians of the twentieth centurv, Lee Kuan Yew, and an almost
equallv remarkable and dedicated group that formed the core of the People's
Action Partv that has governed Singapore ever since.
In the section that follows, the political maneuvering lor control of
Singapore and the battle for merger with Malava and the British Borneo
territories will be examined, sometimes in laborious detail. This period of
transition to independence is critical to understand, as it was during this time
that the PAP earned it political stripes. The methods it learned, such as
detention without trial, libel suits against political opponents, and the "iron
law of oligarchv" in controlling the partv, remain part and parcel of the PAP
todav in a much less turbulent era. It is largely the continued utilization of
these "tools of the trade" that result in criticism of the government of
Singapore today.
B. Politics
The Japanese occupation heightened political awareness on the
Peninsula and Singapore and increased the desire of the non-European
peoples there for self-government. The British, by their policies after their
return, added further fuel to the fire. The British Militarv Administration
(BMA) which initiallv took control after the war was characterized bv
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corruption and inefficient management. The popular appellation circulating
through Singapore following the war was that BMA stood for Black Market
\dministration. 104 A British economist, T.H. Silcock, who lived through that
period maintained, as did others, that the British did more to discredit
colonial government in its post-war administration than the Japanese ever
did during the occupation. 103
Political lines were sharplv drawn as the anti-colonial sentiments of the
people were inspired bv both local and world events. The Malavs organized to
protect the special privileges that the traditional rulers had always enjoved
and to extend Malay influence into the real centers of power. These thev saw
as threatened bv British imperatives to grant equal citizenship to immigrant
populations. The Indians, also responsive to events in the subcontinent,
formed political groups and involved themselves in unions, influenced by
British socialists. Their relatively small numbers limited their political
influence in the unfolding struggles.
The immigrant Chinese, who suffered the most under occupation,
internalized a deep resentment of foreign domination. The Chinese, inspired
bv the dynamics of the struggle in their homeland, divided their lovalties
between the KMT and to an increasing extent, the rising tide of the
communists under Mao. Again the Straits born and Baba Chinese found
themselves in a difficult position. Culturally isolated bv language and by
virtue of their English-language education, these elements of the society had
based their plans before the war on advancing in the existing colonial order.
When the war ended, many were anxious for a return to the pre-war order
104Minchin, p. 38.
l03Op. Cit. in Minchin, p. 38.
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that had long provided the opportunities for upward mobility. That is was
this latter group of ethnic Chinese, by enlisting English-educated Malays and
Indians to their cause, who formed the core of the party that would
eventually dominate politics in Singapore is, in retrospect, an unlikely
outcome. The English-educated were nominally the most acceptable group
from the perspective of the British and this certainly worked in their favor.
Thev were able to unite the populace, distanced from them bv language and
culture, behind their movement, discrediting and eliminating the
communists and triumphing over the politics of race. This, in itself, was a
remarkable accomplishment.
On April 1,1946, the British ended the military administration of
Singapore and Malaya. As has been noted, The Straits Settlements were
dissolved, Penang and Malacca were incorporated into a new Malayan Union
and Singapore was made a separate Crown Colony, to be governed directlv
from London. The Union was replaced by the Malayan Federation in 1948.
The British maintained the separation of Singapore because of the ethnic
imbalance its large Chinese population would have introduced in the new
Malayan Federation and the strategic importance Singapore still played in
British defense plans in Asia. 106
The year 1946 also marked the first elections in Singapore, for six of
thirteen non-official" positions on the Legislative Council that, under a new
colonial constitution was to assist the governor and his Executive Council in
managing the colony's affairs. The electoral franchise included only British
subjects. Twenty-two thousand registered and 65% voted. Although
i06Milne & Mauzy, p. 45.
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inconsequential in government, this did stimulate the formation of political
parties.
The Malavan Democratic Union, a communist front, organized but
boycotted the elections and organized protests against the new constitution.
The Progressive Party formed in 1947, represented English-educated, pro-
British business and professional interests. It was the only party to contest the
elections, winning three of the six seats, the remainder going to
independents. The Progressives advocated constitutional reform toward self-
government but had no anti-colonial fervor.
At about the same time, the MCP ended its moderate stance of ^eekin<r a
political role through constitutional means. This policy was discredited when
the MCP discovered that its leader during the war, Lai Teck, was a double
agent. He had served both the British and Japanese. The militant Chinese
chauvinist Chin Peng assumed leadership of the MCP. Following the
conclusion Malayan Federation Agreement he led the MCP, including most
of its Singapore elements, into the jungles of the peninsula and began a
period of armed resistance. The British declared a state of emergency in
Malaya on June IS, 1948.
The threat of "The Emergency" has important distinguishing
characteristics. Leadership was firmly in the hands of the MCP and the armed
factions that comprised the guerrilla army were almost entirely Chinese,
deriving their support overwhelmingly from the Chinese community. This
continued the pattern established by the MPAJA of the Second World War. 107
Bv 1955, the armed struggle had ended for the most part. As a consequence of
"•"'Bedlington, p. 76.
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etfective British anti-insurgency tactics, the prospects of immediate success tor
the armed revolt had considerably dimmed bv 1954. The MCP lost much of its
ideological appeal when the British promised national independence. From
L951 onwards, the People's Republic of China, which inspired the MCP
movement, shifted its foreign policy to one of united front tactics based on
peaceful coexistence between Asian states .1°* The official "emergency" was
formallv ended bv declaration of the Malayan government in 19b0.
The last five vears of the struggle had consisted mainlv of mopping up
operations, eventually driving the last insurgent elements into sanctuaries
across the Thai border. While characterized as a "communist" insurgency, the
emergency appealed much more to Chinese nationalism than it did to anv
overarching communist ideology. The violent years of the emergency, which
also witnessed the birth of an independent Federation of Malava, further
aggravated the ethnic tensions on the peninsula and aroused Malay
suspicions of all things Chinese. Many of these suspicions were directed at the
Chinese-tinted island across the Johor Strait.
Lee Kuan Yew and the Founding of the People's Action Party
Following the war, Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore s future Prime Minister,
resumed his pursuit of the established means of obtaining upward mobility, a
university education in England. Lee was a Straits born Chinese whose family
had been in Singapore for three generations. He spoke no Chinese and had
served the Japanese during the occupation as a translator in the Singapore
branch of the Domei news agency. There is much speculation concerning his
wartime years of possible connections with British intelligence although no
10S Ibid, p. 82.
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confirmation of this. During the latter phases of the war, Lee used his
position to funnel more accurate war news to the Chinese community and to
circulate information contradicting Japanese propaganda. He ^lipped awav
from the agency in early 1945 when Japanese suspicions were aroused and
stayed underground until the end of the war. 109
A remarkable student he graduated from Cambridge in Law with double
honors and a star for special distinction. This distinction was the first for a
Chinese from Malaya. Following completion of his degree, Lee moved to
London for formal law training. There he became associated with The
Malayan Forum. This was an expatriate student group, dedicated to
promoting national independence in their homeland. Here Lee met many
who would become leading lights of the independence movements in Malaya
and Singapore. These included Goh Keng Swee, who would eventually
become his second in the People's Action Party (PAP) and the architect of
Singapore's economic transformation, and Toh Chin Chve, with whom he
was acquainted with from his days at the prestigious Raffles Institution before
the war, who would be the PAP's first chairman. He also met Abdul Razak,
(later Tun Abdul Razak) who would become a vital member of the ruling
Alliance party of Malaya and Malaysia's second Prime Minister.
Convinced that the days of British colonialism were numbered, many of
the students, whose previous prospects for success were historically tied to the
fortunes of the British, viewed with apprehension the growing influence of
the communists in Malava. The challenge, as Lee put it in a speech to the
Forum, was for the students to take the lead in the independence movements
109Minchin, p. 35.
110
on their return or see the prerogatives they had cultivated for themselves
removed bv the communists.
Lee expressed his views in a speech before the Forum:
...if we do not exercise leadership, it will come from the other ranks of
societv, and if these leaders attain power, as thev will with the support of
the masses, we shall find that we, as a class, have merelv chaneed masters.
The difference between the British, the Japanese and the new masters who
will arise if we remain unorganised will be a difference only of degree and
not of kind.'110
The dilemma, as Lee saw it, was that the students would have to put
their vested interests in the colonial order aside and take a leading role in
sweeping that order away, if they did not, thev along with their British
patrons, would be swept awav, missing the chance to join the elite that most
had anticipated for so long. Lee Kuan Yew returned to Singapore in 1950, with
the emergency across the causeway dominating regional concerns, and a
strange quiescence in the political scene in Singapore. The quiet was due onlv
to the swift detention of the remaining elements of the MCP who remained
in Singapore following the beginning of hostilities.
In 1951 Singapore was made a city by Roval Charter and a second election
was held for a city council and an increased number of seats in the Legislative
Council. The franchise was again limited to British subjects. The British-
oriented Progressive Party predictably dominated the elections.
In 1953 the British recognized the disturbing trend in Singapore of
Chinese affiliation with both events in mainland China and the revolt on the
peninsula. As the armed revolt was contained on the peninsula, the MCP
110 Ibid, p. 46.
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turned its attention to Singapore. There it attempted, somewhat successfully,
to infiltrate both trade unions and Chinese-language secondary schools. The
British, in an effort to guide Singapore toward self-government which would
steer leadership into the hands of the English-educated (and hopefully pro-
British), convened the Rendel Commission to recommend constitutional
changes.
The Rendel Constitution recommendations, accepted by the Singapore
government, included the replacement of the Executive Council,
appointments to which were controlled bv the British, bv a Council of nine
ministers, bix elected and three appointed by the Governor. The Council
would be headed bv a Chief Minister who would be the leader of the majoritv
partv in the new body. The new Council would act as a cabinet and have
collective responsibility for all matters except defense, external affairs and
internal security. The proposal also included a new Legislative assembly of 32
members to be elected by an almost universal franchise to whom the Council
of Ministers would be responsible. The Rendel Constitution ignited political
awareness in Singapore as never before and the formation of political parties
began again in anticipation of the elections scheduled for 1955.
David Marshall, an English-educated lawyer of Iraqi-Jewish extraction,
joined forces with two former members of the Singapore Labour Party,
Francis Thomas and Lim Yew Hock to form the new Labour Front in July,
1954. The pro-British party of the right, the Progressive Party, unabashedly
pro-colonial and , without any base for grassroots support beyond the
commercial community, began to amass a war chest of political contributions
with which to currv the favor of voters. The Democratic Party, formed in
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February, 1955 bv Ihe Chinese Chamber or Commerce, appealed to traditional
and well heeled Chinese commercial interests.
In November, L954 the People's Action Party was founded. Lee Kuan
Yew assembled a group of like-minded English-educated associates and an
unlikely group of the far left to carry forward the vision he first formulated
during his stay in Britain. True to his original assessment, Lee's group of
confederates would attempt to build its following among the poor and non-
English speaking people. The coalition of forces that initially made up the
PAP was a group that had in common only one goal, independence from
British rule. Beyond that there were large differences on key points, social and
economic policy, internal security policy and most importantly, independence
through merger with Malaya. The political battle for control of the PAP
between the moderates of Lee Kuan Yew and the leftist and communist
factions is not only fascinating, it additionally provides evidence of the
political tools which the PAP leadership continued to use, once it had firmly
captured control of the Party, to keep political opposition firmly in check.
The Early Peoples Action Party and Struggle for Control.
Lee Kuan Yew's life in Singapore, following his return from Britain,
does not belie a man planted in the fertile ground for left-leaning politics. He
was presented to the Bar and began practicing law. A more bourgeois oriental
gentleman could hardly be found. Married soon after his return to Kwa Geok
Choo, also a British educated attorney whom he had courted while in
England, the couple settled in a comfortable house in Singapore. Lee bought
the classic symbol of affluence in Southeast Asia, a Studebaker, and enjoyed
his leisure by breeding Alsatians.
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Communal violence had erupted in Singapore in 1950 in what were
known as the Maria Hertog riots. The riots were triggered bv a story and
photograph in the Malav language newspaper, Utusan Melayu, concerning a
Dutch girl who had been sheltered and raised bv Malav Muslims during the
war. After the war she had been taken from them and sent to a convent bv a
European judge. Lee was charged with the defense of some Muslims accused
of murder in the riots and, despite what he felt was their guilt, had them
acquitted. He viewed this exercise as a political trial to mete out false justice to
contain the seething communal forces that threatened order in the colonv. It
is ironic that Lee 's success in this case, and in others in the \ ears that followed
left a sour taste in his mouth concerning the principle of trial bv jurv. Once
the PAP took control of the government, trial bv jurv was eventually
eliminated. 111
Lees initial political involvement was with the "proper'' elements of
pro-British organizations, the Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA) and
the Progressive Party (PP). The attraction to the PP was it platform of merger
with Malaya, but Lee became disaffected by the party's resort to bribery and
demagoguerv.
In the wake of the Hertog riots Lee was retained bv the owner of the
Utusan Melayu for legal advice. The owner, Yusof Ishak (later to be Head of
State and Singapore's first President) was an uncompromising Malav
nationalist and was well connected with Malay political centers. Through
Yusof, Lee was introduced to the entire range of the Malay political spectrum.
^Lee has, through the vears, cited numerous examples from his legal career where he
obtained acquittals ot guilty defendants in cases ranging from petty gambling operations and
tax evasion to murder. 1 rial bv jury was eliminated in two phases, for non-capital crimes in
1 Q59 and for capital crimes in l Qo9. See Minchin, p. 82.
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"i usof had access to Malavan United National Malays Organization (UMNO)
and its leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Yusofs own multi-racial approach put
him somewhat at odds with the policy of entrenched privilege and protected
tradition that prevailed in the Tunku's UMNO organization.
The paper's editor, Samad Ismail was ferventlv nationalist and Marxist
as well. Through Samad, Lee was introduced to Devan Nair, a radical
Malavan born Indian labor leader who would become a kev PAP functionary
and later President of Singapore.
During this earlv period Lee and his colleague from his University davs
in Britain, Goh Keng Swee, were in contact with the British "Special Branch"
which monitored political developments in Singapore and the peninsula and
coordinated internal securitv efforts. It was through his Special Branch
contacts that Lee met another key player in the emergence of the PAP, Indian
journalist Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, who would go on to a long and
distinguished career with the PAP, playing a key role in Singapore's foreign
affairs.
Rajaratnam, also English-educated and a staunch anti-colonialist, steered
Lee into the Union movement as the legal representative for the Uniformed
Postal Staff Workers Union. When the Union went on strike in 1952 Lee
impressed the unionists with his legal acumen and dedication to their cause.
His very public arguments for the union resulted in a successful settlement
and enhanced his image as an advocate against colonial interests. As a result
of his success with the Postal Workers, Lee became the legal adviser to a large
group of unions. This resulted in the creation of a group known as the
Council of Action to provide a clearinghouse for civil service labor
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organizations in dealings with the colonial government. Lee Kuan Yew's
connection to organized labor was to be the kev to reaching a mass base of
support for the PAP.
The political breakthrough for these English-educated leaders came in
1954 when Chinese Middle School students staged a mass protest against a
national service scheme for militarv training (against the background of the
newly signed SEATO alliance which included Britain, but not Malaya and
Singapore). Many of the students were arrested and charged with sedition. Lee
acted as assistant to the defense counsel for the students and for the
Universitv Social Club publication Fajar which had also been charged for
publishing an anti-SEATO editorial that had characterized Malava as a police
state.' The journal was acquitted but the students lost their case.
This venture provided Lee entrance into the world of the non-English
speaking Chinese majority where politics were deadly serious business and
where the radical left was active and passionate. With the awakened political
consciousness of the Chinese masses the Malayan Communist Part}' had the
most to gain. At the center of this movement in Singapore was MCP
operative Lim Chin Siong. Through Devan Nair and Samad Ismail, Lee was
connected with Lim Chin Siong. Lim was active among the student
movement, basing his organizing appeal on both pride in the new China and
the insecurity7 of the Chinese in Malaya and Singapore. According to Lim, the
\;anvang Chinese, were a stateless people receiving no consideration from
the colonial government. Thus began the unlikely common front, the
communists, leftist radicals and the English-educated nationalists that would
provide the basis of the new Peoples Action Partv.
lib
On November 21, 1954 Ihe new party was inaugurated in a meeting at
Victoria hall in Singapore. On the platform with Lee Kuan Yew was Tunku
Abdul Rahman of the UMNO and Tan Cheng Lock of the Malayan Chinese
Association (MCA), respectively the Malay and Chinese faction leaders of the
most powerful force in peninsular politics, the Malayan Alliance. This
inclusion was meant to highlight the PAP's policy of independence through
merger. Lee outlined the Party platform: the end of colonialism and the
establishment of a democratic government for all Malaya, including
Singapore, with universal adult suffrage; to entrench the right to work and its
full rewards in the economic order; to abolish unjust inequities of wealth and
opportunity; to guarantee social security to those unable to work; and to
infuse a spirit of endeavor, national unity, self-respect and self-reliance. 112
The "Rendel Elections" of 1955 and their Aftermath
In the 1955 elections, the PAP elected not to field a full set of candidates
because of the restrictions of the Rendel Constitution and the Party's late
organizing start. Under the terms of the Rendel constitution, the British
retained responsibilities for internal security, which included the sweeping
power of preventative detention without trial. Should the British conduct
unpopular or controversial use of their power, the PAP rightly reasoned that
any sitting government would be held equally responsible for such actions.
To form a government under such restrictions was seen to be counter to the
long term interests of the party. The view of the PAP (although not entirely
accurate throughout the dissolving British empire) was that those who took
power before independence rarely retained afterwards.
112Minchin, p. 74.
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The PAP fielded four candidates and a fifth supporter, Ahmad Ibrahim,
as an independent. Of the 300,000 registered voters, over half actually voted,
as opposed to onlv about a third in the previous election's more limited
franchise. The results, in the confused political milieu of the first real
elections in Singapore, were predictablv mixed. The PAP won three of the
four seats it contested (including Lee's seat ) and Ibrahim won his as well. The
right wing vote was split. The Labor Front, under David Marshall, won the
most seats, 10 of 17 contested, and was asked bv the colonial authorities to
form a government. Marshall was a charismatic figure who had staunchly
resisted the Japanese and had been shipped to work as a slave laborer in the
coal mines of Hokkaido during the war. The platform of the Labour Front
was to seek immediate independence through merger with Malaya, abolition
of emergency regulations and Singapore citizenship for its 220,000 China born
residents. 113 The Party appealed for a "dynamic socialism" to counter the
allure of communism.
With an unstable minority government with limited autonomy, the
British were obliged to take another look at their plans for Singapore. The
demands of the non-English speaking Chinese majority were finding
increasing outlet in the newly seated assembly, both through the Labor Front
Government of Marshall and the PAP "loyal opposition" representatives,
particularly Lee Kuan Yew7 . The labor union movement strengthened itself in
the more labor friendly atmosphere under Marshall's Labour government.
Lim Chin Siong and his confederate Fong Swee Suan, also a leading PAP
leftist (communist ) took control of some important unions in 1954 (The Bus
1 ^Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, p. 4°.
118
Workers and The Factory and Shop Workers Unions) and solidified their ties
in the Chinese speaking middle schools. During 1955 the Hock Lee Bus
Workers strike in April and May led to riots and bloodshed between strikers,
students, secret society gangsters and police. The detention of six Factory
Workers Union leaders in June resulted in public protests, as had an earlier
effort by Chinese Middle School Students for registration of their union.
It was during this turbulent time that Lee Kuan Yew made a statement
that would haunt him and although it probably accurately reflected the tenor
of the times, it is also one of the many gaffes in "transparency" and off-the-
cuff-remark that, although infrequent, have consistently marked Lee'b career.
This quote, reported by an Australian journalist, appeared in the Straits
Times on May 5, 1955:
The Communists are certain to win and nothing and no one can stop
them. Any man in Singapore who wants to carry the Chinese-speaking
people with him cannot afford to be anti-Communist.
"
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The PAP attempted some damage control for these unfortunate remarks
before the Party's second conference in June of 1955. They restated the Party
platform for an independent, democratic, non-communist Malava. Behind
the scenes, the competing party factions struck a deal to "soften" the party's
image and distance it from suspected communist elements. The more radical
elements agreed to step down from the Central Executive Committee or not
to stand for Committee election at the June conference. In exchange, the
communists were granted complete control of the union movement, without
restraint by the more moderate elements led by Lee. Both factions were
buviner time for the showdown that they ultimately knew must come.
114Op. Cit. in Minchin, p. 78.
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The PAP Party Chairman, Toh Chin Chve, also English-educated and a
Lee confederate from both Raffles College before the war and The Malayan
Forum in Britain following the war, proposed a united front of the PAP and
the Labour Front in late 1Q 55 to press for independence. The general view of
the PAP was reflected in David Marshall's rebuff of having no truck with
those who are playing footie footie with Communism.'113
In 195b Marshall led an all-partv conference to London for negotiations
to accelerate Singapore's movement toward ^elf-government. Lee Kuan Yew
and Lim Chin Siong were the PAP representatives. The failure of the talks
(contributed to bv Lee'^ intransigence and political maneuvering) resulted in
the resignation of Marshall. Lim Yew Hock took charge of the Labour Front
government. Lim was more dependent on the British than .Marshall and
followed a more activist security line, detaining a number of leftists,
including the PAP's Lim Chin Siong. This unfortunate line painted Lim Yew
Hock with the British lackey brush and doomed his political future, much to
the delight of the PAP. The decision not to contest for control of the
government under the Rendel Constitution was, in retrospect, a wise one
indeed.
In 1957 talks resumed once again in London for self-government and the
proposals of the earlier year were modified to make them more palatable to
both parties. A compromise was reached on the control of internal security bv
the establishment of the Internal Security Council (ISC). The ISC was
comprised of three British nominees, three Singapore government nominees
and a Federation of Malaya representative who would hold the casting vote.
115Op. C it. in Minchin, p. / Q .
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This arrangement played well for both the PAP and the Labour Front who
were both in favor of merger. In these negotiations Lee showed, once again,
his talent for back room political dealing. Through private contact with the
Colonial Secretary, he had included in the agreement a clause which
prevented those who had been detained for subversion from standing for
office in the upcoming elections. This move would simplify his problem of
containing the leftists in his own partv and enhance the power of his
moderate faction. When the agreement was accepted and made public, he
took the popular position of protesting the clause as contrary to normal
democratic practice.' 116 The practice of eliminating candidates on the basis of
criminal convictions or wrongdoing is one of the many tools the PAP
continues to use to hamstring the political opposition in Singapore. This,
when coupled with a questionable degree of judicial freedom in modern
Singapore, has become an effective and well used tool of political control.
While the talks in London addressed the issues of self-government, the
struggle for control of the PAP was joined in Singapore. In 1956 the leftists
gained four seats on the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and moved to
give increased power to the branches, which thev largely controlled. While
these proposals were being hashed out and the moderates looked to be on the
run, the Lim Yew Hock Government detained all the leftist PAP CEC
members and the PAP cadres who were involved in union disturbances.
The following year, at the Annual Conference of the PAP in August, six
leftists were elected to the CEC and, in protest over alleged improprieties in
the party elections, Lee and five other non-communists' refused to stand for
116Minchin, p. 84.
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office in the new CEC. Ten days later, the Lim Yew Hock government
detained five of the six leftists elected to the CEC.
While Lee's complicity for these detentions has never been firmly
established, the speculation that they took place with his knowledge if not his
encouragement was fanned bv Lim Yew Hock's statement in the Assembly in
1959 that he had done many good things for the PAP after discussions - \ ith
their leadership.
With the leftists detained. Lee's faction took control of the cadre lists and
the CEC. What resulted from all these maneuvers was a party structure in the
PAP which resembled the Stalinist system of circular power. The CEC
screened and approved the cadres and the cadres elected the CEC. Thomas
Bellows described it as the 'iron law of oligarchy.' 117 Lee himself described it
as the Pope choosing the Cardinals and the Cardinals choosing the Pope.118
Prior to the elections of 1959, with the leftists still detained, the party went
through a re-registration which limited cadres to Singapore citizens
(excluding many extremists), over twenty-one and literate. Following
electoral success in 1959, but before the release of the detained PAP leftists, Lee
further consolidated his control of the party by filling out the CEC with two
year appointments and limiting all non-CEC cadres to a temporary status of
one year.
This was a vitally important development in the evolution of the PAP.
The "elitist," Stalinist type system of separating the party leadership from the
control of its membership remains to this day. This top down style of political
'l' Thomas Bellows, The Peoples Action Putty in Singapore, (Vale University : Southeast
Asian Studies No. 14), pp. 24-28.
liSVlinchin, p. 88.
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control placed decision making power and party control firmly in the hands
of the party leadership.
Singapore was marked bv public turmoil between l°5b and l Q59. The
Lim Yew Hock government found itself in the unenviable position of trying
to maintain order in an atmosphere of growing communist-led labor unrest
and activism in the Chinese-speaking community. While the organizing of
the Chinese community was largely carried out bv MCP elements, few of the
Chinese identified with communism and most eschewed violence. It was this
type of politics that many had fled in China, and there was little real militancy
in the Chinese community. When the government and the British Special
Branch moved forcefully to suppress unrest and conducted security sweeps
detaining the radical leadership, they were largely successful. When Malaya
was granted its independence in 1957 the MCP lost much of its nationalist
appeal and became ever more associated with Chinese chauvinism.
Allegedly, the MCP leadership concluded a deal with the PAP to support the
PAP in the 1959 elections in exchange for the appointment of some of its
detained supporters as political secretaries.
When PAP functionary K.M. Byrne, a civil servant, uncovered evidence
of corruption on the part of the Labour Front Education Minister Chew Swee
Kee, Party- Secretary Toh Chin Chye went public with the allegations. The PAP
coalesced around the anti-corruption issue and resolved to contest the 1959
elections in earnest, putting up candidates for all 51 seats, many rapidly
recruited in the final davs before the elections. Herein lies the beginning of
the PAP as the dogged fighter of government corruption. The party destined
to lead by its moral authority, the modern mandate of heaven.
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The 1959 Elections, The PAP takes Power.
The PAP took 53% of the vote in the 1959 elections, winning 43 of the
total of 31 seats in the new Assembly. On June 3, i Q 5Q , the PAP took the reins
of government in Singapore that it has yet to relinquish. True to his pre-
election promise, Lee refused to form a government until the PAP detainees
were released, and the British acquiesced to that demand. As earlier noted,
however, prior to their release, Lee consolidated his control of the partv
machinery. Control, however, was still tenuous. Ong Eng Guan had, prior to
the elections, been elected Mayor of Singapore on the PAP ticket and was
poised to challenge Lee's leadership. Lee was chosen as prime minister over
One onlv bv Toh Chin Chve's casting vote in the CEC. A brash orator and
fluent in Hokkien, Singapore's predominant Chinese dialect, Ong was an
extremely popular figure. Following the elections the mayoral post and city
council were eliminated and Ong was given the National Development
portfolio in the new government, for which he was eminently unqualified
and in which he performed miserably. When he challenged Lee's leadership
of the party and leveled charges of nepotism and manipulation against him,
the party moved against Ong. Using the evidence of Ong's failure in his
ministerial post the PAP expelled him. The unsubstantiated charges he
brought against Lee and K.M. Byrne were refuted. Thus, in a matter of just
more than a year, Lee eliminated the major threats to his control of the party.
When, in 1961, Ong returned to the legislature, crushing his PAP
opponent in a by-election, many blamed Lee for his very un-Chinese personal
attacks on Ong's character. The importance of Ong's victory was lost on
neither the PAP nor the Alliance government in Malaya, still wrestling with
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Ihe question oi merger. The ruling Alliance was a coalition of three parties on
the peninsula, each organized along racial lines. The United Malays National
Organization (UMNO) represented Malay interests. The Malayan Chinese
Association (MCA) represented Chinese on the peninsula. The Malayan
Indian Congress (MIC) represented the Indians. Leadership of the Alliance
was firmly in the hands of Tunku Abdul Rahman of the UMNO. With fears
of the MCP still evident, the victory of Ong, as a underdog Chinese-speaking
candidate running against a former leftist detainee put up by the PAP, with
impeccable anti-British, pro-labor credentials, indicated that support for the
left den\ed from Chinese chauvinism and not the contrary. The victory of
Ong indicated to the Alliance the power of the Chinese in Singapore to
organize themselves along communal lines, outside the compliant
organization of the MCA. The PAP reinvigorated its efforts to connect with
the Chinese and began to cultivate members who would support their line
who were proficient in the dialects. Lee resolved to learn Hokkien and made
fresh overtures to the Tunku in Malaya for merger. The prospects for rising
Chinese chauvinism in Singapore made the idea of control through merger
an increasingly attractive proposition to the Tunku.
Toward Merger with Malaya to Form Malaysia
Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaya's Prime Minister, was pro-British for a
number of reasons. Malaya had gained its independence on very favorable
terms, based on its common front with the British to fight the communist
menace in its jungles. The British had also supported the political dominance
of Malays in the post-colonial government, fearing the menace of a
communist leaning Chinese population, and perhaps attempting to redress
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the inequities of the colonial order which had placed the Malays in a very
disadvantaged position.
The Tunku's positions during the period of the earlv sixties which led to
merger were heavily influenced by the British. The strategic utility of
Singapore had diminished somewhat with the resolution of the Suez crisis.
The volatility of Singapore's politics and the generally compliant relationship
the British had cultivated with the new Malayan government, led them to
reassess their policy of a separate Singapore and move to one favoring ^ome
tvpe of merger. The Malayan leader, fearful of the effects of trying to absorb
Singapore's huge Chinese population, was in favor only of an arrangement
that would include Britain's other colonies in Borneo, balancing the ethnic
impact of merger. The rise of the Communist party in Sukarno's Indonesia
(the PKI) also contributed to the general sense of disquiet that argued for
merger. There were fears that Singapore's political volatility might
eventually result in a "Chinese Cuba - ' at the base of the peninsula, trying to
export revolution should the communist elements gain control. Both the
British and the Tunku believed that such a threat could be best dealt with bv
including Singapore within the Federation.
The Tunku went public with his ideas for a merger of all the former
British colonies in Southeast Asia on May 27, 1961. Although historians point
out that the Tunku's initial statement was mooted more as a trial balloon to
the Borneo territories than as a statement of intent.' 10 The PAP pounced
upon the proposal and began an intensive campaign in Singapore to win its
approval.
llyM.N. Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation. iKuala Lumpur: Perterbit
Universiti Malaya, 1974), p. 140.
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The merger issue set the stage for the final struggle tor control of the
PAP. The leftist elements wanted no part of Malaysia. Staunchly anti-
communist, the Malayan government in concert with the British had
effectively eliminated the leftists on the peninsula. Intolerant of left-leaning
Chinese, the Malayan government could be expected to conduct a ruthless
campaign to eliminate them as a political force. Thus began a fight on two
fronts for the moderate faction of the PAP, one, to secure control of the party
in Singapore and the other to lobby for the most favorable merger terms
possible with the Malayan government to preserve political power equivalent
to their numbers, their economic clout and the defense value of island to the
proposed Malaysia.
Shortly after the Tunku's proposal surfaced, the PAP lost another crucial
by-election, with David Marshall being returned to Parliament. In an
emergency session of Parliament. Lee called for a vote of confidence and
barely survived. Thirteen PAP leftists crossed the floor and joined the
opposition. The PAP held the bare majority of 26 seats in the 51 member
assembly. On July 26 the defecting members formed the Barisan Socialis
(Socialist Front).
The crisis for the PAP was real. The leftists controlled the majority of the
party grassroots. By some estimates some 80% of the members resigned, were
expelled or let their subscriptions lapse. 120 The brink of defeat caused an
immediate reorganization in what remained of the party, cultivating former
PAP members back the active role and the CEC taking absolute control of the
cadre list in strict secrecy. The PAP was only able to maintain control of the
120Pang Cheng Lian, Singapore's People's Action Party, (Singapore: Oxford University Press,
1971), pp. 14-15.
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government bv enlisting the support of the non-leftist members of the
Assembly. As Bedlington notes: "Whatever intrapartv democracy had existed
before was stifled once and for all: the PAP had learned a bitter lesson.' 1 - 1
Factionalism would never again be tolerated in the PAP.
With a tenuous hold on government, maintained only due to the
ineptitude of the opposition, Lee and the Tunku reached formal agreement
on the terms of merger in August, 1%L. Goh Keng Swee proposed a
referendum be held in Singapore on the Malavsia proposal. What eventually
emerged from this proposal was a referendum in form, not in fact. The ballot
was reduced to a choice between different merger proposals on the pretext
that this was appropriate given the approval of the legislature for merger. Lee
and Goh successfully fended off a threat to the proposed merger when the
Bcirisiui Socialis brought the matter before the United Nations Special
Committee on Colonialism. Lee was at his rhetorical finest and the UN
refused to send election observers for the upcoming referendum, scheduled
for September, 1.
The campaign was a very lively affair, and in a foreboding move bv the
Tunku, there were threats that if merger was rejected, the causewav might be
closed by implication threatening the water supply (This is a tactic that has
cropped up from time to time in the stormy relationship between the two
countries). Despite all of the PAP's gerrymandering of ballot choices, the issue
remained very much in doubt and the period of waiting for referendum
results to come in was a tense one. Seventy percent of the marked ballots
supported the PAP proposal for merger and despite the 23^ unmarked ballots
12 bedlington, p. 205.
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returned, a great victory was declared and the course tor merger with Malaya
was set.
Late in 1962, events outside Singapore had significant repercussions on
the local political scene, contributing to further consolidation of the PAP's
control. On December 8, there was a revolt in Brunei led by Sheikh Azahari.
The rebellion was contained bv British forces and completely crushed bv
December IS. While this was taking place in Brunei, the backdrop in
Singapore was one of unrest as well, with troubles at Nanvang Lniversitv, the
< hinese language school, and in Singapore's leftist led unions. The British
Special Branch had been aware of connections between Singapore's leftists
and Azahari. Shortly after the rebellion, the Internal Securitv Council ordered
a securitv bweep. Early on the second of Februarv, 1963, Operation Cold Store
swept across the peninsula and Singapore. One hundred and eleven suspects
were detained.
The Operation Cold Store sweep decimated the Barisan opposition in
Singapore, arresting its leadership, including Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee
Suan. That Lee used these events to wipe out his opposition was clear. His
efforts to distance the Singapore government from the operation were
unsuccessful. He was attacked bv both Lim Yew Hock and Malayan Alliance
members for his duplicity. Backtracking, Lee explained the arrests as a move
against the communists to forestall their attempts to prevent merger and turn
Singapore 'into a Cuba, from which they [communists] hoped to mount an
offensive against the Federation of Malaya.'122 The trial of the leftists, held in
August, was characterized bv a British QC brought in for the proceedings as
122Alex iosev, Lee Kuan Yew, (.Singapore: Asian Pacific Press, 1971), p. 16°.
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one which has wholly failed as a criminal proceeding. It is a case which has
much to do with politics but very little to do with criminal law.' 1 - 3
The Elections of 1963, The PAP Takes Command of Singapore, Merger
With Malaysia.
Television transmission began in Singapore in February, L963 and the
government took maximum advantage of this new communications tool.
The government placed television sets in all the community centers which it
had been building in conjunction with its housing program. The medium
transfixed those who had access to it and the government dressed up its
accomplishments in programming in all of Singapore's major languages.
On July S, 1 Q63, the Malaysian Agreement was signed in London,
finalizing the terms for merger of Singapore with Malaya and the Borneo
territories of Sabah and Sarawak. When the Tunku delayed Malaysia Dav,
Lee, on August 31, unilaterally declared Singapore independent, 'on trust'
until Malaysia was inaugurated. This unilateral declaration enabled
Singapore to obtain some last minute concessions from both the British and
the Tunku.
Shortly thereafter, on September 4, the government, using a tactic that it
would later repeat, called for elections giving the minimum notice of 12 davs.
With celebrations scheduled to mark the merger scheduled, the PAP had
booked every hall capable of holding any sizable assembly. It also had a
yirtual lock on all local printing, effectively hamstringing any organizational
efforts on the part of the opposition. Prior to the campaign, Lee plaved a
masterstroke, deflecting political pressure which tried to capitalize on the
123Minchin, p. 128.
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recent discovery or a large cache of bones from the war and Lee's courting of
Japanese investment. Lee piaved up the Japanese blood-debt' issue and
passed non-cooperation resolutions against the Japanese that answered the
political pressure but did nothing to effectively limit much needed Japanese
investment.
With control of the traditional political ground and the new television
medium used unabashedly in their favor, the PAP went further, de
registering seven leftists unions and freezing the funds of the Barisan trade
union organization, SATU (Singapore Association of Trade Unions). The
election rhetoric was that of the disaster that would befall Singapore if a leftist
government came to power. Despite denials from across the causeway, the
PAP maintained that the constitution would be suspended if an extremist
government came to power in Singapore, and emergency powers would be
used to govern from Kuala Lumpur. This type of fear-mongering of the
disastrous results that would befall Singapore if the PAP were to fall from
power persists to this day. Malaysia Day was observed during the campaign on
September 16, 1963 and Singapore became a state of the independent
Federation of Malaysia. Regionally, Sukarno of Indonesia voiced his criticism
loudly. He regarded the whole enterprise of Malaysia as a deep seated neo-
imperial British conspiracy.
The September sixteenth election was a stunning success for the PAP.
The Party polled 47.5% of the votes and took 37 seats in the Assembly. The
Barisan took 32.1% and returned 13 legislators. Singapore, independent of the
British at last as a state of Malaysia, would, under the PAP, attempt to make
its influence felt in the new nation. The 15 PAP ministers to the federal
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government in Kuala Lumpur took up the role of the loyal opposition." In
their first political act the PAP opposed the Malaysian budget as encouraging a
rentier economy over the development of productive industries. The clash
between the contrasting shies and aspirations on either side of the causeway
and the racial divisions, both exacerbated by pressures from without would
produce powerful centrifugal forces that would act on the new partners in the
next two years.
Malaysia Breaks, the Birth of an Independent Singapore.
In retrospect it seems obvious that the merger of Singapore and Malaya
was doomed to failure from the start. The Malayan government accepted the
proposal because it believed it had a better chance to control the leftist
elements on the island and retain the political concessions to Malay power
obtained in negotiations with the British. The PAP pressed for merger because
it believed that eventually the political center of power would shift back
across the causeway to Singapore. Then Singapore would lead the new nation
into progress and prosperity by creating a successful multi-racial society.
Each party underestimated the ambition and effectiveness of the other
and its ability* to influence events in the other's camp. The UMNO's political
philosophy and that of the PAP were diametrically opposed. The UMNO
maintained that the separate races must each first unite politically to enable
each to pursue national unity in collective coalition with the others. The
PAP's philosophy was that only multi-racial politics could produce national
unity. The PAP encouraged people to unite along economic lines to progress
together toward a more equal society, a "Malaysian Malaysia." This is not a
surprising position for a group which represented those who held the lion's
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-hare of the economic power. What the PAP saw as subterfuge, the politics of
race, the UMNO saw as salvation.
The death knell for the Federation was probably sounded early in 19b4.
With Lee Kuan Yew away from Singapore, leading a delegation from
Malaysia through the African states, the PAP CEC decided to contest the
federal elections on the peninsula. This move specifically violated a promise
Lee had made to the Tunku in November of 1%3 not to do so. Whether Lee
had knowledge of this and approved it prior to his departure is a matter of
peculation. Given his control of the CEC it is hard to fathom that he did not.
It is possible, however, that the move was made in his absence bv other
ambitious and impatient CEC elements, perhaps led by Goh Keng Swee, to
force Lee's hand.
Whatever the truth of the matter, when Lee returned he had little choice
but to support his party* and put the best spin' he could on this transgression.
The UMNO was predictably outraged and the rhetoric and political posturing
on both sides of the causeway became increasingly antagonistic. Although the
PAP fielded only nine candidates, the UMNO rightly perceived this as a first
attempt to gain a foothold in the urban constituencies controlled bv its
Alliance partner the MCA. In the vitriolic rhetoric, charges of racial
chauvinism were slung from both sides of the causeway. On April 4, Sved
Jaafar Albar, Secretary-General of the UMNO told the PAP to stop
antagonizing the Malays, and stop provoking them, otherwise the Malays
will throw democracy overboard and start using fists to teach the PAP
democracy.' 124 In the election, the PAP fared badly, with only one of its
i24Josev. p. 201.
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candidates, Devan Nair, winning a seat in Kuala Lumpur. The MCA, whom
the PAP had tried to discredit as irrelevant, won 27 seats. The notion that the
PAP could break the power ot the MCA and grab the urban Chinese from
them was thoroughly debunked. Despite the trouncing of the PAP, the
damage had been done and the notion of cooperation between the PAP and
the Alliance destroyed.
In 1%4 the issue of race would come to the forefront in the new
federation. On July 12, Sved Jaafar Albar, organized a Muslim Convention in
Singapore to attempt to make political inroads against the PAP among the
Malay voters there. He spoke against the PAP government and the
victimization of Malays. Lee scheduled a meeting of Singapore's Malay
leaders to counter both the influence of Jaafar and increasing propaganda
from Indonesia against the PAP's treatment of Malays. In a lengthy address he
reiterated his three priorities for improving the lot of Malays in Singapore;
education, employment and housing reforms. 125
On July 21, during the celebration of the Prophet Mohammed's birthday
there was huge communal rioting. Twenty-two people were killed and more
than 450 were injured and a curfew was instituted to quell the violence. Upon
his return from the United States the Tunku obliquely charged the PAP with
encouraging the rioting by its very public pronouncements and battles with
the UMNO. The Tunku traveled to Singapore on July 19 and spoke about the
violence. His omission of any mention of Jaafar's political activity and the
attacks on the PAP bv the UMNO through the press preceding the riots irked
the PAP leadership. The PAP's strident demands for an investigation into the
l25Josey, p. 208.
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cause of the riots were entertained cordially and then quietly lost in the
bureaucracy of Kuala Lumpur. When communal rioting occurred again in
Singapore in early September, a commission of inquiry was finally
announced by the Kuala Lumpur goyernment for the July riots.
Tension remained high for the remainder of the year and when the
budget debates resumed in December, the PAP was in opposition once again
oyer what it termed regressive taxation. This cause generated significant
popular support, so much so that the Malaysian Government banned public
anti-taxation rallies (in Singapore) , a move opposed by Lee and the PAP as
stiflimr the debate. The Tunku, in the midst of the tax debate eave an
indication oi the drift in his leanings when he was quoted in the Straits
Times as saying: "If the politicians of various colors and tinges in Singapore
disagree with me, the only solution is a breakaway, but what a calami tv that
would be for Singapore and Malaysia. " 126 In a speech in the Malaysian
Parliament on December 18, Lee spoke with words that ironically might be
directed by critics of his own government in Singapore soon after
independence and beyond:
Let us get down to fundamentals. Is this an open or closed society? Is it
a society where men can preach ideas - the novel, unorthodox, heresies...
-
where there is a constant contest for men's hearts and minds on the basis
of what is right, of what is just, of what is in the national interest? Or is it a
closed society where the mass media - the newspapers, the journals,
publications, TV, radio - either by sound or by sight, or both... feed men's
minds with a constant drone of sycophantic support for a particular
orthodox political philosophy? ... it is not only in communist countries
where the mass media is used to produce the closed mind, because the
closed society* must produce the closed mind. 127
12bOp. at in Minchm, p. 144.
127Josev, p. 228.
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In 1965 the battles between the PAP and the UMNO became more public
and more heated. Lee warned of the dangers of communal politics in his New
Year's message to the people of Singapore but the PAP continued in its
exchanges with the UMNO leadership. In March the Government of
Singapore submitted a memorandum to the Kuala Lumpur laving blame for
the Julv riots squarely at the feet of the UMNO "ultras" ( the PAP term for the
Islamic right, whom Lee also called the "mad mullahs"). The memo
attributed motives as follows:
The riots were willed bv irresponsible and reckless propaganda based
on falsehoods and distortions of facts. Their purpose was principally to re-
establish the political influence among the Malays of Singapore. An even
more important objective was to use the Malays in Singapore as pawns to
consolidate Malay support for UMNO in Malaya.128
The situation deteriorated throughout the next year, 1965. In the wake of
the submission of the memorandum by the government of Singapore in
April Lee sued Jaafar Albar for libel. The suit was based on attacks in the press
in which Jaafar accused Lee of both responsibility for the riots and other
political misdeeds and characterizing Lee as an enemv of Malaysia, agent of
Indonesia and the communists.
This tactic of libel suits against political opponents, making them prove
charges made in the political arena, is one that would be repeated often in the
career of Lee Kuan Yew. The ^uit was not settled until 1967, in Lee's favor,
when Jaafar was obliged to submit a retraction and apology in the case.
'*°Text of Singapore Government Memorandum, March l Qr>?, cited in Minchin. p. 14 s .
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On the same day of Lee's filing of libel charges, PAP chairman Toh Chin
Chve announced a forthcoming convention in Singapore to consolidate a
united opposition front to the Alliance Government. The plans tor the
Malaysian Solidarity Conference were finalized just prior to the opening of
the UMNO General Assembly, placing additional political pressure on the
UMNO. At the UMNO Ab-semblv a resolution tor Lee's detention was barely
defeated. Proposals for the radio and television in Singapore to be taken over
were mooted as well.
Lhe Malavsian Solidarity Conference was held in June in Singapore,
consisting of mostly non-Malavs from the territories outside the peninsula.
Drawing the battle lines between the PAP and the UMNO on their different
approaches to handling communal politics, the Conference further froze the
PAP position and its threat to Alliance control in Kuala Lumpur.
The cross-causewav rhetoric heated up. There were now calls for Lee's
arrest and detention. The Tunku, in London, had to quell the rumors and
deal with British dissatisfaction over the expulsion of one of its citizens from
Malaysia, Alex Josey, a journalist and longtime confidant of Lee Kuan Yew. In
Singapore, plans were made by the PAP for the establishment of a
government-in-e\ile in Cambodia should the Kuala Lumpur government
move for emergency rule of Singapore.
On August 9, 1965, upon his return from England, the Tunku spoke
before the Malaysian Parliament to announce the separation of Singapore
from Malaysia. The separation agreement had been agreed to the day before by
the PAP leadership and signed by Lee. The prospects of continuing communal
strife and the violence that would surely accompany it were persuasive, in
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the end, to all concerned. That day, Singapore became perhaps the most
reluctant newly independent nation of the post-war era.
C. Diplomacy
What is impressive concerning the diplomacv of Singapore in the period
from the Second World War until the succession/ expulsion of Singapore
from the federation in August of 1965 is the fact that it existed at all. For all
the preoccupation of internal politics, Singapore's early diplomacv is
characterized bv the wide scope of the net it cast in the international arena.
Lee Kuan Yew, during the period leading to merger, embarked on a
world travel spree to enlist support for the union and to promote the position
of Singapore in the world. This highlights two important facets of Singapore's
leadership, first, the PAP was and is to this dav, clearlv no one man show.
While Lee was its most dominant personality and the front man for the Partv
on the public stage, the top echelons of the partv were an extremelv
competent group of dedicated and talented individuals. Government was in
good hands in Lee's extended absences. Second, the Partv recognized the
value of world opinion and the necessity to muster support from abroad as
vital to the survival and prosperity of a small state. This was important when
the entity they were lobbying for was Malaysia and became vital when the
Union was ended and Singapore became a tiny citv-state.
In the following examination, diplomacv will not include negotiations
and interactions with Britain, the metropolitan power. Those interactions
have been discussed in conjunction with the political maneuvering for
independence.
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Indonesia, Konfrontasi and the Beginnings of Global Diplomacy
The main difficulty posed to the Malaysian agreement was the
vehement objection of the Indonesian Government of Sukarno. Since the
Bandung conference of 1955, Sukarno had become the self-stvled leader of the
non-ali<rned movement. The Bandung conference of the non-aligned Afro-
Asian nations was in reaction to growing superpower rivalry and its
extension to clients throughout the world. The non-aligned movement
pursued a policy of neutrality and anti-imperialism in the face of this growing
rivalry. The cold war came to Southeast Asia with the formation of SEATO in
1954 to contain the communist menace. The statements of the American
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, that the neutralist policy was
"immoral," given imperatives of the emerging bipolar world, only gave fuel
to the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the movement. It aroused additional
suspicions of those who maintained close relationships with western nations.
A combination of factors led Sukarno to oppose the formation of
Malaysia, an entity he described as a neo-colonialist tool of the west.
Indonesia's path to independence from Dutch rule had been much different
and far more violent than the road followed by the British Colonies.
Sukarno had used the Japanese as a blunt instrument to consolidate
power in Indonesia in an attempt to forestall the return of the Dutch
following the war. Universally distrusted bv the victorious allies due to his
collaboration with the Japanese, Sukarno was feared bv other nationalist
Indonesian political factions. Following the war, Sukarno was forced to settle
for a compromise solution. This involved Indonesian control of Java and
Sumatra and a return of the Dutch to the remaining islands. The
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arrangement was untenable from the beginning. The Dutch, desperate for
reconstruction monev in Europe, had no intention of forgoing the extraction
of wealth from its East Indies colonv. Sukarno had no intention of letting the
Dutch stav.
On<roin<i violent confrontations between the Dutch and Indonesians,
eventually leading to the capture of Sukarno and the Vice President, Hatta,
finally led to an international outcry against the Dutch colonial position.
Pressure from the newly formed United Nations and a threat bv the United
States to withhold Marshall Plan funds from the Netherlands eventually led
to the independence of Indonesia. The vast and populous new nation was
fragmented bv ethnic divisions, racial differences and competing regional
loyalties.
Since Indonesia's beginning in 1950, Sukarno played a dangerous
balancing game with the competing factions in Indonesian politics. The
strength of the communists in Indonesia and the close ties Sukarno
maintained with Peking added to the cold war tinge that Sukarno's political
posturing had in geo-politics. The two leading political parties were
Sukarno's Nationalist Party (PNI) and The Communist Party of Indonesia
(PKI). The PKI was, in the early sixties, the largest communist party outside
the Soviet Union and The People's Republic of China. Some thirteen other
parties were active, most organized along ethnic and religious lines. Sukarno
eventually adopted the concept he described as "Guided Democracy." With
the support of the military, Sukarno eliminated all effective political parties
with the exception of the supportive PKI and his own PNI. By 1957 the infant
parliamentary system had succumbed to crib death, martial law was declared
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and the short and unhappy history of an attempt at a plural political system
was at an end.
Sukarno's legitimacy as a national leader was closely tied to his carefully
cultiyated image as a reyolutionary visionary. A consummate political
showman, Sukarno had a slogan and ideology for eyery occasion. One of
these was the concept of Nekolirn or opposition to neo-colonialism and
imperialism. 129
Sukarno, before the formal declaration of opposition precipitated by the
Malaysia agreement, had tried to short circuit the proposed merger through
his influence in the non-aligned movement. It was to counter this rhetorical
attack that Lee Kuan \ew first embarked on international diplomacy.
Lee's first visit overseas as Prime Minister of Singapore was to Indonesia
in January of I960, prior to the furor that would later develop over the
proposed Malaysia. He stated the desire for friendship and a growing trade
relationship. He acknowledged the inspiration that Indonesia's struggle for
independence had given to the nationalists in Singapore. Indonesian
representatives returned his visit later in the vear.
Barely two years later, with Indonesian prodding, The Afro-Asian
Secretariat in Cairo passed a resolution declaring Malaysia as neo-
colonialist. 130 Lee Kuan Yew conducted a tour of the Afro-Asian nations in
early 1962 to counter anti-Malavsia propaganda from Indonesia. He also met
Tito in Yugoslavia and obtained his somewhat lukewarm assent for the
Malaysia proposal. 131





In julv of 1962 Lee and Goh Keng Swee argued for Malaysia, countering
the Barisan Socialis move to short-circuit the merger before the United
Nations Special Committee on Colonialism. The cogency of Lee's argument
and his rhetorical skill impressed mam* in New York. It was during this
successful rhetorical exercise that Lee uttered his oft quoted statement that
Singapore, independent bv itself, is a political, economic and geographical
absurdity.'132
Lee attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in
London in September 1962 as an adviser' and caused a stir when he visited
Moscow for trade talks during his return trip to Singapore. This was a curious
trip, given the fears in Malava of communism. The connections, through the
labor unions, of manv of the PAP to known communists and fellow travelers,
highlighted the political significance of Lee's Moscow visit. While it is
indicative of Lee's staunch independence in his dealings with the world
(especiallv in regard to trade), it also demonstrated his sometimes
controversial political decision making. The trip was reported widelv and
elicited stern criticism from Kuala Lumpur. The Tunku claimed that it
invalidated all that Mr. Lee had said about communism. Whether this was a
ploy to hasten merger on the basis of constraining Singapore's 'freedom of
action" or simplv a foolish enterprise on the part of an arrogant elitist
exercising his political muscle will be left to the reader to decide. What is
certain is that Lee knew exactlv what tvpe of reaction such a visit would elicit
from both the Tunku and the British. This in the midst of trving to conclude
the final terms for merger!
132|osevp. 1?°.
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On his return to Singapore, after visiting Prince Shianouk in Cambodia
enroute, Lee expounded on the views that he shared in common with the
Cambodian leader:
We are neutral where it is a collision of the big power blocs because we
are not sure who is on our side, but we are not neutral where our interests
are concerned. And if we are threatened we will defend ourselves. 1 "" 3
These comments, in light of Lee's Moscow trip, must have generated an
equal amount of rancor in both Kuala Lumpur and London. This is perhaps
his first statement of a unique neutrality policv, that would be developed
further over the vears as a basis of Singapore's foreign policy. Singapore's
foreign policv has always been one that has tried to stav awav from the pull of
large power blocs while at the same time acknowledging their existence and
maneuvering for position to gain protection within a realpolitik svstem that
it sees the great powers as controlling. Singapore has always taken the
pragmatist's approach in its dealings with larger powers in the arena of
international diplomacv. It's fine to be neutral in conflicts that are not in vour
own backyard. In vour own region, however, one must admit that others do
have interests and then support those whose interests are most similar to
your own.
Konfrontasi Intensifies, 1963.
Sukarno's Nekolim found outlet in Southeast Asia against the
formation of Malaysia as a neo-colonial tool of Britain and the West. On
January 20, 1963, before the conclusion of the Malaysia agreement and just
^•"losev, p. 156.
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after the failure of the Indonesian supported Azahari revolt in Brunei,
Indonesian's Foreign Minister publicly proclaimed Indonesia's policy of
Konfrontasi (confrontation) against Malaysia. The Indonesians, in their
announcement, explained that this amounted to a direct offensive in the
economic and social fields, but without a military element. Within three
months, however, there were Indonesian troops near Sabah and Sarawak in
Eastern Indonesia. 134
The United States supported Malaysia and U.S. Secretary of State Dean
Rusk declared "that if anyone on the outside attempts by force to interfere it
would create a very serious problem. '—The communist overtones that large
<cale military action would have represented entailed risks that Sukarno was
loath to risk. The British still retained defense responsibilities for their
possessions in the east and for the newly independent Malava. Given the
statements of Rusk, the possibility of United States intervention to support
the British could not be discounted. Following Bandung, Indonesia was a part
of the so-called Peking-Jakarta axis. The tenor of the statements of opposition
to Malaysia asserted that it was a conspiracy of the British to inhibit the
growth of nationalism in the region and attempted to separate Indonesia
geographically from her ally Peking. 136
In April, 1963 the Indonesian military attacked elements of the Malay
forces on the border of Sarawak. Peace talks were held in Tokyo in April of
that vear which produced a Malaysian-Indonesian declaration of peaceful
intentions. A later summit in June in Manila resulted in the establishment of
134Iosev, p. loo.
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Ihe regional organization of Malphilindo, a loose consortium of the ethnic
Nialav nations and the Manila Accord which welcomed the formation of
Malaysia, provided that the wishes of the peoples of the Borneo territories
were ascertained. A United Nations mission, under the supervision ot an
American born diplomat, Laurence Michlemore, was designated to
investigate the results of the Borneo referendum on the issue. It was for this
reason that the Tunku delayed Malaysia Day ceremonies which so aroused
the PAP's ire. When Singapore unilaterally declared independence prior to
merger (as did the Borneo territories), this provided Sukarno the excuse to
renew the confrontation.
In the midst of the confrontation, prior to the merger and the electoral
campaign of 1963, Lee was presented with the discovery of a huge cache of
wartime remains in Singapore, sparking further debate on international
issues. His political opponents tried to use this against him. He was portrayed
as pro-Japanese for his courting of Japanese investment, particularly in the
giant Jurong Industrial Park which was the centerpiece of Singapore's
industrialization efforts. While most political issues were divisive in
Singapore, the issue of the blood debt' of the Japanese was not. Lee seized the
blood debt issue and took ownership. He gave a stirring speech to one of the
largest crowds to ever assemble on the Padang (a large open lawn in
downtown Singapore, historic as a gathering place) in which he outlined the
steps that the government would take to force Japanese acknowledgment of
their actions. The performance was a political success and the measures
instituted by the government were largely symbolic. Resolutions of non-
cooperation with the Japanese were instituted on new industrial and
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commercial projects. These left unaffected those projects already approved
while satisfying the popular call for action.
Following the conclusion ot the Malaysia agreement in lulv, 1963 and
the merger in September, Indonesian opposition rhetoric became more
bellicose, and the Indonesians stepped up military activity, including
infiltration of agents into the peninsula, Singapore and the Borneo territories.
These activities included terrorist bombings in Singapore and armed
marauders conducting guerrilla activities in the Borneo territories. The
Indonesian government under Sukarno assumed that appeals to Malay
nationalism and anti-imperialism would find popular support among Malays
in the new Federation. It utilized anti-Chinese propaganda to discredit the
Singapore goyernment and stir up communal hatreds (Its agents were
implicated in the racial riots of July and September 1964). While causing
security difficulties, their efforts never received much popular support in the
newly formed Malaysia. Bedlington maintains that the Indonesian activities
actually solidified the popular support for the Tunku's leadership in the face




President Kennedy suspended most American aid to Indonesia as the
confrontation entered this more aggressive and military phase but continued
some minor aid programs to retain some leverage. Following Kennedy's
assassination, Lyndon Johnson sent Attorney General Robert Kennedy to
Indonesia to attempt to negotiate an end to the fighting. Kennedy obtained a
cease-fire agreement on January 25, 1964, although Sukarno largely ignored its
137Bedlington, p. L09.
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provisions. American threats to suspend all U.S. aid to force compliance
resulted in Sukarno's famous cry, "To hell with your aid!"13b
On other international fronts, however, the flamboyant Indonesian
leader had some success in creating difficulties for the newly formed
Federation. In early 1964 Lee Kuan Yew led a delegation from the newlv
incorporated territories (Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore) on a tour of
seventeen African states to debunk the neo-colonialist charges of Sukarno.
"We have got to be constantly aware of the danger of isolation," said Lee.
While Singapore and Malaysia were linked economically and for defense to
the commonwealth countries, Lee was aware of the importance of its image
in the newly emerging third world countries. Concerning his trip he stated:
Many of the countries in Africa have no intimate knowledge of
Southeast Asia Like us, thev cannot afford to keep embassies all over he
world. But somehow we must get them to know us, to understand us, to
see us for what we are. Then we can debunk all this talk that we are a neo-
colonialist plot ... This is a continuous and continuing task. The effort
must be made all the time. 139
The confrontation reached its zenith following the failure of a third
effort at mediation in Tokyo in June, 1964. After failing to reach agreement on
withdrawal of Indonesian guerrilla forces from the Malaysian Borneo
territories, the Indonesians conducted large amphibious landings in Johor in
July and paratrooper drops in the same state in September. Both these
military efforts were crushed bv local forces.
The incidents were brought before the U.N. Security Council. A
resolution condemning the attacks was vetoed by the Soviets. When Malaysia
13S
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was elected to the rotating Security Council seat shortly thereafter, Indonesia
withdrew from the United Nations. The resolve of both the Malaysians and
staunch pronouncements of British solidarity led to a decline in Indonesian
military activities following the abortive military adventures of 1%4.
In March, 1965 Lee traveled to Australia and New Zealand, important
players in regional defense arrangements. In an address at Auckland
University he highlighted the disturbing characteristic of Southeast Asian
countries being inward looking and the fact that they have not been able to
act in concert with each other in their collective interest.
'
140He went on to
express his conviction that the Americans were incorrect in their assumption
that China was an aggressive expansionist power. In his view the Chinese
threat was their confidence and belief in revolutionary principles. It was the
promotion of those ideas to others, to fight their own revolutions that
presented the real threat. Lee contended that any attempt on the part of the
Chinese to move militarily would be viewed by other nations in Asia as
Chinese imperialism. This was a mistake that the Chinese leadership would
never make. This was the American dilemma in Vietnam, Lee contended;
the Chinese example and sustenance provided to the Vietnamese
revolutionaries enabled them to bring the normal economy of South
Vietnam to a halt. This left the government in the South in a position of
complete dependence on the United States. Such a dependent relationship
was completely contrary to the nationalist aspirations that pervaded the
region after World War II. Lee argued that only when the regional nations
were insured that they could survive could they move on to act in their
140Tosey, p. 245.
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collective interests. Onlv then could they ensure that a reasonable balance of
power was established to protect the region from the aggression of any
potential powerful regional actor, in an oblique reference to the circumstances
in Vietnam he concluded that, "you must first have a people who want to
-ave themselves. If you don't have that then no amount of external help,
either military or economic, can prevail..." 141
In a quite remarkable speech at the Victoria University in Wellington,
Lee expressed a world \ iew that would be echoed some twenty-seven years
later in Western political science literature bv Samuel P. Hunnington in his
Article Tlie Clash of Ciz>iUzations. li2 Mr. Lee's remarks are worthy of
quotation at length and give an insight into his world view:
Today we face a world in which the ancient civilizations, the Chinese,
the Indian, the Arabic, have been aroused and are wanting to reassert
themselves on the world scene. Accompanying them are a vast majority
of smaller groups of people, broadly grouped together as the Afro-Asian
nations... But one thing still remains as it was - for how long I do not
know - the supremacy of the European peoples in the scientific techniques
of conducting war and, more important, in the industrial capacity to
sustain modern warfare. So it is unlikely, in my view, whatever one may
believe of the wickedness of the communists and Chinese communists,
that thev will seek war. They know that under the present circumstances it
is not in their interests to seek war. But I think they also know that, given
time in which to consolidate their gains, given time in which to
consummate their system, perhaps in another twenty, thirty or more
years, the odds will not be that unequal, and then brinkmanship from
their point of view need not be a one sided-thing....
From an Asian viewpoint, I see this as a period in which the European
world begins to learn to readjust its attitudes to the non-European world ...
old civilizations, China, India, the Arab world and ultimately, how these
old civilizations, non-European civilizations, together with the
Europeans, decide to deal with the lesser groups of human societies
scattered throughout the rest of the world....
141Josey, p. 248.
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I now sav we are at the watershed of history because, I think, we are
nearing the time when it is possible that the big powers will again begin to
think in terms not just of counting heads, but of real ultimate capacity to
survive conflict... The second half of the twentieth centurv will witness,
first, in my view, the reassertion of the ancient civilizations. And next,
after that, assuming that the world still has not destroyed itself, if will
witness how they collectively view the less sophisticated civilizations that
exist...
1 have no doubts whatsoever that in the ancient civilizations, the
Chinese, the Indian, the Arab people, not only with the cultural
techniques with which to galvanize and mobilize human nature, but with
a calculated sense of greatness, not only of their past but in their




What this equated to in Lee's eves was that Malaysia (and Singapore) was
constrained by size and location to "accept the arbiter of the power-interests.
The capacity of the smaller nations to survive and prosper then, Lee asserted,
was directly related to "our capacity* to discern where big power interests must
collide, and how in this conflict of power interests we are to find a
coincidence of interests for ourselves."144 More significantly, it foresees an era
of competing cultural value systems, the Asian, Islamic and European,
beyond the competition of two essentially European ideologies, liberal
democracy and capitalism and communism and centralized, government
owned socialist economics.
This pragmatic world view, opposed as it was to many in the region,
who searched vainly for a means to eliminate the influence of big powers
from Southeast Asia, proved extremely influential in shaping policies that
would later emerge in the ASEAN group. It would also encourage Singapore
143losev, p. 248-24Q.
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to cultivate international contacts with all the worlds great powers to ensure
its survival as a midget in a world of giants. Summarizing his arguments
against the background ot the Indonesian confrontation, Lee appealed for
Commonwealth support of Malaysia to survive the threat from its large and
digressive neighbor. This, he maintained, was in their interests as well, as the
concept of a "Greater Indonesia" with perhaps a strong communist element at
its core, could equally threaten Australia and New Zealand's survival.
Summary of Early Diplomacy
In these earlv diplomatic efforts, the position of Singapore and the view
of its leadership emerges clearly. A prisoner of the limitations of small size
and strategic location, the options of isolation and withdrawal from the world
stage were simply not available. The colonial history of Singapore made it
abundantly clear that world powers would always have an interest in
Southeast Asia. This was particularly true of the countries near the strategic
maritime chokepoints. The diplomacy of Singapore, first as part of Malaysia
and more so as a small independent island city-state, would embrace rather
than lament its circumstances and cultivate its position in the international
order to maximum advantage. While Singapore avoided alignment directly
with the great powers, thev would not eschew realpolitik relationships with
these powers that worked to their advantage. This was true in both the
economic and defense spheres. Singapore, as a active but not activist nation
in foreign affairs, cultivated contacts that would work to its advantage. As a
result, Singapore would come to exert an influence on the world stage that
was and is proportionally much greater than one would expect from a tiny
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nation only three times the size of Washington D.C. with a population of less
than three million.
D. Economics
In the period immediately following the war, Singapore faced enormous
economic challenges. Allied bombing had taken its toll on Singapore's
infrastructure and all utility delivery services were in a serious ^tate of
disrepair. Social services were non-existent. The Japanese had legalized
gambling and prostitution. Opium and alcohol abuse were rampant among
the legions of poor in the decrepit slums of the city.
About the only significant accomplishment of the British Military
Administration was the restoration of utility service to better than pre-war
levels and the clearing and restoration of the port and airfield facilities. When
the civilian colonial administration took charge in 1946, food shortages were
a persistent problem and rice was strictly rationed. Malnutrition and disease
were an ongoing challenge and there were repeated outbreaks of violence in
protest of the terrible social conditions. Labor organizing began, often under
the auspices of communist functionaries, and the economy was plagued by
strikes for higher wages to enable the workers to survive the spiraling
increases in food prices. The black market flourished as did the crime
attendant to such enterprise.
By late in 1947 the rebuilding of the infrastructure and growing
worldwide demand for tin and rubber buoved an economic recovery. Bv 1949
the economy was meeting pre-war levels in trade and productivity. Social
services had been reconstituted. A 1949 social welfare plan outlined a five
\ ear program to extend benefits to the aged, unfit, blind, crippled and widows
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with dependent children. A ten rear plan to expand hospital and health
services was mooted in the same year. 14 ^
The immigrant populations, which before the war had been mostlv
transitory, began to be a more settled and permanent part of Singapore. Sixty
percent of the Chinese in Singapore in 1947 were Straits born. The upheavals
in India resulting from independence and partition encouraged further
Indian immigration. Singapore shared in the boom created by the Korean
War in the early fifties enjoyed by many Asian nations.
Educational services were rebuilt under the colonial goyernment which
inaugurated a ten year program beginning in 1947 to provide six years of
primary education to all children. Primary education was available in the
yernacular languages of English, Malay, Chinese and Tamil. Perceptions
concerning the opportunities provided by English-language education
remained strong. These institutions crrew, as did their funding by the
government, at the expense of the vernacular institutions. While the British
did improve the educational atmosphere somewhat, the system was very
backward for an urban center and a significant stumbling block that the
government would struggle with for many years to come. In many ways, the
British tendency to educate a few select students at the expense of the many
remained deeply entrenched. In many less obvious ways it is still entrenched
today in Singapore. Education still presents Singapore with its most
significant challenges.
Unemployment was the most consistent problem in the post-war years
as was one of the highest birthrates in the world. Even as the economy
^Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, pp. 42-43.
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redeveloped the creation of jobs could not keep up with the ever expanding
population. In 1959, when the PAP first took office, unemployment was
estimated to be 13.5 percent. 146 Singapore's population, nearly half of which
was under age fifteen, continued to grow and 19b0 statistics showed that
Singapore's economy depended on the gainful employment of only thirty-
two percent of its population, one of the lowest proportions of any
community in the world. 147
The PAP leadership was faced with tough decisions in 1959 concerning
the economic development of the island. The political upheavals of the era
entwined the labor movement with politics in a way which demanded that
the government be seen as sympathetic to labor while getting on with the task
of tying to rebuild the economy. During the political battling that came later
the PAP and the Barisan Sodalis created rival trade union umbrella
organizations to battle for control of the movement, the PAP's National
Trade Union Conference (NTUC) and the Barisan Singapore Association of
Trade Unions (SATU). The trade unions would remain highly politicized
during the leadership struggles in Singapore and the fight for merger with
Malaya.
While merger with Malaya and the formation of a common market
were seen as essential for Singapore's long term prosperity and expansion of
its entrepot trade, they were not viewed by the PAP as a panacea for all of
Singapore's ills. Without economic expansion which would provide
employment for the masses, the social foment demanding opportunities for a
better life would turn to the communists. This would politically force the
l46Ibid, p. 124.
14/ Josev, p. 1 17.
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economic agenda into a policy demanding redistributive programs of the
existing economic rewards, -tunting the growth potential of the economy.
Given the history of the entrepot tradition in Singapore, to move from it was
a bold initiative. The loss of the Indonesian trade due to the Confrontation
certainly stimulated this movement. Nonetheless, the courage to change does
not come easily, and the PAP has never been accused of lacking political
courage. Lee related the rationale for the industrialization move during a
speech given to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Singapore in 1959:
Although we are a socialist party, we fullv recognize that socialism
cannot be implemented in Singapore before the merger with the
Federation of Malaya. We are an island of 220 square miles. We have been
living for the past 100 years bv the hard work of our traders... But we
would be blind if we did not recognize the tremendous change in the
pattern of trade and commerce in Southeast Asia. ..We must adjust our
position. ..It is unlikelv that we shall be able to support our ever-increasing
population just by trade alone. 14S
The PAP leadership, under British trained economist and PAP stalwart
Goh Keng Swee, adopted a policv of industrialization. While Singapore did
have a successful entrepreneurial core, its businesses were overwhelminglv
trade related and not much involved in the manufacturing economy. This
was especially true of the Chinese. The PAP enlisted the advice of a United
Nations industrial survey mission and began planning the construction of a
number of industrial estates to attract foreign investment and expertise. The
industrialization strategy adopted was import-substitution industrialization
strategy (ISI) that was, at the time, advocated bv both the World Bank and the
^Federal Research Division, Library of Congress p. 98
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majority of economists. 149 While this was a logical strategy, given the
prevailing economic wisdom of the time, its success, for Singapore, was
dependent on the conclusion of the merger and the establishment of a
common market in the federation. To attract foreign investment the Pioneer
Industries Ordinance and the Industrial Expansion Act were enacted in 1959
to provide new industries with tax exemption for up to five years.
Success also depended on changing the image of Singapore as a hotbed of
labor unrest, which characterized the political struggles leading to
independence. The Industrial Relations Ordinance of 19b0 provided for the
swift resolution of strikes and made all strikes illegal after the newly created
Industrial Arbitration Court, a forum for the resolution of labor disputes,
took cognizance of a dispute. 150 Bv I960 the National Trade Union
Conference (NTUC), the PAP created labor organization had made significant
inroads in co-opting the renegade unions and the seeds of government
control of the labor unions were beginning to take root. The shift in
bargaining power from workers to employers that still persists in Singapore
had begun. 131
Singapore's first (and only) development plan was instituted in I9fc»l,
proposing to spend S290 million dollars in government funds in the first four
years. Still espousing a democratic socialist party line, the Partv allocated 40%
of its budget to social programs and an equal amount toward
industrialization. The centerpiece of the social programs was an extensive
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public housing program which remains one of the PAP's ongoing priorities.
Rehousing a population that lived in slum ridden urban squalor was seen as
essential to creating a modern industrial society and answering the public's
desire for more social equity.
In 19b 1 the Economic Deyelopment Board (EDB) was created to
coordinate programs to attract foreign investment. The EDB was given a
budget of thirty-three million dollars and instituted a plan for a giant
industrial park ( q ,000 acres) in the Jurong area, to attract foreign
multinational companies. The government built a new port there, connected
it to the old citv bv railroad and extended and expanded utility service to the
site. l52
This bedrock basis for industrialization, reiving on foreign capital and
expertise, has remained the fundamental basis for Singapore's
industrialization and the building of the export led economy. Land clearing
for the Jurong industrial estate began in 1961. At the time manufacturing
accounted for only 10 percent of Singapore's GNP. The economy was still
highly dependent on entrepot functions and British military spending.
While, in retrospect, it has been wildly successful, it has created a dependence
on foreign enterprise and capital which is one of the problems which the
current government is tryine to address.
Singapore devised some unique schemes for generating investment
funds locally. The Central Provident Fund, instituted in 1955 under the
Marshall Labor government, was retained. The fund, which finances social
services and workers' pensions, is financed by contributions of a percentage of
152Gould, p. 163.
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each workers earnings and a contribution paid by the employer. This deyice
is the tool by which Singapore maintains the highest sayings rates in the
world. These funds are ayailable to the goyernment for inyestment and
proyide a "buffer" which is often used to stimulate the economy in difficult
times. 1 " 3 While capital formation in Singapore has improyed remarkably in
recent times, the largest part of its industrial and manufacturing base remains
in the hands of foreign companies.
While espousing "democratic socialism" as an ideology, the PAP
remained essentially pragmatic in its approach to economic development.
The Prime Minister, on numerous occasions and in a variety of forums,
espoused these pragmatic \iewpoints and analyzed the problems of
development faced by the newly independent nations. The problems of
political and economic development and the contradictions they placed
before the leadership of many nations were exaggerated by the racial divisions
present in Malaysia.
The dilemma, as the PAP saw it, was that newly independent nations,
flush with pride in their long sought status, rejected the colonial order and
the economic structures that they had constructed. \Tew leaders came to
power on the basis of their anti-colonial stances, promising that when the
colonial masters had been removed, the benefits of the economies of the
countries would then pass into the hands of the indigenous peoples. With
their peoples longing for a more equitable distribution of the country's wealth
and freedom from what was viewed rightly as exploitation bv metropolitan
powers, the first group of leaders, in their zeal, often destroyed what the
153Milne & Mauzy, p. 32.
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Europeans had built over more than a century without replacing it with
anything. Kick the bums out was not the best solution, despite its emotional
appeal. The results of such policies were nations which were impoverished as
well as free.
The notion of self-sufficiencv, so tempting given the new sense of
nationalist pride, was exactlv the wrong prescription for nations that did not
possess the technical skills to run a modern economv. In the context of
Malaysia, Lee ^aw the same contradictions in the policy of forced
redistribution of economic benefits to the Malays at the expense of the
Chinese and Indians. Mam immigrants, both Chinese and Indian, had come
to Malaya to build their fortunes. Those who succeeded in building; successful
enterprises were aggressive and innovative businessmen and, along with the
Europeans, formed the core of the economy of the new Malaysia. By adopting
policies that favored Malays over the immigrants and the Europeans, Lee
contended that they were undermining the expertise in the economy that
provided the means with which to attack the real problem of the Malays, lack
of education and skills necessary to compete in a modern commercial
economy. The approach in Kuala Lumpur relied on dividing the pie more
evenly. The approach in Singapore was to bake a bigger pie.
The approach that Lee and the PAP took in Singapore was to encourage
the overall expansion of the economv soliciting the support, assistance and
investment of the industrialized West. This many others eschewed in the
name of nationalism or non-alignment. The reasons the PAP differed were
twofold, (1) to provide jobs for a growing population, and (2) to provide
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revenue to educate the younger half of that growing population. 134 The PAP,
in 19b0, to address the inequity the Malays faced in the modernizing
economy, instituted a policy of free education for Malays at all levels, up to
and including University. This "leveling up" through education policy stood
in stark contrast to the policy of "leveling down" through redistribution being
advocated by the Alliance Government on the Peninsula.
The basis of the PAP's opposition to the L%3 Malaysian budget was that
the terms of the budget attempted to create a birtall group of "haves" in the
elite Malay population by giving them preferences in the acquisition of
"rentier" type enterprises, such as bus licenses, rather that attacking the
problem of educating the largely Malay rural population to provide broader
opportunities across the economic spectrum. As Lee put it, addressing the
Malaysian Parliament in 1963, "... my indictment of this Budget, as of all other
budgets, is that it has not set into train what one would call, euphemistically,
social change for the better, social change to create a more equitable society,
where rewards are based on performance and efforts, and not property and
rent..." 155
While reward of merit and performance has always been the cornerstone
of all PAP policies, the arguments Lee made for economic development were
practical to the core. The dilemma of maiw of these newly emergent nations,
especially those who had been previously associated with the British Empire,
was that many of its new leaders had been educated in economics in Britain.
When they came to power in their homelands, they attempted to apply the




countries' problems. At the same time, for nationalistic reasons and to
maintain political support, they attempted to redistribute the rewards of the
economy away from those who possessed the expertise required to make such
economic solutions viable.
In 1%4, with the ethnic tension between Malays and Chinese tearing at
the newly formed Federation Lee addressed the economic plight of the Malays
in Singapore. In a speech before a group of influential Malay leaders Lee
attempted to answer the charges of Chinese chauvinism being directed at the
Government of Singapore by the Indonesian propaganda of the
Confrontation and echoed, for political reasons bv the Malay "ultras"' of the
UMNO.
Lhe policies of the PAP were designed to attack the inequities of the
present economic order by addressing three concerns which it saw7 as
paramount to relieving them — education, employment, and housing. The
education policies of the PAP were designed to redress the inequity,
intentionally designed by the British, in education. The British design was to
keep the Malays confined to the agricultural and unskilled labor sector and
compliant with the prevailing political order. Only bv improving the
education of Malays would they be able to eventually compete with the other
ethnic groups. The immigrants, at present, were better able to compete in the
growing economy.
The solution of the education problem would contribute to solving the
employment problem. In the interim, subsidized health services and decent
lowT cost housing for Malays in the government housing units would provide
them with adequate, low cost, living conditions to enable them to make the
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transition from the traditional to the modern economy. There was significant
resistance from Malays to the resettlement from their traditional kampongs
(villages) to these government high rise flats. Faced with a critical shortage of
land in Singapore and the need to create an industrial base to support the
exploding population the government needed to move boldlv. The measured
resettlement of these communities was the only viable solution to the
required development.
Housing development was one of the primarv efforts of the PAP
government to alleviate the squalorous ^lum conditions that obtained
following the war. The policy of government housing development has
continued apace throughout Singapore's historv. The high rise society of
Singapore, to meet the needs of a large population in a limited space and to
encourage home ownership among its population has always been a
centerpiece of the PAP Government. The dislocations this caused and the
sweeping (and autocratic) government methods of land acquisition to enable
the policy to be carried out were a political hot potato in Singapore's early
years. A private property clause was not a feature of Singapore's constitution.
Land was acquired at below market prices by condemnation. The housing
rush was on.
When the Federation dissolved in 1965 under the pressure of ethnic
tension and competing political visions for Malaysia, Singapore found itself
in extraordinarily difficult economic circumstances. The entrepot economy
was threatened by the economic boycott of the Indonesian Confrontation (at
one point S7°l of Malaysia's trade had been lost156 ) and the uncertain
^6Lee Kuan Yew, op. at. in losev, p. 190.
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relationship with Malaysia. The Malavsian leadership, eager to develop their
own ports and domestic economy, enacted tariffs to protect these interests.
While embarked on a strategy of industrialization, the fruits of this were slow
in materializing, and the viability of the tiny new nation state to survive was
much in question. The economic policies that resulted in the modern
economic miracle of Singapore and its emergence as one of the "Tour Tigers"
of the Asian economic resurgence are a testament to the dogged persistence of
the PAP leadership and the tenacity and resourcefulness of the people whose
support or compliance thev enlisted, the citizens of Singapore.
E. Defense
The period prior to Singapore's independence does not feature the
development of an indigenous defense capability. The defense of the region
remained the responsibility of the British. Following Malayan independence
it became a joint Malayan-British responsibility under the terms of the Anglo-
Malayan Defense Agreement of 1957, concluded just after the granting of
independence of Malaya to spell out British rights and responsibilities
following the abandonment of its colonial position. Indigenous defense forces
in Malaya and later in Malaysia were almost entirely composed of ethnic
Malays who had been organized and trained by the British. It was these forces
who loyally and effectively opposed the Indonesian military incursions in
eastern Malaysia and the abortive military expeditions on the peninsula. The
ethnic Chinese had no desire for military careers, being more attracted to the
more lucrative business opportunities available to them. The Chinese
traditionally avoided military occupations and accorded them a very low
status. The sentiment "that vou do not use good iron to make nails" pervaded
163
the thinking of Singapore's Chinese community. 1
3
-The riots against the
national service scheme proposed bv the British in 1954 were as much in
response to this fact as to any ideological stance against the British
involvement in SEATO.
The initial separation of Singapore from Malaya and the former Straits
Settlements following the war was directlv related to the vital position that
Singapore played in the defense scheme of the British after the war. In
retrospect, this separation mav have doomed the reunion of the two
territories, when it was later attempted. At independence, with strained
relations with Malaysia, the Indonesian Confrontation oneoine and the war
in Vietnam escalating, Singapore's armed forces consisted of two battalions of
the Singapore Infantry, 1,000 enlisted men, most of whom were Malay and
many not Singapore born and 50 officers. The Singapore infantry was, at the
time of independence, serving in Sabah under British command to counter
the Indonesian threat. The navv consisted of two small vessels and there was
no air force. 15S
The presence of British, Australian and New Zealand troops gave
Singapore some time in which to address the development of an indigenous
defense capability which will be explored in the next chapter. Credible defense
would become and remain a high priority of the government of the
independent Singapore. Such high priority was accorded to defense that, by
1990, defense analyst Aaron Karp would characterize Singapore as 'the most
heavily armed country on earth.' 159
1::,
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V. 1965-1990 The Epoch of Lee Kuan Yew
A. Introduction
The trauma of separation from Malaysia for Singapore was enormous.
Despite the acrimonious relationship that had developed across the causeway
and the dangers of racial strife that the Federation contained, Malaysia was
key to Singapore's strategy of survival and prosperity. All the plans the PAP
had made for economic development were keyed to access to the Malaysian
market and a functional relationship with its northern neighbor. Dependent
upon Malaysia for water and as the hinterland for entrepot trade, separation
fears were well founded.
In the infancy of an industrialization plan that was also contingent on
access to the Malaysian market, Singapore was obliged to change directions
rapidly. The export-oriented industrialization (EOI) strategy that would be
chosen to face this challenge was not adopted because of clairvoyant brilliance
but because of necessity born of desperation. The EOI strategy is now7 widely
accepted as the paradigm for successful development to an extent to which
the general superiority of the outward-looking strategies, particularly in the
context of the structural characteristics of the NICs, seems no longer in
doubt.'160 The success of Singapore's economic development contributed in
no small part to this paradigm shift.
Although Singapore had begun to develop an independent foreign
policy prior to separation from Malaysia (much to the chagrin of Kuala
160j Wong, "The Asian NICs Towards the Year 2000: Growth and Adjustment," in Asia and
Pacific Economy: Towards the Year 2000, papers and proceedings of a conference held m Beijing,
November, 198o, Fu-chen Lo (ed.) (Kuala Lumpur: Asian and Pacific Development Center), p.
120.
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Lumpur at times), the era of Lee Kuan Yew heralded the development of a
globally oriented foreign policy strategy which its longtime Foreign Minister
S. Rajaratnam described as follows:
a judicious mixture of well-trained and well equipped defence forces,
friendly alliances, wise foreign policy, and gwing as many countries as
possible a tangible stake in the security, prosperity and integrity of
Singapore.(lta\ics added)161
In the transition period, the PAP learned the survivalist ethic in the
political arena. With the advent of independence, with an uncertain
relationship with Malaysia to the north and with a large and still belligerent
neighbor, Indonesia to its south, Singapore extended its "survivalist"
mentality in its foreign affairs. While initially survival was of paramount
importance, the evolution beyond the survivalist mentality is well described
by Minchin: "the bottom line is survival, but fear of sinking to the bottom
line has spurred the nation to accomplish and project a great deal above it."162
As mentioned above bv Rajaratnam, the foreign policy of Singapore
depends not only upon ensuring a web of international connections to give as
many nations as possible a stake in Singapore's survival, but also on
developing a credible defense establishment. Singapore has made a quite
remarkable transition from being completely dependent on the British for
their external defense to the present situation of having one of the most
modern and effective military establishments in Southeast Asia.
Shortly after the separation from Malaysia, the PAP was left with no
credible opposition to its political control of Singapore politics. Those who
^*S. Rajaratnam, Straits Times, Id December 1^/0, p. 8.
l62Miru hm, p. 178.
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had not been eliminated from politics during the transition era had been
either co-opted bv the PAP to serve their interests or had removed
themselves from politics. There was also a desire in the majority of
Singaporeans (a term which has meaning onlv after the events of 1965), after
the turbulent struggles that resulted in independence bv expulsion, to get on
with the task of building a viable nation. The sense of crisis coalesced the
people behind the PAP and allowed it to build a nation according to its own
design. In the first elections following independence in 1968, the PAP took
complete control of Parliament, winning all the seats in the assemblv. This
dominance remained unbroken until 1981, when a single opposition member
finallv broke the PAP's electoral monopoly. 163 Politics in Singapore returns to
prominence late in this era a new generation of leaders was groomed for and
finally took the reins of power. It should be noted that "politics" is something
that the PAP would just as soon do without. A technocratic rather than a
political party, the PAP has returned its attention to its political fate only
because of events which forced it to do so. Beginning with the opposition
breakthrough in 1981, politics in Singapore again becomes an area of interest,
as the PAP struggles once again to maintain its stranglehold on power.
Given the success the PAP has produced in Singapore's short historv, it
is easy to understand their reluctance to vield easilv a political order that has
served their country so well. It has produced a technocratic elite leadership
which discharges its obligations to its people in an effective, if paternalistic
manner. While it probably does not meet western standards of representative
government, it certainly exceeds western standards of effective government.
16: Bilveer Singh, Whither PAP's Dominance, (Selangor: Pelanduk, 1«Q2), pp. 3-8.
167
This is perhaps the crux of the Asian-Western controversy. One might
plausibly argue that most western liberal democracies are, by design,
ineffective to limit their potential for tyranny but the Government of
Singapore is designed on completely different assumptions. It is designed to
be an effective government, assuming that the moral superiority of its
carefully selected elite will check any tendency toward tyranny. In tinv,
vulnerable Singapore where the group is the political unit, where the latitude
for error is seen as nearly non-existent, the danger is that the government
will not be effective. In the vast, wealthy and populous United States, where
the individual is the political unit, the greatest danger is that government
will be too effective, limiting the freedom of the few to benefit the many.
B. Economics
Goh Keng Swee, the man behind Singapore's economic transformation,
had endured the Japanese occupation and following the war had been
graduated from the London School of Economics with first-class honors. He
was a founding member of the Malayan Forum in London where he met Lee
Kuan Yew. Also a founding member of the PAP , he returned to England and
obtained a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of London shortly after
the party's inauguration. He was first elected to office in the 1959 elections
and remained an elected MP until 1984. As mentioned previously
mentioned, following his retirement from government Goh was retained as a
consultant bv the People's Republic of China. 164
In its early search for development models, Switzerland was one of the
short-list candidates that seemed to offer a model that Singapore could strive
lt,i4Goh Keng Swee is not related to Singapore's present Prime Minister Goh Chock long.
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to emulate. Switzerland was a multilingual state with well armed civilian
based military forces to protect its neutrality. Its national economy was
selectively industrialized and sufficiently prosperous to attract high end
foreign experts to assist in its development. It utilized low wage guest workers
from outside its borders to do unpleasant jobs and supplement its own
domestic labor force in times of shortage. Blessed with a favorable location in
the heart of Europe, the Swiss built an impressive financial service sector
economy in international banking and insurance. The Swiss standard was a
goal that the PAP would strive to reach. It would be a long journey. To meet
its goal it had to attack three problems; I) massive unemployment and the
explosive growth in its population, 2) a dearth in capital investment, and 3)
the history of labor unrest that was closely tied to the struggle for freedom
from colonial rule and independence.
The PAP had been embarked on a labor intensive industrialization
program since first taking office in 1959. Most of the effort w7as directed toward
labor intensive, low wage import substitution industrialization (ISI). This was
an attempt to soak up massive unemployment. It was not designed originally
to create competitive industries which could export to the rest of the world.
With independence, the government moved quicklv to offer incentives for
the MNC's of the developed world to solve the capital crisis. In 1965 the
government spent ten percent more than planned on development. A
hundred new industries were granted permits and half of them went into
operation. Of the 55 million dollars in new foreign investment that came into
the island, ten million came from the United States. The lions share of
169
foreign investment was in oil refining facilities to serve as a regional centerO CO
for the expanding petroleum business. 165
The traditional entrepot trade of Singapore was embattled in the earlv
vears of independence. The acrimonious separation from Malaysia had
doomed the proposed common market. Shortly after independence stiff tariff
barriers went up across the causeway. The Malaysians were implementing
their own ISI strategy and tariffs were seen as essential to protect both
Malaysia's infant industries and encourage the development of Malaysian
ports to handle their own entrepot trade. The sense of competitiveness with
upstart Singapore and the desire to cut out the "Chinese middleman'' was
also operative. The ongoing Indonesian confrontation further limited
Singapore's entrepot trade. With feu- options left to it, Singapore, under the
capable leadership of Goh Keng Swee, turned to an Export Oriented
Industrialization (EOI) strategy with a dedication born of desperation.
A combination of regional events conspired to both relive the
restrictions on regional trade and add future impetus to the industrialization
drive. The confrontation with Indonesia wound down following the ouster
of Sukarno in late 1965. It was formally ended bv his successor Suharto in
1966. Suharto was eager to exploit his countries oil resources, and Singapore
was well positioned to serve its needs in the petroleum sector, both in
refining and the production of drilling equipment.
The British announcement in 1967 that it would withdraw from its
military bases in Singapore bv the mid-seventies was a heavy blow to the
economy. British bases and their associates services accounted for some 15,000
165Gould, p. 164.
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jobs and 20% of Singapore's GDP. This redoubled Singapore's
industrialization efforts as the PAP estimated that it would need to create
7,000 to 10,000 jobs per vear to offset these losses. 166 The final death knell for
ideas of a common market came in 1967 when, unable to agree on common
financial policies, Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore each began to issue their
own currencies. 167 Initially the currencies were interchangeable. The one for
one exchange with Malaysian currency was ended in 1973. InS
Labor discipline and changing Singapore's image as an adyersarial
"union town' was immediately assaulted. The winds of change were eyident
in an address Lee sjave to the International Labor Organization at its first
Asian conference held in Singapore in November L9bd.
In a way we created these problems. For in the pre-independence phase
our unions were part of the political mass moyements. The legitimate
trade unionism became a useful omnibus coyer for the carrot you must
offer the masses if you want them to join you in driying the colonial
power out... The same unions I egged on I now have to face, to explain
why a repetition of the habits learned in the pre-independence era must
mean the disintegration of the whole society as the economy ceases to
keep pace with growing demands of an educated population...
...it requires the greatest amount of sophistication in labour machinery,
economic policies, an understanding of this on the part of management,
and a grasp of realities on the part of union leaders that ultimately more
pay, more fringe benefits, more security can only come with higher
productivity and greater economic growth. 169
Labor legislation, which had begun in the early 1960s was strengthened
by the Trade Union Act of 1966 which made strikes illegal unless the majority
gave consent by secret ballot and additionally banned non citizens and those
166Lee Kuan Yew, Op. Cit. in Josey, p. 37Q .
167Gould, p.loQ .
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with criminal records from holding union office. A series of further acts in
1967 and 1968 severely constrained area's of legitimate union concern. 1 '' 11
What resulted was de facto government control over unions which
transferred bargaining control from workers to employers. It ushered in a
period of labor peace that remains in place. 171
The response of MNC's to the incentives offered by the government and
the swift and effective measures to enforce labor discipline was remarkable.
Cumulative foreign investment in manufacturing rose from $157 million
(US) at the end of 19b5 to SbOO million in 1969. The end of the confrontation
brought massive investment in the petroleum sector from the US, Britain
and the Netherlands (bv 1972 these three countries accounted for 61% of
cumulative foreign investment in manufacturing). From the time the PAP
took office in 1959 to 1969, just prior to a shift up the value added ladder by
the government, Singapore's per capita income had doubled and its GNP had
increased two and a half times. 172 While the withdrawal of the British
military became an even more pressing problem when the timetable was
advanced by the British Labour government in 19b8, American spending in
conjunction with it increasing Vietnam commitment together with an influx
of capital from Hong Kong investors unnerved bv the events of the Cultural
Revolution offset most of it pernicious effects.
The Seventies, Singapore Moves up the Value Added Ladder.
In 1970, in his New Year's message to the people, Lee outlined
Singapore's accomplishments and challenges as it entered the new decade:
170Milne & Mauzv, p. 63.
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We have trained and educated our voung people. We have increased
their ability to use the instruments of modern technology to create wealth.
The 70's will be better than the bO's. This is our confident expectation,
provided we do not become complacent. If we do not allow anything to
upset this assessment of our potentials, investments will continue to flow
in, generating more and better jobs, and increasing revenue to pav for
better social amenities.
Until 1970, when the challenge posed bv the withdrawal of the British
bases had been largely met, investment was concentrated in labor-intensive
industries. That rear the government shifted its strategy to upgrade its
industrial base bv attracting more capital and skill intensive industries. 173 The
diversification program included the growth of electronics, precision
equipment and expansion of the service sector in transport, communications
and business related services. The traditional entrepot trade of Singapore
shifted more to the service sector with the brain power of the banker
operating along with the muscle power of the dock worker.
The linkage of Singapore's economy to the world at large was intensified
by its shift in strategy. By 1971 foreign investment had leaped forward to US
SI.575 billion more than doubling the 19b9 figure. 174 Linked to three engines
of growth, the OECD countries, the region (including ASEAN and the larger
Indian Ocean Pacific Basin) and Singapore's own management skill,
productivity, high domestic savings (through the CPP) and domestic
market. 175 In this new economic strategy, Singapore offered the MNC's its
key location, access to inexpensive labor and tax concessions in exchange for a
1 7 "*L/ JG. Rodan The Political Economy of Singapore's Industrialization: National Slate and




transfer to Singapore of equipment know how, marketing techniques and
access.
In conjunction with its up market shift, the government established the
National Wage Council (NWC) in 1972, with representation from labor,
government and employers to stabilize wage increases associated with the
new strategy and ensure that the increases were linked to productivity. The
recommendations of the Council were not mandatory but have been
followed by the public sector and most companies. These measures as well a^
dramatic improvement of the islands infrastructure by dramatic public works
programs, and the political stability the PAP provided secured Singapore's
image as a secure and stable location for the Multi-Nationals. 176
Singapore's EOI strategy has been extraordinarily successful. Bv 1973
Singapore reached full employment, a remarkable achievement. 17" EOI does,
however, make the economy vulnerable to changes in the world economy. In
the characterization of Milne and Mauzy, Singapore developed "a dependent
but dynamic economy."178 During the worldwide downturn brought on bv
the oil shocks of the 1970s. Industrial output actually declined 7.3% in 1975.
While the oil shocks rattled Singapore, other events offset some of its effects.
Extending the figures through the seventies, the rapid expansion of
Singapore's economy produced an outstanding average annual growth rate of
10.1% between 1965 and 1979.* 79
l76Rigg, p. l°l.
'''Minchin, p. 244.
'' Milne and Mauzv, p. 131.
l79Rigg, p. L91.
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The Second Industrial Revolution, the Eighties and Onward.
Toward the end of the seventies, the government poised to shift the
economv up market once again it what became known as "the second
industrial revolution." Rigg cites five factors as propelling this bold
restructuring program: 1) other developing nations, including many of
Singapore's ASEAN neighbors, with even lower wage rates, were beginning
to crowd out Singapore's advantage in labor intensive industries, 2)
Malavsian and Indonesian programs to develop their own capabilities to
process and transport their primary products had matured, further crowding
some of Singapore's remaining entrepot functions, 3) growing
unemployment in developed nations was driving down wage rates there,
narrowing Singapore's wage advantage in less labor intensive enterprises, 4)
new technologies were eliminating many labor intensive processes,
encouraging the relocation of MNC industry to their home countries, and 5)
the use of immigrant guest workers as a solution to cyclical labor shortages
was seen as an undesirable solution that labor intensive industries would
continue to require. 1S0
Goh Keng Swee and Lee, with advice from a longtime economic advisor
Dr. Albert Winsemius a consultant since the first United Nations
development mission in 1960, decided to make the move. In 1979 investors
and managers were put on notice that three years hence the government
would institute wage increases or release its constraints on the labor market




programs were stepped up to improve worker productivity. The government
Skills Development Fund was expanded and a Vocational and Industrial
Training Board was established. 14,2 Concentration in economic development
was to be placed in mechanization, computerization, and automated
production facilities. Restrictions on immigration of skilled professionals was
eased to grease the transition skids and investment in research and
development was encouraged through various tax incentives.
The Recession of 198
5
Singapore's transformation to a high-tech economv initially went very
well. GDP figures, labor productivitv and value added figures all rapidly
leaped to record levels. Bv 1984, however, the vagaries of the world economv
came home to roost and the economv slid into recession. In 1985 the
Singapore experienced negative growth (-1.7%) for the first time since 1964.
The profitability of foreign firms plummeted 70%. Nine thousand workers
were laid off and unemplovment rose to over 4%.1S3 There were a number of
factors that contributed to the recession, including an international decline in
two sectors, shipbuilding and repair and petroleum. At least as important was
the governments policy to "force" the economv to shift upwards bv pressing
wages ahead of productivity. Between 1980 and 1985 unit labor costs leaped
forward 40% in Singapore. Compared to the other "tigers" during the same
period, Taiwan (11%), South Korea (1%) and Hong Kong (-22%), the loss in
international competitiveness is clear. 184
1S2Rigg, p. 194.
1S3Chong Lee Choy, "Singapore's Development: Harnessing the Multi-nationals,"
Contemporary Southeast Vsia, Vol. 8, No. 1 198o, p. t>2.
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In response to the shock of the economic recession, the government
appointed a Economic Committee, under the chairmanship of the Prime
Minister's son Lee Hsien Loong, to study to difficulties that led to the
economic downturn. The report of the Committee, The Singapore Economy:
New Directions, was released in February, 198b. The essence of the report
called for three corrective actions; 1) Reversal of the high wage policy to
restore competitiveness, 2) a long term reorientation of the economy favoring
modern services instead of manufacturing and, 3) liberalization of the
economy and reducing the government's role in managing the country's
economy. is '
The recommendations of the committee were largely adopted.
Compulsory CPF contributions by employers were reduced and corporate
taxes were reduced. There were numerous reductions in costs imposed on
Singapore's businesses by the plethora of government statutory boards.
Wages were frozen for two years (1986-7) and the NWC reviewed the wage
system to build in greater flexibility.
The economy responded quickly to these changes, helped along by the
recovery in the United States and the resurgent demand for electronics. If the
1985 recession demonstrates Singapore's agility in responding to economic
circumstances, it also demonstrated how the foreign business community can
respond immediately to government policies that affect their profitability.
While often hailed as an example of the success of allowing the "free market"
to mold its outward-looking economic success, Singapore's interventionist
^Ministry f Trade and Industry (Singapore), The Singapore Economy: New Directions
(Singapore: Ministry of Trade and Industry, Republic of Singapore, 198o>
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approach verv nearly cost it dearlv in 1985. As such, government intervention
in the economv deserves further examination.
The Government and the Economv in Singapore (1965 - 1990)
Far from exercising a free market, hands off approach to economic
management, the Government of Singapore has been highly interventionist.
The state holds a significant share in many of Singapore's enterprises.
Initially, it used these to support pioneer industries to restructure the
economv and stimulate and channel foreign investment.156 Bv 1977 the
government held approximately one-third of net fixed assets and bv 1987 had
a stake in 430 firms with a total paid up capital of S3 billion Singapore dollars.
Some of the most familiar of these are the giant Keppel shipyards, Singapore
Airlines, and the Development Bank of Singapore. All ^tate enterprises were
run competitivelv and, if unprofitable, would be allowed to go bankrupt.
The government became the sole supplier of infrastructure and many
public services Thev took over management the airport and port facilities,
controlled all radio and television and the press. The Housing and
Development board supplied housing for nearlv 90% of Singapore's citizens.
Most of these projects were financed bv the enormous reserves built up by the
Central Provident Fund (CPF). The fund, financed bv both emplover and
employee contributions, which varied in size according the economic
conditions as interpreted by government policy planners, has resulted in the
growth of extraordinarily high saving rates for Singapore. The impact of this
enforced savings can be noted bv examining the statistics for gross domestic
i '- D L. Sean, "Public Enterprise and Economic Development," in Singapore Development and
Trends, P.S.I. Chen (ed.) (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.152.
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savings as a percentage of GDP. In 1965 the figure for Singapore stood at 10%,
by 1985 it had skyrocketed to an astounding 42%. ls7 Bv 1988 it had 2.0b million
members with SS32.5 billion to their credit. In 1988 it accounted for 24% of
gross national savings. 1 8S According to some estimates, fully half of all
domestic income passes through government hands. 1SV Additionally, the
government held 75% all land 190
While it is often pointed out that Singapore, in contrast to most of its
Southeast Asian neighbors, has no development plan, the above facts do
pointedly indicate that its economic success has been the result more of state
intervention that Adam Smith's invisible hand. Up until 1985, the
goyernment's interventionism had been hiehlv successful. Since L9S5 and as
a result of the rethinking the recession caused, the policy may have shifted
away from strict government control. In the economic sphere, the
authoritarianism and interventionist policies of the government tended to
soften. Recent moves to privatize state owned companies, gave CPF
contributors more latitude in the investment of their funds (including
availability for housing purchases, investment in Singapore companies and
for college education) highlight this trend which Finance Minister Richard
Hu commented upon in 1987:
The government has, during the early stages of the economy, had to
take the lead to get the economy going. Now7 we have to on move to a
different level of development, different industries, smaller,
1S7World Bank, World Development Report, 1987, pp. 210-211.
*'-
-Ministry of Communications and Information, Singapore 1989, (Singapore: Information
Division, 1989)
l^^Lim, op. cat. in Rigg, p. 197.
190Rigg, p. 197.
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entrepreneurial - where I think the private sector must play a far larger
role. 191
Social Engineering
Beyond the government control of labor and its intervention in the
economy, some of the policies elicited that the most external criticism have
been Singapore's various efforts at social engineering. These ranged from
those that were viewed as comical, i.e. the government sponsored "love boat"
cruises for voung professionals to meet and find romance, to those that were
viewed as sinister, i.e. the "encouragement" offered to low income females to
accept sterilization. Both of these had one thing in common, they were
designed to attack the problem of population, in terms of both size and
quality.
When that PAP initially took office, size was a problem that demanded
its attention immediately. In the early 1960s Singapore's population growth
rate of 4.7% was one of the highest in the world. In 19b3 the Planned
Parenthood Conference was held in Singapore and the Prime Minister cited
that figure and noted the fact that in Singapore 25% of the population was
working to support the t>0% who were either too old or too young to be part of
the work force. i92
The Abortion Legalization Bill came before Parliament in 19b9 and
aroused a heated debate. During this debate, the issue of "quality" of
population surfaced as the body debated the merits of legalized abortion. Lee
Kuan Yew's expressed his beliefs on genetic endowment in an unashamed
19 l"The Government's Role, an interview with Finance Minister Richard Hu" EEER, January 8,
1987, pp. 70-72.
l92t.ee Kuan \ ew, Op. Cit. in losey, p. 171
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manner. Clearly, Lee has specific ideas on the "endowments" of different
racial groups and these obtained some validity in the circles of the party. Lee's
ideas of genetic factors influencing intelligence formed a core of his argument
for legalized abortion and voluntary sterilization. In all societies, he claimed,
there are those who are more intelligent and those who are less intelligent,
quoting extracts from an Irish scientist, Richard Lynn, who had concluded
that intelligence was principally determined bv heredity. The following is an
excerpt of Lees arguments during the abortion debate:
When the less educated who are also in the lower income groups have
large families, the problems thev create for their children are
compounded. Resources, time attention and care, lavished on one or two
children, can nurture the endowments of the children to their fullest
extent, when spread and frittered over six or more in a family, prevent anv
child from getting the chance he could have in a smaller family....
[subsidized housing, medicine, education] leads to a situation where less
economically productive people in a community are reproducing
themselves at a higher rate than the rest. This will increase the total
proportion of less productive people. One problem is how to devise a
system of disincentives, so that the irresponsible, the social delinquents,
do not believe that all thev have to do is produce children and the
government owes them and their children sufficient food, medicine,
housing, education and jobs.
The quality of our population depends not only on raising the IQ level
but also on getting parents to care, nurture and educate their children...
Every person, genius or moron, has a right to reproduce himself...beyond
three children the costs [housing, medicine, education] should be
transferred to the parent. By introducing this new abortion law together
with the companion voluntary sterilization law, we are making possible
the exercise of voluntary choice.
...we will regret time lost, if we do not now take the first tentative steps
towards correcting a trend which can leave our society with a large
number of the physically, intellectually and culturally anemic. 193
!^°Lee Kuan Yew, Op. Cit. in Josev, pp. 546-^47.
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It is impossible to imagine analogous arguments being brought before
the Congress of the United States bv the President. This is an indication of the
gulf that exists between our political systems and the difference in outlook of
those who rule in some other countries. While not judging the efficacy of the
evidence that would prove or disprove such assertions, the core of the
argument is based on practical results on the society rather than the principles
of the society, or the value of all individuals.
It is impossible to disengage the procreation controversy from the ethnic
and religious arguments that are entwined within it. The most backward and
poorest part of Singapore's population were the _\Ialavs. Their Islamic beliefs
led them to oppose the abortion/ sterilization issue on religious grounds. The
abortion bill passed despite the objections of Islamic and Roman Catholic
religious leaders. The initial restrictions of the 1969 bill which limited
abortions to those women with family and financial hardships were removed
by amendment in 1974 to provide universal abortion on demand
The government's population control policies proved even more
effective than planned. By the late 1980s the population growth rate had
fallen below replacement levels and the rhetoric of "two is enough" was
changed to "three is better or more if vou can afford it." In 1987 a number of
programs were instituted to encourage a rising birthrate, including large tax
rebates for third children (extended to fourth children in 1989), child care
subsidies, access to larger government flats etc.,. 194 The seeming abrupt about
face caused political difficulties for the PAP. Previous policies which had
encouraged sterilization after two children, giving priority to those who
L94Milne & Mauzy, p. 1 1.
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accepted it in registering their children for school, had to be continued despite
the contradictions involved. The abortion legislation remained intact
although doctors were encouraged to use social persuasion'' to discourage
what had once been viewed as nearly tantamount to an act of patriotism. Lest
one doubt the 'family values' of the PAP, it should be noted that the
incentives for three children did not applv to unmarried women. 195 Nor is
artificial insemination or other "fertility assistance" available to unmarried
women.
Education
The other tool that the government used extensively in its social
engineering effort was the schools. Surprisingly, education received relatively
little attention until the mid 1970s. The system that had been established
before the PAP took office was left largely in place. Expansion was seen as
more important than curricula. The imperatives of the multi-lingual society
had a deleterious effect on early efforts at educational reform. In the early
years this often resulted in excruciating difficulties for both teachers and
students who were ill-prepared for the transition. Prior to separation from
Malaysia, Malay was declared the national language, first to court the merger
and then to remain within it. Tor a Chinese dialect speaker this could mean
learning Malay, English and Mandarin, the designated Chinese "mother
tongue" at school and speaking none of them at home. This example of the
government legislating the impossible and being hence disappointed with the
results seemed to characterize early efforts at educational reform.
195Milne & Mauzy, p. 11.
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Following separation, bilingualism was adopted and universal education
was implemented in four language streams (Chinese, Malay, Indian and
English) with each stream to learn a 'mother tongue' and English. English
was the language most suitable for economic development and providing a
common medium of communication. It was also the least susceptible to
charges of cultural chauvinism from the different racial groups. English was
progressively emploved more and more in teaching science and technical
subjects and the "mother tongue" used in civics and other non-technical
subjects. With the advent of bilingual education the drift to English-medium
schools became more pronounced.
In the mid-seventies, despite government financial support for
expansion of the education svstem, testing of incoming national service
candidates revealed large numbers of English-educated youths were
functionallv illiterate. Years of concentrating efforts on the brightest students
while throwing money at an ineffective svstem for the rest had produced
poor results for a large majority of Singapore's students. This prompted the
caustic remark of Goh Ken Swee, who would be given responsibility to fix the
problem that, Most countries produce illiterates without spending any
money'. 196
The Goh report, completed in 1979, was complemented by a report on
moral education by Ong Teng Cheong (who in August 1993 became
Singapore's first elected President). The provisions of the report were
implemented following a lively debate in Parliament and in public. The
major problem identified was the high dropout and failure rate at the
L9«
*Op.cit. in Minchin, p.259.
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primary level which produced a group of people who were essentially
unemployable. The universal bilingualism was simply beyond the capabilities
of many students.
The solution applied was increased "streaming" of students at earlier
and earlier stages of schooling. The streaming solution selects the most
talented students by virtue or exam performance and places them in
demanding bilingual schools with challenging curricula. Weak students are
identified and shifted to monolingual schools and on to vocational training,
reducing dropout and failure rates. Singapore's factories get trained workers
and the most talented students are given the opportunity to excel in Ihe most
challenging educational environment. This is meritocracy in action, and the
PAP is dedicated to this concept.
Following the implementation of the recommendations in the Goh
report, those who did not represent the polar ends of the talent spectrum
were placed into normal and extended bilingual streams. Here their talents
could develop and if promising enough, lateral transfers to a more
challenging "stream' were possible. The Goh Report also called for emphasis
on language skills in the first three years of primary school. By 1983 the
government announced that one national stream with English as the only
first language would be implemented in 1987, all other languages would be
taught as secondary subjects. That move represented the end of Singapore's
attempt at full bilingualism for all but the very top students. 197
As the eighties wore on, Singapore's education system adopted the
reforms necessary to produce students who could become useful members of
197Milne & Mauzv, p. 21.
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a society geared toward increasing levels of technical sophistication. As the
"'Singaporean identity" became more well established the more symbolic
characteristics of the educational system began to fade. The Chinese medium
schools that dominated the educational system early in Singapore's existence
gave way to English-medium schools concentrating on teaching skills that
result in an employable student product. Full bilingualism gave way to a
system which attempted to meet the needs of the entire population bv
offering practical alternatives to students who were unable to master,
simultaneously, language and academic skills. Between 197b and 1985 the
dropout rate was halved and the secondary education completion rate rose
from less than 40^, to 75%.
While these statistics offered a promising view of Singapore's progress,
the policies encountered problems. Early streaming of students (beginning at
the third year of Primary school) produced a highly competitive situation for
very young students. Most children who could afford to do so attended
private kindergartens to get a head start on the primary education system.
Exams were everything and the social costs to young children were openly
questioned by many. For each student who did not qualify for the most
desirable stream there were usually two resentful parents. While designed to
offer maximum opportunity to a large and diverse population, the streaming
system appeared to be biased in favor of those who could afford to get their
children extra instruction. The cultural reverence which the Chinese have
traditionally placed upon the scholar very much worked in their favor.
Minority populations, both Indian and Malay, continued to lag behind in
school achievement and there was little positive evidence to show that
18b
Malavs adapted well to the achievement oriented meritocracy that is the
essence of the "Singaporean identity." While the reforms begun by the Goh
report lifted the performance of the schools for the entire population, the
performance gap between the majority Chinese and Singapore's minorities,
particularly Malays, tended to be widen.198 Also, as recognized in the report
following the 19S5 recession, Singapore did not invest as much in education
as the other NIC's and fewer of its students went on to secondary and tertiary
education. While this was not a significant hindrance in the industrial era, in
an economy shifting up to higher technology, this educational gap has more
significant economic implications. 109 The ethnic gap has political as well as
economic implications in the multi-cultural society. The decidedly elitist
approach to education that the government pursued during the 1980's may
have to be modified to meet the changing needs of a new economic vision.
Housing
The most significant problem the PAP faced when taking control of
government was the critical housing shortage and the slum conditions faced
bv the majority of the population. In less than a quarter of a century the
government transformed the face of Singapore from a low rise city of urban
slums to a high rise society of apartment dwellers. What was once among the
most primitive of the world's urban areas became "the public housing
laboratory of the world."200
19sMilne & Mauzv, p. 23.
199Lawrence B. Krause, "Industrialization of an Advanced Global City," in Lawrence B.
Krause, Koh Ai Tee & Lee (Tsao) "Yuan, TJie Singapore Economy Reconsidered, (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), pp. 58-59.
200Barnngton Kaye, Op. Cit. in Milne & Mauzy, p. 35.
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After 19b0 the government built 540,000 high rise apartment units in
which 86% of the population live. Two- thirds of these families owned their
apartments. Home ownership was encouraged and highly subsidized bv the
government through various incentive programs. In contrast to Raffles
policy of separating the races, the PAP enforced integration and constantly
ensures that the ethnic mix of the government housing projects reflected that
of the society as a whole. This policy has served to prevent the rise of ethnic
enclaves and to reinforce the government's vision of a multi-ethnic, multi-
cultural societv living harmoniously together. Critics of government housingO o o o
policies pointed oul that it also served to nullify any possibility of the growth
of local political centers of power based on the shared interests of am
particular ethnic group. Given the PAP's stand of the politics of race, this
result was certainly in line with their own vision of multi-ethnic politics.
In this, as in other contentious issues concerning race, the policies of
enforced integration and equality of opportunity can be viewed from two
contrasting perspectives. First, the hopeful perspective, that bv living,
working and learning together, the races will draw together and find their
primary identity as Singaporeans rather than as Malays, Chinese, and Indians.
Second, the insidious, that bv denying the opportunity of the various racial
groups to organize themselves as a political force, the Chinese, who began
with significant advantages, will continue to outpace their counterparts in




Singapore found itself in a verv tenuous position upon receiving its
unexpected independence in l%5. Singapore was sponsored for UN
membership bv Malaysia shortly after independence and became its L17th
member on September 21, 1965.201 Initial foreign policy initiatives were based
on a strategy of non-alignment and Singapore attempted to identify with the
Afro-Asian community. 202 Singapore also had some significant advantages
working in its favor as it began to reach out to the rest of the world. Because
of it location and history as a center of regional trade, there were already thirty
foreign consulates and missions in Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew had cultivated
his international contacts during the transition period and was well known to
the world's political leadership. His contacts with the Democratic Socialist
movements were particularly e\tensive(and ironic).
There was also the additional advantage of being able to conduct foreign
policy without much oversight from domestic interest groups. Without
opposition in Parliament and with a population that cared little for the affairs
of state, Lee and his talented Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam, were able to
chart their own course in foreign affairs.
Lee Kuan Yew's conduct of diplomacy will be divided into three periods:
The "survivalist phase" from independence until the elections of 1968; from
1968 to the fall of the Indochinese states to the communists in 1975 and; from
1975 to the departure of Lee Kuan Yew from the Prime Minister's office in
1990.
201 Mimstry of Information and the Arts (Singapore), Singapore Facts and Pictures 1992,
(Singapore: Ministry of Information and Arts, 1QQ 2), p. 13.
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1965-1968 The Survivalist Phase
Perhaps the single most important strand of Singapore's foreign policy
that emerged from the early survivalist phase was the decoupling of trade
from issues of international politics. Acutely aware oi Singapore's need for
economic growth and of its reliance upon international connections to
achieve it Lee and his confederates actively sought trading partners wherever
Singapore could find profit. At the press conference announcing the
separation from Malaysia Lee stated, in somewhat Churchillian fashion, "we
will trade with the devil', in the event of lack of economic cooperation
between Malaysia and Singapore. 203
The situation with Indonesia changed dramatically with the September
30, 1965 coup and countercoup in Indonesia. When Sukarno's ouster resulted
in General Suharto taking control of the country. In December of that year Dr.
Subandrio, the new Indonesian Foreign Minister made some tentative
overtures for bilateral talks with Singapore (excluding Malaysia) concerning
the Confrontation. Lee, in spite of pressure for solidarity with Malaysia,
responded that he would meet anybody anytime to seek peace. He softened
his foreign policy line, however, bv openly stating that the defense and
security of Singapore and Malaysia were closely interwoven. Continuing on
this line he remarked that defense and security were indivisible from trade
and industry. The distinction that he made using these two points was that he
would, as long as Singapore's territorial integrity was not threatened, support
a security line congruent with Malaysia's but would pursue world trade
without regard to the political pressure he might feel from the Kuala Lumpur
20j>Lee Kuan \ ew, Press Conference Q August l uo s , op. at. in Minchin p. 1 56.
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government. Later in the same interview, Lee revealed that a trade mission
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would soon be visiting Singapore.
Early in 1 Q66 the Indonesians were making overtures to Singapore,
which were condemned bv Malaysia at the same time that thev (the
Malavsians) were invoked in secret talks in Bangkok. Lee, in April,
embarked on a world diplomacv trip. He visited Cambodia, Thailand, the
UAE and London enroute the Socialist International Conference in
Stockholm. In Stockholm, Lee stated Singapore*s hope lo establish social and
economic ties with both Indonesia and China provided that these involved a
firm understanding of non-interference in internal affairs. There was n_o_
discussion of political ties with the Chinese, however. He also pointedly
remarked that Singapore had chosen the Israeli model of national defense
over the Swiss, remarking that "in our situation it appears necessary to train
not only every bov, but also every girl, to be a disciplined and effective digit in
the defense of their country ".204
Shortly after Lee's return from his international tour, Tun Razak, the
Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, announced the end of the confrontation in
Kuala Lumpur. While there was much jubilation over the end of the long
standoff and the opportunities it represented, there was an uncomfortable
disquiet in Singapore over the images of the Indonesians and Malaysians
embracing one another as long lost brothers. The idea of a greater
Malaysia/ Indonesia, Melayu Raya, would continue to haunt Singapore. A
common front between these two nations, joined by race and religion, is,
undoubtedly, Singapore's particular vision of Armageddon. Although
^^Lee Kuan Yew, op. at. in Josey, p. 394.
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Indonesia recognized Singapore unilaterally on June 4, Lee contacted Kuala
Lumpur and informed the government that Singapore would not recognize
Indonesia prior to Malaysia undertaking such an action.
Singapore and the United States got of to a rocky start. Lee, still smarting
from the unexpected divorce from Malaysia unleashed a tirade against the
United States and its lack of civilization in August, 1965. At a press conference
he detailed the efforts, years earlier, of CLA attempts to bribe a Singapore
Special Branch officer and subsequent attempts of the Kennedy
administration to buy back Singapore's goodwill.
In I960, the CLA apparently thought that the communists were gaining
control in Singapore and attempted to put the head of Singapore's ISD on the
US payroll. The American offering the bribe was promptly arrested. A high
ranking US official (who Lee still refuses to name), came to Singapore and
offered Lee USS3,300,000 to keep the affair from going public. Lee refused,
offering that he would instead take $US 33 million in economic aid, which
was not forthcoming. 205
In 1965, when Lee went public with his story, the State Department
denied it. When confronted with the possibility of Lee documenting his
charges to an eager press corps with incriminating tapes and other
documents, the State Department confirmed the charge. As Lee put it:
[the Americans] are not dealing with Ngo Dinh Diem or Syngman
Rhee. You do not buy and sell this government. 206
Lee railed about the lack of diplomatic courtesy extended when he and
Goh Keng Swee visited New York in 1963 to argue the merger issue before the
205Stan Sesser, "A Reported at Large, A Nation of Contradictions," The New Yorker, January,
13, 1 Q°2, p. 47.
206Op. at. in Sesser, p. 47.
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United Nations. He condemned the impudence and impertinence' of
American specialists who suggested his wife flv lo Switzerland or the United
States for medical treatment.
Much of the acrimony Lee heaped upon the United States was based on
his perception that The United States was far more supportive of the
Malaysian government than of Singapore. This was probably true as
Malaysia's staunch anti-communism and success in dealing with its own
insurgents contrasted starkly with Lee's fancy dancing with the communists
in his own party. Lee was concerned with the possibility of the United States
intervening in the area in support of the Malavsian government should the
British withdraw from the region. His public statements concerning the
United States buying and selling leaders in Vietnam and South Korea and the
possibility of the United States going in to help the racist groups there
[Malaysia] and brutalise the country," were but examples of the darts he flung
at Washington immediately after independence.207 An Australian academic,
K.G. Tregonning, who spoke to Mr. Lee in September of 1965, interpreted his
highly personal criticisms as a calculated ploy to warn the United States that
any intervention in Malaysia would make the communal situation worse
than it was.20S
Throughout 196b the Prime Minister continued to outline the
parameters of Singapore's foreign policy. He maintained that two of the
axioms that had guided the affairs of many of the developing nations in the
post-colonial era had vanished . First, the idea of a monolithic communist
world had yanished as evidenced bv the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural
207 Ibid, p. 159.
208Op. Cit. in Minchin, p. 158.
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Revolution in China. Secondly, the notion of Afro-Asian solidarity yersus
the developed world had fallen apart as the colonial powers withdrew (these
were certainly not views shared by United States policy makers at the time).
With regard to Vietnam/ the Prime Minister expressed his conviction that the
present state of affairs, with the Americans fighting to contain communism
there, could not be assumed to prevail forever. In an almost clairvoyant
assessment, Lee stated:
We must never believe that the happy situation we are in will go on
forever, that the Americans consider South Vietnam fundamental to their
prestige and to the whole security of Southeast Asia...
...we must never assume that thev want to do this for ever and
ever. ..there may come a time when their mood mav change .ind they mav
say, no, this is not in mv interest.' If you get a shift, a major shift of policy
after the present struggles in China, the whole spectrum may change.
South Vietnam no longer becomes important. New forms to secure big
power interests can be arrived at, and big power interests do not
necessarily coincide with your and my interests. You might well get into a
situation where big-power interests make it irrelevant whether or not we
are engulfed in a bigger whole... And in that contingency, we must have
the capacity to make it extremely painful and expensive for ever after
because history is an unending process.209
That Lee's remarks presage the Nixon doctrine announcement in Guam
by three years and the shattering announcement that Nixon would go to
China by five years is remarkable. That they were made while Lvndon
Johnson was still in office and the American commitment in Vietnam was
still on the rise is astounding. The closing of his argument indicates some of
the dedication that Singapore would bring to its efforts at building an effective
national defense.
^Lee Kuan "new, Address to the Political Study Center, Singapore, 13 July L966, op. cit. in
losey, p.328.
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Lee and Singapore never did come around to directly support the
American effort in Vietnam, nor did they oppose it. Following the British
announcement of their impending withdrawal in 1967 Foreign Affairs
Minister Rajaratnam expressed an appreciation of the United States as a
Pacific power and Singapore's US Ambassador could call on the United States
to assume a more positive role in the region as Britain had "lost her grip."
The Prime Minister, speaking in Japan in March, 1967 exclaimed that what
was happening in South Vietnam "cannot be repeated ... We cannot allow the
same forces that have emasculated South Vietnam to emasculate the whole
region." He even mooted the idea that a permanent American military
presence might be preferable, a presence 'whose creditworthiness would
depend on performance.' 210 Barely two months later the same Lee would join
India to call for an immediate halt to the bombings as a necessary first step to
peace. 211 Later in the year in London, on his way to met LBJ in Washington,
Lee described himself as neither a hawk or a dove on Vietnam but an owl'
looking at what was happening with baleful eyes. 212 The western cultural
connotation of the "wise owl" certainly played a part in Lee's avian selection.
He spoke of both the dire consequences of escalation and the dangers of a
precipitous withdrawal.
He was received with great fanfare bv President Johnson who
characterized Lee as "a patriot, a brilliant political leader and a statesman of
the New Asia."213In typical Lee rhetoric, he appealed to LBJ for the building of
a relationship based on mutual respect. "You are big and powerful," he
210Op. Cit. in Gould, pp. 234-234.
211Gould, p. 23?.
212Lee Kuan Yew in a speech to the British Labour party, Scarborough, "10 October 196/
213Op. Cit. in Josey, p. 396.
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remarked "but unless we and others like us in the region can also learn to
trust your judgment and to respect it, then I think vou will have continuing
problems in Asia."214 Lee managed to rankle a number of people during his
stay in the United States bv not taking any discernible stand on American
actions in Vietnam. The Far East Economic Review categorically stated that
Lee was "sitting pretty on the bamboo fence.. .to bend with the wind, to
reserve positions of maximum flexibility, to leave all escape hatches well
open, to sidestep commitments already made." The Review, lamented the
'obyious dedication to expediency' in someone of Lee's caliber, and made the
trenchant point that while expediency was no crime, it was an uncomfortable
bed mate with a penchant for preaching. 215
To understand Lee's position is not terribly difficult. It is only irritating
in its pragmatism and cynicism. In numerous prior statements he had clearly
revealed that he believed the war was unwinnable as long as the regime in
South Vietnam could not win the support of the people. He viewed the
various Saigon regimes as corrupt puppets, distanced from the people and
largely out to milk Washington for as much as they could get to enrich
themselves, not their country. In retrospect, this is a difficult point to
challenge. He openly admired the Viet Cong's fighting and organizational
abilities, but not their ideology . Ie had gone so far as to suggest, in a
Commonwealth meeting on the Rhodesian crisis, that if some of the African
nations had similar armed movements that the era of while rule would
quickly come to an end.
214Op.Cit. injosev, p. 398.
215Op. Cit. in Josev, p. 408.
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Yet, the presence of the United States in Vietnam, especially in light of
the impending withdrawal of the British, bought the Singaporeans time to
build up their own defense forces. While it was in Singapore's interest for the
Americans to remain, Lee was convinced, far earlier than most, that,
ultimately, the cause was lost. It is difficult to put a happy face on a message
whose gist is: stay as long as you can despite the fact that you will ultimately
lose, so that I can build up my security arrangements. But, as the Reznew
pointed out, such a message would, perhaps, have been better conveyed more
quietly than Lee's considerable ego would allow.
As a practical matter, Singapore welcomed L~S soldiers on leave and
reaped a significant economic windfall from US military -pending during the
war. While the political line may have been not so blandly non-committal,
Singapore certainly placed no practical obstructions in the way of the US
effort. WTiile the phrase, 'they laughed all the way to the bank' is a bit
misanthropic, if one exchanges preaching for laughter, it is probably accurate.
Another significant event that occurred during the early survivalist
phase was the formation of ASEAN. This, in point of fact, could be marked as
the beginning of the end of the survivalist phase. While the organization was
designed as a forum for mutual cooperation in regional economic, social and
cultural areas, many analysts conclude that formation of ASEAN was
primarily based on mutual security fears and weaknesses.21
6
The regional
stage was set for cooperation by the end of the Confrontation, the
announcement of the British withdrawal "East of Suez," and the escalation of
the war in Vietnam. All of these factors led to a desire on the part of the non-
216Rigg, p. 20°.
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communist governments in Southeast Asia to take a more activist role in
regional security. The fears of these countries (the Philippines, Indonesia,
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand) were based largely on the threat of
internal insurgencies, with perhaps sponsorship from abroad. The
xenophobia of the Cultural Revolution was at its height and the
revolutionary rhetoric of the Chinese was troubling lo manv in the region.
The memorv of the bloodv coup in Indonesia, where the Chinese, communist
or not, suffered miehtily at the hands of the army were still fresh in the
minds of the leaders of these new nations. Singapore, still viewed by some as
a potential Chinese outpost in Southeast Asia, had much to gain bv becoming
more firmly identified as a Southeast Asian nation.
The ASEAN basis for cooperation was centered on efforts to foster
economic development to deny the potential "fertile ground" of economic
deprivation to revolutionary political movements which would prey upon it
as a recruitment tool. Further, regime survival, the ASEAN five agreed,
depended upon non-interference in the respective internal affairs of the
member nations to enable them to get on with the difficult task of nation
building. This task was especially difficult in Malaysia, Indonesia and
Singapore in an atmosphere riven with communal differences that tended to
work against such efforts. In all these countries there were firm, sometimes
draconian measures used to deal with suspected communist elements in
society. These measures, contentious as they were in domestic terms, could
have been made extraordinarily more difficult bv a regional neighbor
providing either material or political support to dissident factions. The
Confrontation provided ample evidence of this.
L98
Earlier efforts at regional cooperation had failed. The first of these, the
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), had been formed in 1961 and
immediately branded by Sukarno of Indonesia as a pro-Western anti-
communist front organization. In 1963 Malphilindo (Malaysia, Philippines,
and Indonesia), with a communally base Malay membership, excluded the
other states and was \iewed by a threat by many. It was doomed when the
Confrontation began. These early failures, however, established some of the
principles that helped ASEAN to succeed where others had failed. The
common threads were universal membership and a non-communist, non-
communal approach. The Bangkok Conference of 1 Q67 produced a broad
definition of cooperation between the original ASEAN five. The twin pillars
of ASEAN efforts were to be economic development and political stability.
The Indonesian strategy of "national resilience" perhaps best describes the
core of the ASEAN agenda. President Suharto described this as the ability of
the nation to make the social and economic changes necessary to progress,
and to meet all external threats while preserving the country's essential
national identity. 217 The acceptance of such an approach, although specifically
unstated initially, provided the significant advantage of drawing Indonesia
into peaceful and cooperative relations with its neighbors. This was key after
a very difficult period in which Indonesia had been viewed as a regional and
international pariah. It also represented tacit acceptance of Indonesia, with its
huge population and strategic location, as a regional "first among
2 *' Regionalism in Southeast Asia, (Papers presented at the first conference of ASEAN students
of Regional Affairs; Jakarta, 22-25 October 1974), Jakarta, 1975, p. 8.
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equals. "-^The Bangkok Declaration embraced the widest possible principles
of cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural spheres. The tenor of the
Declaration reflects these sentiments and the Indonesian principle of
resilience:
... the countries of South East Asia share a primary responsibility for
strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring
their peaceful and progressive national development, and... are
determined to ensure their [the ASEAN states] stability from external
interference in any form of manifestation in order to preserve their
national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their
peoples;219
It should be pointed out that ASEAN, for Singapore, had more political
utility than any other attraction. The economic utility to Singapore was
negligible, as its economy was far more advanced, and likely to be seen as
more of a competitive threat than a complementary partner. As a largely
Chinese community, there were cultural gulfs to be bridged rather than
common ties to be established. Singapore's ostensible multi-culturalism was
an anathema to most of its neighbors. What ASEAN did (and continues to
this day to do) was provide a political identification with the region and
regularize ties within the region. Singapore is often the "odd man out" in
ASELAN policy discussions. While ASEAN has disappointed many critics by
its lack of progress in real integration, such criticisms tend to obscure the
significant accomplishment of these countries in coming together at all. As
Shee Poon Kim points out:
-
ls Roger Irvine, "The Formative Years of ASEAN: 1967-1975" in Alison Broinwski (ed.),
Understanding ASEAN, (London: Macmillan Press, 1 Q82), p. 12.
^wThe ASEAN Declaration, reproduced in, Alison Broinwski (ed.),Understanding ASEAN,
Appendix A.
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the ASEAN countries form a group of distinct heterogeneous
communities that differ greatly in their political social and economic
structures, cultural ethos and ruling elite philosophies. These differences
have often been so fundamental that they have predetermined attitudes
toward regional cooperation.--
When, in January of 1968, the British Labour Government announced
that its time table for the withdrawal of its ''East of Suez" forces would be
accelerated and all troops would depart bv 1971, Lee went to London to plead
for an extension.
Beyond difficulties with its regional neighbors, if one thinks back to the
events of L968, with the Let offensive in Vietnam and active insurgencies in
almost all the Southeast Asian countries, it is not difficult to find grounds for
a significant degree of discomfort in Singapore. At the time, to label
Singapore's external defense capability as rudimentary would have been
charitable at best and reflective of hopeless naivete at worst.
Lee managed onlv to secure a promise from the British to extend their
military presence through the end of 1971. As a result of this, security became
the top priority concern. With this dragon to slay, as well as the threat of
looming unemployment due to British base closures, the PAP dissolved the
Parliament and sought a new mandate for the difficult tasks ahead. On
February 17, the PAP swept the polls and returned the first of many all PAP
legislatures.
1968-1975, ASEAN to the Fall of Indochina.
With the confrontation over and a framework established for civil
cooperation with its neighbors, Singapore's international position
220Shee Poon Kim, "A Decade of ASEAN 1Q66-1977," Asian Survey, Vol. 17 No. S 1977, p. 75:
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significantly improved. The initial foray into the Afro-Asian world was
largely left behind, Lee contending that Commonwealth partners, Britain,
Australia and New Zealand would now pay closer attention to the
Commonwealth's specific needs.
At the January 1969 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference,
negotiations began for a defensive arrangement to replace the departing
British. Lee Kuan Yew viewed Singapore's Commonwealth connection as a
safer alternative to "western leaning" policy that direct association with the
United States. In a universe of giant planets, being the midst of the
Commonwealth constellation was a useful balancer for the larger
gravitational attraction of the massive Soviet and US planets.-21 As far as
relations with China, the Prime Minister maintained that he thought China
and its 700 million inhabitants were there and could not be ignored. When
the excesses of the Cultural Revolution were over, China's power would
continue to grow, in particular its nuclear capability. Lee foresaw a day when
the major powers would have no choice but to come to grips with the fact of a
reasonable balance of power between them.
In May, 19b9 Lee visited President Nixon in Washington amidst
speculation that the Prime Minister might possibly succeed U Thant as
Secretary General of the United Nations, despite his denials that he needed at
least 10 years to devote to the development of Singapore. Lee had come at a
critical time, just before Mr. Nixon was to make a televised address on
Vietnam. He met with a plethora of Washington elites including Dr.
Kissinger, the Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, and a group of Asian
221 Lee Kuan \ ew's analogy mooted at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, London,
lanuary \°o°. Op. Cit. In Josey pp. 4Q1-Q2.
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specialists in the Department of State. While in Washington, news of
communal rioting in Malaysia, in conjunction with the general elections
reached the United States. Lee was uncharacteristically restrained, limiting his
comments to a desire that the difficulties be resolved quickly.
In an interview with the New York Times Lee expressed his opinion
that a gradual disengagement of US forces was the most prudent policy if the
Vietnamese were given adequate time to "get on their own feet and carry the
burden themselves."222 Lee continued on this line concerning the
Vietnamese taking up responsibilities they should have taken up long ago.
Twelve hours before Nixon's nationwide address (in which he announced
that the US had ruled out attempting a military solution on the battlefield, a
one-sided withdrawal, or the acceptance of terms in Paris that would be
tantamount to defeat. Vietnamization was about to begin), Lee remarked that
every thinking person in Southeast Asia had accepted the drawdown trend in
US policy and indicated that, if orderly done, confidence in US commitments
in the region would not suffer. To the astonishment of his aides, Lee,
according to the Times, assailed \Tguven Cao Kv of South Vietnam for his
extravagance and lack of sensitivity to his people. Lee warned that the mood
in the United States demanded that the Vietnamese show the capacity, "not
just the willingness - the capacity to stand up for themselves and for what
they believe, then this last chance will pass them by."223
A month later the Washington Post would editorially laud Lee for his
correct and realistic view of America's position in Vietnam and somewhat
remarkably comment that: "This country has had no stronger supporter of its
222 Op. Cit. In losev, p. 309.
zzoLee Kuan Yew, op. cit. in losev, p. 509.
203
Vietnam effort over the years than Mr. Lee Kuan Yew." Lauding the Prime
Minister's pragmatism, the Post went on to remark that in private
conversations, he '.vas asking less of the Ameri ns than the were askine of
themselves. While he had read public opinic correctly, it puzzled and
dismayed him. He was realistic. If the public would not see the war through,
it was time to begin the gradual withdrawal - to Yietnamize the war. Citing
the Prime Minister's assessment the Post called upon Secretary of Defense
Clark Clifford to follow Lee's advice and give the Vietnamese "an honest,
reasonable shot at their own salvation."224 Being seated atop the bamboo
c had paid dividends, the Owl, despite his Janus-like posturing, ended up
looking wise indeed.
An interesting post script to the above events is Nixon's assessment of
Lee Kuan Yew. It will never be known if Lee had any influence on Nixon's
decisions in Vietnam, other than perhaps confirming, from an Asian
viewpoint, his own assessment of the political ground. Nixon commented, in
his 1982 book Leaders that, "the fact that a leader of Lee's breadth of vision
was not able to act on a broader stage represents an incalculable loss to the
world."--" This may represent the admiration of a man who shared an almost
spiritual affinity with Lee. Two men who knew they were right, and used all
the organs of state to press their own visions ahead, with a confidence that, in
both, bordered on megalomania. This admiration and affinity may also have
been mixed with just a tinge of envy and maybe arrogance. Had Nixon had at
his disposal the tools that remain in place in Singapore to this day, Bob
Woodward and Carl Bernstein would probably have been detained without
224pp. Cit. in losev. p. 510.
225Ridwd M. Nixon, Leader*, (New York: Warner, 1 Q82), p. 336.
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trial, the Washington Post shut down, and the former President would
certainly not have resigned in disgrace.
Singapore's improved relationships regionally and a softening of its
paranoia following the foundation of ASEAX opened the door to a
resurgence of diplomatic activity. The reception that the Prime Minister
received in Washington was also helpful. In June, 1969, in a Time magazine
interview, the Prime Minister maintained that even if Vietnam fell and Laos
and Cambodia were threatened, Thailand, with US backing, would hold. This
was of supreme importance to West Malavsia and Singapore. Lee expounded
on the need for economic development to forestall the development of
indigenous insurgent movements and called upon the United States, Japan
and .Australia to assist the region bv providing capital and expertise. He
outlined Singapore's regional role as that of regional spark plug for economic
development as the "Venice" of a vibrant trading region. Maintaining his
tight-lipped posture on his northern neighbor, he refused to comment on the
racial riots there. He later reinforced his conciliatory tone highlighting the ties
of history, geography and family that still remained between Singapore and
Malaysia, noting that the two countries would always be interrelated.226
The Prime Minister visited India enroute to the non-aligned nations
conference in Lusaka. At Lusaka, Singapore's departure from the socialist line
and increasing distance from the non-aligned was much in evidence. He
openly advocated practical development strategies which involved a large
wage gap between the skilled and unskilled and the broad utilization of
experts from abroad to assist in development. He unabashedly stated that
226Op. Cit. in Josey, p. 531.
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inequality was a necessary component of deyelopment. Using Singapore as
his example he remarked the "Singapore is deyeloping painfully, unequally,
often unjustly. ...but we are deyeloping."- 27
Following the Conference in Lusaka, the Prime Minister visited Cairo,
the Soyiet Union, France, West Germany, and Britain. He then journeyed to
the United States where he spent twenty days at Harvard in a "working
retreat." He attended the UN General Assembly for the first time and yisited
President Nixon once again. On the way back to Singapore, Lee lectured at the
East-West Center in Honolulu, where he expounded on his beliefs that the
transition from the agricultural society to the industrial society required
jettisoning those parts of traditional yalue systems that inhibited the
acquisition of knowledge and interfered with work discipline.-—
Of significance during his world travels were his defense of Singapore's
non-aligned status in Cairo, despite Egyptian claims of inconsistency due to
the continuing British military presence in Singapore. He maintained that
non-alignment had acquired a new definition. According to Lee, in the
present circumstances of cooling superpower tension it now meant not to be
automatically aliened or committed to fi^ht on one side or the other
e O O
regardless of the rights and wrongs of the issue involved. He also stated in a
speech in West Germany that Soviet Naval ships would be welcomed in
Singapore for the economic benefit they provided to the Singaporean
economy. "We will repair any vessel from any country because we provide a
service to the ships of all the world," Lee stated, qualifying his remarks by
stating that such conditions would obtain only under peaceful conditions.
227 Ibid, p. 380.
22& Ibid, p. 588.
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Addressing the same topic in London, he explained that he welcomed such
opportunities as they provided a peaceful economic approach to greater
cooperation. The same applied to the 7th Fleet and the Japanese. He reiterated
his hopes tor continuing defense cooperation with the British, Malaysians,
Australians and New Zealanders once the British departed from their
Singapore bases.--
Singapore reached a new level of achievement when it hosted the first
Commonwealth Heads of Government conference to be held in Asia.
Singapore played host to 32 Heads of Commonwealth nations in an event
that, in the context of the Commonwealth, had a similar impact on
Singapore's image as hosting the Olympic games might have had on the
world stasre.
The conference dealt with some difficult issues, such as the ongoing
controversy concerning British arms sales to South Africa. In true Asian style,
Lee mollified the sometimes tense atmosphere by stating that if consensus
was not possible "we shall have to decide whether we can agree to
disagree.'230 The issue of a rise of US trade protectionism was raised as was
the impact upon the Commonwealth of Britain's impending entrance into
the Common Market.
Following the triumphant Heads of Government Conference success in
1971, with the conflict in Vietnam winding down and an American table
tennis team making a precedent shattering visit to China, the five regional
Commonwealth partners met in London to formalize defense arrangements
for Southeast Asia prior to the departure of the British. The result of the
229 Ibid, p. 590.
230 Ibid, p. 591.
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meeting was a joint communique, issued on April lb, 1971, which spelled out
a new relationship of the Commonwealth for the defense of Malaya and
Singapore which had been the primary responsibility of the British.
The Fi\e Power Defence Ministers Communique recognized the
determination of the signatories to continue to cooperate closely in the
region's defense arrangements based on "the need to regard the defence of
Malaysia and Singapore as indiyisible." The joint communique recognized
the signatories "belief in the settlement of all international disputes by
peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter." The language of the Communique does not require united military
action in response to an attack upon one of the signatories, it is therefore not
an alliance, but rather specifies that:
...in relation to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore, that in
the eyent of any form of armed attack externally organised or supported or
the threat of such attack against Malaysia and Singapore, their
governments would immediately consult together for the purpose of
declaring what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relation
to such an attack or threat. 231
The initial purpose of the Fi\re Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA)
was simply to fill the yoid left by the withdrawal of British forces and buy
time for Singapore and Malaysia to build up and train their own armed
forces. 232 The British Far East Command ceased operations on October 31,
1971, bringing to an end one hundred and fifty two years of British
responsibility in the defense of Southeast Asia.
2
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208
Shortly after the FPDA came into existence, the Malaysians brought
forward to ASEAN a proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia, with
-uch a status to be guaranteed bv the great powers. Singapore's realpolitik
stripes began to show clearlv in the debate over the Malaysian proposal for a
Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The ASEAN foreign
ministers met in Kuala Lumpur in November of 1971 to discuss the proposal.
There was no consensus on the Malaysian proposal. The Thai's and Filipinos
did not want to jeopardize their defense relationships with the United States
and the Indonesians objected to the notion of going hat in hand'' to the
superpowers as inconsistent with the principles of regional and national
resilience. Singapore, in a typically pragmatic assessment, maintained that
such a position, while laudable in its intent, stood very little chance of
changing the course of traditional power politics on the part of the great
powers, should their regional interests dictate otherwise. What resulted from
the conference was consistent with earlier ASEAN agreements. A "lowest
common denominator'' statement of intent which accommodated all
viewpoints. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration (ZOPFAN Declaration, 1971)
called for initial efforts on the part of all ASEAN states to secure Southeast
Asia as a "zone of peace freedom and neutrality;"
free from any form of interference from outside powers and [pledged
the signatories] to make concerted efforts to enhance and broaden areas of
cooperation to contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer
relationship.233
^^The ZOPFAN Declaration, reproduced in, Alison Broinowski (ed.\Understanding ASEAN,
Appendix E.
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While this document required no real action on the part of the
signatories, the statement of principle has endured and often forms a part of
the continuing security dialogue in the region. Bv again following the least
common denominator approach, ASEAN provided a sound basis for further
efforts in an area where no consensus could be reached. While geopoliticallv
insignificant, the declaration was another step forward in regional
cooperation and solidarity. The ability to frame unified positions
encompassing the viewpoints of all the members, albeit achieving few
tangible results, remains a feature of the evolution of ASEAN as a true
regional entity.
The ZOPFAN declaration brought to a close the first phase of ASEAN's
development. ASEAN's major accomplishment was simply that it endured.
ASEAN defined mutual principles, inculcated the habit of consultation,
enhanced regional trust and initiated a sense of regional identity. For tiny
Singapore, separated from the other countries by ethnic differences and
without a large traditional agricultural population, this was vitally important.
The stronger its regional identity and the further it could move from an
image as a "Chinese island in a Malay sea" the safer Singapore would be.
In addition to increasing commitment to ASEAN, the early 1970s saw
Singapore adjust its foreign policy in reaction to the oil shocks. The neutralist
policy towards the Arab-Israeli dispute (de facto pro-Israeli due to Singapore's
military links to Israel and Lee's affinity for the Israeli position as similar to
that of Singapore, surrounded by Muslims) was adjusted slightly toward the
Arab position to secure oil supplies and mollify it Muslim neighbors.
Singapore sent trade missions to the Middle East and offered its expertise in
210
the management of port facilities there. Singapore actively courted
petrodollar investment in Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew got along particularly
well with the Shah of Iran, visiting Teheran in 1975. That same year,
however, a new and dangerous threat would chantre the source of events in
Southeast Asia.
Phase II, The Shocks of the Mid-Seventies.
The fall ot Vietnam followed quicklv bv communist takeovers in both
Laos ^nd Cambodia were the central events of the mid-seventies.
Additionally, Ihe death of Tun Razak in Malaysia and Chou Ln-Lai in the
PRC changed the political landscape in Asia and Southeast Asia. The election
of Jimmv Carter in the United States in 1976 further muddied the
international political waters.
On May 12, 1975 Lee spelled out his view before the Asia Society in New
York:
I believe mv best course of action is to take an intermediate term view
of events. I have no apocalyptic predictions. Nor will my views
tranquillise [sic] opinion that all is and will be well, for that way I shall
surely lose mv credibility and reputation...-34
The strategy that emerged was to increase the prominence of ASEAN
with Singapore staying in the background as much as possible while the
United States licked it wounds. Still sensitive to criticisms within the
organization of Singapore asserting itself, the role of unseen guide,
previously eschewed by Singapore was adopted with, if not relish, a
recognition of the circumstances. With a growing defense capability,
54Op. Cit. in Minchin, p. ISo.
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Singapore was a quintessential "Nixon doctrine state. " The plan was to attract
a maximum of US investment and to gather whatever military assistance
that might still be available.
The Bali Conference of ASEAN in February, 1976 brought the heads of
the ASEAN governments together for the first time in what many have
called the group's watershed event. The Vietnamese victory was a disturbing,
though expected, event in Southeast Asia. Possessed of the most powerful
armv in Southeast Asia, there was no indication that the Vietnamese were
disposed to cordial or even functional relations with the non-communist
ASEAN states. The need for solidarity in ASEAN, while remaining non-
provocative to Hanoi, was seen as acute and drove the members together to
seek more effective methods for regional integration.235
The Bali Summit produced three important documents: The Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation, The Declaration of Concord, and the Joint Press
Communique. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was a more detailed
effort to specify principles of cooperation into concrete terms. It contained
proposals which endorsed United Nations recommendations for economic
cooperation on basic commodities, industrial projects, trade and international
issues. Again, differences existed, with Singapore and the Philippines
accepting a more modest position on reducing tariffs and movement towards
freer trade that thev desired. 236 While consensus on regional trade was
difficult, agreement on presenting a united front vis-a-vis the developed
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ASEAN's few earlv successes of obtaining concessions from the Japanese with
regard to synthetic rubber production. These efforts marked the real
be^inninir of ASEAN solidarity on a number of trade issues.
On the diplomatic front, the membership decided during preparatory
negotiations to remove any discussion of military or security cooperation
from the agenda. Given the regional situation, the view of ASEAN leaders
was that such discussions would have the effect of appearing antagonistic to
the Vietnamese, without enhancing regional security. The decision to avoid
collective security discussion and rely on bilateral cooperation became a de
facto principle. The political nature of the relationship was solidified and the
concept of national resilience was incorporated in the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation. This reconfirmed the ASEAN principle that economic
development, not military power, was the key to regional stability. 237 The
treaty also established procedures for conflict resolution among members,
specifically eschewing the use or threat of force.
The Declaration of Concord outlined the framework for the program of
actions to be carried out and established the administrative mechanisms for
implementation. It provided details on all the areas originally envisioned in
the Bangkok Declaration, with a section on politics, economics, social issues,
information and security. The bulk of the Concord dealt with economic
programs, as one would expect given the tenor of discussion. The security
statement is telling in its simple (and brief) language:
^ J/ Russell H. Fitfield, National and Regional Interests in ASEAN: Competition and
Cooperation in International Politics, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia studies,
Occasional Paper no. 57, 1 Q7Q ), p. 13.
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[. Continuation of cooperation on a non ASEAN basis between the
member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual
interests. 2-
The Joint Press Communique summarized the achievements of the
summit and, in typically nebulous ASEAN language, highlighted the
signatories "satisfaction with the progress made in the efforts to draw up
initially necessary steps to secure respect for the zone [ZOPFAN]" and the
intention "that these efforts should be continued."239
With ASEAN solidified, Singapore moved into the larger world stage.
The death of Chou En-Lai signaled the beginning of the end of the era ot the
communist giants in China. Chou, whether for cultural reasons or ideological
reasons, held a particularly low opinion of Tee Kuan Yew. His passing
enabled Lee to make his first trip to the homeland of his ancestors in May of
1976. He was received by Mao, ailing from a recent stroke. The China that had
been viewed only from afar finally had a human face. It was at last recognized
that Singapore might gain from contact with its "spiritual mother."210
Diplomatic recognition would have to wait until the rest of Southeast Asia
(most particularly Indonesia) came around, but extensive informal contacts
would develop until that day finally arrived.
Another significant break occurred for Singapore in 1 Q76. The PAP
resigned from the Socialist International, preempting a Dutch Labour Party
move to have them expelled for non-democratic practices and manipulation
^-Declaration ot Concord, reproduced in Alison Broinowski (ed.), Understanding ASEAN.
Appendix C.




and repression or the labor movement. While Singapore mounted a hasty
and effective campaign to refute the Dutch allegations, including a book bv
longtime PAP labor leader Devan \air aptlv entitled Socialism Hint Works,
the break with the socialist world was completed. It was not completed
without a great deal of acrimonv. The Singapore version of socialism,
equality of opportunity; not of result'' so reminiscent oi a clever
manipulation of the capitalist credo, was firmlv established.
Singapore's policv of dealing with both portions of the worlds divided
nations was also firmlv established bv the mid-seventies. The bridging of the
China gap closed that book once and for all. Relations with Hong Kong
continued to be close and productive. Taiwan, once a corrupt right wing
target of PAP vilification, overtook China in two way trade with Singapore.
Lee besran regular visits to Taiwan and militarv training ties were established.
Relationships with both Koreas and the two Germanvs continued apace
Dealing with both sides of countries or blocs divided bv ideology had become
an operative principle in Singapore's pragmatic public diplomacv.
With regard to Japan, Lee and Singapore continued to court the Japanese
for investment and technologv and was open in his admiration of the mightv
feat the Japanese had achieved in the post-war reconstruction and rise to
world prominence.
Lee's position on Japanese militarism had softened bv the 1970's. When
initial fears of a resurgence w ere apparently not realized, Lee began to call for
an upgrading of Japanese preparedness and limited burden sharing with the
United States. The election of Jimmv Carter in 1976 caused some uncertainty
throughout Southeast Asia. The need to check the growing Soviet presence in
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Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean called upon the United States to be
relieved of responsibility near the Japanese islands. As the eighties
approached, more and more or the affairs of state were left to Rajaratnam and
later to his equally competent successor S. Dhanabalan.
1970, The Crisis in Cambodia: ASEAN Matures Politically
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in ! Q79 caueht ASEAN
flatfooted. The destruction of the buffer state between Thailand and Vietnam
directly threatened Thai security and profoundly altered the regional strategic
situation. With 200,000 battle-hardened Vietnamese troops in Cambodia,
ASEAN faced its most significant security challenge. D.K. Weatherbee
describes the situation:
The westward military thrust into Kampuchea by the Vietnamese gave
concrete expression to the foreboding and looming menaces that informed
ASEAN security managers since the communist victories in Indochina in
1975. No matter how complex the factors may have been in Hanoi's
decision to invade, it was a dramatic demonstration to a worried ASEAN
of the willingness of its potential adversary to use force in pursuit of its
external political objectives. The perception was that the first Southeast
Asian domino' had fallen to aggressive Vietnamese expansionism. 241
ASEAN's swift reaction is indicative of the gravity with which the
situation was viewed. A week after the Khmer Rouge were driven from
Phnom Penh, an ad hoc meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers was convened
to craft a unified response. A statement was quickly released deploring the
invasion and calling for an immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese forces.
While this may seem unremarkable, previous ASEAN statements had been
241 D.K. Weatherbee, "ASEAN Defense Programs: Military Patterns of National and Regional
Resilience" in Seatrity, Strategy ami Policy Responses in the Pacific Rim, \, Whan Kihl & L.E.
Grinter (eds.) (Boulder Co.: Lvnne Rienner Publishers, 1 Q8Q ) p. 185.
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painstaking in their avoidance of language that might offend Hanoi.
Potentially contentious issues, such as the exodus of seaborne refugees, which
had plagued all of ASEAN throughout 1978, had elicited only the most
lukewarm responses. The firm ASEAX stance, in conjunction with pledges of
support for Thailand from the United States and China tilted ASEAN ever
close toward the West and awav from the Soviets. Soviet sponsorship of the
Hanoi regime was viewed as the enabling factor for Vietnamese
adventurisim. The growing Soviet presence in Vietnam, both Naval and Air
Force units, reinforced this drift awav from stated neutrality objectives.
ASEAN adopted a three pronged approach to bring pressure to bear upon
Vietnam to end the occupation. The strategy was put before the United
Nations bv Singapore's able ambassador, Tommv Koh. The diplomatic front
opened in the United Nations. In the UN, the ASEAN delegates led a highly
successful effort to denv international recognition of the Heng Samrin
government. Despite the pressure that the members faced to recognize the
new Cambodian government in the face of the revealed barbarity of the Pol
Pot regime, the consensus of the ASEAN members was that the precedent of a
change of government by force of arms, violating the basic principles of
national sovereignty, must be opposed. On the economic front, ASEAN led
efforts to isolate Vietnam to ensure that Western and particularly Japanese,
assistance would continue to be withheld from the Vietnamese government.
On the military front, tacit support of the Khmer Rouge, by channeling
Chinese military supplies to resistance forces based in Thai border areas was
commenced. By maintaining pressure simultaneously on these three fronts,
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ASEAN felt that it could eventually make the cost of the occupation too high,
forcine a withdrawal or negotiation on favorable terms.
As part ot the diplomatic effort, Lee Kuan Yew, who had a close
relationship with Prince Sihanouk, was enlisted to put together a alternate
Kampuchean government from three politically irreconcilable and military
and numerically unequal factions, including the frightful Khmer Rouge. The
ASEAN sponsored Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CDGK)
was in the main, an ASEAN creation. The ability of the ASEAN group to
maintain a common front on the Cambodian issue is an impressive
achievement, given the somewhat disparate views of its members. Singapore
was, in public, particularly harsh in its criticism of the Vietnamese in contrast
to the somewhat muted view of Indonesia, which viewed China as more of a
long term threat. Privately, however, Singapore had to be "persuaded" to back
the hard line ASEAN position.This was perhaps a Lee tactic to wring some
concessions from some of the concerned parties.242 Despite attempts to
maintain a low profile in ASEAN and minimize differences, Singapore
continued to be the odd man out on many issues. So much so that Lee
proposed a novel approach of Five minus One for consensus in ASEAN,
which would leave the remaining four able to enact programs without the
consent or participation of Singapore.
The era of Lee Kuan Yew (as Prime Minister) approached its end in the
late 1980's, Singapore had established itself as an influential and above all
independent player in the foreign policy arena. Its sensitivity to the ethnic
212Minchin reports a shouting match between Lee and Australian PM Malcom Fraser following
the 1980 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in New Delhi which eventually
resulted in Singapore backing the hard line position in exchange tor military benefits horn the
Australians. See Minchin p. L90.
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issues of the countries surrounding Singapore has been acknowledged
symbolically bv its deference to Indonesia with regard to diplomatic
recognition of China. Singapore was deliberately the last country to recognize
China. In a classic, if perhaps misguided, attempt to assert its independence,
Israeli President Chaim Herzog paid a state visit to Singapore in November,
198b, provoking a furor in its Muslim neighbors, especially Malaysia. The
visit also sparked controversy within the Singapore Parliament, where
Muslim MP's issued a statement acknowledging the "disappointment and
unhappiness" of the Muslim community.243
The arrests in 1987 of a group involved in a "Marxist conspiracy" and the
subsequent coverage it received in the press (both locally to justify the arrests
and internationally to condemn it) indicate Singapore's steadfast refusal to
bend to international pressure with regard to its internal affairs. The US-
Singapore relationship suffered in 1987 and 1988 as the detentions continued.
Singapore requested the removal of United States diplomat E. Mason
Hendrickson in May, 1988 for alleged "close contact" the former Singapore
Solicitor General, Francis Seow, and other lawyers "to manipulate and
instigate Singaporeans, in order to bring about a particular political
outcome.
"
244The United States denied any wrongdoing by Hendrickson, but
withdrew him as requested. The United States asked Singapore to withdraw
from the United States a diplomat of similar rank. The Department of State
^"Lee Boon Hiok, "Leadership and Security in Singapore: The Prevailing Paradigm." m
Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia, Mohammed Avoob & Chai Avan Samudavamia
(eds.) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), p. 177.
^^Recent Developments in Singapore and Malaysia, Congressional Hearings, 1988 p. S.
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handled the controversy deftly, cleariv indicating its desire to settle differences
in a manner befitting relations between friendly countries. 24 "
Largely due to the restraint of the State Department, relations were
quickly on the mend, with the Prime Minister stating in a speech before
Parliament in June, L988 that given the importance of the bilateral
relationship, it was time to put the incident behind both parties. While the
State Department maintained its position of principle, opposing both
detention without trail and subsequent restrictions on foreign publications, it
acknowledged that:
It [democracy] takes different forms in different places, shaped always by
the special historical, cultural, and societal forces that exist in a given
country. But it is a strengthening trend around the world, and in spite of
some recent disquieting developments, we are optimistic that a
commitment to fundamental democratic values will continue to exist in
Malaysia and Singapore.246
In August 1989, near the end of Lee Kuan Yew's last term of office, in the
midst of the difficult US-Philippine base negotiations, Singapore offered the
United States access facilities for both the US Air Force and Navy. Always the
geo-politician, Lee was concerned that the United States would withdraw
from the region if the base talks proved unsuccessful. He may also have been
attempting to put some pressure on the Philippines to move forward with
the base negotiations by demonstrating solidarity with the Philippines for a
continued United States presence. The offer raised some criticism in Malaysia,
but the objections were quickly answered to Kuala Lumpur's satisfaction.
245 IHd, pp. 151-152.
246 Ibid. p. 154.
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The final significant foreign policy action of Singapore under Lee Kuan
Yew was the resumption of diplomatic relations with China. Ever sensitive to
regional concerns, Singapore had pledged to be the last of the ASEAX states to
renew the formal tie with China. The road was finally opened for Singapore
when the Indonesians resumed normal relations with Beijing in August
1Q90. Singapore followed suit in October. It should be noted that there was
-ome cynicism among the ASEAN states on Singapore's deference to
Indonesia with regard to China. Lee was viewed as having built significant
enough connections since his first trip in 1976 to gain all the benefits of
normal relations while --till maintaining a principled position vis-a-via the
paranoid" government in Jakarta. The cozy position of Goh Keng Swee as a
consultant in China following his retirement contributed to such this
impression. Still, it is significant that the Government of Singapore, always at
the ready to assert its independence, deferred on such an issue. It is a clear
indicator that the impression of Singapore as a Southeast Asian state first is a
primary concern. The political reality of dealing with one's neighbors first as
the cornerstone of diplomacy is a legacy which will be passed to a new
generation of leaders.
If one central theme emerges in Singapore's foreign policy in the ear of
Lee Kuan Yew, it is that the government has consistently acted in what it sees
as its long term interest, despite occasional missteps and behind the scenes
manipulation. The offer of facilities to the US military was made because it
was seen to be in Singapore's national interest.
Lee still (1994) remains in government as the Senior Minister in the
Prime Minister's office and he will continue to exert an enormous influence
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on Singapore's foreign and domestic affairs. The successor generation taces
the daunting task of managing a delicate foreign policy mix, rooted in the
survivalist ethic of its founders and dedicated to the proposition that the
interests of the trreat powers must always be dealt with while recognizing
regional sensitiyities as well. Accomplishing this without haying the
significant reputation of Lee directly at the front of the effort, has both
advantages and disadvantages. With those countries Mr. Lee has rankled in
the past, and they are many, the successors have the opportunity to mend
fences. With those who have come to respect, grudgingly or otherwise. Lees
considerable ability and foresight, the new generation will have to prove
themselves worthy of the mantle they have inherited.
D. Defense
The experience of the PAP leadership through the turbulent era of
merger and separation embedded a strong belief that the new country could
not afford to make mistakes or falter in any way, and that if it did, it would
not be able to recover. This fear of failure has had its impact on the country "s
security policy and helps to explain the Herculean efforts undertaken since
1965 to ensure the Republic's security. 247 As Goh Keng Swee put it, "...If we
have no defence we will be swallowed up in no time. "248Besides small size
and strategic location, the security perceptions of Singapore's leaders have
been shaped by the country's location between two large Malay-Muslim
neighbors. There is a well founded measure of paranoia present in Singapore
24/ Bilveer Singh, "Singapore's Management of Its Secuntv Policy," Asia Pacific Community ,
bummer 1 Q85, No. 29, p. 77
' 4
*Op. cit. in Obaid ul Haq, "Singapore's Search tor Secuntv' in Li>tuu:rship and Security in
Southeast Asia. Stephen Chee (ed.) (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991),
p.129.
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based on the treatment of the Chinese throughout Southeast Asia. Bliveer
Singh, one of Singapore's most prolific writers on defense issues categorically
states that:
the Chinese in Southeast Asia have been the object of jealousv, hatred
and persecution, and are still perceived as a potential "fifth column" and a
vanguard for Chinese expansionism. In view of this fact, the
predominance of Chinese demographic strength has created security
problems and the Republic has been charged with being a Third China."
Viewed largely as a "Chinese state" in a "Malay Sea" the Republic faces
acute economic and military problems vis-a-vis its larger and often
difficult Malay neighbors, and this has played a crucial role in shaping the
security perceptions and policies of Singapore's leaders.'149
The presence of these two states, Indonesia and Malaysia, with divergent
ethnic-religious orientations and a history of difficult and sometimes hostile
relations with predominantly Chinese Singapore, led to a siege mentality in
early Singapore.250
At independence, Singapore had only two infantry battalions which
were trained and equipped mainly for internal security operations. Two
thirds of these units were Malaysians. It had no air force or navy to speak
of.251 The constraints of size (both geographic and population) and financial
resources limited the available options of the newlv-independent city state.
Proposals were considered and rejected until the leadership decided on the
citizen army concept. This would involve the conscription of "national
servicemen" to make up the majority of its manpower pool. This conscript
force would be trained and administered by a core group of professional
249Bilveer Singh, "Singapore's Management of Its Security Policy," Asia Pacific Community
,
Summer 1985, No. 29, p. 79.
•""R.S. Sassheen, "The Singapore Armed Forces, Geared for Total Defence," Asian Defence
Journal, April 1989, p.o.
251Obaid Ul Haq, "Singapore's Search for Security: A Selective Analysis" in Leadersliip and
Security in Southeast Asia, Stephen Chee (ed.) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, l Qoi)p.!30.
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officers and noncoms, enabling Singapore to assemble a credible military force
quicklv and relatively inexpensively.252
Without experience in such matters and under pressure to move
quicklv, the leadership selected the Israeli model, based on that of the Swiss,
but battle tested in the Israel's struggle for survival in the Middle East. During
the earlv 1960's the similarities between Singapore and Israel had become
apparent to Lee Kuan Yew. Both were migrant enclaves surrounded by
Islamic nations. Both were subject to what was viewed as resentment from
disaffected Muslims within their own populace. 253 The Singaporeans were
impressed with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) compressed training program
that could quickly produce combat ready soldiers. Equally important, the
Israelis could rapidly mobilize extensive reserve forces in times of crisis to
meet threats from larger neighbors able to field armies manned mainly by
professional soldiers. This was seen by Singapore's leaders as a vital quality
for the manpower poor island citv-state to develop.
Having settled on the Israeli model, a number of senior officers and civil
servants from the then Ministry of Interior and Defence went to Israel to
negotiate terms for military advisers. The Israelis agreed to assist in the
development of training methods, doctrine, combat tactics, operational
procedures, logistic management, intelligence and so on. While in Israel, the
representatives of the Singapore government were able to observe first hand
the functional aspects of the IDF. 254
2j2M. bhuhud, The Singapore Army: "A Flaming Sword In The Righteous Cause Of National




Singapore quietly imported Israeli military advisors, by some reports in
the hundreds, who began arriving toward the end of 1%5. 235 When news of
this reached Singapore's Muslim neighbors, they reacted with predictable
outrage. When later questioned on the political wisdom of employing Israeli
military advisors, given the location of Singapore in the center of the Malay-
Muslim world, the Prime Minister responded with a typically taciturn
answer:
We are not very particular where other people get their advice. We
turn to those whose experience is releyant to ours. ...The Israeli model
offered us a better pattern to go bv.256
This remark and others indicate the extent to which Singapore's military
strategy and defense doctrine are geared to meet the perceiyed threat from
Singapore's neighbors, particularly Malaysia. Fresh from expulsion, the
security of the tiny island republic was pursued with a vigor bordering on
mania. In an 1966 address to the people on the eye of National Day (August 9)
the Prime Minister, exhorting the people to help him build a "hard society, a
tough, rugged society" to ensure their ability to survive, commented that
everybody must know that small though we may be, this place is not a
digestible morsel."257 This comment provided the basis of Singapore's early
defense metaphor of the "poison shrimp," able to cause extreme discomfort
or perhaps death to any who tried to devour it.25S
This regional bias in security strategy has remained part and parcel of
Singapore's military strategy since its inception. Size has dictated that threats
255 Ibid, p. 7.
lob Lee Kuan \ ew, op. cit. in losev, p. 4/
257 Ibid, p. 333.
25S\lilne & Mauzv, 157.
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from large powers be dealt with through diplomacy and seeking a place under
the wing of those more powerful. It has also dictated the design of indigenous
defense forces which are quite capable of inflicting grievous damage on any
potential regional aggressor. This axiom in Singapore's foreign policv was
elucidated in an oft quoted Lee remark made during an address before a
seminar in International Relations in Singapore in 1966:
When vou talk about foreign policy, unless vou are a big power, an
intercontinental power... you are really talking about your neighbors. Your
neighbors are not your best friends, wherever you are...So mv foreign
policy has two objectives. One the right political climate. The other power.
For vou can have the best of political climates, but if the power to sustain
your position is not there you must lose....-- 9 [italics added]
The National Service Bill was introduced to Parliament in February 1967
just as the first of the Singaporean military professionals were preparing to
graduate from the Israeli designed Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute
(SAFTI). The first classes at SAFTI had convened in June of 1966 and the first
batch of graduates were commissioned in June of 1967, to be ready to train the
incoming conscripts. The National Service Bill made every fit man and
woman eligible for compulsory national service in defense of the country
beginning at age eighteen. As an incentive for acceptance of the new system,
the ten percent of the available conscript pool who would initially be called
for full time duty (the complete two year training period) were to be
guaranteed jobs following service, in government, the Statutory Boards, or
the private sector. The Prime Minister and the government conducted an
extensive campaign to enhance the status of the soldier in society in an effort
to overcome the long-standing derogation of soldiering in the Chinese
•"^Lee Kuan \ ew, op. at. in josev, pp. 343-344.
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community. Singapore's Chinese (and indeed the Chinese in general) had
long regarded simple soldiering as a low status occupation, unworthy of the
aspirations most had for their sons. The attitude that one should not use
good iron to make nails" was deeply entrenched in Singapore's
Chinese. 260Singapore has been moderately successful in the effort to promote
military service as a position of high honor, much in the pre-war Japanese
mold (but without the ideological fervor). There are still those who are less
than enthusiastic about military conscription and national service but they
have no choice .
The Israeli military advisers, who were presumably without command
function in Singapore s armv, were assigned right down to the platoon level.
The impact of the Israeli's on Singapore's military culture and operational
doctrine is highlighted by the fact that they continued to advise the Singapore
Army at the battalion and company levels until 1973 and at the brigade and
division levels until 1975. These advisers, most of them tough young majors
and captains, have left a lasting impression on Singapore's Armv. 261 The
doctrine of the SAF and the notion of lightning attack by highly mobile
armored units under the cover of total local air superiority is evidence of this
Israeli influence. This effect cannot be overemphasized.
The military buildup began with the infantry and quickly moved to
support arms. These all followed the pattern of training instructors first, then
a first batch of Officer Cadets and then the instruction of National Service
recruits. 262 The Signal Corps received its first batch of trainees in 1967 and
260Milne & Mauzv, p. 158.
261M. Shuhud, p.7.
262 Ibid, p. 7.
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soon thereafter began training conscripts. Artillery training began about the
same time with recent SAFTI graduates preparing an artillerv course to be
reach* tor the first class of conscripts in early 1968. Artillerv was quickly
followed bv Combat Engineers, including a Bomb Disposal Unit, whose core
officers were trained bv the British in the UK.
The final support arm to be developed was Armor. The original impetus
for an armor capability* was the desire to develop a reconnaissance battalion.
This initially proved infeasible and while these plans were on hold, the 4th
Singapore Armour Brigade was formed. The basis of the tank battalion was to
be the Vehicle Commando Unit (VCU). In 1968, 36 officers were posted to the
VCU where thev received preliminary instruction before being sent to Israel
for tank training. In 1969 training was conducted in Israel on the AMX-13
tank which the Singaporeans had decided to buy from the Israelis. During
their exercises in the desert, the trainees used the hulks of tanks left over
from the Six Day War for target practice.263 Singapore's first tanks were
delivered in June of 1969. In Julv of 1970 two companies of national service
recruits were trained as tank crewmen and the 40th Battalion, Singapore
Armour Regiment became operational. The new AMX-13 tanks were paraded
before the public on National Day in August of that year.264
With the establishment of the Armor Battalion all the necessary arms of
the ground forces were established and progressing rapidly. The first group of
national servicemen was released to the reserves be^innin-r in 1969. Bv the
end of the following year there were six active duty infantry battalions and
three full battalions of reservists. Expanded command structures for both the
263 Ibid, p. 10.
-"'ibid, p. 10.
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active and reserve components were established. In 1970 the Ministry of
Interior and Defence, which oversaw the early defense establishment, was
separated into the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Home Affairs. This
was an indication of the increasing complexity and size of the defense
establishment. Bv 1970 the armv was on track, but the air force and navy were
still accorded a relatively low priority. The announcement bv the British in
1967 of the withdrawal "east of Suez" gave impetus to the program for the
Army and forced the government to look for solutions to the pressing needs
for air and sea defense. When the date for withdrawal was moved up from
the mid-70's to 1971 bv the new Labour government in 19bS, the search for
innovative solutions continued.
The establishment of the FPDA in 1971 was the initial solution to
Singapore's more complex defense problems. The FPDA bought additional
time for Singapore in the development of its armed forces, especially the
more capital intensive naval and air arms. The "arrangement" also provided
a useful means for Singapore and Malaysia to engage in a regular form of
military cooperation, a useful function given the hot and cold nature of the
bilateral relationship. Initially each of the external powers stationed one
infantry battalion in Singapore. The British contributed naval units (up to six
frigates), Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft and a squadron of
Whirlwind helicopters. The Australians contributed one frigate and a
destroyer to the FPDA. The British and Australians also assumed additional
maritime responsibility, establishing a rotating submarine presence in the
region. 265
"-65Chin Kin Wah, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Twenty \ears After," Tlie Pacific
Revieiv. Vol. 4. No. 3 1QQ1, p. 196.
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The FPDA established the centerpiece of regional air defense, the
Integrated Air Defense Svstem (IADS). This initially solidified the
commitment of the Commonwealth to regional air defense. Australia
provided the teeth of the TADS, stationing two squadrons of Mirage fighters
in Buttervvorth, Malaysia where TADS headquarters was also located.
As Chin Kin Wah points out, the "thinning out" of external forces began
almost as soon as their deployment was completed. The initial external
contribution of about 7,000 men, directly responsible to an ANZUK
(Australia, \Tew Zealand, United Kingdom) commander began to wane bv
1974. Both Australia and the UK were now under Labour governments which
began to question the expense of overseas troop deployments. The Australian
troops were removed in earlv 1974 and the last of the British ground forces
had departed bv March of 1976.2bb Australian air power, however, remained
in the region for some time beyond the withdrawal of ground troops, the
Mirages being finally withdrawn in mid- 1988. Malaysia now has only a
minimal foreign military presence, with rotating detachments of Australian
P3 Orion Maritime surveillance aircraft and support personnel and a small
infantry company stationed at Butterworth. The New7 Zealand infantry
contingent and air support group, never very large, were finally withdrawn
from Singapore in 1989. Although the bulk of aircraft for local air defense
now come from the local nations, an Australian officer continues to be
assigned as the Commander of the LADS, as has been the case since its
inception. The Australians conduct rotating deployments of F/ A- 18 aircraft to
Butterworth and sometimes Singapore from their new base at Tindal in the
26b Ibid, 1%.
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Northwest Territory.267 The contribution of the Australians to the FPDA has
been recently characterized bv their leadership as based on political rather
than military considerations. 26 ^1
Singapore made the most of the crucial buffer time the FPDA provided
to address the problem of regional air defense for the island republic.269 The
Singapore Air Force was established under the air defence command in 1%8.
The Royal Air Force (RAF) assisted Singapore in establishing an air force pilot
training program at Tengah Air Base. The Republic of Singapore Air Force
(RSAF) began training pilots locally in 1969 when the Flying Training School
was established. The first group of pilots to graduate locally were then sent to
Britain for training in fighter aircraft.270The slower development of the air
arm is a reflection of the perceived threat, at least the threat that Singapore
was capable of dealing with autonomously, as arising from Malaysia. The
Malaysian armed forces had no significant air capability, relying on its
Commonwealth partners for air defense.
Singapore was left with excellent facilities for the development of its air
force including the Tengah Air Base, site of the training school and the center
of regional air defense activities, and Seletar Air Base, which was upgraded
following the departure of the British. The first British trained pilots returned
to Singapore in 1971, the year the FPDA was negotiated and were assigned to
one interceptor squadron composed of sixteen Hawker Hunters and a ground
attack squadron with sixteen Strikemasters and four Hunters. The aircraft
267 Ibid, 197.
26SPaul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities: Report for the Minister of Defence,
March 1986 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 198o) p. 48.
269Sassheen, p. 20.
<-/
^Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, p. 228.
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acquisitions made the defense budget of 1971 the largest government
expenditure. This aggressive defense procurement was made possible onlv bv
a generous compensation package from the British as part of its withdrawal
from its Singapore facilities.271 By 1979 Singapore acquired 30 Northrup F-5
E/F fighters which now form the backbone of its interceptor force. These
replaced the aging British made Hawker Hunter F74's. The Hunters were
moved into a ground attack role where thev now augment a force of A-4
Skyhawks acquired from the United States during the 1970's.272 Bv the
beginning of the 1980s the RSAF was a credible force to discourage anv
regional aggression.
Airspace restrictions have made adequate training areas for the RSAF a
difficult problem. Singapore makes extensive use of simulators and has
concluded a number of agreements for the training of its pilots outside
Singapore. Prior to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption in the Philippines, the
Singaporeans maintained a semi-permanent presence at Clark Air base for
advanced pilot training making use of the advanced facilities there such as
the Crow Valley instrumented range. 273 Singapore also has training
agreements with Brunei, where its helicopter units are routinely deployed.274
The Navv was, as the Air Force, slower developing than the Army. It
originated from the Singapore Maritime Command, established at Sentosa
island in 1969. The initial maritime assets consisted of two aging training
ships. Construction agreements were concluded with the German Lurssen
Werft firm and the British Vosper company for joint production of the first
2/ lFecierai Research Division, Librarv of Congress, p. 238.
-'
^Federal Research Division, Librarv ot Congress, p. 234.
2>
°Sassheen, p.20.
- 74 Ibid, p. 20.
232
combat vessels. The first two gunboats were delivered in 1%9 and the first
Singapore-produced craft from the same design were introduced in 1970.2
""
The Republic ot Singapore Navy (RSN) was not established as a separate
defense arm until 1975. The RSN was tasked with two separate missions
within the overall defense strategv, the seaward defense of Singapore and
protection of the sea lines of communication. The Navy once again echoed
Israeli Naval strategv, reiving on fast missile armed gunboats for offensive
punch and providing the Army with sufficient sea lift capabilitv to conduct
amphibious operations should conditions dictate, the latter being a crucial
function given SAF doctrine.
Results of the 25 Year Military Buildup, "Total Defence"
As a result of its dedication to comprehensive defense planning and
investment, bv the earlv 1980s Singapore had built one of the most modern
and capable militarv machines in Southeast Asia. In 1984 the government
unveiled its program of "Total Defence" as a philosophy that would provide
an overarching scheme of defense svnergy involving contributions from all
sectors of Singaporean societv. With improved relations with its ASEAN
neighbors, a cooling of global tensions and a much less tense and threatening
environment, the "Total Defence" program was more a renewed nation
building exercise than a shift in defense policy. By elucidating its defense
vision and highlighting the part that each sector of societv plaved in the grand
scheme, society at large was expected to regain a heightened awareness of the
ongoing vulnerability of Singapore, despite the cooling of the sense of
immediate danger that had prevailed earlv in Singapore's existence.
2i
-''federal Research Division, Library of Congress, p. 22S.
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There are five pillars of "Total Defence,' these are described bv the
government as follows:
...the citizens commitment to the nation and their confidence in the
defence and future of the country (Psvchological Defence); the unitv of the
multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious societv (Social Defence);
Government, business and industry organising themselves in such a way
that the economv will not break down when faced with external attack, be
it military or economic (Economic Defence); the abilitv to safeguard
civilian lives, help the injured and limit damage during emergencies
(Civil Defence); and the abilitv of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to
provide credible military deterrence against threats to Singapore's
sovereigntv and territorial integrity, and to secure a swift and decisive
victory over aggressors should deterrence and diplomacy fail (Military
Defence). 276
Using the above defined "pillars" one can usefully look back at the
accomplishments of Singapore in the first twenty-five years of its existence as
an independent nation. The "Total Defence" concept is unique among
Southeast Asian nations and is designed to limit Singapore's vulnerability to
external and internal threats through preparedness, awareness and, if need be,
action. One of the most interesting parts of this defense philosophy is its
extension of the defense rhetoric into spheres that are rarelv addressed in
these terms in most countries, especially in peacetime. The first two pillars of
the "Total Defence" structure, Psychological Defence and Social Defence
deserve special mention as these are easily the most controversial. Because of
the internal nature of these "pillars" they will be examined in the section
dealing with politics that follows the defense discussion. It is only important
2/
^Ministry of Defence (Singapore), Defence of Singapore 1992 - 1993 (Singapore: Public
Affairs Department MINDEF, 1992). pp. 13-16.
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to note here their appearance in the context of the overall defense strategy
and philosophy.
Military Defence
Although 'Military Defence" appears last in the context of the
government description of "Total Defence", the Singapore Armed Forces
(SAF) will be examined first as the civil and economic defense factors are
closelv related to the functions of the SAF.
National Service
The conscription svstem upon which the armv depends for most of its
manpower requires all able-bodied citizens over the age of 18 to be available
for service to the nation. Conscripts form the bulk of the active force (60%)
and on completion become part of the reserve force which comprises 80% of
the total SAF. At anv one time, 30,000-40,000 Singaporeans are serving their
conscription and another 200,000 are part of the reserve force in the SAF.27
"
The conscription svstem ensures that the SAF has access to the manpower
resources of the entire country. The best candidates from this pool are selected
for officer and Noncom training, serving an additional six months to acquire
the additional training. They become the section leaders and platoon
commanders of the SAF and when released to the reserves continue to
upgrade their skills and rise in rank through military schooling. These
officers fill the bulk of the leadership positions in the reserve force. Military
service for reservists ends at age 50 for officers and 40 for all others.
*'
' Ong Boon Kwee(Major RSAF), A Conscript Military Force as a Credible Defense System for
a Small Nation: Die Case of Singapore and Taiwan, Masters Thesis prepared for the US Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 1987, p. 92.
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With the bulk of its strength in the reserves, heavy emphasis is placed
on maintaining operational readiness. The Singaporean svstem involves the
transfer of entire units from active to reserve dutv, together with the bulk of
their officers and XCO's. Conscript soldiers, therefore, usuallv remain in the
same unit with which they trained, enhancing unit cohesion and esprit de
Corps. Reserve unit training is accomplished in a thirteen vear cvcle
involving annual in-camp training and routine physical fitness training.
Reserve officers hold many key command and staff billets. 2" 8 As a reporter
from the Asian Defence Journal described it:
Unlike the reservists in other ASEAN armed forces, those in the SAF
have be well tested in the open mobilization system. ..[the reserves] state of
operational readiness is exceptionally high, which is to be expected in a
nation that regards itself vulnerable to foreign interference. 279
The conscription system and active reserve solved the immediate
manpower problems of the SAF, both in quality and quantity, and continues
to adequately fulfill its needs today. 280
Republic of Singapore Army
Active dutv Army strength leveled out at roughly 43,000 of whom 34,000
are national servicemen. Reserve strength stands at 250,000. The Armv
consists of three divisions, two of which are reserve units. In addition to the
Divisional Groups there are two commando battalions of infantry, two
Armored Brigades and a Tank Battalion. Support Artillery, Engineer and
Signal Battalions round out the force. The Armv has 350 French designed
27S Ibid, p.38.
-' °Sassheen, p.l 1.
-
s
°In addition to serving in the SAF, National Servicemen may serve in the Singapore Police
Force or the Singapore Civil Defense Force. The numbers serving in these organizations is small
compared to those serving in the SAF.
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GIAT AMX-13 tanks and in excess of 1000 armored personnel carriers. The
Artillerv fields more than 90 155mm guns, which Singapore is now-
producing locally. Additional firepower is provided by Slmm and 160mm
mortars and the new locally produced 120mm mortar.— 1
SAF doctrine, although never explicitly stated as ^uch, embraces the
concept of forward defense, including the doctrine of preventative attack. The
assumptions this rests upon are twofold, first, Singapore will defend itself as
far from its border as possible and second, the SAF will preempt military
aggression bv dealing the first blow.282 While this mav seem an unduly
threatening posture across the causeway, Shuhud Saaid, points out the
reasons for such an approach:
*It is difficult to defeat or dislodge a numerically superior attacking
force if the SAF is obliged to deplov its forces into defensive positions
within such a confined and congested area as Singapore.
*Taking the war to the enemy denies him initial success in his
offensive and avoids the need of having to eventually retake ground
ceded to him.
*Starting its defence as far forward as practical ensures that its forces
have the greatest possible operational and tactical depth.
*Because Singapore is more a city than a state, a strategy which calls for
a war to be fought on the home ground' would be economically ruinous
and psychologically unacceptable. From Singapore's perspective, it is far
better to stop the rampaging bull a safe distance from one's shop than
wrestling with it after it has entered the shop. One may eventually kill it,
but not before it has wrought untold damage on all that expensive
crockery. 283
•^Statistics from The Military Balance 1992-1993, The International Institute of Strategic
Studies (London: Brassev's, 1992) p. 159-160.
~» CO "
^- z \l. Shuhud Saaid, "Girding up for total attack through Total Defence,"Asian Defence
Journal, February 1987, p. 7.
:s3 Ibid. p. 10.
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The Republic of Singapore Air Force
Key to any such strategy would be control of the air. The Republic of
Singapore Air Force (RSAF) is the showpiece of the SAF. The force is
comprised of 6,000 active duty personnel, 3,000 of whom are conscripts and
fill only support roles. It is quantitatively larger than that of both its regional
neighbors and qualitatively superior as well. In the fighter/ attack role at the
end of the 1980s it has a fleet of three squadrons (fc>3 total aircraft) of upgraded
A-4 Super Skvhawks for the ground attack/ support role, augmented by the
aging Hunters. Its interceptor force is comprised of 2 Squadrons of F-5's (a
total of 29 fighter configured aircraft and S RF-3's for airborne
reconnaissance). The real qualitative edge of the RSAF is its AEW capability*.
Singapore acquired 4 E2-C Hawkey e early warning aircraft from the United
States, the first being delivered in 1987. Truly an awesome force multiplier,
the Hawkeves provide Singapore with a trump card in any regional air war.
The capabilities of the Hawkeyes are unmatched bv Singapore's regional
neighbors. Referring once again to the Israeli connection, the performance of
the Hawkeves in the air war with the Syrians over the Bekaa Valley in 1982
was singled out by the Israelis as the most crucial factor in their dominance of
the air. The E-2's detected Syrian fighters on their takeoff rolls prior to leaving
the ground and the attacks and intercepts directed bv the E-2 radar operators
decimated the Syrian Air Force. The comments of some "interested
observers" in Southeast Asia are germane. Said one such observer, "With the
Hawkeves, the RSAF can neutralize our air force in a matter of hours and
proceed to destroy our critical C3 nodes: command posts, communication
centers, early warning sites..." Another regional observer stated, in a
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somewhat more succinct manner, "When the RSAF Hawkeves enter service,
we can kiss our Air Force good-bve. "-M
The RSAF's total of more than 130 aircraft are more than regional
neighbors Malaysia and Indonesia combined. Singapore also possesses a
helicopter fleet sufficient to support airborne assault operations in
conjunction with Lhe army's commando units. By the end of the decade
contracts had been concluded for one squadron (nine aircraft) of F-lb A and B
models with long term options for more, to continually maintain the RSAF'b
regional air superiority. Plans were made for the acquisition of Maritime
Surveillance Aircraft (Fokker MPA'b) in the late eighties to breach a
significant gap in maritime patrol and ASVV aircraft. The Hawkeves are useful
in this regard as well. With excellent radar coverage and command and
control capability, the E-2's can significantly decrease time necessary for patrol
or attack aircraft to locate suspected hostile vessels.
The Republic of Singapore Navy
From its inauspicious beginnings as a fleet of two, the Republic of
Singapore Nfavv (RSN) has expanded to become a credible, if not
overwhelming, force. The RSN's immediate zone of responsibility is the
confined area of the Straits.2S5Aside from primary duties of protecting
Singapore from seaborne threats and securing the Sea Lines of
Communication (SLOCs), the RSN conducts anti-piracv patrols, fishery
protection, coastal patrol and assists in air-sea rescue. A necessarily unstated
^"iSources unnamed, Op. Cit. in Saaid, "The Singapore Armed Forces, Girding for Total
Attack..." p. 1 Q -
i c rZ3DGuy Toremans, "The Republic of Singapore Navv," Naval Forces, Vol. XXIX No. 1, 1992,
p.ll. "
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mission of the RSN (in conjunction with the RSAF) would be interdiction of
sea traffic between east and west Malaysia in time of conflict. It would also
attempt to preclude support for Malaysia from Indonesia in the same scenario
should such be forthcoming.
The 4,500 man force operates approximately 40 ships from its
headquarters at Palau Brani. The Navy operates six separate squadrons of
ships and emphasizes sea denial through the use of Fast Attack Craft. Its six
modern Victory class missile corvettes and six Seaivolf coastal missile craft are
all equipped with Harpoon anti-ship missiles.286
The RSN possesses 13 smaller patrol craft and two aging minesweepers.
This glaring deficiency in mine countermeasures has been addressed by
concluding a contract with a Swedish firm for four modern mine
countermeasures craft. The Navv does possess the ability to support
amphibious operations, although its five remaining (four operational) US
made Endurance class LST's are World War II vintage and beg replacement.
The Navy also has three hovercraft and four Ramp Powered Tighters (a
medium landing craft) and a large number of small assault craft for the
amphibious role (crossing the narrow Strait of Johor, after all, would not
require large seaworthy craft).287
The Eighties, the metaphor changes.
Bv 1983 Singapore's military preparedness had improyed to the point
that Singapore's leadership was able to change the metaphor of the poisonous
286The Military Balance 1QQ2-1«93, p. loO
2S/ Guy foremans, p. Q .
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-hrimp. Goh Chok long, then Minister of Defence (who subsequently
succeeded Lee Kuan as Prime Minister in 1990) described the shift as follows:
We prefer to think of ourselves as a porcupine - friendly, no threat to
anvone. But if the porcupine in threatened, the quills will be up in defense
of itself. If the predator insists on further annoying the porcupine, the
porcupine will rush backwards, of course, with the quills up, charge
backwards into the bigger predator and the quills can cause an awful lot of
pain. There are verv few animals that can take on the porcupine. That is
the kind of overall defense strategy which we will have. 2ss
The rush of the porcupine backwards seems to clearly indicate that the
quills would be pointed squarely at Malaysia.
The Doomsday Scenario, War With Malaysia
In a quite provocative article on the Singapore/ Malaysia nexus, Tim
Huxley, a longtime Singapore and Southeast Asia watcher, labels war with
Malaysia "thinking the unthinkable." Huxlev asserts that the whole structure
of the SAF, with its heavv emphasis on armor, capability for rapid
mechanized movements and close air support is designed specifically for
operations across the causeway and up the peninsula. While Soviet-inspired
Vietnamese adventurism may have provided Singapore a useful cover for
manv years, the main impetus for Singapores military build up and
continuing modernization was never a communist military threat. 2S9 Huxley
goes on to assert that Singapore would aim to disable Malaysia with a brutal
and fearless preemptive strike, much in the manner of their Israeli mentors.
The scenario that Huxlev envisions has Singapore initially establishing
complete control of the air, destroying most of the Malaysian Air Force on the
£
°°Op. at. in Bilveer Singh, "Singapore's Management ..."p. 93.
2S9Huxlev, p. 203.
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ground, as in the 1982 Israeli campaign. The weakness of Malaysian air
defenses makes this an entirely probable outcome. The Armv would conduct
a lightning armored assault across the causeway, which would have been
secured bv para-dropped commandos and helicopter borne strike units. The
highly mobile mechanized armor units would then move rapidly up the
peninsula under cover of the RSAT, with the RS\T securing the maritime
flanks against interference bv the Malaysian Navy and preventing
interference bv naval units of any "interested" regional powers--e.g.
Indonesia. Huxlev anticipates that Singapore's forces would penetrate the
peninsula about SOkm into Johor and establish a defensive line there. Such
an operation would secure Singapore's water supply and provide the SAF
with substantial strategic depth, leaving Singapore outside the range
Malaysia's artillery. Occupation of southern Johor, relatively sparsely
populated and containing a disproportionate ethnic Chinese population,
would be a very difficult, but manageable, proposition. 290
It is important to note that while the SAF appears to be designed for
operation just as Huxlev describes, the chances of such a scenario developing
are remote. Resort to force would only be attempted under the most grievous
circumstances. The provocation for Singapore to act would have to be
extreme. The damage to Singapore's cherished reputation as a safe and
profitable haven for foreign investment, would be severely damaged. Almost
instantly, Singapore would be transformed explicitly into what it has been
only implicitly in the past, the Israel of Southeast Asia. 291
290Tim Huxlev, "Singapore and Malaysia: A Precarious Balance. "The Pacific Review, Vol. 4.
No. 3 L991,p.208
291 Ibid, p. 210.
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Singapore's carefully cultivated military prowess and the ability to inflict
-evere damage on Malaysia is a deterrent capability, never intended to be
used. The fact of the matter is that tiny Singapore is extremely vulnerable to
invasion from the peninsula. Should the regime in Malaysia be overthrown,
or a fundamentalist Muslim leader come to power, admittedly an unlikely
prospect, the situation could change so rapidly that time would simply not
permit Singapore sufficient warning to prepare to defend itself otherwise. In a
very real sense, the causeway to Johor is Singapore's "Fulda Gap," a scenario
that all wish to avoid but nonetheless the central focus of military planning.
This mind-set is well described by Shuhud Saaid:
The reunification fear - utterly incomprehensible and irrational from
Malaysia's perspective - is so deeply embedded in Singapore's political
culture and its leaders' thought processes that short of an act of God (such
as Malaysia being submerged under 1,000 meters of water a hi Atlantis)
little can be done to minimise or erase the fear... Mindful of the military
mistakes the British made in the Far East during World War II - mistakes
which ultimately led to the fall of Singapore - much of the country's
defence planning has been geared toward meeting the threat from the
north'... Indeed, the much feared and fully expected 'invasion from the
north' - whether by Vietnam or some other regional power is immaterial -
is an almost obligatory initiating scenario for Singapore's wargamers. This
scenario is now so firmlv set in concrete that to try to convince
Singaporeans otherwise is an exercise in futility. 292
Lest its northern neighbor doubt Singapore's resolve, the SAF has made
clear its determination to resist and defeat any attempt to compromise its
hard won sovereignty. Consider the farewell speech of the Prime Minster's
mercurial son, given upon his retirement from the SAF. Brigadier General
(Reserve) Lee Hsien Loong has obviously inherited at least a portion of his
father's rhetorical skills:
192QSaaid. "Girding up tor Total Attack..."pp. 6-10.
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The SAF is an armed force; it is not a civilian corporation.
Its mission is to defeat its enemies, ruthlessly and completely. It is an
instrument of controlled fury. Soldiers must have ^teel in their
souls. ..must learn to kill and not flinch, to destroy and not feel pity, to be a
flaming sword in the righteous cause of national survival.293
Lee the Younger's rhetoric later in the 19S0's caused Singapore some
difficulties with its regional neighbors. B. G. Lee was questioned on
restrictions on Muslim Malays serving in the armed forces. The particulars of
the question involved a suggestion for minimum ethnic quotas for certain
high level military positions, the example mooted being fighter pilots.
Muslim sensitivities were particularly acute at the time. The Israeli President
had visited Singapore the previous November, despite the vociferous
protests of Singapore's Islamic neighbors. 294B.G. Lee indicated his position in
these now infamous remarks:
We live in Southeast Asia, if there is a conflict, if the Singapore Air
Force is called upon to defend the homeland, we don't want to put any of
our soldiers in the difficult position where his emotions for the nation
may be in conflict with his emotions for his religion because there are two
verv strong fundamentals and if they are not compatible then they will be
two very strong destructive forces [pulling] in opposite directions. 295
The remarks provoked predictable outrage in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta.
He was widely quoted in the popular press of both countries. Leading
Indonesian papers criticized the remarks warning they could affect relations
with neighboring countries where Malays were the dominant race. The
Indonesian Foreign Minister remarked, quite accurately, given the
circumstances, "If Singapore wants to firmly establish its national identity and
^9oLee Hsien Loong speech given at Khatib Camp, Headquarters of Singapore Artillery,
September 18, 1984, op. cit. in Saaid, "A Flaming Sword..." p. 5.
-^ Asian Defence journal, Julv 1987, p.99.
-
" \stan Defense journal, April 1987, p. u=; .
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unity then [LeeJ should not have made those remarks."- 1 '6 The Golkar party's
dailv, in an editorial commented, with words that must have shaken eirders
and gleaming glass in Singapore that, "the ruture leader of Singapore seems
unable to free himself from racial and religious sentiments."-
"
In a somewhat dubious attempt at political damage control, B.G. Lee later
remarked that his obvious misstep was an intentional remark to raise the
issue to the forefront of the national agenda, "re-sensitizing Singaporeans to
the reality of multi-racial society." He continued, indicating that the debate
thus far had not adequatelv covered three kev points, Total Defence,
community development and Singapore's vulnerability, [italics added]298
Any doubts about the most likely potential military adversaries are probably
settled by these comments.
Civil Defence
In the Total Defence" philosophy government, business and the people
are all made aware of and to varying degrees participate in substantive
programs that heighten their awareness of Singapore's vulnerability. Each
citizen is made aware of his responsibility to be part of a cohesive society
which is a critical part of maintaining the sovereignty of the nation. While
the transference of the survival ethic to a new generation of Singaporeans is
undoubtedly useful as a nation building tool, it is nonetheless true that the
conditions in Southeast Asia could change very rapidly.
In 1964 against the backdrop of the Confrontation with Indonesia, which
included numerous terrorist acts in Singapore, the government established
296Asian Defense journal, Mav 1987,p. 110.
297Ibid, p. 110.
"*Asian Detetise lournal. July, 1987.
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Ihe Vigilante Corps to assist the police in community patrol and reporting on
activities considered suspicious. This was an entirely volunteer group who
were trained in general police procedures. After the advent of conscription,
some of the conscripts were assigned to perform police duties in the Vigilante
Corps or another police oriented group known as the Special Constabulary.
The Police National Service Command was established in 1Q67 to train and
organize the conscripts. At the time the volunteer forces numbered about
12,500. Bv the 1970's most of the Vigilante Corps were conscripts who assisted
the police in their home communities at night, on weekends and during
times of emergency. In the early eighties, in response to an excess of
conscripts, the government expanded the national service scheme to include
service in civil defense organizations. In 1981 the Vigilante Corps was
disbanded and the members reassigned to the newly established Civil Defence
Force. The force is trained for disaster response and construction skills to
assist in times of disaster or external attack. By the late eighties a vigorous
civil defense program was in place and exercises were routinely conducted in
selected locations. Units conducted exercises which not only enhanced
readiness for possible wartime scenarios but had a community service aspect
as well. In 1986 the government passed the Civil Defence Act, redefining the
mission and responsibility of the Civil Defence Force. 299 Bv 1989 the Civil
Defence force was manned bv about 40,000 national service reservists and
18,000 volunteers. 300
^"Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, p. 220.
300 Ibid, p. 2o°-270.
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Vulnerability, as such, is no mere paper tiger, no idle rhetoric in the
TAP's bag of opinion shaping tricks. Tim Huxley, describes the "Total
Defence'' strategy as remarkable in several ways:
- it attempts to provide a degree of security from enemy attack
unmatched elsewhere, except perhaps Sweden and Switzerland;
- it involves the wartime mobilization of human and other resources
on a scale matched only in Israel, some European neutral states and the
rapidly diminishing communist world;
-and it necessitates per capita defense spending exceeded only in the
United States, Israel, and oil rich countries like Saudi Arabia. Overall,
Singapore is probably the most densely defended state.301
Economic Defense, Defense Spending and the Arms Industry
Singapore has always accorded a high priority to providing adequate
budgetary resources to national defense. During a recent interview, Dr. Yeo
Ning Hong commented:
A strong defence has been the foundation of Singapore's success and
prosperity. An architect who seeks to raise a high rise building by taking
from its foundation is reckless and foolhardy. He risks the total collapse of
the entire building and the lives of those in it....
Singapore is a nation of high-rise buildings...We know that the higher
we reach for the skies, the deeper our foundation must go...
Our experience over the past 25 years has shown that for Singapore 5%
of our GDP is most appropriate. Such a budget does not hold up national
development in any way. 302
Defense spending in Singapore is capped by legislative fiat at 6% of GNP.
From 1987 to 1991 per capita defense spending was a remarkable S 550 (US).
Among ASEAN, Thailand was a distant second in per capita defense
o0lTim Huxley, "Singapore and Malaysia: A Precarious Balance," The Pacific Review, Vol. 4.
No. 3 1991, p. 205.
JUZ
"An Exclusive Interview with Dr. \eo Ning Hong, Singapore s Defence Minister," Asian
Defence Journal, Februarv 1992, p. 11.
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spending at S33 (US). During the bame period of time defense spending as a
percentage of GNP stood at 5.1%.303
The philosophy of defense spending was well elucidated bv Shuhud
Saaid in a 1987 article:
Unlike many other countries Singapore is one country which has not
allowed trifling matters like adverse trade figures, economic downturn
and such stand in the way of what it regards as it over-riding concern; the
defence and security of the nation. This is reflected in the fact that in the
midst of the worst economic recession in oyer two decades, expenditure
on defence increased compared to previous (and better) years.... There
ought to be a moral in this for finance ministers everywhere, whose
number one priority whenever there is an economic downturn is to
strangle defence expenditures regardless of the consequences to the
nation's overall defence posture and quite unmindful of the impact such a
cut would have on national security. ...the government has not forgotten
what President John F. Kennedy, in stout defence of America's military
spending, said over twenty years ago: Only when a nation is strong bevond
doubt can it be secure beyond all doubt.304
With an expanding economy, inadequate funding is not a problem for
the SAF. With regard to upgrading its C3I capabilities, with purchases such as
the E2-C Hawkeyes, money is never a problem. One of the reasons that
Singapore is able to shop in the world's arms markets, particularly in the
United States, is the fact that it produces and services many of military needs
in indigenous defense industries, saving foreign exchange. It also conducts a
significant arms export trade, earning foreign exchange.
Defense Industries
Economic Defence includes a robust arms industry, designed by Goh
Keng Swee with the assistance of Australian consultant Sir Laurence
"^Gerald Segal, "Managing New Anns Races in the Asia/ Pacific/' Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1992. p. 85-8o.
j04Shuhud Saaid, "The Singapore Armed Forces Pt. 1: Girding Up tor Total Attack Through
Total Defence," Asian Defence journal, February 1987, p.5.
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Hartnett. Defense industries were begun to eliminate vulnerability to outside
suppliers. As Sir Laurence stated:
From the start the Singapore leaders were determined to avoid
political alignment with foreign nations, and this was particularly true in
the matter of arms supplies from abroad which might have come with
political strings attached. 305
In the context of Singapore's difficult birth, such a viewpoint is not
difficult to understand. As Singapore progressed, the nature of its armaments
industries emphasized those which would assist it in maintaining its forces
in a conflict where it might find its political motives questioned bv the world
communitv. It seems clear that the areas in which Singapore has specialized,
^mall arms, artillery, and ordnance production as well as modification and
maintenance capabilities for its own equipment, would enable Singapore to
carrv out a militarv campaign in the face of possible arms embargo. This point
is highlighted bv Lim Hock Gin in Pointer magazine, the SAF's in house
publication, discussing the six militarv related reasons for having a defense
industrv:
1. To insure self-sufficiencv in the production of critical war materials
and in providing essential maintenance services;
2. To develop a local maintenance capability";
3. To acquire technology which could facilitate adaptation of our
military hardware to changing threat scenarios;
4. To form part of the SAF supply system in times of hostility [and] to
ensure securitv of supplv of critical weapons and ammunitions;
5. To enable a minimum stock of ammunition to be kept during
peacetime and reduce the maintenance effort and cost required for such a
stockpile; and
j05Sir Laurence Hartnett, "Operation Doberman: The Singapore Armaments Storv," Pacific
Defence Reporter, April 1 Q82, p. 11.
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b. To provide, during the warning period*, the necessary skills tor
upgrading or modifying existing equipment to meet the anticipated
threat.306
Singapore Technology Corporation (STC)was inaugurated in 1983 under
the Sheng-Li Holding Company holding company to bring together
Singapore's defense industries. It has six component companies. 307
Chartered Industries of Singapore (CIS) was founded in 1967 and has
grown into the national star of defense industries. It produces a wide range of
ordnance from small arms ammunition to large caliber mortar bombs, tank
rounds and 155mm ammunition. In 1969 CIS began making M-lb rifles under
license from Colt. CIS went on to develop its own assault rifle, the SAR-SO,
which in addition to being better and cheaper then the M-lb (according to the
manufacturer) was also not bedeviled by the export restrictions that the
licensing agreement with the US for the M-lb entailed. In 1980 CIS began
production of the Ultimax-100 light machine gun These two weapons alone
put Singapore on the map as international competitors in the small arms
trade.
Ordnance Development and Engineering (ODE) was incorporated in
1973, under the guidance of Sir Laurence Hartnett, for the production of
smaller volume weapons such as field guns. It has grown to three plants
involved in manv different ordnance related fields. These include sun
barrels, a 120 mm mortar, overhaul of 35mm Anti-Aircraft guns, assembly
and servicing of 76mm Naval guns and the manufacture of a 155mm
Howitzer. ODE also produces extended range mortar bombs in a variety of
sizes.
-^Lim Hock Gin, "The Defence Industries" Pointer, Vol. 1 1 No. 1 October - December 1884
, p. 4.
->0/ Bilveer Singh, "Defence Production in Singapore," pp. °-10
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Singapore Automotive Engineering (SAE), formed in 1971, was designed
to service and modifv Singapore's tanks and armored personnel carriers. SAE
has done vehicle retrofits of surface to air missiles on Singapore's V200 APC's
and other modifications of Singaporean Army equipment. '^
Three other companies Singapore Computer Systems (SCS) and
Singapore Automotive Leasing (SAL) and Unicorn International (Ul)provide
essential services to the arms industry. SCS provides computer services for
both CIS and SAE and is the information clearinghouse for STC. SAL is the
leasing arm of the STC and has expanded with a subsidiarv which has been
spearheading the country's movement in robotics and automated production
technology. Unicorn International (UI) is the marketing arm of Singapore's
defense industries. Formed in 1978 it markets Singapore's military products
to the world 309
In April of 1989, the group of companies under Sheng-Li Holdings had
so expanded that they were once again reorganized as Singapore Technologies
(ST), offering a comprehensive range of goods and services. In 1989, just prior
to the change of Prime Ministers, ST was comprised of 48 companies
emploving over 11,000 people in Singapore and overseas. ST companies are
streamlined into five sectors, the familiar Chartered Industries of Singapore
Ltd.(Ordnance), Singapore Aerospace Ltd. (Aerospace) Singapore Shipbuilding
& Engineering Ltd. (Marine), Singapore Technologies Industrial Corp. Pte Ltd
(Industrial) and Singapore Technologies Venture Pte Ltd. (Ventures). 310
30oLim Hock Gin, p. o.
-J
09Bilveer Singh, pp. 9-10
' 10David Boey, "Singapore Business Industry built on ambition/' Jane's Defence Weekly, 22
February 1992, pp. 287-2SS.
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Robust and growing, Singapore's "military industrial complex" is able to
service and maintain Singapore's armed forces as well as upgrade its
equipment. It defense industries are a notable strength, not only militarily,
but economically as well. Information on Singapore's foreign military
customers is difficult to come by. Given it non-ideological trade practices in
the past its arms sale might prove a point of contention. Jane's Defence
Weekly reported sales of arms to the Croatian National Guard, which
highlights this possibility. 311
E. Politics
The Forms of Democracy
The Constitution of Singapore provides the basis for Singapore's
institutions of government, outlining the composition of the executive,
legislative and judicial branches. The Constitution dates from colonial times
and as such reflects the political ideas of the British resulting in a
Westminster type parliamentary system. The legislative branch is chosen by
popular elections, which, at a minimum, must be held every five years. The
legislators then "choose" the executive leader, the Prime Minister, who
governs with the assistance of the cabinet, whose members are chosen from
Parliament by the Prime Minister. The cabinet is responsible to the
legislature, relying on the legislature's support for its government. If this
support is lost, the familiar vote of "no confidence," the government is
dissolved and new elections are held. 312
31 1"Armour to small arms," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 22, 1Q92, p. 292.
'^Milne & Mauzv, p. 77.
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The Singaporean svstem differs from the British svstem which inspired
it in tour respects. 313 First, Singapore has a written constitution, which the
British lack, which can be amended bv a two-thirds vote ot the legislature.
Second, Singapore has only one house of Parliament. Third, Singapore has an
appointed presidential advisory council with limited oversight powers to
review proposed legislation that might unfavorably impact Singapore's racial
or religious groups. Lastly, there is of course no monarch in Singapore.
During Lee Kuan Yew's tenure as Prime Minister, there was a President,
elected bv the legislature, who served as ceremonial head of state. 314
The Politics of survival
The struggles of merger and expulsion from Malaysia had moved the
PAP from a party with its power in the grassroots of the left to a closed party
of circular power. With the PAP CEC approving the cadres and the cadres
electing the CEC, the party leadership solidified their positions as behind-
closed-door policy makers. Parliamentary debate, when it was held, became
mere window dressing for policy which was determined by the PAP's core of
elites, the members of the CEC. This lack of legislative input was true for the
majority of PAP MPs who were "backbenchers ", holding no cabinet portfolio
and even more so for the opposition. The PAP majority became the rubber
stamp for party policy, into which most had little, if any, input. The
opposition became the PAP's whipping boy, harassed and vilified as
obstructionists and obscurantists. What was required was swift, decisive
313 Ibid, p. 77-7S.
jl-ljhe Office of President has subsequently been changed to an elective post with significant
power. The first Presidential elections were held in 1993. This constitutional change and its
impact will be examined m the following section on politics in Singapore today.
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action to meet the challenges of unsought independence. Given this mission,
and the milieu in which it had to be carried out, opposition was tantamount
to treason.
In October of 1966 the beleaguered opposition Barisan Socialis members
of Parliament walked out "in protest against undemocratic acts of the
Government
-
' and declared their intention to take the struggle to the streets.
The government took the position that the opposition had degenerated "into
a gang of streetfighters" and was no longer a political but a police problem. 315
The struggle for control of the partv and the government during the
transition period, first between the leftists and moderates within the PAP and
finallv, after the party split, between the PAP and the opposition Barisan
Socialis, left an enduring legacv for the political culture of Singapore. James
Minchin describes how this legacv was carried forward bv Lee Kuan Yew and
the PAP:
The authoritarian measures the British had adopted to keep the peace
suited him well, and bv and large he maintained them, even refined and
extended them. The initial justification he gave - the prospect of merger
with Malaya - removed the colonial stigma. The chief objections to British
rule had been to foreign cultural imperialism, or to law and order
imposed from outside - not to law and order themselves. Bv contrast, the
Marxists suffered from being seen as the group willing to destabilse an
economic svstem that was not completely uncongenial to the rest of the
population. 316
Following the walkout the PAP used every means at its disposal to
destrov the remainder of the grassroots connection of the opposition. The





-ection. This had always been the political ground of the leftists and with this
connection severed and the looming prospect of detention at every turn, the
Barisan became impotent as a political force. What had been limited to
circumcision prior to independence became emasculation afterward. With
political opposition moribund and facing the prospect of an extremely
difficult reorganization of both its economy and defenses in the face of the
impending British military withdrawal, the Government dissolved
Parliament on February S, 1968 to seek a new mandate. The elections, which
were boycotted by the Barisan Socialis, represented a watershed in Singapore's
political history. The PAP won all of the 58 seats in the legislature. An
indication of the effectiveness of the PAP's slash and burn strategy against
political opposition is measured by its returning 31 candidates unopposed.
This was the beginning of an electoral monopoly that would remain until a
single opposition member was returned to the Parliament in a bv-election in
1981.
Winter had come suddenly to Singapore's political scene, though the
signs of politicians falling like the leaves of the trees had been in evidence for
some time. The beginning of the "hibernation"' of democratic politics in
Singapore that this election represented is highlighted bv the fact that of the
58 members of the legislature returned in the 1968 elections, 26 had never
been in a Parliament with an opposition and 16 had never run in an election
against an opposition candidate. 317
The PAP went through the next three general elections and the next
fifteen by-elections over a period of thirteen vears without losing a seat in
317 Josev, p. 434.
255
Parliament. The complete dominance of the PAP in all spheres of political
activity, remained unchanged until the electoral breakthrough of J. B.
Jevaretnam of the Workers Party in the by-election of 1981. Jeyaretnam's
victory was the first sign of stirrings in the hibernating opposition.
What was it that enabled this remarkable dominance of the electoral
system in Singapore for so many years? The views of two of Singapore's
leading political scientists are instructive. Bilveer Singh elucidates the
indicators of the PAP's political dominance and its causes in the following
list:
1. Its ability to retain all the parliamentary seats in the General
Elections and by-elections from 1%8 to 1981 as well as most of the seats
from 1980 to 1988.
2. Its ability to virtually incapacitate all its major political opponents
through sanctions and socialization.
3. Its ability to gain control of most of the political and non-political
organizations as well as the to win co-operation from organizations that
are able to mobilize political support among the populace.
4. Its ability to establish and gain control of all grassroots organizations
in the country, including the Citizens' Consultative Committees (CCCs),
the Community Centres (CCs) and the Residents Committees (RCs),
thereby functioning as a link between the Government and the people as
well as depriving the Opposition of a potential source of recruitment.
5. Its ability to establish strict rules for the media, which in the end,
enabled the PAP to use the media almost as its own organ, as well as to
deny similar access to its opponents.
6. Its ability to gain credit for all the progress and development that has
taken place in the country and hence legitimize its dominance through
the performance criteria.
7. Its ability to present itself as more than a political party, something
akin to a national movement, thereby neutralizing the need for other
competing political parties in the system which would challenge the PAP's
predominance.
8. Its ability to gain control of the civil service and trade union
movement.^ 1 * (Italics added)
318 Bilveer Singh, Wither PAP's Dominance? (Selangor: Pelanduk, \^2), p, 10.
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Dr. Chan Heng Chee, perhaps Singapore's most well known political
scientist and its former ambassador to the United Nations argues that the
PAP's success issued from three circumstances, two external to the party and
one internal party factor. First, the fortunate circumstance of inheriting a well
organized bureaucratic system from the British when it assumed power,
staffed bv experienced personnel. Second, the compact geographic size of
Singapore facilitated the creation of a centralized political apparatus that
could penetrate the society and direct the population sectorally or
indiyiduallv. Dr. Chan continues by acknowledging a third internal
circumstance, the TAP's ability to make the most of the political ground. As
indicated by Bilveer Singh's analysis and echoed by Dr. Chan, the PAP made
the most of these fayorable conditions and built up an extensiye
organizational network at the grassroots level to enable it to control and
mobilize the population. 319
What resulted from these circumstances and the actions of the PAP was
that, in effect, the Party became the government and, from the public
perspective, the government became the party. The PAP leadership is not
apologetic about this fact. In 1982, perhaps in recognition of the electoral
breakthrough of the opposition in 1981, the PAP declared itself a national
movement, dedicated to the service of Singapore and to the advancement of
the peoples well being. 320
The question begged by both Bilveer Singh and Chan Heng Chee is
exactly how did a political party that had cut itself off from the constituency
that had brought it to power succeed so remarkably in maintaining its power
3i9 Ibid, Op. Cit. p. 11.
320Minchm, p. 210.
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afterwards. How did the PAP create a grassroots network to replace the one it
scorched out of existence in the fires of political survival? The PAP's answer
to these questions resides in a combination of strategies. The first, crush its
only organized opposition bv all the means at its disposal to buv time to
implement its vision. Second, create, from its own imagination and vision,
first, a new constituent, literallv, "a new man." A "Singaporean" with a
distinct identity and set of values which coincided with those of its leaders.
Taking the best of what their ancient cultural heritages provided and
discarding that which stood in the way of progress and modernization,
Chinese, Malav and Indian would fade into distant memorv and become
Singaporean. This was the hope of the leadership and to some extent it has
been realized. To accomplish this monumental task, under the most
daunting circumstances, required unprecedented vision and unmitigated
temerity. As Lee Kuan Yew put it, "First what we know must be done, we
explain, and then enforce." 321
This brings up the earlier mentioned pillars of the "Total Defence"
philosophy, Psychological Defence and Social Defence. Although these were
elucidated under the rubric of "Total Defence" they have been part and parcel
of Singapore's development since independence. This is the crux of the issue
between the western view of Singapore and the manner in which Singapore's
leaders view7 their island state. It is no secret that the leadership in Singapore
has always viewed economic prosperity7 as the key to providing a stable society
that provides its citizens with all the advantages that civilization has to offer.
The challenge was how to bring prosperity to a city-state of more than two
j21Lee Kuan New, op. at. in Minchin, p. 3.
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million people, with all the societal problems attendant to a large, poor,
crowded and racially mixed urban community. To ensure that the society
would be prosperous, while living in very small nation devoid of the
substance (natural resources) of wealth generation, required that the citizens
be the natural resources, each a productive part of the whole. The talents and
energies of the people would have to be harnessed with maximum efficiency
for the ship of state to move forward. Trom the perspective of Singapore's
leadership, the ship thev captained had a small hole in the bow. Only moving
forward at a sufficient speed to keep the bow out of the water kept the ship
from taking water. To slow meant danger, to stop meant the certainty of
sinking, however long it might take, to go in reverse meant certain and rapid
disaster.
Given the situation Singapore found itself in at independence, Lee Kuan
Yew's call for a "hard society, a tough, rugged society" became more a demand
than a request. The government, during the twenty-five years of Lee's tenure,
undertook a program of suppression of dissent, social engineering and
government intrusion into the life of its citizens that is unprecedented in the
histories of nations which retain open borders and depend on their
populations to validate their rules at the ballot box. Singapore went about the
difficult task of building a nation by enforcing good citizenship upon its
populace. In doing so the government often used methods which those in the
west, preoccupied with rights rather than responsibilities as the basis of
societal organization, would often find insidious at best and abhorrent at
worst. Make no mistake about it, the government of Singapore brooks no
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dissent, politically or socially. There is no problem that cannot be solved and
no practical solution that is politically too difficult to enact and enforce.
It is useful at this point to break with chronological analysis and look
further forward to examine a few of the methods of Singapore's unique
approaches to nation building. By doing so, an appreciation of the types of
tools the government used to depoliticize its society become more clear. This
provides a basis for understanding the quiescence of the political scene for
such a long period of time and also gives clues as to the reasons for its rebirth
in the earlv to mid-eighties.
Psychological defense, prior to its designation as such, oftentimes has
been extended into areas that have raised western eyebrows in terms of civil
liberties. These measures, involving the maintenance of a vigorous and
effective Internal Security Department (ISD) and the detention without trial
of "subversives." The judiciary of Singapore is largely controlled bv the
executive, limiting their ability to curb "excesses" of the government. There
are significant restrictions on freedom of speech and the press. This results in
a situation onetime Singapore resident and longtime Singapore observer Tim
Huxlev labels "no rule of law, merely rule by law." 322
The notorious Internal Security Act (ISA), a British import from the days
of the Malayan "emergency," which allows detention without trial of any
person or group involved in what the government deems subversive
activity, is the tool of last resort in the government's ability to deal with its
political enemies. The domestic arm of Psychological Defence is the Internal
Security Department (ISD) with tools such as wire tapping, mail interception,
322Tim Huxley, "Singapore's Politics in the l«80s and '90s," Asian Affairs. Vol. XXIII Part III,
October 19°2, p. 284.
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immigration checks, direct interrogation, personal shadowing and electronic
surveillance at its disposal. 323 These domestic security tools, learned
effectively from the colonial British master, were unabashedly retained by the
government of newlv-independent Singapore and continue to be utilized bv
the government. Perhaps the most notable example of the use of this power is
the case of Chia Tve Poh, a Barisan member of Parliament detained in 196b
and finally conditionally released in 1989. 324
Chia was a university lecturer in Physics and a Barisan MP from 1963
until 19bb when he, along with the other members of the Barisan Socials
resigned from Parliament in protest over the PAP's high handed, elitist
manner of government. Three weeks after these resignations Chia was one of
the organizers of a protest rally against the Vietnam war which was held on
the eve of Lyndon Johnson's visit to Singapore. Chia was arrested under the
terms of the ISA which Singapore has used against hundreds of political
opponents. The Act allows any number of two year detention periods without
charges and with no provision for judicial review. 325
For most detainees, the ticket out of detention is to 'confess" their
crimes against the state and profess that they understand their mistake and
have mended their ways. Chia was unique among Singapore's detainees in
that he refused to admit that he was involved in any wrongdoing, stridently
maintained his innocence and requested that his case be brought to court so
that he could defend himself against anv charges. This uncooperative attitude
323Minchin, p.217.
324For a more complete discussion of Singapore's Internal Security Act and its use throughout
Singapore's history see Recent Developments in Singapore and Malaysia, Congressional
Heanngs, 1988 (Washington: GPO, 1988).
oz:3Stan Sesser, "A Reporter at Large, A Nation of Contradictions," Tlie New Yorker, January
13, 1992, p. 55.
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brought a detention of twenty-two years. Although now released, due to his
"stubbornness" and lack of contrition, Chia is still restricted from 9 P.M. to 6
A.M. each dav to Sentosa island, Singapore's recreation Mecca and site of a
beautiful theme park. Chia is Sentosa's only permanent resident where he
lives, at government expense, in a guardhouse by the old fort (stop \To. b on
the tourist monorail that circles Sentosa ). Chia has been characterized by
human rights activists as Singapore's Nelson Mandela. While this is a gross
exaggeration, it is a characterization that he maintains was not lost on his
interrogators. In a 1992 interview he had the following to sav concerning his
experience:
They were telling me that Mandela remained in jail because he had
lots of outside support. But they said there's no point in my remaining in
jail, because no one remembers me. Mandela at least got a chance to
defend himself in court, and now he's a free man. He can travel all over
the world. He can take part in politics in South Africa, where the situation
is far more tense than in Singapore. But I'm still not free. I don't know
why the government should keep me here.326
The government virtually controls the local media by ownership of
radio and television and strict licensing requirements for the print media, in
which the government also has a significant ownership stake. All of
Singapore's newspapers are published bv Singapore Press Holdings. Anyone
who wants to own more than three percent of its stock must first be approved
by the Minister of Communications and the Arts. The Minister also has veto
power over the company's directors. Government owned companies and
agencies are among the largest stockholders of the newspaper company. The
Straits Times, Singapore's most prominent daily, is so unabashedly a
326 Ibid, p. 55.
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proponent of the government line that critics claim it sometimes irritates
even the supporters of the PAP. 32
"
Foreign publications which circulate in Singapore and have criticized
government policies have found themselves in protracted battles with the
Singaporean government. Singapore has consistently maintained that any
publication which circulates in Singapore allow it the right of unedited reply
to any stories that are the least bit critical of the government or its policies.
Those who fail to acquiesce find their circulation limited."— The government
clearly recognizes the power of the media to shape opinion and feels the
responsibility and the right to carefully select what type of content will be
permitted. This involves more than just unpopular political viewpoints. Not
only will one find no copies of Playboy in Singapore, even Cosmopolitan is
too controversial for the tastes of Singapore's censors. The Cosmo girl is
apparently not the model citizen. This brings us to the issue of "Social
Defence."
Social Defense is the term for building a society that conforms to a set of
norms, determined bv the government, that produce a tranquil, happy group
of citizens who respect one another and the laws of their nation. It is perhaps
these efforts that have drawn the most ridicule from the foreign press. The
efforts of the government and its rationale for these run the gamut from the
sublime to the ridiculous. One thins that does characterize all the efforts is
the ability of the government to abandon programs that do not work in
addressing the problems thev are designed for.
-
>2y Ibid, p. o3.
oz
" Publications which have, at one time or another had their circulation restricted in
Singapore include, Hie Far East Economic Review, Time, The Asian Wall Street journal and
The Economist.
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The government, mindful of the communal rioting before and during
the merger years, has undertaken significant programs to minimize the
potential for racial strife in Singapore. For many years following
independence, all education for Malays was free, up to and including
university. The government is very sensitive to Islamic freedoms, provided
they do not impinge upon the religious freedom of others or attempt to
bridge the PAP constructed chasm that separates religion from organized
politics. While the dislocation of the Malays in the early years of Singapore's
housing program were psychologically traumatic, there are few Malays who
would want to return the kampongs, with their lack of plumbing, leaking tin
roofs, and packs of wandering farm animals, however nostalgic some may be
for that simpler time.
Housing is arguably Singapore's most potent socialization tool. The
blocks of high rise apartments represent the middle class dream made real.
The squalor of "the projects", as government housing has come to be known
in the United States, is notably absent from Singapore's government housing,
though in other regards the buildings themselves very much resemble US
inner city subsidized high rises. There are no walls filled with obscene graffiti,
no garbage filling the hallways, no mindless destruction of the amenities. The
explanation, beyond stiff criminal penalties, is the fact that ninety percent of
these units (and eighty percent of all housing in Singapore) are owned by the
people who occupy them. The notion that owners not only have a greater
stake in property value (and hence property maintenance and upkeep) than
renters but also a greater stake in the health of the country as a whole has
been proven beyond doubt in Singapore. Making middle class citizens has
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produced a generation with little interest in political or racial revolution. As
the nation prospers, the housing stock is upgraded to meet the needs of
increasingly sophisticated consumers as they trade up, much in the manner
of prospering homeowners in the United States, but on a vastly
proportionally larger scale. And the older, less desirable units? You find no
homeless on the streets of Singapore. Those who are at the lowest end of the
wage scale or through circumstance find themselves near the breaking point
financially rent less desirable units at extremely low, heavily subsidized
prices.
One of the legendary examples of resocialization from the low rise to the
high rise society is the urine detectors in the elevators of these high rise
complexes. Should a lift occupant be unable to restrain nature's calling, due to
incontinence, drunkenness of simply poor manners, a device detects the
ammonia in the urine, stops the lift in mid-course and summons the
gendarmes to fine the rascal heavily for such anti-social behavior.
The list of proscribed behaviors and the fines that they incur are as large
and creative as the wavs in which the government uses to discourage and
prevent them. Trucks are fitted with flashing lights which go off if the vehicle
exceeds the speed limit. Likewise, taxis are fitted with alarms that sound
inside the car at above the posted maximum speed limit for the island. Those
who run red lights receive their citation in the mail, courtesy of cameras
mounted at intersections to record such behaviors. 329 Chewing gum is
completely banned from Singapore because of the mess it created when
improperly disposed of. Litter and you will find yourself heavily fined. Litter
j2%esser, p. 50.
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again and you will be doubly fined and sent out to pick up trash at a local park
or along the waterfront. You may also find your photograph in the Straits
Times as you complete Your assigned punishment to humiliate you into
correct behavior and to warn others against meeting the same fate.
The government does not take a strictly stick" approach to socialization
but liberallv offers the "carrot" as well. The government, through the media
and other outlets constantly runs organized campaigns to promote
everything from common courtesy (saving please and thank you) to proper
breeding patterns (have two, three if you can afford it). Some of these
campaigns and the legislation that accompanies them has drawn merciless
criticism, often in a mocking fashion, from the foreign press. Consider the
following comment from the Far East Economic Review on a government
campaign to clean up the island's public toilets including a law requiring
flushing of toilets and urinals. Reporting on Singapore's campaign to
"punish those of its population who have not been properly housetrained"
the Review wrote,
Those who ignore the new law do so on peril of a fine up to SI, 000.
And how is this law being enforced? A crack battalion of inspectors from
Singapore's Ministry of Environment will be roving public toilets in
pursuit of the aberrant non-flushers. This could prove embarrassing for
the respectable patrons of such public facilities. How to distinguish the
man from the ministry from the common-or-garden Peeping Tom?330
While the humor in such a situation is undeniable, the point is that in
Singapore the rights of the many (those who are "properly housetrained")
have precedence over the abuse of few who ignore their responsibility to treat
public property with respect. It is in this mania with minutiae that the
330Op. cit. in Sesser, p. 44.
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philosophy of enforced good citizenship becomes most clear. While such a
situation is ripe for the rapier of the journalistic swordsmen, the majority of
the people using such facilities are pleased that there are clean, sanitary public
restrooms to use. As is evident from the Review article, what passes for
domestic tranquillity in the view of the PAP qualifies as paternalism at best
and unabashed repression and invasion of privacy at worst, in the view of
many international observers. The ^ame is true on the domestic front but
with a schizophrenic quality that does not exist in foreign observers. Most
Singaporeans resent being told by the government how to be good citizens
while at the same time thoroughly agreeing that a nation of good citizens is a
much better place to live. Thev do not care to be forced bv legislative fiat to
flush the John while being completely in favor of clean public restrooms.
Extending this to the political realm, they resent the PAP and want more
political pluralism, but trust only the PAP to run the country. 331
The Awakening of Politics, Singapore in the 1980's.
Huxley argues that the most significant political phenomenon in
Singapore during the 1980's was the resurgence of organized political
opposition to the PAP's dominance. As he states, this should not have been a
surprise to anyone. Given Singapore's rapid economic progress and
diversification, lack of a rising political consciousness would have been much
more surprising than its occurrence. 332
Nineteen-Eighty marked the high water mark fro the PAP, with the
party capturing 75% of the vote and sweeping its fourth consecutive general
oSiRegional Outlook: Southeast Asia 1993-94, (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian
Studies), p. 1/
oozHuxley, "Singapore's Polities. .."p. 283.
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election. Jevaretnam's breakthrough in the by-election of 1981 was the first
hint of simmering discontent. If 1981 was the first hint, the general election of
L9S4 was the wake up call. In the latter stage of its transition to a new and
younger generation of leaders, the PAP's fortunes swung perceptibly and the
question of an aberration in the Anson by-election which returned
Jeyaretnam was answered in the negatiye. The PAP garnered about 63% of the
vote, a twelve point swing from the preyious election and the opposition
parties returned two MP's, including the ubiquitous Mr. Jeyaretnam. With
his second win. the PAP had to admit what it had previously denied, a
opposition party might actually have a role to play in Singapore's politics. 333
The shift in the political ground was not well received by Lee Kuan Yew.
While he interpreted the results as a call for more pluralism on the part of an
increasingly sophisticated electorate and a desire for some opposition to
pressure the PAP, he also spewed some characteristic bile at the voters. He
warned against "dangerous brinkmanship" and hinted at alterations of the
one man one vote system. He argued that:
it is necessary to try to put some safeguards into the way people use
their votes to bargain, to coerce, to push, to jostle and get what they want
without running the risk of losing the services of the Government,
because one day, bv mistake, they mav lose the services of the
Government. 334
The trends that caused the shifting political ground, however, were
more complex than a simple protest vote. The elections of 1984 marked the
transition to power of the second generation of PAP leaders and the 215,000
new voters in 1984 were better educated, more vocal and seemed to be more
o <-\ <-%
>
°°N. Balakrishnan, "Warrior's Fate" Far Eiist Economic Review, 21 lanuarv l00 "*, p. 21.
•^The Straits Times, 24 December 1984, op. at in Bilveer Singh, Wither PAP's...p. L5.
268
concerned with political rather than "bread and butter
-
' issues. 335 In the
cabinet formed after the 1984 elections, only three of Singapore's "old guard"
remained. On January 1, 1985 Goh Chok Tohg, the new First Deputy Prime
minister, announced that the "old guard" had relinquished day to day control
of the goyernment to the new generation of leaders, claiming high place as
first among equals in the new inner circle and the heir apparent to Lee. This
was significant as the 1984 elections also marked the debut of the Prime
Minister's son Lee Hsien Loons, the thirty-two year old recently "retired"
Brigadier General (Reserve) on the political scene. This led to the popular
characterization of the new PAP goyernment as "the father, son and the holy
Goh.
"
336With a new and troubling trend to face, the PAP moyed to meet the
opposition challenge.
The first challenge that the PAP, spearheaded by Lee Kuan Yew,
undertook was the elimination of Jeyaretnam, the twice returned leader of
the Workers Party. The manner in which Lee went about this is instructive
both of the political methods, perhaps long unused, but not forgotten and the
intolerance of the PAP for vocal opposition in Parliament.
Barely tolerated from 1981 when he first came to Parliament,
Jevaretnam's verbal duels with the Prime Minister brought a new excitement
back to a chamber that had seen no real debate for sixteen years. When he
questioned the government's policies, he faced accusations of abuse of
Parliamentary privilege. A Sri Lankan, trained in law in Britain, Jeyaretnam
was a forceful orator and very nearly a match for Lee's formidable presence.
333Bilveer Sineh, Wither PAP's Dominance?
, p.15.
•^^Author's interview with Dr. David Winterford, Adjunct Professor of National Security
Affairs, May 17, 1993.
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Televised sessions from the legislature became high drama in Singapore. This
service was begun early in 1985 in the wake of the 1984 elections, in response
to what the PAP discerned was a call for a more open government. 337 If the
government thought such a move would discredit its opposition, this proved
a mistaken assumption The sparring matches between the two became very
popular with viewers.338
In 1984 Jeyaretnam was accused of misuse of his party's funds. He was
acquitted on three charges and convicted on the fourth and fined SSI, 000.
Under Singapore's law, a MP must be fined SS2,000 before being deprived of
his seat. Seven months later, with the judge that had tried the case transferred
to the Attorney General's office, the government appealed the case. In 1986 he
was convicted, fined the requisite S$2,000, was disbarred and sentenced to a
month in jail. Having exhausted the appeal svstem in Singapore for the
criminal charge, Jevaretnam appealed his disbarment (a civil matter) to the
Privy Council in London, a Commonwealth vestige left over in the
Constitution from the pre-independence davs. In 1988 the Privy Council
concluded Jeyaretnam and a co-defendant from the Workers Part}', in their
opinion:
have suffered a grievous injustice...They have been fined, imprisoned,
and publicly disgraced for offenses of which thev were not guilts'.
The council restored Jeyaretnam to the practice of law. The government
responded bv abolishing the right of appeal to the Privy Council. Not satisfied
with this, Lee brought out his libel tool and in 1990 won huge damages
337 Ibid, p.16.
33SMilne & Mauzy, p. 25.
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against the beleaguered Workers Party leader, who was forced to sell his
home. The lot of the vocal opposition in Singapore is not an easy one.
The other opposition MP, the leader of the Social Democratic Party,
Chaim See Tong, with perhaps a wisdom born of expediency, was far more
muted in his criticism. With the only troublesome voice in the legislature
crushed, the PAP, with the shock of recognition now evident, moved into its
more characteristic long term planning mode to short circuit future
opposition.
How manv proposals for electoral tinkering were mooted behind closed
party doors will never be known. An example of one that found the light of
day but was not approved was minimum qualifications for candidates to the
legislature. Although this was rejected, it may have been a trial balloon for
later debate on the elected President issue, where it would be accepted. The
solution that emerged was a system of Group Representation Constituencies
(GRCs) for up to half of Singapore's constituencies. Under the scheme, large
consolidated constituencies would be formed and parties wishing to contend
would stand a "team" of candidates who would be elected as a unit. The
PAP's rationale for this novel concept was that each "team" would have to
include one member of a minority race, thereby ensuring continued
representation of Singapore's Malays. With a fragmented opposition,
centered around the personalities of party leaders, this made the opposition's
job very difficult. Additionally, the redisricting involved in building the new
"super" GRC constituencies would enable the Government to combine
"troublesome" districts into a larger whole. PAP claims of the "political
neutrality'" of the plan carried little water with its critics. First mooted in early
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1987, the proposal received significant attention in uncharacteristic open
Parliamentary Select Committee hearings in 1988, further evidence of the
successor generations move to more openness. 339
The proposal passed the Parliament in May of 1988 and shortly thereafter
passed additional legislation which called for MP's to run the housing estates
by chairing town councils. 340 This grassroots move was intended to give the
electorate a more direct stake in the quality of the MP's they returned to
Parliament, as their competence would affect the quality of lives in the
government housing estates where the vast majority of Singaporeans live.
While never openly stated, the image of the PAP as a patronage dispensing
machine was well fixed in the minds of the populace. The idea of choosing a
PAP opponent was thus made far less attractive.
In the midst of these efforts to manipulate the electoral system, the
government, now ostensibly in the hands of a new generation of leaders,
dusted off the Internal Security- Act and began a security sweep against a
"Marxist conspiracy," whose unlikely membership included Catholic lay
workers and the former Solicitor General of Singapore. The crackdown began
in Mav and June of 1987. Twenty-two were detained. By the end of 1987, the
citizens of Singapore had been treated to the videotaped confessions of all the
conspirators who were then released, with the exception of the alleged ring
leader, Vincent Chens.
When, in April of 1988 nine of the released detainees recanted their
confessions and alleged mistreatment during their detention, the eight who
were in the country were rearrested as was a lawyer, Patrick Seong, who was
j3%lilne & Mauzv, p. 70.
340 Ibid, p. 71
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unfortunate enough to have decided to represent one of their number. Seven
of the now re-detained "conspirators'' did an abrupt about face, "reconfessing"
and being quicklv released. The eighth, a female lawyer, Teo Soh Lung,
refused and filed a writ of habeas corpus. This netted her two more years in
detention. She and Vincent Cheng were released in 1990.
This brings up the "Hendrickson affair'' which resulted in the
expulsion/ recall of an American Embassv political officer, E. Mason
Hendrickson. Francis Seow was the Solicitor General of Singapore from 1969 -
1972 and as ^uch verv familiar with the PAP higher-ups, including Lee. Since
1985 Seow had been president of the Law Societv, the equivalent of a national
bar association. Under Seow, the Law Societv began to take a more activist
role in politics, commenting on proposed legislation. This was a brief forav
that the government proscribed in 1986.
Seow had announced his intention to stand for Parliament in the 19S8
elections. In May 1988 he appeared in court to represent Teo Soh Lung and
the detained lawyer, Patrick Seong. Hours later, Seow was arrested and
charged with being in "close contact with Hendrickson." The Singapore
government requested that Hendrickson be recalled on May 6, and the US
Department of State acquiesced, firmlv maintaining that Hendrickson had
done nothing contrary to accepted diplomatic practice and deploring the fact
that the Government of Singapore did not attempt to solve the dispute
"privately, in a manner befitting relations between friendlv countries." On
May 10, the Department of State requested that a Singaporean Diplomat of
similar rank be withdrawn.341
j41Reeent developments in Singapore and Malaysia p. 151.
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With elections scheduled for September, Seow was released in time to
contest the election, but with insufficient time to organize any coordinate
opposition movement. With the new GRC scheme in place (the PAP as
indicated, did break up troublesome constituencies bv redistricting them
within the plan) the PAP returned 80 of 81 MP's. The Social Democratic
Party's Chaim See Tong retained his seat and took his place as the sole
opposition MP.
Francis Seow was defeated, but did well enough to qualify for a seat as a
Xon Constituency Minister of Parliament (NCMP) another of the
government's novel approaches to quench part of the electorate's thirst for a
political opposition while maintaining its lock on effective power. The
NCMP Act of 1984, provided for up to three non-voting MPs to be appointed
by the government, the candidates to be those who had received the highest
"losing percentage
-
' in general elections. 342 This unusual provision was to
provide the PAP with "sparring partners" and rebut the "one party state"
allegations of the international community. As Huxley notes, the prospect of
Francis Seow in Parliament was apparently too much to contemplate for the
PAP leadership. The opening of Parliament was delayed for five months
(allegedly for building repairs). 343 While Seow was out of the country in the
United States, he was convicted, in absentia, of Income Tax evasion, fined a
sufficient amount to disqualify him from his seat. Seow is now effectively
exiled from Singapore. Seow's son, Ashleigh, a Singapore resident and
secretary of one of Singapore's town councils, alleges that his father's fiancee,
o42Milne & Mauzv, p. o°.
343 Sesser, p. 58.
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a .Malaysian businesswoman residing in Singapore, was given, without
reason, two weeks to leave the country. 344
As the decade of the eighties came to a close, the trovernment took
further steps to prevent the resurgence of communal tensions and bv
implication the possibility of political interest groups along racial lines, the
longtime PAP nightmare. The Housing Development board announced in
March of 1989 that strict ethnic quotas for Singapore's government controlled
flats would be extended at both the neighborhood and individual apartment-
block level. The government portrayed the initiative as a continuing part of
its nation building, to ensure that Singapore did not develop into a city of
ethnic enclaves. Critics noted that the plan would disproportionately impact
Malays politically and ab- a group, the Chinese, financially. The plan limited
the resale of HDB units to situations which would not worsen the growing
concentration of minorities and applied to the housing lottery. With the
"clustering " problem confined to Malays, Chinese who lived in an area of
Malay concentration would be prohibited from selling to a Malay, thereby
worsening the proportional mix. The flats, which were intentionally
ethnically mixed when constructed, began to show evidence of clustering
after the initial time of ownership restriction on resale began to expire. The
quotas for problem areas of ethnic clustering (35 of the total of 125 HDB
neighborhoods) seemed to observers to encompass a number of
predominantly Malay areas that had shown strong support for opposition
candidate in the 1988 elections. The Eunos district, with a large concentration
344 Ibid, p. 60.
275
of Malays where Francis Seovv polled 49.1% of the vote was predictably among
them.345
Another controversy that reared its head prior to Lee's departure from
the Prime Minister's office was a program by the government to battle against
the evils of creeping "westernism." Lee Hsien Loong was given chairmanship
of a government committee to search for Singapore's core values. These core
values were to form the basis for a national ideology. Much of the rhetoric in
the debate on core values, which seemed to lean toward a Confucian
perspective coupled with the government push to promote Mandarin as the
only acceptable Chinese vernacular, aroused sensitivities among both the
Indians and the Malays, who were apprehensive about this new leaning
toward Chinese cultural values. The issue became whether Confucian values
would be extended into the political sphere. The overtones of Confucian
despotism, with its implied elitism of mandarins, superior in intellect and
directing the people looked insidious to a populace which already had to
stomach enough elitism and paternalism. To many, the Confucian rhetoric
was simplv another tool to legitimize PAP rule. Malay PAP MPs expressed
their concern. Abdullah Tarmugi summed up Malay concerns:
It appeared that we [Malays] did nothing right. It seemed that we were
singled out for regular unmeritorious mention. ...some members of my
own community were on the verge of disowning my Malay parliamentary
colleagues and I for not openly championing their interests or challenging
strongly enough the perceived indignities aimed at their community. 346
345N. Balakrishan. "The Politics of Housing," Tiie Far East Economic Review, March °, 1989, p.
24.
34bLvnn, Pan, "Plaving the identity Card," The Far East Economic Review, February 9, 1989,p.
37.
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Opposition MP, Chaim See Teong highlighted the dangers, both
domestically and regionally of an emphasis on Confucianism in Singapore's
multi-racial society:
....when we introduce Confucianism, we must inevitably refer to
China. In this way, we will be reviving our racial links with China. It is
dangerous and will have harmful effects on the promotion of racial
harmony. Any promotion of Chinese chauvinism must be dangerous in
our multi-racial society. ...we are in an area where the Malay race is
dominant and we cannot be seen to be advocating values which will make
us more and more distinct and different from the rest of the region. 347
Even many Chinese were dissatisfied with the "Speak Mandarin''
campaign. Many of their children were having difficult}" in keeping up with
the study of both English and Mandarin at school, both languages that few of
them bpoke at home. This was cited as a reason for the emigration of
Singaporean Chinese to Australia, where with only one language to handle,
the educational opportunities of their children were less hindered348 The
PAP had to do some fancy dancing to convince all of its populace that the
debate was open to all cultural viewpoints and the goal was to help
Singaporeans maintain their Asian bearings as they moved toward the
twenty-first century. 349
The search for a national ideology was one of many awkwardly handled
issues as the eighties drew to a close. The security sweeps for the Marxist
conspirators', a reversal of the long-standing two child policy and the ham
handed treatment of encouraging "breeding among Singapore's
professional women while offering sterilization incentives to the poor and
347 Ibid, p. 37.
348N. Balakrishan, "Speak Mandarin," Tiie Far East Economic Review. February^ 1989, p. 41.
349Lvnn, Pan, "Plaving the Identity Card," The Far East Economic Review, February c>, 1989,
pp. 30-37.
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the changing ethnic housing mix are others. Despite, and sometimes because
of these battles, the upcoming leader and First Deputy Prime Minister, Goh
Chok Tong acquired a reputation for toughness beneath an exterior that was
much less abrasive than Lee Kuan Yew's. The other tough battles Goh led
through the eighties included his handling of the foreign press. The
Newspaper and Printing Act Amendment of 1985 codified restrictions on the
foreign press as part of the running battle with foreign publications over their
alleged meddling in Singapore's internal affairs. In a David and Goliath battle
with the Asian Wall Street Journal Goh acquitted himself well. He earned the
respect of his colleagues in the PAP for deft political handling of the GRC and
Town Council issue. Other unpopular measures such as limits on foreign
workers, an unpopular Vehicle Quota Scheme, and a mixing program to try
to improve the educational lot of young Malays. With an important elected
President measure pending, and a reputation as being a key player in the
turnaround of the economy (along with B.G. Lee) from the shocking
recession of 1985, 35 ° Goh was ready to take the reins of power. While he
would live in the giant shadow of Lee Kuan Yew for some time to come and
have to deal with the pressure of the legendary Prime Minister's son, Lee
Hsien Loong, waiting in the wings, that Goh made it to the pinnacle in
Singapore is a remarkable feat.
On November 26, 1990, Lee Kuan Yew tendered his resignation as Prime
Minister of Singapore and advised the President to call upon Mr. Goh Chok
Tong to form the next government. After 31 years encompassing perhaps the
most remarkable political career of the twentieth century, Lee Kuan Yew, the
350 Bilveer Singh, "Wither PAP's....' - p. 21.
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world's longest serving elected head of government, with little ceremonv,
turned the reins of power to a new generation of Singaporeans.
Singapore has a national identity that acquired meaning only because of
his remarkable tenacity. Lee built a government whose hallmarks are
leadership bv technically competent, well educated elite, absolute
incorruptibility, and non-ideological pragmatism in policy decisions. The
Singapore model is government of the elite, bv the elite for the people. Lee
Boon Hiok has characterized the prevailing paradigm of the PAP government
as being dominated bv two themes: the political ideology of survival and the
concept of achievement.351 Lee has built a selection process that has produced
a small group of dedicated, competent elites devoted to the survival and well
being of their tiny island nation. While his rule, his opinions and his
methods were certainly controversial, few would argue his dedication to
Singapore and her people. Fewer still, despite the excesses, would ever
purport that Singapore might have been better off in his absence. Stan Sesser,
reporter at large for Tlie New Yorker, quotes longtime Asia correspondent
Robert Elegant on the career of Lee Kuan Yew:
Among those who led fights for independence only Lee Kuan Yew
afterward ruled wisely.. ..Others failed the transition from revolutionary to
ruler: Mao Tse-tung in China, Pandit Jwawharlal Nehru in India, Ho Chi
Minh in Vietnam, and Sukarno in Indonesia. Those men left disorder -
economic, political, and administrative - compounded bv corruption. 352
'"'•Lee Boon Hiok, "Leadership and Security in Singapore: The Prevailing Paradigm," in
Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia, Mohammed Avoob & Chai-Avan Samudavanija
(eds.) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989)p. 174.
j:>
^Op. at. in Sesser, p. 44.
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Of all the descriptions that Lee Kuan Yew might want applied to his 31
years as Prime Minister, Elegant's statement that Lee Kuan Yew ruled wisely
is probablv the one he would choose for his own.
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VI. Singapore On the Eve of the Twenty-first Century
A. Introduction
The story of the building of a nation where none existed before in
Singapore is certainly a remarkable one. To the visitor who arrives in
Singapore todav it must be difficult to imagine exactly how far this the citv-
state has come since the difficult birth pangs of self-rule and independence.
From a "mosquito infested swamp dotted with pig and chicken farms, fishing
villages, and squatter colonies of tin-roofed shacks'' Singapore has
transformed itself into perhaps the most livable citv in Asia. 333
There are many who wax nostalgic for earlier times, with Somerset
Maugham sipping gin on the verandah at the Raffles Hotel. Recently Simon
Winchester, writing for the Sunday Tunes (London), commented that in
Singapore "tourists found nothing to do, only the shops and the skyscrapers,
no sense of the mysterious east. A sterile place, utopia gone wrong." 354 The
truth of what Singapore once was, the "mysterious east," is not so romantic.
In 1960, one year after the PAP took the reins of government, the travel
magazine Asia Scene wrote, concerning the occupants of the "quaint" two
story shophouses that now line fewer and fewer of Singapore's streets, The
Chinese, who constitute the main current of the city, live in utter filth and
poverty ... Their poverty is phenomenal. One must see with his own eyes to
believe it."355 On sterility, a town planner who was an adviser to Singapore in
its early days of self-government, commented, upon returning after many
"Cesser, p. 44.
j54Simon Winchester, ~flie Sunday Times (London), December 8. 1985. Op. Cit. in Milne &
Mauzv, p. 4.
355Op. Cit. in Sesser. p.44.
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years absence, that if you've seen some of the other places, other cities, you
can stand a lot of sterility."356 Many who have been to Bangkok, Jakarta, or for
that matter London, New York or Los Angeles recently, would probably
endorse similar sentiments.
To have transformed this once wretched outpost of colonial empire into
the country with a per capita income in Asia third behind only mighty Japan
and oil rich Brunei, with living conditions that even many Japanese would
envv, is an astounding accomplishment. That Singapore has built a viable
nation on an island of just over bOO square kilometers with such a dearth of
resources that even water must be imported, borders on the supernatural.
Had bookmakers placed odds on Singapore's survival and prosperity in 19b5,
one could have probably prospered equally as much as the Republic has by
betting, at extremely long odds, on Singapore's success.
The results that Singapore has achieved speak for themselves and these
are rarely the subject of debate. The methods employed, extending the reach
of the government into the details of everyday life in a manner critics allege
is reminiscent of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, 357 has certainly been
the subject of much debate and tons of newsprint. In examining, in retrospect,
what has been accomplished in Singapore since LS 19 and even more
remarkably in the short twenty eight years, 1965 - 1993, one is struck by the
notion that it is sheer hypocrisy to laud the accomplishments and condemn
the methods. In many respects, the methods are the accomplishments. The
dichotomy of Singapore is a conundrum only to those who are deeply rooted
in the belief that only through the application of liberal democratic principles
35b Straits Times, Julv, 29, 1 Q86. Op. Cit. in Milne and Mauzv, p. 5.
•)D/ Shuhud Saaid, "The Singapore Armed Forces, Pt. I..." p. 4.
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can a nation achieve prosperity and an acceptable measure of social justice. It
is important to note that there is a dual responsibility for such judgments
with regard to Singapore. Those outside Singapore must bear part of the
blame for forming opinions without a sufficient knowledge and from a
viewpoint which lacks sufficient cultural and historical perspective. Those in
Singapore are culpable for often encouraging judgment of their nation by the
same Western standards which they often reject out of hand.
In a very real sense Singapore has been created bv recreating the citizens
which populate it. The rugged society has come to fruition in Singapore. A
society of immigrants has been forged into a nation bv a group a visionary
politicians who surmounted every obstacle standing in their path. They have
created a nation of modern secular values existing as a veneer atop the deep
traditions that many of its citizens still cling to as cultural ballast in an
increasingly demanding, fast-paced environment.
This does not imply a nation of self indulgent consumerists, each
seeking his own enrichment at the expense of others. In a real sense the
government of Singapore, under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, has
attempted to create a "new man". A Singaporean is not a Chinese, not a
Malav, not an Indian. A Singaporean is a man who has adopted an entirely
new set of values, while retaining the best of what his cultural legacy has
given him. To oversimplify, a Singaporean is a model of good citizenship and
Singapore the paradise of the middle class. Each citizen is responsible for
being a productive member of society and has the right to be rewarded in
proportion to his productivity and the contribution he makes. Each citizen is
responsible for behaving in a civilized manner, which involves not taking
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part in any activity or behavior that might adversely affect the well being of
his nation o) himself.
What is important to understand is that in Singapore good citizenship is
based on responsibilities from which flow certain rights. The western model,
conversely, places rights in the primary position. These rights then, produce
certain responsibilities. The western model defines carefully the rights of the
citizens. The Singaporean model carefully defines the responsibilities of its
citizens. The western model assiduously protects rights. The Singapore
model, just as diligently, enforces responsibilities. Neither system
accomplishes it goals perfectly. If liberal democracies err, it is normally in the
direction of protecting the rights of those who many believe have invalidated
them bv trampling on the rights of others. The authoritarian system in
Singapore seems to err by demanding that all adopt, with almost equal fervor,
its definition of individual and social responsibility. Non-compliants are not
simply anti-social abberants, they are dangerous and possibly subversive
elements to be either reeducated or ruined. If the victims of western excesses
are the wasted lives of those enveloped in drug addiction, criminality and
permanent underclass status, the victims of the Singaporean authoritarian
system are often the well intentioned, sincere voices who simply believe that
a more open society would not inhibit, but rather enhance, the nation in
which they live. In a strictly moralistic sense, all of these victims are equally
innocent and all equally guilty. If the excess of western democracy is its
neglect, the excess of Singapore is its actions.
Such a view makes it easier to understand the nature of criticism that
sometimes erupts between the two. In this regard, it is normally easier to
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criticize tangible acts than to attack seemingly benign neglect. Western
criticism of Singapore normally has to do with tangible actions, the
suppression of dissent the manipulation of the press and the harsh penalties
meted out to those who yiolate the government's narrowly defined norms.
Singaporean criticism of the west, often yoked by the former Prime Minister,
has been directed at the results of neglect, the racial divisions in the United
States, the hollowing out of the economy of his once beloyed England by the
excesses of the trade unionism and the perceived decline of western moral
standards as abetted by an unrestrained media.
In some respects, one can distinguish a slow movement toward an as vet
unknown center, which exists somewhere in the trulf between these two
visions of how societies should be organized. In the United States, there are
increasing calls for the restraint of traditional freedoms by linking them more
closely to the responsibilities that they infer. The recent passage of the Brady
bill to restrict, however minutely, access to firearms is an indication of this
trend. Recent initiatives to provide universal health care, to eliminate "free
riders" on the present system and enforce the responsibility of both employers
and employees is another. In Singapore, government efforts, equally small
and clumsy at times, to provide more access to the political system have been
taking place to attempt to satisfy the demands of an increasingly sophisticated
electorate. These efforts are occurring simultaneously as Singapore continues
to move further up the "value added" ladder economically by expanding its
overseas economy. The underpinning of all of the programs of Singapore's
rulers is continuing economic prosperity and progress.
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A new generation of politicians is at the helm, attempting to maintain
on the PAP tradition of "performance legitimacy" and move the nation to
new heights. The challenges thev face are, in some respects, as daunting as
those faced bv their predecessors. Success has its own contradictions. First,
there are the expectations that the upward momentum will persist. Will the
sacrifices demanded by the government in terms of personal freedoms, which
are manv, be exceeded bv the benefits these generate? Second, there is the fact
that by obtaining the skills required and making the advances that thev have,
Singaporeans have become increasingly well-educated, prosperous and
demanding of more of a voice in the policies which so much affect their lives.
If, in its early davs, Singapore was a young nation, willing to listen to the
paternalistic voice of government, its more mature bodv politic seems to be
less willing, as the new centurv approaches, to continue with a status quo
relationship with its government. Stan Sesser remarked on this
phenomenon following a recent interview with Lee Kuan Yew:
....his words were delivered with such passion and such determination
that thev also be<ran to resemble something else: to me thev sounded for
all the world like a father talking about protecting the chastity of his
daughter. The only problem, of course, in this instance, is that the
daughter has by now turned thirtv-two.35S
B. Politics
It is in the political arena where Singapore in the I990's faces its most
significant challenges. The election of 1991, the first called bv the Goh Chok
Tong government, provides a fascinating entree to the subject of the
Singapore political scene, revealing both the political failings of the PAP and
J5'%esser, p. ©0.
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the increasing sophistication and strength of the opposition. These elections,
and the response of the PAP to their result, lead one to believe that as the new
century approaches, increasing political pluralism and the birth of a genuine
opposition to the PAP, if not a threat to PAP leadership, may be in the first
stages of coalescing.
The Political Background
Goh Chok Tong, Singapore's second Prime Minister, was born in
Singapore in 1941. Educated at Raffles Institution and the University of
Singapore, he traveled abroad and obtained a Master's Degree in
development economics from Williams College in the United States. Goh
worked in the private sector for a number of vears upon returning to
Singapore, eventually rising to be Managing Director of Neptune Orient
Lines. Identified earlv as a rising star, Goh was elected to the Parliament in the
197b general elections and by 1977 was given the very significant Pinance
portfolio in the cabinet. A longtime PAP member, his party affiliation
predates his election to the legislature bv a number of vears. Goh went on to
hold portfolios in Health, Trade and Industry and, eventually, the critical
Defence Portfolio, which he continued to hold after being named Pirst Deputy
Prime Minister in 1984. 359
Goh Chok Tongs style is far different from that of his predecessor. Self-
effacing and mild mannered, Goh seemed to fit the perceived desires of the
electorate for less paternalistic government. Goh's rise to prominence in the
PAP and the government were viewed bv most Singaporeans as heralding a
359Minchin, p. 197.
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new era of more relaxed and liberal government.360 Goh had characterized
his governmental style as more consultative and participative than that of his
predecessor. 3" 1
Given this stvlistic rhetoric, however, there were factors that constrained
Goh's freedom of action and placed pressure upon him to seek a fresh
mandate for his rule. First and foremost, was the gigantic presence of Lee
Kuan Yew. Lee remained in the new Prime Minister's cabinet as the Senior
Minister and, more importantly, initially retained his position as secretarv-
general of the PAP. This meant that Goh was one of the few, if not the only,
heads of a parliamentary government to not also be head of his party. Second,
was the presence of Lee the younger, Lee Hsien Loong, whose meteoric rise to
political prominence following his "retirement" from the armed forces,
surprised very few.
While Lee Hsien Loong. cannot help but benefit enormously from the
political capital that is his father's legacy (and suffer by this same association
in the eyes of Lee's detractors), he is by all accounts a most remarkable
individual in his own right. A graduate of his father's Alma Mater,
Cambridge (with a double first class and a star of distinction362 ), with a
graduate degree from Harvard, Lee Hsien Loong is a force to be reckoned
with. Few who have met him come away from such an experience with
anything less than admiration for his considerable abilities and intellect.
While recent health problems have given some pause concerning the
prospects for B.G. Lee (Brigadier General Reserve, a title he retains from his
Hl0Tnn Huxley, "Singapore's Politics "p. 285.
361 Bilveer Singh, Whither PAP'? Dominance..., p. 20.
362Milne & Mauzv, p. 117.
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military service and bv which he is widely known to distinguish him from
his father), he still exerts pressure on Golfs leadership, if only by his presence
in government. Goh must constantly battle the notion that he is merely a
"seat warmer" for Lee Hsien Loong. Goh commented on this perception in
1990:
I am not a seat warmer'. Being a seat warmer' means there is an
arrangement by all concerned that you come into this job, you stay for a
certain period until somebody is ready to take over. There is no such
arrangement. 363
It is essential to recognize that the succession process was bv no means a
"coronation" by Lee Kuan Yew of his chosen replacement. The choice of a
new prime minister was left to the Central Executive Committee (CEC).
While Lee Kuan Yew clearly is the most influential member of that body, at
the time the decision was made, he was the only remaining member of the
"old guard" founders. In a 1988 speech, Lee had stated that his short list for
possible candidates was topped by Tony Tan, another of the bright stars of the
younger PAP generation, followed by Mr. Goh. During the time from the 1984
elections up to the elections of 1988, Lee publicly criticized Goh's political
style. While this difference in styles might have reasonably been expected to
raise questions between the two, the public nature of Lees comments raised
some doubts concerning of the unity of the party. When Goh rose to the top
of the pack to become Prime Minister, it was clear that the choice had been left
to the CEC by Lee. Goh emerged as the consensus choice of that body, not the
personal choice of Lee Kuan Yew.364 While Singapore's government is clearlv
•^Alan Chong, Singapore's New Prime Minister, Goh Chock Tong, (Kuala Lumpur, Pelanduk
Publications, 1991) p. 69.
364Milne & Mauzy/ p. 116.
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biased toward a group of people (the cabinet cum CEC) who are absolutely
subordinate to the Prime Minister, it is to the office and not the person of the
Prime Minister that subordination is subject. As difficult as it has been, given
the circumstances, to avoid a "cult of personality" with regard to Lee Kuan
Yew, the government and the party have assiduously attempted to avoid
such a result. This is due in no small part to the restraint of the former Prime
Minister himself.
The PAP has been extraordinarly successful in recruiting the "best and
the brightest" Singaporeans for government service. The meritocracy in
Singapore is alive and thriving. There are two important elements to the
meritocracy in Singapore, first it is rewarding to become a part of it and the
corollary to this, corruption is not tolerated to even the smallest degree.
Singapore's ministers are arguably the best paid in the world, receiving a
salary of SS31,000 per month and the Prime Minister drawing a monthly
salary of S$49,000 per month. While the remuneration is generous, it is the
only fee for service that a government employee receives. As the former
Prime Minister liked to point out, he was nominally the highest paid head of
state in Southeast Asia but actually the lowest paid. While prosperity may be
the central ethic of the PAP leadership, money is not the oil that greases the
gears of government.
The completely non-corrupt ethic, is central to the continuing success of
the PAP and more broadly Singapore itself. This must be fully appreciated to
have any understanding of how the authoritarian rule of the PAP differs
from that of its Asian counterparts (and for that matter the politics of money
which increasingly dominates the west). A few examples are illustrative of
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the extreme attention to detail that is involved in keeping the system intact.
A civil servant who receives a irift in the mail must send it to a government
agencv, which then determines its value and offers to sell it to the recipient at
fair market value. If the government emplovee does not wish to purchase the
item, it is sold at auction, with the proceeds going to the government
treasurv. A postman in Singapore was once arrested for accepting a gift of one
Singapore dollar. The last government official accused of accepting a bribe in
198fc> to spare private land from government acquisition committed
suicide. 365 An American, Carlton J. Parker, managing director of General
Automation of Singapore, a subsidiarv of an American computer firm had
this to sav concerning competition for government contracts:
You explain how your stuff works, what the intelligence is behind it,
and you'll win the contract. If this could happen in places like Indonesia
and the Philippines, who knows what their economies would be like?
Here I never have to offer a bribe; in the Philippines nothing would
happen without one. If you ask a question about specifications, it has to be
in writing, and a copy goes to evervone bidding, so that we're all on an
equal footing. My general impression is that these things go more
smoothly here than in the United States. 366
B.G. Lee has stated that the svstem works because of three factors: 1) there
are no pressure groups capable of promoting the interests of its members at
the expense of the public; 2) there are no ideological preconceptions and; 3)
when emotions clash with logic and practicality, emotions usually give
way. 367 This approach is made possible by the svstem the PAP has developed
of building a small cadre of extremely competent leaders who are
incorruptible and absolutely dedicated to the well-being of the Republic.
.inCesser, p. 40.
366 Ibid, pp. 52-53.
367Minchin, 235.
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These men are beholden to no one other than their own well formed
conscience and that of the party. B. G. Lee again on this point:
The paradox of Singapore's success is that its policies are formulated
almost cold-bloodedly, vet these policies work onlv because of emotions,
the strong ties between the leaders and the led. This is a formula which we
must try to duplicate, in both parts in the next generation.368
This has proven to be a two edged sword, however. Those who rise to
prominence in the PAP and then in government tend to do so based on
technical rather than political abilitv. Cold-blooded policy makers are having
an increasingly difficult time maintaining the emotional ties to the led. A
good policy maker is not necessarily a good politician. The "technocrats" of
the PAP normally have impressive educational or business qualifications.
Thev have earned their stripes by the time thev rise far enough in the party to
enter the "inner sanctum" of the CEC and the cabinet through an exhaustive
screening process and carefully monitored performance. With the one man
one vote system still in place in Singapore, however, the best technocrat, be
he economist, financier, or public administrator, is often, by virtue of his
training, experience and expertise, distanced from those who cast their votes
to elect him or retain him in office bv an enormous intellectual gulf. The
formation of the town councils mentioned in the previous section was not
onlv designed to make the public wary of electing incompetent politicians but
to force PAP MPs to reconnect with their grassroots constituencies. Technical
ability does not always equate to political popularity.
The new government under Goh concentrated on domestic priorities
and indicated that Senior Minister Lee would continue to retain large
36&Op. Cit. in Minchin, 235.
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responsibilities with regard to Singapore's international relations.369 The
domestic bias in the new government's policy was led by the release of a
White Paper on Shared Values designed to enable the nation to keep its
Asian bearings as the country progressed to the twenty-first century. The five
values agreed upon were: Nation before communitv, and society above self;
Family as the basic unit of societv; Community-support and respect for the
individual; Consensus not conflict and ; Racial and religious harmonv. 370
The Goh government also passed a measure for an elected President
who would possess far more power than the largelv ceremonial President had
in Singapore in the past. The President will have the power to safeguard
Singapore's enormous reserves of foreign exchange (through veto power
over their use) and have a right of veto over senior civil service, judicial and
military appointments.371 The first elections for this powerful new position
were to be held on the expiration of President Wee Kim Wee's term of office
in 1993. Despite protestations to the contrary by Lee Kuan Yew, the office was
seen by many as being specifically created for the former Prime Minister, to
give him final right of refusal over contentious policies that a future
government might try to enact. Stringent qualification standards included in
the legislation for the elected President were designed to limit candidacy to a
select group who were either PAP members or would be strongly supportive
of the traditional PAP party line. There is little doubt that the legislation was
implemented to provide a "fail safe" mechanism to ensure PAP control over
the vagaries of the electoral system. The President would act as the last line of
3b9The Straits Times, January 14, 1991, Op Cit. in Bilveer Singh, Wither PAP's Dominance...?.
22.
370 Bilveer Singh, Whither PAP's Dominance...?. 24.
371 Huxley, "Singapore's Politics " p. 285.
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defense should the rising tide of opposition strength result in a "freak"
election, with the opposition gaining strength, or at some time in future,
control of the government.
Earlv in 1991 the Goh government released a glossv publication, entitled
The Next Lap, which outlined the vision of the new PAP leadership. 372 The
vision outlined in the publication highlighted the necessity of maintaining
the Republic's record of robust economic growth bv becoming the "hub citv"
of the region. Bringing prosperity to the region through the Republic would
bring prosperity to Singapore. It emphasized international linkages as the core
of Singapore's prosperity. It also emphasized the new government's
intention to pay closer attention to the amenities of an increasingly
prosperous and sophisticated societv. References to a more interesting and
gracious society abound. The publication outlined a number of initiatives to
make Singapore a "cultured" and "caring" as well as a "rugged" society. 373
The new government did introduce some limited relaxation of previous
policies, allowing some R-rated films to be screened in Singapore and relaxing
editorial constraints on the Straits Times. An interview with Singapore's
longest serving political prisoner, Chia Thve Poh, was even permitted in the
paper. Goh continued the policv he had instituted prior to assuming the
Prime Ministership of holding public hearings on issues of import to make
recommendations to the government. 374 Huxlev maintains that Goh and
newly appointed Minister of Information and Arts, George Yeo, seemed to
J/2The Government of Singapore, Singapore: Tlie Next Lap, (Singapore: Times Editions Pte Ltd,
1991)
J/
°Ibid, See sections entitled "Singapore Our Home," pp. 77 - w ; "Arts and Sports," pp. 101
-115, and;"Manv helping Hands," pp. 117 -129.
j74 Huxley, "Singapore's Politics....," p. 28o.
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understand the necessity of co-opting the political energies of the rapidly
growing English-educated middle class.375 Hu\lev noted, however that the
changes instituted were those of style and not of substance. He remarks on
this phenomenon:
It was abundantly clear that while Goh accepted the need for a degree of
glasnost, he was not willing to sponsor a more fundamental perestroika.
The PAP itself remained an elitist, secretive patronage-dispensing
machine, and showed no si<rn of transforming itself into a more broadlv-
based, democratic party. There was no attempt to separate the interests and
powers of the Party, the Government, and the State. There was no
indication that the judiciary or the trade union movement would be
allowed a degree of independence. The press remained under indirect, but
effective, government control. The draconian Internal Security Act
remained in place. 376
The Elections of 1991
On August 14, 1991, just nine months after taking the helm in Singapore
the new Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, dissolved the Parliament, and
called for general elections (GE). He did so using the time honored PAP
strategy of giving the minimum notice for elections, setting August 21 as
Nomination Day and August 31 as election day.377 While the minimum
notice was given there were many signals that such an event was in the
offing. The publication of the new government's manifesto, The Next Lap
was a powerful indication that Goh would soon seek a mandate to put his
own imprint on Singapore and its institutions. Still, the fact that general
elections were not required under the constitution for another two years led
many to question the motives for early elections.
375 Ibid, 286.
376 Ibid, p. 287.
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Opinion varies somewhat, but a number of factors point to both the
wisdom and strategy behind the decision. The foremost reason for new
elections was for Goh to legitimize his leadership of Singapore. Furthermore,
the PAP also anticipated a slowdown in economic growth in 1992-93. With
good economic performance recently, the government had announced a
series of popular initiatives in the areas of health, education and housing and
had paid a bonus to Singapore's civil servants as the economy had exceeded
previous expectations. Also, the calling of early elections was seen as a way to
catch the opposition flat-footed and give them minimum organizational lime
to mount a challenge.3^
The two major opposition parties, the Workers Party (\VP) under J. B.
Jeyaretnam and the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) under Chaim See Tong
were the only two of the 21 registered political parties which posed any
challenge to the PAP electoral dominance. One of the other reasons for the
early elections, the opposition claimed, was to preclude Mr. Jeyaretnam from
mounting a challenge. Due to his earlier conviction on a charge of falsifying
party accounts, he was banned from standing for Parliament until November
of 1991. Goh answered these allegations by promising to hold by-elections (BE)
after the GE to allow Mr. Jeyaretnam to contest for a seat in the legislature.
In a brilliant political strategy, the opposition parties got together and
agreed to concede to the PAP control of the government on nomination day
by putting up candidates for only 40 of the 81 seats in the legislature. By
adopting this "By-election" strategy, the opposition removed the issue of
control of the government. The PAP had previously used this as an electoral
>7s IWd, pp. 33-34.
29b
^care tactic, outlining all manner of disaster that might be expected should a
freak election result in an opposition victory. The battle lines of the most
interesting election in Singapore's political history became the opposition's
call for a meaningful voice to check unbridled PAP control of the legislature
and Goh's increasingly personal call for a mandate to confirm his leadership
and legitimize his more consultative style of governing.
The ten dav campaign was marked bv contrasting styles of reaching the
electorate. The PAP relied on use of the media, which it largely controlled and
Clinton style town meetings, which the PAP called dialogue sessions. The
opposition relied on more traditional mass rallies. The PAP's platform, based
upon The Next Lap, featured seven main action areas: i) the economy; 2)
Education; 3) Healthcare; 4) Town Councils — Authority and Responsibility; 5)
Housing and Development Board (HDB) upgrading; b) Politics - Participation
and Consultation and: 7) The PAP's Helping Hand. 379
The opposition parties attacked the PAP's elitist style of government and
highlighted the growing gap between Singapore's rich and poor. The PAP's
policies were characterized as contributing to this growing gap and favoring
the wealthy at the expense of the less advantaged. The attack on the
government was conducted in a manner which put the government on the
defensive, offering criticism of the entrenched leadership of the PAP without
offering many alternative solutions.
By adopting the strategy of yielding control of the government to the
PAP on nomination day, this strategy of criticism proved viable and effective.
The Worker's Party platform was more strident in pointing out the failures of
379 Ibid, pp. 65-6/
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the PAP in the area of social equity and justice. The more moderate Singapore
Democratic Party stressed the need for a responsible opposition in Parliament
to begin progress to a real two party system in Singapore. The campaign was
an exciting and contentious one. Late in the campaign, as the challenge to
PAP leadership in the Eunos GRC (Expanded to a four seat constituency)
became acute, Goh accused the WP of playing communal politics and
cautioned the electorate not to allow this trend to return to Singapore's
political scene. The PAP used images from the early days of Singapore,
publishing pictures and accounts of the race riots the plagued the island in
1951 and 1%4. Goh went so far as to brandish the Internal Security Act as a
possible "Volution" to the problem of "communalism" should one of the WP
candidates (the Malay Jufrie Mahmood) "use even more extremist terms,
where you really get people to agitate, to become violent, then you are
crossing the line."380
The election results gave further evidence of the decline in the PAP's
once ironclad hold on power. Its share of valid votes cast declined from the
63.2% in 1988 to 61% in 1991. The SDP won three seats in Parliament and the
WP one. The PAP narrowly survived the challenge in the Eunos GRC, with
52.4% of the valid votes cast. Although this percentage was actually an
increase over the PAP's previous performance in the Eunos GRC, the
opposition vote this time was not split as the united front tactics had resulted
in the WP and SDP not challenging in the same electoral districts. 381
While in most democratic societies the performance of the PAP would
be hailed as a resounding victory, in the context of Singapore's politics of
380Op. Cit. in Bilveer Singh, Whither PAP's Dominance...?. 81.
381 Ibid. p. 88.
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single party dominance, the results were disappointing. Even more troubling
was the reaction of Mr. Goh, who in a late night press conference was nearly
despondent over the result. While he later softened his assessment of the
meaning of the election, his statement that "life cannot go on as before" was
widely interpreted as indicating that he believed that the electorate had
rejected his new style of leadership.382
This interpretation of the election results in indicative of a certain lack of
political acumen on the part of Mr. Goh, who had risen to power in the PAP
during its complete dominance of the political ground. The popularity of the
PAP had begun its decline in the 1984 elections and many observers contend
that had it not been for the change of leadership and a softening of the PAP's
paternalism under Goh that the Party would have fared much worse. 383
Goh's seeming interpretation that the election indicated a desire for less
and not more reform may miss the mark completely. The post election
rhetoric of the government "withholding" service from its opponents seems
particularly misplaced. In the Straits Times on September 21 Goh stated he
would adopt a two track approach to the electorate:
...Broadly, to mv supporters, be very friendly, listen to their input and
do things which will benefit them. Elsewhere, which have given a clear
signal that my style is not wanted, if I listen, if I hear feedback, I can be a
little deaf.3*4
After the post-election reactions died down, the PAP went to work to
determine the reasons for its electoral slip. This effort does demonstrate the
^Huxlev, "Singapore's Politics " p. 289.
3S3Ibid, p. 289, see also Bilveer Singh, Witither PAP's Dominance...p.92 and N. Balakrishnan,
FEER, August 29, 1991, p. 21.
3S4T7*e Straits Times, September 1-2 , 1991, Op. Cit. In Bilveer Singh, Wliither PAP's
Dominance.., p.91.
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manner in which democracy is very much at work in the republic, despite the
dominance of the PAP in government. A Post-General Election Debrief
Committee, significantly under the chairmanship of Lee Hsien Loong,
analyzed the results of the election to determine the corrective actions
necessary to stem the trend. While not released to the general public,
statements bv PAP leaders indicate the nature of their assessment. Ong Teng
Cheong, the Deputy Prime Minister of the new government, presented his
view of those who voted against the PAP:
L) Those who think a democratic country must have opposition parties
in Parliament; 2) Those Chinese-educated who feel they have been
neglected bv the Government; 3) Those who could not improve their
standard of living and: 4) Those who blame the Government regardless of
the issues. 385
The Politics of Singapore in the Wake of 1991
The PAP has begun efforts to reinvigorate its grassroots organizing
efforts to win back the support of these alienated constituencies, especially
among the critical Chinese-educated segment of the population. It also
attempted to pay more attention to Singapore's less advantaged by paying
more attention to programs which address these needs. 386
The political scene in Singapore was considerably muddled in late 1992,
with Goh strengthening his political hand vis-a-vis his predecessor. Goh
made a public appeal for new political talent to step forward in Singapore on
November 22 to take part in the renewal process in the Cabinet. The next day
the government announced that both B.G. Lee and Tirst Deputy Prime
Minister Ong Teng Cheong had been diagnosed with lymphatic cancers and
385Op. Cit. in BUveer Singh, Whither PAP's Dominance, p.119.
j>S6gee m Ramesh, "Social Secuntv in Singapore,'' Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 12, December
1«92, pp. 1093-1108.
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were undergoing treatment. While the best face was put on this
announcement, with the prospects for successful treatment highlighted,
uncertainty about the future was the order of the day. 387 A few weeks later, on
December 2, Goh announced that he was resigning his Parliamentary seat,
along with the other members of his GRC to force the BE's promised during
the 1991 GE. The next dav the announcement was made that he had been
elected bv the PAP CEC to become the secretary-general of the PAP.388 With
Goh consolidating his power to challenge the opposition both outside the
PAP and within, the BE campaign began.
Against the backdrop of this deyelopment, Lee Kuan Yew, during the BE
campaign, commented that he was glad that Tony Tan, his previous first
choice for a successor, would be returning to the cabinet from private life.
Two davs later the Prime Minister indicated that there was no such plan in
the offing and no national crisis to warrant such a move. 389 Some observers
of the Singapore political scene interpreted the curious exchanges between
Lee Kuan Yew and Goh during the election campaign over Tan as an attempt
by Lee to reassert his control over the political power structure of the party in
light of the now uncertain health status of his son. While Goh seemed
acceptable as the interim candidate while Lee Hsien Loong continued the
grooming process, the prospect of Goh as a long term Prime Minister was
apparently not so much to the Senior Ministers liking. 390
Goh's scored a resounding success in the Parliamentary By-elections (BE)
in December of 1992, where he unexpectedly answered the challenge in his
387As**n Recorder, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January 1 -7, 1993, p. 22828
3SSAsian Recorder, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January 1 -7, 1993, p. 22828.
3S9 Ibid, p. 20.
390Ibid, p. 20.
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own Marine Parade GRC. This strengthened the Prime Minister's hand. The
SDP contested and the elections fared poorly. The Worker's Party was unable
to contest the Goh led team of MPs, as one of the four required candidates
bowed out at the eleventh hour. There is speculation that the WP leader, Mr.
Jevaretnam, decided privately not to contest so as to avoid the possibility of
coming in third behind the PAP and the SDP. This election probably spelled
the end of Mr. J.B.. jevaretnam as a force on the Singapore political scene. 391
While the BT firmly cemented the SDP as the strongest opposition to the
PAP, Goh trounced the SDP team, winning 72.9% of the vote. 392 It
additionally demonstrated the rapid maturation of Goh after his initial
stumbles to both take control of the party and execute some deft political
maneuvers in the face of the opportunities that presented themselves. While
Lee Kuan Yew still carries enormous weight and serves a number of useful
purposes for the PAP, it would seem that Goh has successfully wrested a large
measure of control of the Party and the CEC from Lee Kuan Yew's hands.
While this bv no means makes Goh "untouchable," in the absence of serious
missteps on the part of his government, Goh seems much more firmly
entrenched at the top than might have appeared possible in the late night
following the elections of 1991.
Curiously, these developments probably bode well for an eventual
government headed bv the Prime Minister's son, although somewhat later
than Lee Kuan Yew might have envisioned. Lee Hsien Loong's treatment
and progress in his battle against cancer were played out in a very public
manner in the Singapore Press. Bv April of 1993, the Straits Times announced
391 N. Balaknshnan, "Warriors Fate," PEER, lanuarv 21, L993, p.2Q .
392 N. Balaknshnan, "Crack in the Cabinet," PEER, January 7, L993, p. 20.
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that Lee had been given clearance bv his doctors to attend Cabinet meetings,
although the Prime Minister indicated that he would not be given a portfolio
immediatelv to give him time to recuperate. The storv spelled out that the
chances for recurrence of the disease was the greatest within the first two to
three vears. 393 On the issue of eventual succession, Goh stated the following:
Well, he is still mv choice for the next Prime Minister. But the choice is
not bv me. The choice has to be made bv his colleagues, MPs, other
ministers and Singaporeans, I am not vested with the power of choosing
the Prime Minister. 3 ' 14
Should Lee Hsien Loong's cancer remain in remission for the next few
vears, one might anticipate another political succession taking place in the
future, although much farther in the future than Lee Kuan Yew probably
anticipated. Goh has publiclv discussed winning the next elections due in 1996
and the possibility of contesting the first elections of the new centurv. 395
The Presidential Elections of 1993
Another move may provide a precedent for the vounger Lee to remain
an active political player despite uncertainty- concerning his health. Ong Ten
Cheong, the former head of NTUC, First Deputy Prime Minister and PAP
Chairman, diagnosed with cancer at the same time as B.G. Lee, resigned his
seat in Parliament and his position in the PAP to stand for election as
Singapore's first elected President. In what did amount to verv nearly a
coronation, the government Presidential Election Commission (PEC) rejected
applications from all but its own chosen candidate, Mr. Ong, and struggled
until the last minute to find another candidate, Mr. Chua Kim Yeow, to run
"^"BG Lee well enough to join Cabinet Meetings," T7/e Straits Times (Weekly Edition), p. 1.
394 Ibid, p. 1.
395N. Balaknshnan, "Crack in the Cabinet," FEER, January 7, 1993, p. 20."
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against him. The applications of J.B. Jeyaretnam and Tan Soo Phuan, both of
the Workers* Party, were, not surprisingly, rejected. The PEC maintained that
neither had the financial background for the office nor was is satisfied that
they met the requirements of the law with regard to "integrity, good character
and reputation.'* 396
Despite the other candidate, Chua Kim Yeow, being basically a stiff put
up to give the election some semblance of being a real contest, he garnered
41.3% of the vote to Ong's 58.7%. The campaign was a rather laughable affair,
with Mr. Chua, in an almost apologist manner, all but admitting that he was
merely running to provide Ong with an opponent. He was persuaded to stand
by Goh Keng Swee and Tinance Minister, Richard Hu, so as to provide some
semblance of competition. 3 *07 In putting a somewhat curious spin on the
surprising strength of the "empty suit" candidacy of Chua Kim Yeow, the
Prime Minister stated the following in his post-election remarks, (one would
think without intending irony):
That Mr. Chua Kim Yeow is able after only two TV broadcasts and one
press interview to get 41% of the votes reflects on the grouting maturity of
the electorate.
This contest is better than if Mr. Ong Teng Cheong had been returned
unopposed.... I also congratulate Mr. Chua Kim Yeow on his credible
results. I thank him for contesting against Mr. Ong at short notice. 398
[italics added]
What is more likely inferred by the strong electoral performance of the
apologetic Mr. Chua , who received nearly as large a percentage of the vote as
J*°"Two Candidates Approved for Presidential Campaign/' 77ft' Straits Times, published in
FB1S East Asia Daily Report, August 1", \QQ 1, p. 35.
j9/
"Voters Choose feng Cheong, "The Straits rrmes(Weekly Edition),Sunday August 29, [^>Q3
P-l
' s TM: Teng Cheong has clear mandate to be President, Die Straits Times(Weekly
Edition),SundayAugust 29, 1993 p. 1
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that which elected Bill Clinton President of the United States, is the
disillusionment of the electorate with the whole process of the Presidential
election and the high handed manner in which the PAP handled it. While
Mr.Chua was not exactly the Pat Paulsen of Singapore politics, in that he was
not by choice a "protest of the ridiculous'' candidate, the strength of electoral
response does indeed seem to indicate an electorate that is no only
increasingly mature but also increasingly impatient with the PAP's political
manipulation.
In this new political institution, which the PAP created as a backstop to
safeguard its control, they may also have unwittingly created a new political
problem. This is a very public forum, in which the public is able to watch the
government reject application after application of candidates, for whatever
reason, while steering their own chosen candidate into a position which now
possesses a significant amount of real political power. This may result is yet
more public cynicism just as the PAP attempts to counter such electoral
disillusionment by renewing it connections at the grassroots level. In the
short term, however, barring further difficulties with Mr. Ong's health, with
a term of office of six years, the Presidential issue may fade from public
consciousness. Mr. Ong, with a very public reputation as an advocate for the
interests of the more traditional Chinese segment of the population, may in
fact, boost the PAP's short term prospects.
Prospects for the future
Huxley asserts that the PAP will, during the nineties, have to make the
choice between two rather stark alternatives. The first, becoming a genuine
electoral party, and learning to operate in a multi-party environment,
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differentiating itself from the state. The second, is a swing to the right, in
favor of a neo-authoritarian government, with the PAP taking further
measures to stem the rising tide of opposition strength. 399 The circumstances
on the ground seem to favor the former solution over the later, although not
by a wide margin. Either solution is possible.
Recent efforts to reinvigorate the PAP's grassroots connections, such as
the renewal of the vouth wing of the Partv, coordinated bv one of the more
liberal new ministers, B.G. (Res.) George Yeo seem to auger in this
direction.400 Yeo reportedly encouraged the members of the vouth wing to
not be hesitant to adopt views that do not square with the thinking of the
partv. 401 Similar renewal efforts are underway within the women's wing of
the Partv as well.
The presence of B.G George Yeo and B.G. Lee Hsien Loong in the Cabinet
and government highlights another recent phenomenon in the history of the
PAP. This is greater civic involvement on the part of the military and its
extensive reserve components. Since the late 1980's the SAP Reservists'
Association has organized "role playing" exercises in which participants
simulate governmental decision-making on topical issues.402
The PAP partv line on this increasing involvement of senior military
officers in government and politics is that this is simply an effort to take
advantage of proven leaders who have often been educated at significant
governmental expense. Huxley also offers a competing interpretation of the
a99Huxlev, "Singapore's Politics....," p.91.
400See '"Young PAP' Revamped in Partv Recruitment Drive," Business Times (Singapore),
April 26, 1993, p. 2. published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, .August 29, lOQ3, p. 40.
404
"Told to 'Occasionally' Hold Unlike Views" Business rimes (Singapore), April 2o, 1 QQ3, p.
2. published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, August 29, 1993, p. 40.
402 Huxley, "Singapore's Politics " p. 292.
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PAP creating a network of senior SAF officers within the government which
would be capable of administering Singapore should civilian leadership
fail.403 While this is admittedly unlikely, it is an interesting interpretation of
a fairly significant shift in the political makeup of the Party and the
government. Huxley does point out that both of Lee Kuan Yew's male
offspring have risen through SAF ranks to senior positions. 404 While the
political nature of the change remains somewhat uncertain, it does translate
into a powerful lobby for defense interests within the government.
For the foreseeable future, the PAP seems solidly in control of the
political scene in Singapore. The important trend to observe over the next
few years will be how it deals with the increasingly well organized opposition.
The recent (April 1993) sacking of an SDP politician, Dr. Chee Soo Juan, by the
National University of Singapore over the misuse of SS226 dollars, to mail
his wife's thesis to a university in the United States, brought to the fore
charges of a politically motivated vendetta. 405 The PAP's squeaky clean
attention to detail concerning the actions of politicians certainly provides a
somewhat opaque cover for its actions. Still, the details of the case of the
unfortunate Dr. Chee seem to indicate that the PAP is still willing to go after
the most inane faux pas of anyone who opposes them politically.
Liberalization seems indeed more style than substance. By years end the SDP
was in disarray, with its chairman, Chiam See Tong, expelled, the party
searching for new7 leadership and roundly condemning their former leader.
403 Ibid, p. 2^2.
404 Ibid, p. 292.
405See, Dr., Chee affair: SDP rapped in Parliament, Tiie Straits r«nes(Weekly
Edition),Sunday April 17, 1993 p. 2.
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This split in the opposition was, of course, covered in great detail in the
Straits Times.40*
It seems that the PAP's strategy for offering more pluralism in the future
in Singapore will be increasing attempts to renew itself to meet voter
expectations rather than trusting more to the vagaries of a real two or three
party system. While the opposition may find a larger voice in the legislature,
it seems apparent that the PAP will continue to use its patronage dispensing
power and control of the media to hamstring Ihem at every step. While this
will certainly slow the process down, it mav eventually produce a group of
surviving politicians who are every bi as tough as their PAP counterparts.
The 1996 general elections should be a most interesting contest, as well as
saying much about Singapore's political trajectory. What is clear from the
events of the eighties and nineties is that genuine politics has returned to
Singapore. Barring a disaster, such as an unexpected plunge in economic
fortunes, a serious security threat from without, or violent civil unrest, there
is little chance that the PAP will be able to force the srenie back in the bottle.
How they deal with the now released specter bears observation.
C. Economics
Around the world, key economic activities are becoming concentrated
in a few strategic nodes. In finance, the key centers are Zurich, London,
New York, Hong Kong and Singapore. In shipping, Rotterdam serves
Europe, Hong Kong serves China, and Singapore serves a region
stretching from India to Taiwan, and bevond. The same is happening in
air transport, telecommunications, information technology, and even
industries like chemicals and petrochemicals.
Each strategic center attracts business from an extended hinterland and
prospers out of proportion to the size of the local economy. Each is a hub,
406gee "Chaim: Slam colleagues, but also admit your own faults," The Straits Timrsi Weekly
Edition Uulv 31, 1«°3 p. 13.
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servicing the region and linking it to the world. Each builds up its position
by investing in its people, planning far ahead, organizing itself as a world
class team, and staving ahead of the pack.
Singapore has always been an entrepot, but a hub city is much more
than an entrepot. A hub citv must offer first-class products and services.
The infrastructure must rank with the best in the world. The quality of
service must be acknowledged even bv competitors. "Singapore" must
become a synonym for quality, reliability and excellence. We will become a
business hub of the Asia Pacific.407
An Economy with two Wings, The Internal and External Economies
The preceding excerpt from Jlw Next Lap, the Goh government's 1991
election manifesto, gives a verv compelling statement concerning Singapore's
economic future. The success of the Republic since independence has not bred
complacency. Any notions of resting on its laurels were forever quashed bv
the recession of 1985. Singapore is continuing its move up the value-added
ladder, both at home and abroad.
This is being accomplished bv encouraging the shift to a more service
oriented economy at home and extending its reach farther into the extended
hinterland of the world economy abroad. Singapore's internal economy has
been built by capital and expertise imported from abroad. This has created
strong linkages to the world economy and vulnerability to the vagaries this
entails. Singapore, with a tiny domestic market, is not taking the course of
trying to inhibit direct foreign investment (DPI), but rather continuing to
encourage it in the domestic economy. While foreign companies are
encouraged to bring their expertise to Singapore, Singaporeans are being
encouraged to take what they have learned thus far and export these skills to
emerging markets abroad. In this new era, however, Singapore is being more
40/ The Government of Singapore, Singapore: Vie Next Lap, (Singapore: Times Editions Pte Ltd,
1991), pp. 58-59.
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selective about the incentives it offers. It is aiming for those industries and
services that will provide it citizens with the skills and technology to compete
in increasingly competitive world markets. At the same time Singapore is
attempting to decrease the need for imported labor to man less skilled, low-
value added production industries. It is pressing its businessmen and
entrepreneurs to venture abroad and aggressively pursue opportunities in
emerging markets, particularly in Southeast and East Asia, letting labor in
these nations do what was once necessarv to build the economv in Singapore.
Singapore's modern and efficient infrastructure has had outstanding
success in attracting foreign investment. More than 3,000 multi-nationals
have invested in Singapore.408 Singapore's 1990 GXP per head of US 511,300
was approximately equal to that of such countries as Hong Kong, Israel, Spain
and Ireland, for this reason the World Bank and other UN agencies placed
Singapore in the High income Economies' category. In 1991 there were only
24 other countries covered bv this definition and there was a strong possibility
of Singapore, together with the Republic of Korea, joining the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the near future.409In
1991 external demand continued to provide two- thirds of the increase in total
demand. Singapore's international competitiveness remained strong through
1991. In 1991 goods exports grew at 11%, service exports at 4.6%. and
manufacturing at 5.3%.410
Concerted efforts to develop local commerce were begun in 1989, as the
government began to give fiscal, financial, marketing and technical assistance
4°°The Embassy of the United States of America Singapore, Investment Climate Statement:
Singapore, June 1 QQ0, p. 3.
l09T7ie Far East and Australasia 1993, (London: Europa Publications Ltd., L992),p. 8o5.
410 Ibid, p. 865.
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to local small and medium-sized enterprises. These efforts to develop an
indigenous entrepreneurial base were a response to what was viewed as an
excessive dependence on MNC's. While encouraging business development
at home, the Singapore government was determined to advance further into
high-technology and capital-intensive industries bv introducing automation
and more effective mechanization into existing industries. These efforts were
made across the board in the petrochemical, aerospace, biotechnology, and
information technology sectors. 111 As the economv shifts up, Singapore has
placed increasing emphasis on its service sector. Tax incentives have been
added to encourage development there following the pattern that initially
attracted manufacturing. Manufacturing has been increasingly shifted
offshore and the vision broadened to include a more integrated
manufacturing/ service mix, offering after-sales services, testing, storage and
warehousing services. As wages in Singapore rise, the Republic takes
advantage of its outstanding infrastructure to move production to low cost
areas in Southeast Asia, especially in the Johor-Riau-Singapore "Growth
Triangle," with Singapore acting as the management, financing and
headquarters node. The constraints of the domestic market, including the
shrinking labor pool have given further impetus to the press for expansion
overseas. The government's announced intention of limiting the number of
foreign workers is a further indication of the trend toward both automation at
home and expansion abroad. An overview of the incentive offered to both
foreign investors and local businesses will give a more accurate impression of
the trajectory of government policy than a litanv of statistical data.
411 Ibid, p. 866.
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Government Incentive Programs
Administered by the Economic Development Board (EDB), investment
incentives play perhaps the most crucial role in the government's shaping
the pace and direction of the economy of Singapore. These policies represent
vision of Singapore's leaders concerning the economic future of the island
Republic. The EDB has great leeway in administering incentive programs
under the Economic Expansion Incentives Act. The following incentive
programs are designed primarily to encourage foreign companies:
fc Pioneer Status: Xew Manufacturing and service activities, approved
by the Finance Ministry, are granted complete or partial exemption from
the 31% tax on profits for a period of five to ten years. Pioneer Status
requires that the investment introduce technology, know-how or skills
into an industry which are substantially more advanced than that of the
average level prevailing in the industry and that there be no firm in
Singapore performing similar activity without being awarded Pioneer
status. This provision may be extended upon expiration to encourage such
companies to continue their Singapore operations.
* Expansion Incentive: Manufacturing and service companies with a
minimum investment of S$10 million in new production equipment and
machinery may be granted exemption from the taxes on profits in excess of
pre-expansion levels for up to five years.
* Investment Allowance Incentive: Allows manufacturing and service
activities, particularly those in research and development activity,
construction, or projects for reducing consumption of potable water, to be
exempted from taxation on a proportional basis (up to 50%) of the value of
new fixed investments.
* Operational Headquarters (OHQ) Incentive: Provides tax incentives
fro the establishment of entities providing management and other
approved headquarters related services to subsidiary/ associated/ related
companies in other countries, provided that the company is incorporated
or registered in Singapore.
* Export of Services Incentive: Aimed at encouraging the development
of export-based services, available to Singapore-registered companies
providing professional and knowledge-intensive services to customers
outside Singapore. Companies should have a minimum of 20% of
revenue derived from offshore earnings.
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*Post Pioneer Incentive: Continued tax relief, at a lower rate for
companies whose Pioneer status or export incentive status has expired.
Venture Capital Incentive: For companies with at least 50%
Singaporean ownership (citizens or permanent residents), tax concessions
on losses incurred for approved new technology projects.
* International Direct Investment Incentive: Also for companies with
at least 50% Singaporean ownership, tax relief for investors overseas losses
against other taxable income.
Approve Foreign Loan Scheme: Withholding tax exemption on
interest pavments to foreign lenders on loans for the purchase of
productive equipment in Singapore, provided such relief does not
increase tax liability in a foreign country.
''Approved Royalties: Full of partial exemption of withholding tax on
royalties to eligible companies if such relief does not increase tax liability
in a foreign country.
* Accelerated Depreciation Allowance: Additional annual allowance of
up to 33 1/3^ for machinerv and plant investment. Accelerated allowance
of 100% (a one vear write-off) for computers and prescribed automation
equipment. 412
The following incentive programs are also administered by the EDB to
assist and encourage the development of smaller domestic companies in
Singapore. Most provisions are available to companies with joint
Singaporean-foreign ownership, provided the linkages to the Singaporean
economv generate local benefit:
Product Development Assistance Scheme (PDAS): Provides cash
grants to encourage product design and development capability for
indigenous technologv and know-how.
* Business Development Scheme (BDS): To encourage and assist small
and medium sized companies, particularlv in overseas markets.
Assistance grants are available to cover cost of studies or overseas visits to
explore new technologies or markets, establish business contacts, pursue
joint-venture arrangements or participate in approved business
development workshops and seminars.
*Automation Leasing Scheme (ALS): Provides incentives and low cost
financing to encourage Singapore companies to introduce and apply robots
4i2The Embassy of the United States of America Singapore, Investment Climate Statement:
Singapore, June 1990, pp. 8-11.
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and related automation equipment and systems. Also available to foreign-
owned companies with established Singapore operations.
* Incentives in New Technology Scheme (INTECH): To encourage
investment and manpower development in the application of new
technologies, industrial R&D, professional know-how, and design and
development of new products, processes and services to establish new
capability within companies or industries.
' Equity Participation Scheme: Provides capital assistance through an
EDB share in investments. Intended as a short term support measure for
new enterprises
Venture Capital Program: To promote overseas direct investment in
high technology firms in Singapore, assist local firms in acquiring new
technologies or penetrating new markets. Also supports diversification
into new industries through joint-venture or equitv participation and
local entrepreneurship and innovation.
* Capital Assistance Scheme (CAS): Makes available long term fixed-
rate loans for investment in Singapore. Loans mav be used for equipment,
plants or buildings. Firms are selected bv the EDB without restriction on
ownership or size.
*Automation Feasibility Study (AFS): Provides grants of up to SS50,000
to assist firms in identifying operational areas where automation can be
implemented. All Singapore registered firms are eligible. AFS provides a
grant of 70% of the cost of using experts of parent firms to implement such
programs for subsidiaries of MNC's.
* Design for Automation Scheme: Offers incentives for design
modification to adapt products for automated manufacturing. Available to
all Singapore registered firms, but with restrictions with regard to local
participation.
* Investment Study Grant (ISG): Encourages local companies to invest
overseas for purposes of technology acquisition and/ or market access.
Available only to local firms it helps defray expenses associated with
exploring opportunities for overseas investment.
* Small Industry Finance Scheme (SIFS): A low-cost financing program
administered by EDB to help smaller enterprises (less than S$S million in
fixed assets) to encourage them to upgrade and expand their operations.
* Small Industry Technical Assistance Scheme (SITAS): The EDB
reimburses up to 70% of the cost of engaging experts to assist in upgrading
skills and technology. Covers human resources only, not the cost of
implementation of recommendations.413
413 Ibid, pp. Ll-15.
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In addition to programs administered by the EDB, the Trade and
Development Board (TDB) manages incentive programs to assist companies
with international marketing. These programs have particular -ignificance
now as Singapore move aggressively to expand its external economy:
* Approved International Trader Scheme: Tor traders whose Singapore
operations have an annual turnover of at least SS200 million and direct
business cost of at least SS2 million a vear, employing at least three traders
and contributing to the training of international trading expertise. The
enterprises must make use of Singapore's banking, business and ancillary
services and support and make use of Singapore's trade infrastructure
such as the Export Institute of Singapore, trade arbitration services and
futures trading.
Double Tax Deduction Scheme (DTD): Designed to encourage
Singapore traders and manufacturers to increase exports ot Singapore-
made products. Allows deduction of twice the expense of activities related
to eligible overseas trade promotion activities.
* Market Development Assistance Scheme (MDAS): Cash grant
program to encourage export promotion and market development
projects. Available to manufacturers, traders, and service companies. Open
to all Singapore registered companies, 30% local equity requirement,
limited to Singapore-made goods or services, promotion activity must not
be related to purchases by affiliated companies overseas.
Pioneer Status Scheme for Countertrade: Limited to countertrade
services companies to encourage development of that sector. A separate
company must be formed to engage only in countertrade activity. The
company should have established links, commit to a certain volume of
trade and employ an agreed number of specialists. At least one leg of each
trade must be routed through Singapore. Tull tax exemption for the first
five years on countertrade profits. Tax holiday may be extended by the TDB
after the first five years.
* Approve Oil Trader Scheme tATOS): Concessionary tax program to
encourage promotion of Singapore as an oil trading center. Annual
turnover requirement of USS100 million and direct business spending in
Singapore of at least S$500 million per vear. Must employ at least three
experienced oil trading professionals and be an established company with
a good track record in the international market. 414
414 tbid, pp. 15-17.
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Results of Incentive Programs and Restructuring Impetus
It is not surprising that with such a variety of incentive programs that
offer such attractive terms, Singapore has been so successful in attracting
investment, promoting its exports and expanding its role as a regional and
global "hub city." The results of the incentive programs are impressive. The
services sector, as of the end of 1991, had generated SS44b million in Total
Business Spending (TBS). Fixed asset values stood at SS991 million. TBS had
more than doubled ?ince 19S9 when it stood at SS200 million. 11
"
The
Overseas Headquarters Program (OHQ) program was verv successful. More
than 35 companies (excluding financial companies) qualified and -pent more
than SSbOO million in L991.416 Following the success of the OHQ's were
logistics services and information technology services. In 1991 TBS by
companies promoted bv the EDB under the logistics services program stood at
SS80 million, an increase of S$15 million over 1990. Singapore's technical an
engineering services sector made inroads into regional markets, concluding
contracts worth some SSI billion in 1990. Government estimates project an
additional SS45 billion investment in environmental control infrastructure




Local initiative programs were flourishing, as well. The SIFS, renamed
the Local Enterprise Finance Scheme (LEFS), disbursed over SS353 million in
loans to 1,130 local enterprises and the SFTAS program SS10.3 million in
grants to 439 projects in 1991. The pool of available venture capital for local
"^Ministry t Information and the Arts (Singapore) Singapore, Facts and Pictures l () 92,
I Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1992), p.3S.
4i6Ibid, p. 38.
417 lbid, pp. 38-3"
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companies stood at over SS2 billion in the same vear and more than 100 local
firms had received financial assistance through the fund. lls
In the area of upgrading the production stock and automating industry,
government programs received a similarly strong response. From LQSQ-LQQl
34b companies took advantage of the ALS program. Loans valued at SS283
million were recorded with 54^7 of the loans (comprising some 30% of the
amount financed) going to small and medium enterprises (SME's). Average
project ^ize had increased from SS7U000 in L989 to SSI, 187,000 in 1991. The
government also established the Institute of Manufacturing Technology
(IMT) to spearhead efforts in industrial automation and process technology,
to be established at Nanvane Technological University. The International
Federation of Robotics reported that Singapore had reached second place
behind Japan in terms of robot density as compared to workforce. (Singapore
had 5 robots per 1,000 workers and the Japanese 20 per thousand).419
In financial services Singapore showed similar results. In 1991 the
Singapore Foreign Exchange Market consolidated somewhat, with an average
dailv turnover of US$74 billion, down from the 1990 average of USS83 billion
but still above the 1989 average of SUS b2 billion. Financial futures, traded on
the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) include eleven types
of futures contracts. Trading volume on the SIMEX grew from 1,579 contracts
in 1984 to 24,175 contracts in 1991. The banking industry included some 134
banks, 35 with full licenses of which 13 were locally incorporated. Fourteen
operated with restricted licenses and 85 with offshore licenses, altogether
there were a total of 43b bank offices in Singapore at the end of 1991. Domestic
41s Ibid, p. 30.
419 Ibid, p.p. 3°-40.
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banking assets/ liabilities at the end of 1991 totaled over S$136 billion. At the
end of 199 1, 136 insurance companies were operating in Singapore in all
phases of the industry. In 1991 total premiums written bv general insurers
stood at SSI, 843.2 million. Domestic business represented 33'" of the total.
The Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES), at the end of 1991, listed some L83
companies with a total market capitalization of over SS94 billion.420
Excellence in Services, Southeast Asia's "Hub City"
Singapore continues to be a trade giant among Southeast Asian nations.
In L992 non-oil domestic exports grew bv I3. oc
"
(-, ending the year with a
whopping 46 <7c increase in December. For the '.ear, Singapore- total trade
volume climbed 5.4°< to SS230 billion. The strong performance was led by
brisk exports of computer disc drives (Singapore is the world's largest
producer of computer disc drives421 ) and other electronic and computer
products to the US and the EC countries as those economies began to struggle
out of recession. 422
The success of Singapore in developing itself into the primary "strategic
node'* of Southeast Asia is highlighted bv some pertinent facts. The port of
Singapore remained the worlds busiest container port in 199 1 and since l QSb
has been the world's busiest port in terms of tonnage handled. Singapore
Airlines was rated bv Conde Nast Traveler as the world's best airline.
Glittering Changi Airport won its fourth successive title as 'World's Best
Airport', based on an international poll commissioned bv the British
420 Thid, pp. 56-59.
'- 1 \sia 1993 Yearbook. (Hong Kong: Far East Economic Review, 1993), p. 201.
i22
"Trade Development Board on l qa2 trade Volume," Hir Straits rimes, February 2, \°° 3, p.
36. Published in IBIS East Asia Daily Report, 1 ebruary 5, L993, p. 34.
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magazine Business Traveler. Singapore retained the top spot in two BERI
labor force ranking measures, the Labor Force Evaluation Measure and the
quality of Workforce Measure, outdistancing second place Switzerland in
both cases. BERI ranked Singapore as the third most creditworthy country in
the world. In a survey conducted by Merrill Lynch, covering e>7 major banks
in 15 countries, Singapore banks took the top three spots among the world's
strongest banks in terms of capital strength. The Overseas-Chinese Banking
Corporation was rated first, the Development Bank of Singapore second and
the United Overseas Bank third. A survey by japan's Nihon Keizai Shimbiw
journal cited Singapore as the most promising location tor investment by US
and European companies. Respondents highlighted infrastructure,
educational standards and the quality of Singapore's workforce. 423
Building the External Economy
In the 1990s perhaps the most prevalent trend in Singapore in the push
for Singaporeans to move offshore and develop a strong external economy.
Lee Kuan Yew warned that Singapore would become a "failed XIE" if its
people were satisfied with success at home and did not venture abroad to
build an external economy. Lee warned that Singapore was already being left
behind by South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, which were rapidly
internationalizing and that the other ASEAN states were rapidly catching up
as well.424 In February, Finance Minister Richard Hu announced a new
package of incentives to encourage Singaporean investors to take part in
"^^ Ministry of Information and the Arts (Singapore) Singapore, Facts and Pictures 1992,
(Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1992), pp. 1Q0-1 Q 1.
"^^"Lee Kuan \ew Urges Building External Economy," TJte Singapore Sunday Times
,
January
3, 1993, Published m FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 5, 1993, p. 35.
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"risky but highly profitable" ventures abroad, particularly in Singapore's
neighbors. Hu announced a unilateral tax credit on overseas dividend
income and a program of double tax deductions tor expenses incurred in
developing overseas investments and promoting the export of services. Hu
stated, "the government will on its part do whatever is possible to encourage,
facilitate, and be a partner of an outward economic expansion."42 '
Singapore's efforts are beginning to bear fruit. Perhaps the centerpiece of
the effort to expand overseas while concentrating on regional neighbors is the
Growth Trianiile" established with Malaysia and Indonesia m the southern
Malaysian state of Johor, Singapore and the Indonesian Riau islands. The
Minister ot Trade and Industry reiterated Singaporean commitments to the
scheme in August of 1993. In late -1993 the Bantam Industrial Tark had some
23 factory buildings employing lb, 000 workers. 42t> Singapore also maintained
significant investment activity in Malaysia. In 1992 Singapore had 1S4
approved projects worth MS442 million, up in number from the 1991 figure
of 10S but down sharply in total dollars from the 1991 figure of MSI billion.
Two thirds of the projects were located in Johor. There was concern in
Malaysia that a drop in investment was a signal that Singapore had
"forgotten" Malaysia in favor of the cheaper labor markets in China and
Vietnam. A rise in first quarter investments in 19^3 was somewhat
reassuring to Malaysian authorities, who noted that Singaporean investment
was increasingly coming from small and medium sized companies. Although
it can be expected that Singaporeans will seek out new opportunities in China
425"-ran,e t Overseas Business Expansion." Hong koti$ AFP, F :ebruarv 27. L993, Published in
FB1S East Asia i to'Iy Report, March I. L993, p. 44.
'^''"Minister Reaffirms Commitment to growth triangle," Die Straits Times . lulv 31, l^u 3, p.
27, Published in FB1S East Asia Daily Report, August 2, L993, p. 35.
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and Vietnam, ihev should maintain a significant presence in Malaysia, for
political as well as economic reasons. A recent survev by the singaporean
Mnnuiacturer^ Associated indicated that a third of the 323 polled companies
had factories in Malaysia.42
"
Singaporeans were active in t nina, setting up a joint venture computer
firm and winning bids for a major property development in Shanghai, in
partnership with a Hong Kong firm. Major projects were also announced in
Vietnam. '-following Goh Chok Tong's China trip in May L993, a SS300
million joint venture "mini-city" project with a group of Thai businessmen
ivas announced. The project, to be located in Shandong, also involved
developing port facilities and a power plant. 12 " At the end of 1QQ 2
Singaporean investment in China stood at only SS1.6 billion.
A Straits Times editorial in the wake of Mr. Goh's China trip highlighted
the opportunities for Singaporeans in the rapidly expanding Chinese
economv, given the government's strong push for the development of the
external economv and the cultural and language ties of Singaporeans with
China. The editorial urged Singaporeans to catch up with their Taiwanese
and Hong Kong counterparts in the opening Chinese market. 4 >° Two of the
big local banks, the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) and
Overseas Union Bank (OUB) have been given the green light by the Chinese
42/
"Investments in Malaysia Rise in First Quarter," Business rimes (Singapore), May 24, l OQ 3,
p. I, Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, May 26, 1 Q°", p. 33.
42SSee "Computer Firm to Open Factorv in PRC Province, Business Times (Singapore), April 7,
1993, p.2 and. "Firm Wins Land Development Protects in PRC, SRV," The Straits Times, Apni 8,
1993, Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, April Q
, 1993, p. 34.
"•^Mary Kwang, "S'pore plans S300m mini-citv in bhandong," Die Straits Times Weekly
Edition, 'May i, 1993, p. 1.
4
3
°"S 'pore's edge in China ventures," Tlie Straits Times Weekly Edition, May i, l OQ 3, p. 14.
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government to expand Chinese operations.431 The government, in June L993,
announced the incorporation of an investment company, China-Singapore
International Pte. Ltd. to ^eek and develop investment opportunities with
partners from Hong Kong. ' -
Athough Singapore clearly has advantages in competeting tor Chinese
investments, not the least of which being Goh Keng Swee's Peking
connections, Ihe political ramifications in Southeast Asia will probably
exercise a degree of restraint. The widespread use of Hong Kong based
partners may be an effort to blunt such potential criticism. How well this will
hold up alter L997 is an open question. Singaporean, "encouragement" of
immigration from Hong Kong mav be connected to this effort to tread
carefully and circuitously into the Asian giant. The "Third China" rhetoric
could be easily adapted to the China Inc." rhetoric.
Singapore's Economic Vision for the Future
Employment
In April of 1993 Goh Chok Tong outlined four strategies to help
Singapore tackle the problem of low-skilled workers losing their jobs and
taking advantage of the challenges of an increasingly competitive world. He
cited the following points in Singapore's attack on the problem: 1) Investing
in education; 2) Immigration of talent; 3) Giving Singaporeans a ^take in the
country, and; 4) Programs to help poor Singaporeans raise their standards of
4ji Banks Lxpand Operations in China," Hie Straits Times. Nfav 13, 1 QQ 3. p. 36, Published in
FB1S Fust Asia Daily Report, Mav 14, L993, p. 41.
"2-(
.owrnment Incorporates Firm for PR( Investment," Business n"mes,(Singapore) June 3,
1993. p. 36, Published in I BIS I OSt Asia Daily Report, lune 8, L993, p. 32.
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living and upgrade themselves.433 Programs to encourage smaller families
among low income parents and to assist these families in providing a good
home environment and access to education were announced. Goh
highlighted the utility of allowing skilled entrepreneurs from countries like
India and Hong Kong to operate in Singapore, as this would create jobs for
Singaporean workers. Home ownership and ownership of Singapore
industries such as Singapore Telcom, available to Singapore citizens through
their CPF funds, were highlighted as a wav for citizens to get a personal stake
in growth. Goh urged Singaporeans to upgrade their skills so that thev would
be qualified for the jobs of the twentv-first centurv. He cited these tvpes of
educational efforts as essential to stem the growing disparity in income
between the earnings of the top 20% of earners and those in the bottom
20%. 434
Singapore's Economic Plan for the Nezu Century
In his National Dav message, the Prime Minister outlined the reasons
for Singapore's success, their strategies for the future and what was to be
learned from the mistakes of the West. With growth for 1993 projected at
7.5% to 8%, an improvement over the performance of 1992, Goh cited three
factors for Singapore's good performance. First, regional prosperitv and
Singapore's participation in it. Citing schemes like the growth triangle, Goh
highlighted the fact that one third of Singapore's investments in
manufacturing were going to Malavsia. He also outlined the expansion of
investment in Indonesia, into Bintan and the Karimun Islands. The Chinese
4:>0
"Goh Outlines Four Employment Strategies," Tlie Straits Times, August 16, 1 QQ 3, p.l,
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Revert, August 18, l«a3, p. 28.
434 Ibid, p. 29.
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connection and the position of Singaporean businessmen to take advantage
of those opportunities received attention. Singaporean efforts in entering the
Indian market and encouraging Indian businesses to utilize Singapore as a
base tor expansion into Southeast Asia were also outlined. Second, the efforts
of Singapore to stav competitive were detailed. Despite rising costs, Singapore
was rated bv the World Economic Forum as the most competitive among 15
newlv industrialized economies. The upgrading of worker skill, political
stability of the country, efficient administration and quality of the
infrastructure had enabled Singapore to offset rising labor costs, rhirdlv, Goh
maintained, Singapore had proven itself nimble enough to seek out and take
advantage of new opportunities. This enabled Singapore to prosper even
when its main markets were experiencing economic downturns.435
Goh urged Singaporeans to learn from the plight of the western
industrialized world. As their industries found themselves increasingly
uncompetitive, with jobs shipped overseas to developing countries, the west
had to go through a painful restructuring process to adapt to the global
economv. Citing the high unemplovment and slow growth in the west, Goh
remarked that the political pressure in these nations had resulted in social
and welfare programs and subsidies for uncompetitive industries, cushioning
the impact of the realities of the marketplace and inhibiting needed changes.
Over time, Goh said, "these policies became millstones around the necks of
the taxpayers." Lastly, with the exception of Japan, chronic budget deficits had
taken from these governments the tool of using fiscal policy to combat
economic downturns.
4
->5"Goh National Day Message Stresses Economic Vision,"" The Straits Times. August °. 1993,
p.27, Published in FB/S East isia Daily Report, August 10, 1993, p. 38-40.
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Goh compared Singapore's position in 1993 to where the western world
was in the early 1970s. With double dieit growth behind them and settling
into a phase of single digit mature growth, Goh posed the rhetorical question
of how Singapore would avoid the economic problems of the west. His
answer to this question gives one a clear perspective on Singapore's economic
trajectory and vision tor the future:
We have avoided mam" of the West's structural problems: We have a
budget surplus, we shun welfareism, we emphasize education and
vocational training, we promote flexible wages. We do not practise
fractious adversarial politics. We do not allow populist pressures to
prevent us from taking rational, hard decisions.. .nor do we have musical
chair governments.
The future belongs to countries whose people make the most
productive use oi information, knowledge and technology. These are the
kev factors for success, not natural resources. To stay ahead we must keep
on improving our skills, knowledge and productivity. Onlv then can
Singaporeans enjoy high and rising living standards. Hence our heavy
investments in education and in the productivity movement.
Let us learn from other peoples' experiences, and be resolute and far-
sighted in tackling the challenges ahead. Onlv in this way will we avoid
the problems of the developed countries and continue to succeed in the
next phase of our development. 136
D. Diplomacy
Singapore's diplomacy has not vet entered a post-Lee Kuan Yew era. The
Senior Minister continues to exert enormous influence on Singapore's
foreign policy. Prime Minister Goh stated as much on January 13, 1991:
My priority over the next few years is domestic politics, not
international politics. So on international matters, Mr. Lee has quite a bit
of influence on me over the coming years.437
43
»Ibid, p. 40.
437 Op. at. in Bilveer Singh, Whither PAP's Dow inn nee..., p. 22.
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Prime Minister Goh has assumed the mantle of leadership in carrying
out official state visits while Lee has become the free asrent in foreign affairs.
Relieved of the responsibilities of heading the government. Lee has assumed
the role of Senior Statesman for Singapore. Emboldened bv the success
Singapore has achieved, Lee is an outspoken advocate for his own brand of
rationalism, cultivating; a role as a senior statesman for Southeast Asia as
well. Nezoszveek magazine commented that while Lee';? iron listed brand of
democracv remains controversial ... he is widelv considered Asia's wisest
statesman'.435 With the gift for rhetoric undiminished, Lee is both respected
and reviled for his straight-forward and blunt comments, solicited and
unsolicited, on world and regional affairs.
Two tools are useful for examining Singapore's recent foreign policy.
The first is a "mock Baedeker'' constructed in 1984 bv Lee biographer
(unauthorized), James Minchin, of the "printable factors" that influence Lee's
choice of overseas trips:
1. Access to special knowledge or classified intelligence and those MPs
who possess it. Reinforcement of Lee's views on genetics, medicine, etc. is
a bonus, although experts can sometimes be annoyingly reluctant to
confirm his interpretation of their data and theories.
2. Facilities to map out the several chessboards on which Singapore
plays, to analyse a nation's or bloc's prospects and project scenarios.
3. A potential beach-head for Singapore - militarv training; acquiring
needed resources of technology software and hardware, personnel
including guest workers and professionals, raw materials, know-how,
markets, trading partners or investment targets; lining up alliances or UN
votes; provoking a third partv bv visiting a second.
4. Demand for a consultancy, (increasingly prevalent since Lee's
"retirement ").
1 ,s
"'-'inv>,apore, Can Uncle sam bounce back?" (interview with l.ee Kuan Yew) U.S. News and
World Report, December 21, 1 QQ2, pp. 74-75.
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5. A platform to purvey hard truths, more in sorrow than anger, either
directly to the people/nation concerned or via another audience.' "
Secondly, these characteristics must then be viewed within the venue in
which thev operate. Returning again to \. Ganesan's definition of
Singapore s "foreign policy terrain" is appropriate. Ganesan maintains that
Singapore's foreign policy is made within a terrain, which "constitutes a ^et oi
imperatives or constraints that implicitly or explicitly are fostered into the
decision- making process." 1- 40 The four constraints that Ganesan highlights for
Singapore are: 1) Vulnerability and the sovereignty principle; 2) demography;
3) strategic location and; 4) resource base, or the lack oi it. ] M
As a small nation, Singapore must be constantly aware of its
vulnerability with regard to its larger regional neitrhbors and threats to the
region from without. As such, Singapore will do its utmost to maintain a
strong military capability and cordial relations with the great military powers,
particularly the United States. Singapore's foreign policy line has always
rested on a bedrock of supporting the sovereignty of small nations and
opposing actions which violate the "Sovereignty principle." This was the
central organizing principle in the opposition to the Vietnamese actions in
Cambodia. Their vocal opposition to the United States invasion of Grenada
in the United Nations is another example of this which demonstrates this
principle despite the generally pro-western bias of Singapore's foreign
policy.442 Demographics dictates that Singapore must be sensitive to the
439Minchin, p. 15.
4
^'N. Ganesan, p. e>7.
441 Ibid, p. 68.
442Singapore's permanent representative to the UN stated before the Security Council that
Singapore could not condone the actions of their friends [the US] "consistent with the stand
which we have taken in other cases where the principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of states was also violated." see N. Ganesan, p. 72.
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views of the Islamic nations and the foreign polio" initiatives of its regional
neighbors. Singapore will be careful to maintain its regional identity and not
become identified as a Chinese outpost in Southeast Asia. The strategic
location of Singapore dictates a policv that acquiesces to the fact that the
region can never isolate itself from the currents ot geo-poiitics. Thus, while
ASEAX might advocate a zone of neutrality, Singapore has always argued for
a policv that involved a balance of power in the region rather than exclusion
of the great powers and continues to do ^o. Exclusion is viewed as impractical
given the :-trategic imperatives that the geographv of the region dictate.
Finally, Singapore's dearth of natural resources dictates a policv that separates
trade from politics. Dependent on open world markets to obtain the resources
required for survival and to market its products and services to pay for those
resources, Singapore cannot burn bridges over ideological issues. Diplomatic
niceties will never be allowed to exert significant influence over Singapore's
trade relations.
With the previous tools in mind, it becomes apparent that Singapore's
policv will be biased toward efforts which minimize the negative impact of
the constraints imposed bv its foreign policv terrain. Singapore's foreign
policv has strongly regional roots, with relationships with its immediate
neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, at the top of the agenda. As an adjunct to
regional relations with the two Mala\ -Muslim giants, Singapore has paid
increasing attention to the development of cordial relations with Brunei.
Singapore and Brunei share many interests bv virtue of size and vulnerability
in a region of larger neighbors and Brunei's oil resources have certainly
played a part in Singapore's calculations.
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Moving outward, the ASEAN group probably represents the next
priority. Solidarity with the membership of this grouping provides a weighty
voice in world affairs as well as minimizing the possibility of interference in
Singapore's internal affairs on the part of regional neighbors. As has
previously been alluded to, Singapore is often the odd man out in ASEAN, by
virtue of its more advanced economy and more global view. The group's
consensus management style, however, has enabled ASEAN to successfully
"agree to disagree'' for the past twentv-six years. 443 Singapore's ASEAN
connections are extremely important for the maintenance of its regional
image and providing a forum to discuss regional disagreements.
Apart from its regional neighbors, Singapore's strategic outlook
necessitates attention to more global actors. The United States is clearly, to
Singapore, the most important of the world's great powers. This relationship
has become even more important since the beginnings of stronger military
ties with the US initiated in 1990. The United States is Singapore's largest
investor and export market. Japan probably ranks second, internationally,
behind the US. The Japanese are the second largest investor in Singapore and
the growing political role of the Japanese in Asia is seen as something that
needs to be carefully monitored. Almost on a par with Japan is the rising
giant, China. This relatively new priority is due to China's huge economic
potential and the uncertainty concerning the strategic picture as the Chinese
acquire more significant military capabilities. Ethnic and cultural affinity and
44oFor an excellent discussion of this phenomenon in the economic sphere see Bilson Kurus,
"Agreeing to Disagree: The Political Realitv of ASEAN Economic Cooperation," Asian Affairs,
Vol. 20 No. 1, Spring L993.
329
Ihe effect of these on Singapore's regional image figure prominently in this
relationship.
Ties with Commonwealth nations are still important to Singapore. This
has much to do with common traditions, language and some iies, such as the
Five Powers Defence Arrangement, which still remain in place. Manv
Singaporeans still study overseas in Commonwealth countries. As Australia
attempts to identify itself as a more Asian nation, Lies with Singapore may be
expected to expand. Singapore has attempted to maintain good relations with
Arab oil producers and the Indian Ocean Basin countries such as India,
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The non-aligned movement, with which
Singapore initially identified itself, is seen as increasingly irrelevant.
Priorities in Singapore's Foreign Relations
Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei
Singapore's relationship with its northern and southern neighbors are
critical for reasons which should be evident given the stormy historical legacy
of confrontation, merger and separation. The "growth triangle" economic
development scheme is a perfect metaphor for the relationship between these
three nations. The relationship is very triangular in nature, with Singapore
attempting to maintain a balance between the two Malay-Islamic nations,
while doing its best to prevent an alignment of the two.
The growth triangle itself is seen by some observers as more political
than economic. Under the triangular arrangement, Malaysian criticism of
shifting of Singaporean investment south and expanding lie^ with the
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Indonesians can be blunted bv the multilateral "partnership" arrangement.444
The Singapore/ Malaysia relationship has a tendency to wax and wane and
has much more emotional volatility than that with Indonesia. A shift in
Singaporean emphasis in favor of the latter seems evident in the early
nineties.
Malaysia is vitally important to Singapore bv virtue of Singapore's
dependence on Malaysian water resources, need for Malaysian labor and the
perceived military threat from across the causewav. Still, Singapore is most
assertive of its independence from Malaysia. This assertiveness and the
necessity to judiciouslv guard Singapore's territorial integrity, makes the
bilateral relationship with Malaysia the most difficult to manage. The
Malaysians were initially enthusiastic about the prospects of dealing with a
government headed bv a new generation of leaders, bereft of the emotional
baggage of merger and separation. Dr. Mahathir commented that, "it will be
easier for Singapore and Malaysia to work together now that a new
generation of post-Independence leaders are in charge of Singapore."443
The hopes of Mahathir mav be simply rhetorical. Continuing difficulties
with Malaysia were highlighted in 19Q when the Malaysians suspended
scheduled military exercises after tensions between the two were sharpened
over a possible spying incident. In late 1989 the arrest in Malaysia of nine
alleged spies (including five members of the Malaysian military, two defense
ministry personnel and two Singaporeans) accused of selling secrets to an
444Tim Huxlev, "Singapore and Malavsia: A Precarious Balance?," 77^ Pacific Review, Vol. 4.
No. 3, 1991, p. 209.
445 77je Straits Times, January 14, 1991, Gp, cit. in Bilveer Singh, Whither PAP's Dominance.../'
p. 2o.
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ASEAN country (presumably Singapore) caused a serious rift between the
two.446
In earlv LQQ0, following Singapore's agreement with Jakarta tor the use of
training facilities in Indonesia, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister made a
public statement which dismissed allegations that the bilateral relationship
with Singapore had hit a low point. The statement insisted that the closer
bilateral military ties between Singapore and Indonesia represented no threat
to Malaysia. This statement was made after a public statement by Indonesia's
Ambassador to Malaysia indicated relationships with Kuala Lumpur were
facing seyeral problems. Among these were suspicions of the improvement
in the Singapore-Indonesian relations and expanding military ties. 447
By 1992 relations with Malaysian had cooled sufficiently to allow
bilateral military exercises to resume. The relationship remained somewhat
thorny, with continuing difficulties oyer conflicting claims to Pedra Blanca
island, the only unresolved territorial conflict on Singapore's foreign policy
agenda. Pedra Blanca, and one other small islet, located 35 km from
Singapore, halfway between Johor and the Indonesian island of Bintan, are
claimed by both Singapore and Malaysia. Although both parties have agreed
to settle the dispute by diplomatic means, the negotiations have dragged on
without resolution for more than ten years. Singapore bases it claims to the
island on its maintenance of the island's lighthouse for more than 150 years.
The threat of a difficult incident oxer the Malaysian claim was only narrowly
in 1992 avoided when a group of Malaysian opposition Parti Islam youth
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group was unable to find anyone willing to provide them passage to the
island. 14S
in February ! qu:> the Malaysian Chief of Defence Forces, General Tan Sri
Yaacob Zain. announced the formation of a joint Singaporean-Malaysian
committee to look into wax 1- of strengthening military ties, noting that in
recent years the tendency had been for the two to drift apart. With the
Malavsian Navv preparing to leave its Woodlands base in Singapore, the final
direct link between the two will be coming to an end. General Yaacob
indicated a desire to expand both the -cope and frequency oi bilateral exercises.
He mentioned both naval and air exercise- and pointedly omitted any
mention of bilateral ground exercises. 44^
Mahathir's aggressive promotion of the East Asian Economic Gaucus
(EGAG), excluding the United States, prescribed to counter insular trade blocs
elsewhere certainly places Singapore in an uncomfortable position between
ASEAN and its largest investor/ export market. Singapore's pledge to
conditionally support the ECAC was based on three provisos: 1) that it be
consistent with GATT guidelines; 2) that it not adversarialv affect APEC, a
grouping which it views as having wider scope and coverage and; 3) that it
not undermine the solidarity of the ASEAN six, expected to be the core of
such a group. 4 ^° The opening of the APEC secretariat in Singapore on
February 12, 1993 is an visible indication of Singapore's commitment to
44S Malavsia, Tangled Ties." Pacific Reverter, Vol. 5. No. 4 November 1Q92, p. 23.
44y
"Military to Strengthen Ties with Malaysia," text of broadcast by Singapore Broadcasting
Corporation, 1 100 GMT February 3. 1993, published m FB1S. East Asia Daily Report, February
5, 1993. p. 33.
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globalism in its trade policies. Singapore was elected by the 1992 APEC
ministerial meeting to host the secretariat for three years. 451
Mahathir's vocal opposition to the APEC group and his refusal to attend
the Seattle summit must somewhat rankle Singapore's leadership. Nor does
Mahathir's bluster and demeanor as the spokesman tor the interests of the
"south" sit particularly well with President Suharto of Indonesia. 4 " 2 The
ASEAN brokered solution ot making the ECAC a subcaucus within APEC,
while still linking it to the ASEAN economic ministers meetings, represents
the influence oi Indonesia. 4 - 3 This also is an indication oi an increasing
confluence of Singaporean - Indonesian international policy, at the expense ot
Malaysia. With the ASEAX states struggling toward the development oi an
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the cross causeway rhetoric between
Singapore and .Malaysia has begun to heat up as well. The Malaysian
members of the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry have accused
Singapore of serving as a dumping ground for imports in the region. They
argued that non-ASEAN products enter Singapore, because of its free-port
status, and are then relabeled as originating in Singapore. These products
thereby gain preferential ASEAN access. Constructing an AFTA regime on a
si\-minus-two basis, eliminating Singapore and Brunei, was one solution
that was proposed to eliminate such practices.454 Such rhetoric is certainly
unwelcome in Singapore.
4:>iTe\t of a broadcast by the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, 1400 GMT February 12, lOQ 3,
published in FB1S, East Asia Daily Report, February 17, 1QQ 3, p. ^2.
432William Case, "Malaysia in L992," Asian Survey, Vol. XXX1I1, No. 2. February, l oc>3, p.
L93.
I
^'APEC's Prestige ( -rows, but Questions Remain About Proper Role oi the West," Asian Wall
Street Journal Weekly, August 2, ] QQ 3, p. 1.
1
' '"Discuss Dumping in AFTA Market," Business Times (Singapore;, July i°, 1993, p. 3,
published in IBIS, Last Asia Daily Report, July 20 1993, p. 1.
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Other indicators point toward a shift in Singaporean policy toward more
importance in the Indonesian ties compared to those with Malaysia.
Singapore has recently concluded agreements with Indonesia to deyelop
water resources in Sumatra for supplying Singapore, decreasing its
dependence on the resources in Johor.455 The Asian Defence journal noted
the following in the early stages of water deyelopment negotiations in 1990:
...Singapore's search for new water supplies can easily be
misinterpreted in neighboring Malaysia, traditionally a major source of
water, because of their sensitive relationship, diplomats said. Join talks on
Singapore's water needs began [with Malaysia] in 1982, when both sides
agreed to develop new water resources in Malaysia's southernmost State
of Johor that would serve Singapore and Johor. ! 56
B.G. Lee maintained that the Indonesian water initiatives were necessary
because Johor had not agreed to build more dams. He also noted that buying
from more countries would also help Singapore develop links with
neighbors and give them an interest in Singapore's security.
^
7
Singapore was effusive in its praise of the reelection of Suharto in March
1993. The New Order government was praised for its stability, contributions
to sustained economic growth and lone-range thinking. The election of
General Try Sutrisno as Vice President was also been as a positive
development. With a clear second in command established in Sutrisno, the
possibility of political infighting was viewed as minimal, all the faction heads
having attested to his fitness for the office. This would ensure an era of
""^"Development Accords Signed With Indonesia," Text of a broadcast bv the Singapore
Broadcasting Corporation, 1 100 GMT January 29, 1993, published in FBIS, East Asia Daily
Report, February 02, 1993, p. 36.
"^"Indonesia Mav Ease Singapore Water Crisis," Asian Defence Journal, May 1990, p. 113.
457 Ibid. n. 113.
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"stable change."45* The General was viewed in Singapore as the best possible
succession candidate, cementing civil-military relations and assuaging
military anxieties as the Suharto era comes to an end. General Try's regional
contacts, established during his vears as the head of the ABRI, were viewed as
"help[ing] to further strengthen Indonesia's ties with Singapore and other
ASEAX partners, firming up the long-term prospects for regional stability.459
The General, prior to stepping down from his position as Indonesian
Commander-in-chief, paid a farewell visit to Singapore, meeting with both
the Prime Minister and Singapore's Minister of Defence. 400
In Singapore, it would seem, a strong authoritarian regime such as
Indonesia's is viewed as a reliable partner which is a predictable entity in
regional affairs. In the future, expectations of a further lilt toward Indonesia
mav not be misplaced.
Singapore has also been paving more attention to its bilateral links with
Brunei. Bilveer Singh comments on the rationale behind this relationship
between the secular, predominantly Ghinese Singaporeans and the Islamic
Monarchy in Brunei:
Despite sociological difference, both Singapore and Brunei share an
almost common geopolitical and geo-strategic environment. Both exist in
Southeast Asia and are therefore subjected to the political vagaries of the
region. Singapore and Bandar Seri Begwan are very much concerned and
influenced bv developments and policies of their two proximate
neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia. This largely explains the growing
strategic alignment between the two small states. The convergence of their
45s
"Suharto and Stability," The Straits Times, March lo, 1^3, p. 42, published in FBIS. East
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geopolitical and geostrategic outlooks has been so great that it overcame
the ethnic divide of the two societies. 461
Brunei is the onlv ASEAN ^tate whose military officers, of all branches,
are trained in Singapore. Brunei's pilots are also trained bv the RSAF. Brunei
grants training facilities to Singapore and the SAF has a permanent training
camp and its own jungle Warfare School there. The two conduct numerous
bilateral exercises and Singapore has supported the inclusion oi Brunei in the
Five Powers Defence Arrangement. Both share difficulties with Malaysia.
Brunei, like Singapore, has an ongoing territorial dispute with Malaysia over
Limbang, which divides Brunei into two enclaves linked bv a narrow bridge.
Lee Kuan Yew has maintained a close relationship with the Sultan of Brunei.
Following the departure of the British Hong Kong based Gurkha defense
forces from Brunei in 1997, the relationship mav assume even more
importance for Brunei. 462 Further reflecting the similar outlook of the two
small Southeast Asian nations is the action ot Brunei concerning the
presence of United States forces in the region. Brunei has also signed a
Memorandum of Understanding to facilitate expanded access for the US
military to the Sultanate. 463
Lee Kuan Yew visited Brunei in April 19Q 3 and stressed the
opportunities for Singapore as Brunei's economv became more sophisticated.
Lee stated the desire of Singapore to work with Brunei "as equals and that is
the basis on which we will have an enduring relationship." Lee commented
on the Sultan's request for assistance in setting up an investment agency and
461
"Yulnerable Allies: Singapore-Brunei Defence Bilateralism," Asian Defence Journal, Mav
1902, p. 12.
4o2 Ibid, p. 13.
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"Regional U.S. Military Presence Supported,'" Hong Kong AFP, April 30, 1 QQ2. Published in
FB1S East Asia Daily Report, Mav 4, 1992, p. 14.
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his agreement to foster such efforts. This assistance included, but was not
limited to, cooperation with the Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), the
investment arm of the Singapore government.464
Close lies with oil rich Brunei has obvious advantages for Singapore.
Aside from the military training facilities Brunei offers, there is the
diversification of energy supply resources that the relationship involves. As a
large energy importer, this bilateral tie is very productive for assuring reliable
oil supplies in an uncertain world. Huxley, in his somewhat alarmist
examination of possible conflict scenarios vis-a-vis Singapore and Malaysia,
deduces that Brunei might align itself with Singapore in such an instance,
allowing its territory to be used for the opening of a second front' in East
Malaysia.465 While this projection is admittedly very speculative, as indeed is
the entire premise of a Singaporean-Malavsian armed conflict, the growing
closeness between Singapore and Brunei is a digit that cannot escape the
strategic calculations of Malaysian military planners. In their policy of
demonstrating such strength that military solutions to bilateral problems
between Singapore and Malaysia are too costlv to consider, the Singaporeans
have made significant inroads in strengthening their ties with Brunei.
ASEAN and Southeast Asia Regionalism
Identification with Southeast Asia is a critical part of Singapore's foreign
policy. Goh Chock Tong reiterated this policy recently in an interview with a
German business newspaper held in Singapore:
464 Lee Kuan Yew Views Brunei Economy, Hnds Visit," Hie Straits Times, April 23, ! OQ 3.
Published in FBIS East \sia Daily Report, April 26, 1 QQ3, p. 4°.
l65Huxley, "Singapore and Malaysia: " pp. 209-210.
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We are very clear in our minds that geographically, politically, and
socially we belong to Southeast Asia and we have to be Southeast Asian
first,
[f Singaporeans don't understand that, and think that because we are
Chinese we can identify with the People's Republic o\ China when
Southeast Asian interests are threatened, that will spell trouble tor us. 4 "°
ASEAX hat provided a valuable forum since 1967 for the consolidation
of Southeast Asian interests. During the period when the region was
fractured into the non-communist ASEAX states and the communist
Indochinese nations. \SEAN provided a political bulwark of umtv which
was of immeasurable value to the membership in getting on with the
business of post-colonial development. While constituted as a grouping to
enhance economic, cultural and social interaction, ASEAN's most significant
accomplishments have come in the political sphere. Their pivotal role in the
resolution of the Cambodian is perhaps the apex achievement of the
organization. With the demise of the \ ietnamese threat, however, manv
observers are beginning to question the continuing viability of the ASEAN
group. These suspicions are well placed. ASEAX's record in the area of
economic cooperation is poor at best and dismal at worst.
Current initiatives at establishing an ASEAX Free Trade Area (AFTA)
have not progressed well. At the Julv 1993 ASEAX Ministers Conference
security issues dominated the agenda, with the announcement of the plans to
develop a new forum to discuss securitv issues, the ASEAX Regional Forum
(ARF). The international excitement with regard to this change of ASEAN's
long-standing policy of relegating securitv issues to venues outside ASEAX
overshadowed the lack of progress on AFTA. In typically nebulous ASEAX
4b6
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339
language the press communique confined its remarks to "a desire to see the
smooth and swift implementation of AFTA."46" The question of whether the
political leaders of ASEAN have reached the point of being able to sufficiently
close the gap between what they want and what thev are willing to accept and
implement in pursuing ASEAN's -tated economic cooperation objectives is
one that has yet to be answered with any certainty. Some thoughtful
observers conclude that AFTA is likelv to go the wav of earlier cooperative
efforts due to political incapacity.468 In a uniquely ASEAX statement of the
difficulties, Bilson Kurus quotes a recent statement , % f Malavsian
International Trade and Industry Minister Datuk Rafidah Aziz, "Tel it not be
-aid of ASEAX that the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak. "* |V) Time will
tell. Based on its track record Srnee 1%7, "weak flesh" may triumph once
again.
The newly announced ASEAN Regional Forum seems a logical venue
to pursue multilateral security discussions. The Forum, however, should not
be expected to progress much beyond discussion for some years to come. One
should expect it to retain the core characteristics of the ASEAX organization
which spawned it. This minimalist consensus shie which results in "lowest
common denominator" solutions, should not be expected to produce results
which significantly enhance multilateral military cooperation. Singapore
remains wary of multilateral arrangements for security. Prior to the July
meetings, a Singaporean defense expert, commenting on US enthusiasm for
multilateralism in Asia is reported to have remarked:
t67Michael Vatikiotis, "Uncharted Waters," PEER. August ?, l aQ T p. 11.
l6SBilson Kurus, p. 38.
469 Ibid, p. 38.
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The US is now pushing this policy for the wrong reasons, it will be a
wav for them to reduce their forces and allow regional states to take the
!ead...Thev could also use the forum to push other issues like trade and
human rights. '- °
The \RP is likely to become a venue tor diplomacy rather than
substantive military cooperation, which will remain largely confined to
bilateral ties, rhis suits Singaporean concerns far belter than a real
multilateral arrangement which would impinge on its bedrock principles of
sovereignty. Singapore's Ambassador at large and former Embassador to the
United States had the following comments following the announcement
concerning \R1\ nade perhaps to blunt expectations of rapid movement
toward security cooperation in Southeast Asia:
The Asian preference, unlike the Western preference, is to take a very
non-legalistic approach to things. We take actions step by step and allow
things to evoke, rather than sit down and say, ..' priori, we want to create
an institution, this is our charter, this is our mission statement. 17 '
As Southeast Asia moves toward the new century, ASEAN seems to
have increasingly less relevance. Singapore will remain committed to the
"ASEAN spirit" of unity and filter its policy initiatives through the principles
upon which the organization is based. The psychological advantages of
ASEAX are not to be underestimated. The group, while falling short of many
of its stated objectives, has succeeded in establishing a regional identity in an
area of disparate interests. The success of ASEAX is in providing a sense of
connectedness and minimizing the possibility of regional misunderstanding.
This function should continue undiminished. The resolution, however
470Michael Vatikiotis, Toreine Stronger Links," FEER, April 2°, L993, p. 26.
~i/ i Op. Cit. in Steven Holmes. "U.S. is Seeking New Trade and Security Links With Asian
Nations," The New York Times, August 16, 1993, p. A3.
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superficially, of the controversy concerning the ECAC, is an example of the
utility that ASEAN -till retains.
Despite the prerogatives of ASEAN membership, Singapore, and
particularly Lee Kuan \ew, is not above making statements that mav generate
a significant amount of controversy. One pointed example of the Senior
Minister's penchant for "purveying hard truths" is a 1992 speech Lee made in
Manila. In what the Far Last Economic Review called "a rare example of
Asean statesman publicly expressing divergent views'' Lee devoted part of his
-peech to the need for more discipline in the Philippines rather than more
democracy:
Contrary to what American political commentators say, 1 do not
believe that democracy necessarily leads to development I believe that
what a country needs to develop is discipline more than democracy. The
exuberance of democracy leads to undisciplined and disorderly conditions
which are inimical to development. A7 ~
While Lee's remarks sparked predictable public outrage in the
Philippines, which had suffered mightily under the Marcos regime, many in
the Philippines thought Lee had hit the mark all too accurately. In a FEER
editorial one unnamed former Philippine cabinet officer was quoted as
saving, "If you ask me formally I would sav I was outraged. Put if you do not
use my name I would tell vou we are all saying of course he is exactly
right."473
In 1993 Philippine President Ramos paid a state visit to Singapore to
cement bilateral ties between the two, announcing that many of the
privatization goals of his government had been realized and offering
l72
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evidence that the new policies of his government had opened opportunities
for Singaporean investment in the Philippines. He stated that the Philippines
had much to learn from Singapore's experience and at the same time
Singapore had much to offer in terms of opportunities to boost economic
expansion. 474
The Thai Prime Minister, Mr. Chuan Likphai, also visited Singapore in
1993 where he met with both the Prime Minister and Lee Kuan Yew. The
Thai PM Mated that Singapore and Thailand could both compete and
cooperate for mutual benefit. The large delegation of Thai businessmen
which accompanied the Prime Minister highlighted the desires of the
respective business communities to Team up." Prime Minister Goh called on
Thailand to lead the wav in the realization of AFTA bv cutting tariffs more
quicklv. Goh also thanked the Thai government for providing training for
Singaporean troops. The Thai Prime Minister praised Singapore's efforts to
expand investment in Indochina and endorsed Prime .Minister Goh's
initiative to pursue expansion of the "growth triangle" concept to encompass
more partners.475 In Julv 1993 Singapore posted a trade officer to P>angkok,
opening a Trade Development Board (TDB) there. The Bangkok office was the
twenty-fifth in Singapore's overseas network and reflects the higher profile
accorded to bilateral relations. Total trade between the two nations more than
doubled from 1987 and 1992 and Thailand took sixth place as a market for
Singapore's non-oil exports. 476
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All these trends in ASEAN with regard to Singapore point to more
bilateral cooperation and less emphasis on the ASEAN forum. Singapore, bv
virtue of its more advanced economy and different comparative advantages
is moving to exploit its service skills to prosper from regional development.
While Bangkok mav still entertain visions of becoming the "hub city" of
continental Southeast Asia, Singapore is bv no means willing to concede that
position. With its desire to be the center of commerce and finance in all of
Southeast Asia undiminished, Singapore can be expected to follow policies
that support such a goal, vet with attention to regional sensitivities. The
ASEAN format does not offer the advantages of bilateral ties for establishing
mutually beneficial relationships. This is due mainly to manner in which
bilateral arrangements might affect other ASEAX states.
Indochina and Myanma
r
Singapore has jumped into the emergent Vietnamese market
enthusiastically. The formal investment ban on Vietnam and Cambodia was
lifted following the developments of late 1991 when the Supreme National
Council of Cambodia occupied Cambodia's seat in the UN and Prince
Sihanouk returned to Pnom Penh.477 Singapore opened its embassy in Hanoi
in September 1992. This was followed in March 1993 bv the establishment of a
consulate in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). Singapore has become
Vietnam's largest trading partner in the last few years with 1992 two-way
trade totaling SSI. 7 billion. 478 Singapore Telcom, the giant government-
"
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linked telecommunications corporation, has established commercial
agreements for joint development projects in Vietnam. ' "
Singapore businessmen are also involved in numerous infrastructure
development projects in Vietnam. United Land and Trading (ULT)
announced a USSbOO million project for the development of up market'
housing units near Ho Chi Minh city, with attendant parks and recreational
complexes to be located near developing industrial estates. The project is
designed to serve the needs of foreign businessmen in a Singapore-like
-citing near Ho "hi Minh Citv. LET was incorporated in 1Q73 by ten
Singaporean companies and individuals for the specific purpose of
penetrating the Vietnamese market.4* Singapore and Vietnam also signed
an environmental cooperation agreement in Mav 1993. The accord included
training agreements and Singaporean pledges to assist the Vietnamese with
the development of legislation and institutional frameworks to manage and
control the environment. In the statement announcing the agreement, a
letter of intent between a Singapore Environmental Engineering firm was
announced to explore joint ventures for commercial opportunities in
environmental monitoring, assessment and control. !sl
Statistics released in the first quarter of 1993 indicate that approximately
three-quarters of Singapore's trade with Indochina was with Vietnam. The
first quarter figure of S$683.5 million for the aggregate trade with Indochina
represented a 5% increase from the last quarter of 1992. This trend of
4/
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expanding trade can be expected to continue in the near term if the political
trends continue to stabilize in Indochina. With no ideological encumbrances
to inhibit them, Singaporeans can be expected to aggressively pursue
economic opportunities in these nations. A concomitant level of political
attention should be expected as well.
Even pariah ^tate Mvanmar sought Singaporean assistance in opening its
economy. A 22 member Mvanmar ministerial delegation, led bv Lieutenant
General Khin of Lhe ruline State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC), visited Singapore in mid- 1993 -eeking development assistance.
General Khin was received bv the Prime Minister, Senior Minister Lee Kuan
Yew and Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. Lhe Singapore Foreign
Ministry announced that Singapore would help Mvanmar open up its
economy and work towards a representative government. In its statement,
the Ministry said it hoped that economic development would enable
Mvanmar to make orderly progress towards an open government and
economy. This would enable Mvanmar to rejoin the regional community - and
thereby contribute to stability.482
The United State*
Of Singapore's relations with the extra regional powers, the relationship
with the United States is clearly the most important. This is bv reason of
economics and geo-strategic view.
The United States is the largest foreign investor in Singapore. Singapore
is the only Southeast Asian country where investment from the United
^"Ministry: Government to Help Burma Open Economy," The Straits Times, \lav 29, 1°°"*. p.
3. Published in FB1S East Asia Daily Report, fune 4, L993, p. 3.
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States still outstrips that of Japan. Twenty-three percent of Singapore's exports
go to the United States and onlv 8.6 percent to Japan.4S3 Investment by US
companies in Singapore soared in l q92 to SS1.2 billion, a 24°e increase from
the previous year. Japanese investment also rose 18%, to SS843.5 million, but
Japanese cumulative investment lags far behind that of US companies.4S4
Singapore has been vocal in its preference for American investment over
Japanese. American companies are viewed as offering better opportunities
than Japanese, with more Singaporeans advancing to management roles.4 - 5
There is little question that Singapore has been the most vocal and most
practically supportive of the United States maintaining ils military presence
in Southeast Asia. The statements of Singapore's leaders, in a variety of
forums, make it abundantly clear that they consider the US presence vital to
the stability and continuing progress of Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific as
a whole. Tee Kuan Yew expressed Singapore's geo-strategic views clearly in a
recent address, quoted here from a Straits Times report :
If they [the US] pack up, then all the ancient suspicions and animosities
between Japan and China, Japan and Korea, Korea and China, and the
fears of ASEAN for China and Japan will shift focus from the positive
which we have achieved to defence and security which is a zero ^um
game. 486
Tee outlined what he saw as the possible outcomes of such a situation, a
merger of Japan and China or takeover of one bv the other:
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and World Report, December 21, 1992, pp. 74-75.
4S6
"Minister Urges U.S. To Maintain Asian Presence," Tile Straits Times, May 16, 1 Q93.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, May 18, lOQ 3, p. IS.
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In other words a colossus so biii that the US, and for that matter
Europe, will not be able to balance its weight. [Lee went on to argue that
the best way forward was for the United States to take advantage of the fact
that it was the most trusted in the Pacific] That is an asset not to be thrown
away.4 - 7
Singapore's strategic location plays prominently in the growing military
relationship between the two countries. This will be explored more fully in
the following section on defense. Diplomatically, Singapore brooked a
significant amount of regional scrutiny oyer its expansion of access to
Singapore for US military units. The initial Memorandum of Understanding
for such access was signed shortly before the succession of Goh Chock Tong,
by Lee Kuan Yew and then Vice President Dan Quavle on November 13,
1990. 4 - In January of 1992, President Bush visited Singapore and announced
that the United States and Singapore had reached agreement on terms for the
transfer of the Naval Logistics Command (CTF-73) from Subic Bay to
Singapore in 1993. The President committed himself to engagement in the
Asia-Pacific area and stated that the United States was "unalterably opposed to
isolationism.
-
' President Bush thanked the Singaporeans for their "far-sighted
approach to the security requirements of a new era."489
Malaysia reacted by stating that it would keep a close watch on US plans.
The Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Abdullah Fadzil, indicated that Malaysia
and its ASEAN partners would oppose any move to set up an American




°°For an excellent discussion of Singapore's rationale behind its initiative see Bilveer Singh,
" \mencan Military Facilities in Singapore: Enhancing The Creation of Zone ot Peace, Freedom
and Regional Security," Asian Defence Journal, January, 1991, pp. lo-l Q .|v '
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zone of peace freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN). He elucidated that
Singapore was aware of regional sensitivities and expressed confidence thai
Singapore would not deviate from the provisions of the 1990 MOU which
allowed US ships to use its facilities for repairs.490
The diplomatic talk of "'playing nice'" demonstrated by the Malaysian
government and invoking the ZOPFAN concept was a soft-pedal on what
was clearly Singapore's final abandonment of the principles that the ZOPFAN
declaration represents. Faced with the closure of the US Philippine bases and
a situation similar to the British withdrawal East of Suez, Singapore "put its
money where its mouth i^.'*" M Indeed, Bilveer Singh, a lecturer at the
University of Singapore and Singapore's most prolific writer on defense
issues, published an extensive piece in the influential Asian Defence Journal
(published in Kuala Lumpur) which called strongly for the abandonment of
the impractical and unrealized ZOPFAN in favor of a Zone of Peace, Freedom
and Regional Security (ZOPFARS). The article explained Singapore's
rationale behind the decision to host limited US military facilities and argued
persuasively that regional realists should rethink the concept of the Zone in
light of two factors:
1. The external great powers cannot be wished away due to their
regional interests, on the one hand, and due to their power interests on
the other.
2. Many states in the region see the presence of external great powers as
the minimal necessary condition for their national security. Thus no
matter how often affirmative ZOPFAN declarations are made, they are
meaningless as they do not sincerely represent the security requirements
and responses of the different states of the region. It remains a Utopia.
4y0Ibid, p. 22177.
491 Bilveer Singh, "American Military Facilities in...," p. i Q .
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While all states aspire for peace and freedom, the neutrality element has
been divisive and has made the ZOPFAN concept an unreaiisible ideal. 492
Singapore will clearlv exercise its sovereign right to do what it thinks is
necessary to guarantee its security, regardless of regional opinions concerning
the arrangements it makes. The presence of US forces works to the advantage
of both partners and its less parochial nature, compared to the more client-
patron oriented relationship in the Philippines, is more appropriate for the
new era of Asian assertiveness. While Singapore may be somewhat less
compliant and patronizing than the Filipinos once were, their very
independence bodes well for a relationship based on shared interests. This
should minimize Asian accusations of "hegemonic" designs on the part of
the United States. If Singapore has gained nothing else in Asia in the past
twenty-eight years, it has certainly gained the respect of its neighbors for being
an independent player which acts in its own interests without yielding to
pressure from extra-regional patrons. The United States has obtained a
valuable partner, not a client, in its new arrangements with Singapore.
Politically, Singapore seems somewhat less sanguine about the new
administration in Washington. Clinton election rhetoric aroused
Singaporean suspicions concerning the tack the new administration would be
taking on both security and economic issues. Just after Mr. Clinton's
inauguration the Straits Times ran an editorial entitled "Looking Past
Clintonism" that outlined three hopes concerning the new US President:
Hope No. 1 is that Mr. Clinton disabuses everyone of the notion that
he is flakey [sic], and given too readily to bending to populism. His flip-
flop on tax policv even before assuming office has been unnerving. Early
intimations of a weak will? During the campaign, an inclination to say
492Ibid, p. 1 Q .
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different things to please different audiences when a position was
supposed to be immutable will now be scrutinised by all nations for clues
to his moral resolve and intellectual integrity.
Hope Xo. 2 centers on his oft-criticised propensity to duck foreign
issues as being troublesome and distracting to his stated mission of putting
America right first ... how quickly lie exercises world leadership in these
far from comforting times will shape post-Cold War permutations.
Hope Xo. 3 is that he does not make a hash of the China policy. Ex-
China envoy Winston Lord. ..is said to be hawkish about applying pressure
on the Chinese to extract compliance with democratic ideals, such as more
humane treatment of political dissidents... .it gets harder to define how the
Clinton Administration would reconcile idealism with the cold facts of
geopolitical and economic change.493
On this last point Lee Kuan Yew categorically stated that a strong push
tor human rights and democracy would be "the greatest error that could be
made. You're not troine to change either China or Indonesia or any of these
old countries overnight."494
Clinton's economic plan and deficit reducing measures were generally
well received in Singapore. Clinton was viewed as exercising considerable
political courage in the measures he proposed to address the structural
difficulties inherited from his predecessors. The political costs of such
initiatives, including defense cuts and unpopular tax hikes, however, were
viewed as endangering Mr. Clinton's electoral base. His ability to ^ell the
American people on the necessity of such measures was seen as the linchpin
of the Clinton program. 495 While there are significant philosophical
differences in the world-view of Singapore and the United States, particularly
with regard to issues of democracy and human rights, common economic and
493
"Looking Past Clintonism," The Straits Times, January 22, 1993. Published in FBIS East Asia
Daily Report, January 2?, 1QQ 3, p. 54.
494
"Push tor democracy in Asia by Clinton would be a big mistake - SM," Tlie Straits rimes
Weekly Overseas Edition, fanuary 24, 1 Q93, p. 3.
4y5
"So Americans Must Pitch In." The Straits Times. February 22, 1993. Published in EB1S East
Asia Daily Report, February 22, 1 QQ3, p. 41.
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security viewpoints provide a measure oi confluence which should spell for
productive relations as the new century approaches.
japan
Singapore's poiicv with regard to japan is rather schizophrenic. The
legacy of the occupation has not died in Singapore. However, it is difficult to
distinguish genuine apprehension in Singapore concerning rising Japanese
influence from the convenient use of the World War II club to beat the
Japanese over the head. It seems that in manv instances Singapore uses this
tool to force concessions from Japan bv appealing to Japanese guilt. In this, the
Singaporeans have clearly shown a masterful hand, although one can debate
how much thev have gained through buch tactics. The ubiquitous Mr. Lee has
frequently chastised the Japanese for not following the German example of
"being frank and open about the atrocities and horrors committed" in the
war. Lee made the above comments in a speech before a conference of
Japanese business leaders in Kyoto, adding that because the Japanese have
failed to educate their young people concerning the behavior of Japanese
forces during the war, "the victims suspect and fear that Japan does not think
these acts were wrong, and that there is no genuine Japanese change of
heart." 496 The new Prime Minister recentlv opened an exhibition of
photographs and other record of the occupation characterizing the period as
one of "terror, fear and atrocities."49
"
Former Prime Minister Mivazawa's Southeast Asian tour in early 1993
drew calls from the Straits Times for a policv which would clarifv Japan's
,l,n \lichael Richardson, "Regional Mistrust Increasing," \sia-Pacific Defence Reporter, Apnl-
Xlav t^Q'2, p. 34.
<lJMbid, p. 34.
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policy for Southeast Asia in two areas, security and economic expansion.
Pointing out that Japan and security was ^ till an unwelcome mix to many
\Man governments, the times echoed Lee's calls for educational changes in
Japanese schools and acknowledgment of atrocities and action on wartime
topics such as the comfort women issue. It called for guarantees that japan
would not fill any security vacuum left by departing US forces and urged the
Japanese to reaffirm their commitment to US forces in Asia, [n the economic
sphere the Times urged action to increase Japanese imports and address the
huge trade surplus with the United States. Highlighting the lack of progress
with regard to its surpluses with the United States, the editorial noted that
japan's Asian trading partners had even less clout to extract concessions and
pointed out that, in non-oil exports, Japan maintained trade surpluses with
all Southeast Asian countries. "It hurts Japan if it is seen in these countries as
being rapacious," the Straits Times editorial concluded. 4MS Mivazawa was
similarly condemned by Singapore's leading Chinese language daily for not
expressing contrition during his trip and sidestepping wartime issues in his
regional speeches. Commenting on Mivazawa's proposal for an international
lorum to map out a development strategy for the reconstruction of
Indochina, the daily cynically indicated that Japan would no doubt reap the
economic gains from such a plan itself.499
Prime Minister Goh visited Japan in May of la93, following meetings in
Singapore with Japan's Trade Minister Mori, during which joint high-tech
training initiatives were discussed. Goh's statements just prior to his
498
"Would Upan Act Mature?," The Straits Times, January lo, 1993. p. 34. Published in FBIS
East Asia Daily Report, January 1°, 1QQ 3, p. 21.
^""Chinese Paper Disappointed With Mivazawa Visit" text of a broadcast by Tokyo Kyodo,
070? GMT. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Summary, January 21, 1QQ3, p. 36.
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departure merit some examination. Just prior to departing for Japan, Goh
expressed his support for Japan's bid for a seat on the UN Security Council, "if
the UN decides lo restructure the Security Council." Goh expressed concern
that Japanese inyestment in Southeast Asia might be diyerted to China and
Vietnam. He also indicated that Singapore would consider joining NAFTA,
announcing that if an imitation was forthcoming, Singapore would seriously
consider it. The Prime Minister indicated that President Bush had eiwisioned
expanding NAFTA to "some Asian countries with good trading records."" 00
While in Japan the Prime Minister deliyered the keynote address at the
Asia Society Conference on Asia's Role in the Chaneine World Order in
Tokyo. In the address Goh called attention to the US-Japan relationship as
crucial to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Goh called on Asian
countries to open their markets to US exports. "It is in Asia's self-interest to
help restore America's economic competitiyeness," Goh stated. His
assessment of Japan's uncertain foreign policy comes through clearly in his
remarks:
No longer is Tokyo willing to simply bankroll US leadership without
due consideration of its distinct national interests and enhanced global
status. At the same time, not all Japanese agree what precisely those
interests entail. Japan's reach and aspiration are global. But they are yague.
They cannot be made clear for a number of reasons. Since the Gulf War,
Japan's leaders have come under external pressure to shoulder a greater
burden for international security in the midst of a domestic controyersy
that has left it with a weakened political leadership. Japan is under further
pressure from the US to redress the economic imbalances at the same time
it is trying to cope with a serious economic recession. In the build up to the
G7 summit, Tokyo - the host - was suddenly confronted with pressures to
-HM'Goh Supports Japan's Bid to loin UN Secuntv Council," text of a broadcast by Tokyo Kyodo,
1215 GMT. Published in FB1S Dot [sia 1 )aily Summary, May 5, l OQ 3, p. 33.
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switch the policv on Russia. The prospect of a nuclear armed North Korea
created another diplomatic crisis. 01
Goh highlighted three major uncertainties in Japan's strategic future: I)
the apparent downgrading of the US-Japan strategic relationship by the
Clinton administration; 2) the emergence of a powerful China and; 3)
difficulties and uncertainty in Russia. Goh called upon Japan to discuss these
uncertainties with Asian nations to define the parameters of Japan's global
involvement to ensure that Japan's new role would be clearly understood
and welcomed. -°-
The advent of a new government in Tokvo seems to have resulted in a
"wait and see" attitude in Singapore. New Japanese Prime Minister
Hosokawa's open expression of remorse and apologv were well received in
Singapore." " Singapore went so far as hosting a group of forty Japanese
teachers to expose them to the horrors of the occupation through interviews
with some Singaporean survivors."' 04 While rhetoric in Japan concerning
electoral reforms to inhibit corruption is also well received in Singapore, the
underlying currents of cynicism remain. Singapore does not expect Japan to
change its ingrained policv of insular protection of its own interests, often
seen to operate at the expense of its neighbors. Where cooperation with the
Japanese will produce tangible benefits for Singapore, the government will
take advantage of such opportunities. While rhetorically the Singaporeans
will continue to oppose unilateral Japanese security initiatives, Japan as a
-^i'The 5tj-i Column, Asia's New World Order," text of Goh's address in Tokvo May 13, lQq3
published in FEER, May 18, \.°°3, p. 2?.
^Ibid, p. 2o.
j>0o"5'pOre welcomes Japanese Apology," The Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, August
29, 1993, p. 5.
-"^"Japanese teachers here to learn about S'pore war-time experience,'' T)te Straits Times
Weekly Oi>erseas Edition, August 29, 19Q3, p. 3
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balancer for the growine capabilities of China, as Ions as it confines its
attention to East Asia, would probably not be unwelcome. In this regard, a
healthy Japan-US security relationship is seen as vital. The ASEAN Regional
Forum may provide .1 useful venue for keeping lines of communication
open concerning Japanese security interests.
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan
Singapore generally views China with 'ess apprehension than do
Western nations and other Asian nations. It is probably not inaccurate to
characterize Singapore's position as viewing Western manipulations with
regard to Chinese "internal affairs" as the most cogent threat to stability in
Asia. Since the resumption of diplomatic relations in I9Q 0, Singapore has
distanced itself from any notion of support for efforts to force reform upon
the Chinese. This is not surprising, given the viewpoints of the PAP with
respect to its own political system. Singapore's counsel to others concerned
with the reformation of the Chinese system would be one of patience and
respect. As the economy opens and Chinese venture overseas to educate their
young people to compete in the global economy, reform is viewed as
something that will take care of itself, albeit slowly and under the control of
the CCP. It is not difficult to envision the CCP attempting to transform itself
into a PAP type organ, as evidenced bv Nicholas D. Kristoff's, (former New-
York Times Beijing correspondent) remarks concerning Beijing's admiration
for the Singapore model." 05
'"^Nicholas D. Kristoff, "China Sees Kev to Future In New Market Leninism." The New York
Times, September o, 1 QCT>, Sect. A. p.l.
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Lee Kuan Yew aroused the ire of some in Hong Kong and the British in
late 1QQ2 over proposed political reforms in Hong Kong. Lee had been invited
to address the University of Hong Kong and in one interview advised Hong
Kongers to back awav from Governor Patten- constitutional reform plans.
Lee was flaved for his remarks bv the British who indicated he had failed to
observe international diplomatic protocol by attacking the Hong Kong
Governor in public and commenting on Hong Kong politics.
>
06
In Singapore, Goh Chock Tong was asked whether Mr. Lee's remarks
alluding to American and British attempts to use reform in Hong Kong as a
lever to induce reform in China reflected the thinking of the Government of
Singapore. Goh, in a display of commendable political acumen, replied that
the Senior minister normally circulates important >peeches to cabinet
members, who give their comments freely. Thus," Goh concluded, the
ministers shared the views expressed."' 07
In the same interview, Goh indicated that he believed that China would
remain stable regardless of who eventually replaced Deng Xiaoping.
Indicating that there was nothing to indicate that Chinese leaders were
maneuvering in a wax that would bring disturbance to China as the Chinese
are "very fearful of disorder or luan' in Chinese." 50 ^ When pressed for his
assessment of whether there was a Western conspiracy to destabilize China
the Prime Minister commented that realitv was not as important as
perception:
'-^""Chinese war games." Asian Recorder, Tanuarv 13-21 1°°3, p. 22854.
->0/
"Premier: Nations Interests 'Firmly' in SE Asia," The Straits Times, January 23, l QQ3.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, January 25, 1993, p. 41.
50SIbid, p.41.
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If the Chinese believe there is a Western conspiracy ... China is going to
create problems over the political reforms of Chris Patten. So whether it is
true or not is irrelevant. It's whether the Chinese believe it to be true.509
Singapore is attempting to maintain functional relationships with all the
"Chinas'' while biasing its public pronouncements toward the interests of the
Beijing government. In the long term, it is apparent that Singapore envisions
a situation where Beijing will be the center of power of the one China which
will eventuallv emerge.
With regard to the China-Taiwan nexus, Singapore, along with the
West views this as a problem to be resolved bv the respective parties and as
such has maintained relationships on both bides ot the Taiwan Straits.
Singapore was careful to negotiate its continuing right to train its military
forces in Taiwan as a part of the agreement to renew diplomatic ties with the
mainland. 310
In an interview with The China Unit's in February of 1993 Lee Kuan
Yew advocated a policy of gradualism, expanding contacts between Taiwan
and the mainland and encouraging bilateral economic and social interaction.
Lee envisioned that such contacts would, in the next ten to twenty vears,
result in the development ot empathy, understanding and a realistic
assessment on the part of the two. Bv Taiwan participating in the economic
development of the mainland a sense of reality would prevail on both sides,
enabling negotiations to move forward without either side losing face. In
response to the potential for mainland China to resort to economic
"blackmail" should Taiwan become too dependent on the Chinese market,
Lee estimated that a 20^, figure tor faiwanese exports would be a figure that
509Ibid. p. 41.
"^"Jottings," Asian Defence Journal, November 1 QQ0, p. 110.
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would not be too dangerous. Ever the promoter, he encouraged Taiwanese to
invest through countries which have investment guarantees with Beijing,
-uch as the ASEAN states, fie stated that the Chinese would not hesitate to
respond to Taiwanese attempts to declare independence with force and that it
was his belief that the United States and Japan would not intervene in such a
circumstance. Growing Chinese military capability was viewed as a foregone
conclusion with the Chinese taking advantage of bargain-basement prices in
the Soviet arms market. The sale of 150 US F-16's to Taiwan was seen as
balancing recent Chinese acquisitions of Russian Su-27's.
When asked if Singapore had been asked to act as a mediator in
negotiations between the PRC and Taiwan, the Senior Minister indicated thev
had not, but he did not rule out such a role in the future, remarking that in
such a case, 'then our position must be completely fair to both sides. In other
words, we cannot support one side against the other during negotiations."" 11
Singapore hosted meetings between China and Taiwan in April 1993
which resulted it little substantial progress between the two sides but were
svmbolicallv important. While Singapore did not plav the role of mediator,
the choice of venue is still significant.
At the same time these negotiations were in progress, Goh Chock Tong
was leading a 27 member Singapore delegation on a Q da\ trip through
mainland China, discussing economic opportunities for Singaporean
investors. Goh met with both President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng.
The Straits Times praised Mr. Goh's trip as a resounding success., building on
previously cultivated connections to help Singapore participate with China as
^"Lee Kuan Yew on Chins-Taiwan Reunification," TJie Straits Times, January 30, 19Q3 p. 3.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Report, February 2, 1QQ 3, p. 36.
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it worked "at being what could be the next century's only new
superpower."" 12
The Chinese connection is still a delicate issue in Southeast Asia and
Singapore must balance its ardor for Chinese ties with its regional identity.
The same editorial that characterized the trip as 'Goh's China triumph," and
waxed effusiyelv on the opportunities ayailable to Singaporean investors
ended on a note of caution:
It should not be oyerlooked that Singapore has an abiding interest in
the economies of Southeast Asia, principally Malaysia and Indonesia. This
is the home turf, the income stream from trade and investment has long
flowed, and security links are firm.' 13
Periplieral Areas of Interest
Among other relationships, the Commonwealth ties of Singapore
remain important, although at a far lower priority than those relationships
previously discussed. The Five Powers Defence Arrangements remain in
place and have actually enjoyed a resurgence recently. Singapore has been
cultivating increased defense ties with Australia, whose vast territory is
useful for training of Singapore's armed forces. Relations with New Zealand
remain cordial as well.
Of interest with respect to Singapore's policy in the Middle East were
statements in the press characterizing Clinton's striking of Iraq, in response to
the revelation of the plot against former President Bush, as "careless."
Singapore strongly supported the US-led coalition effort against Iraq in the
Gulf War, consistent with its policy of opposing the violation of national
?12
"Goh's China triumph," The Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, May I, lqQ3, p. 12.
313 Ibid, p. 12.
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sovereignty bv force of arms. The tomahawk strike against Iraq was criticized
because it: 1) was conducted prior to the firm establishment of Iraqi
government complicity in the plot; 2) Recent experience in strikes to root out
state terrorism (Reagan and Libya) were not particularly encouraging, and; 3)
hitting Iraq while "allowing the Serbs the run of Bosnia as Muslims are being
exterminated and pussyfooting over Israel's infractions against Palestinians
in its occupied territories, the U.S. must concede it cannot rebut accusations of
applying double standards.'"" 14 The same editorial went on to label this last
point "the lament of the Arab league." It cautioned against the alienation of
the moderate Islamic and secular countries of the Middle East, citing that
polarization of the region on religious grounds would work against a
realignment of strategic alliances in the wake of the Cold War. While these
may or may not represent the views of the government, it looks suspiciously
like a convenient way to make hay in relations in both the Middle East and
with its Islamic neighbors at the expense of the United States.
The non-aligned movement, which Singapore once haltingly embraced
has all but disappeared from the foreign policy agenda. Goh traveled to
Jakarta in 1992 to the 10th Non-Aligned summit and delivered an address
that in barelv couched terms questioned the credibility of the entire
movement:
I have no doubt that the credibility and reputation of NAM would be
significantly advanced in line with an increase in the capability for
problem solving... 115
314
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Goh went on to remark that the NAM should concentrate in the future
on working out realistic solutions to outstanding problems without
abandoning the principled positions it takes on many issues such as in the
Middle East and South Africa. Highlighting the lessons from the past when
-ome members tried to high jack" the movement by declaring the former
Soviet Union as its natural ally, Goh urged that the XAM cooperate with the
UN security council in the future "and be ruthlessly impartial in the
future."" 11 "'
E. Defense
With the exception of the new defense agreements for the expanded
access to United States militarv forces to Singapore, defense planning in
Singapore shows very little change in the J Q90's under Goh's leadership. This
is to be expected as Goh held the defense portfolio for quite some time before
assuming the post of Prime Minister. Singapore also boasted one of the
world's longest serving top military officers, Lt. General Winston Choo, who
had served has Singapore's Chief of the General Staff for nineteen years.
General Choo finally stepped down in 1992. The presence, previously
discussed, of an increasine; number of high ranking SAF reservists in the
government also indicates that Singapore's defense policy is not likely to
change much in the future.
Singapore will remain heavily armed and continue to upgrade its
training and equipment to offset the advantages of its regional neighbors in
terms of size. The SAF has identified two critical problems the as the new
century approaches. First, shrinking manpower pools as the national service
516 Ibid, p. 15.
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resource pool is already 30% less than its peak in LQ76- 17 Second there is a lack
of training '-pace as the island nation continues to develop and hands over
land once used tor military training to other uses.' ls A third area of concern
is complacency among younger Singaporeans with regard to security
measures who haye no experience or memory of uncertainties or
vulnerabilities.519
Echoing recent calls in the United States tor military service "jointness"
Singapore's Minster of Defence, Dr. Yeo Xing Hong, recently commented that
by the \ ear 2000, the SAF will be a balanced and highly integrated force. After
two decades of expansion and modernization, the emphasis a ill be on
creating a torce where the Army, Air Force and Navv work as one. Dr. Yeo
indicated that the SAF's punch will come from heavier firepower of smaller-
sized units comprised of better-quality soldiers who will be trained to exhibit
superior initiative and exploit technology to the fullest. ~-° One would expect
the SAF to concentrate it efforts on C3I acquisitions and modernization of its
existing force structure in the near term.
The Defense Budget
Fhe unwavering commitment of Singapore to its defense is evidenced
by the high budgetary priority it places upon defense expenditures. The
Defense budget for 1991 was US$2.13 billion, just over 5% of GDP. 321
^'Ministry of Defence (Singapore) Defence of Singapore 1992-1993, p. 65.
-
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Singapore's defense expenditures ranked third in Southeast Asia both in
absolute terms and in percentage of GDP. ?22 Singapore spent more on defense
than uriant Indonesia's USS1.55 billion and Northern neighbor Malaysia's
USS1.7 billion.-- 3 While the Six percent of GDP cap remains operative in
Singapore's defense budgeting, continued strong economic performance
should enable the SAF to continue to upgrade its capabilities without
significant fiscal encumbrance.
Modernization Programs
The Armv has contracted with GIAT of France for the manufacture and
purchase of its newlv developed FH-88 135mm gun. 2S of these lowed
howitzers have recently" been delivered. The ability of Singapore to
manufacture these weapons indigenously is a significant new capability. 524
Recent reports indicate that the Army" has taken delivery of 22 AMX-10 PAC
Q armored reconnaissance vehicles and 22 AMX-10P APCs.525
The Air Force (RSAF) concluded agreement with the United States to
exercise its option for 11 more F-lb Falcons. The F-lbs will be added to the
seven that Singapore presently operates (one of its original Q F-lbs was lost in
a training accident over the South China Sea in 19Q 1 and another damaged).
RSAF personnel will be deploying to Luke Air Force base in Arizona where
the USAF's S32nd Air Division will be training RSAF crewman.-126 An
522 Chiaravallotti, Joseph R., Southeast Asian perceptions of U.S. Security Policy m Hie Post-
Cold War Era, (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey Ca., 1 QG 3), p. 34.
523 77it' Military Balance 1992-1993, pp. 148 (Indonesia) &155 iMalavsia).
^ ' For more on recent developments in Singapore's arms industries see David Boey, "Singapore
Business Industry built on ambition. Jane's Defence Weekly, February 22, 1 Q92, pp. 2S7-2Q2.
52577ie Military Balance 1992-1993, p. 140.
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upgrade program, similar to that of the A-4 Super Skvhawk program is
planned for Singapore's F-5 aircraft.'- 7 \ir defense systems have been
bolstered bv the replacement of aging Bloodhound missile systems with I-
Havvks. The RSAF announced in 1 Q91 that it is also in the process of
upgrading the I-Hawks and that a number of shoulder launched SAM's
would be purchased for evaluation and trials. v- sThe Air Force has also
acquired Fokker 30 Maritime Enforcer aircraft to shore up its deficiency in
airborne ASW and maritime patrol capabilities. The RSAF presently has
three529 and mav exercise an option for tour more.530 While the operational
capability of these new aircraft is somewhat uncertain, as this is a relatively
new area for the RSAF, the acquisitions do show Singapore's increasing
concern with maritime patrol as a mission.
It is in the area of naval modernization that the most significant changes
have been taking place recently in Singapore. Four of Singapore's six Victory
class Missile Corvettes (MCYs) were built in Singapore. These units continue
to be upgraded with the installation of improved fire control systems for the
OTO-Melara 76/62 Super Rapid Guns and the Barak 1 ship point missile
defense system ongoing.531 It was announced in early 1QQ2 that the RSN had
signed a contract with Kockums of Sweden for four modern mine
countermeasures vessels (MCMYs). The 47 meter craft displaces 3b0 tons and
is based on a Swedish Landsort design. It is permanently equipped for both
mine hunting and mine sweeping. Capable of speeds of 15 knots and
_
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equipped with a 40mm Bofors gun and computerized navigation and
minehunting information systems, the MCMVs represent a significant
addition to Singapore's maritime capabilities. The Landsort design is a state of
the art system that represents \ ears of development cooperation and
extensive research and testing bv the Karslkronavaret AB, KkrY and the
Swedish Navy. The vessel has the capability to act as a control platform for
remote-controlled minesweepers, offshore patrol vessels and anti-submarine
warfare coordination. The MCMVs are made of Glassfibre Reinforced Tlastic
tGRP), using a special sandwich construction method. 332
The project is being carried out bv the Swedish firm in cooperation with
Singapore Technologies Marine Ltd. (STM, formerly Singapore Shipbuilding
and engineering, SSE). One vessel (RSS Bedok) was recently launched in
Sweden. The ship is being outfitted in Sweden and will undergo sea trials
before being delivered to Singapore in early 1994. The remaining three hulls
will be built in Sweden and outfitted in Singapore bv STM .533
STM recently completed upgrading the RSN's six Missile Gunboats
(MGBs), lengthening the superstructures and installing a new prime mast
with noise/ deception jammers and a secondary mast with ESM equipment.
Additionally, four Mk 3b chaff / flare dispensers were installed. Another
development mentioned recently by Singapore's new Navy chief was a new
series of patrol boats to be built bv STM to replace four coastal patrol craft
recently given to the Police Coast Guard. Upgrades will include
^"Kockums MCMVs Ordered," Asian Defence Journal. February 1002, pp. 122-123.
:>oo"pj
rst j\jew Mmehunter Launched in Sweden," Hie Straits limes, June 2o, l QQ 3, p. 2
Published in FB1S East Asia Daily Report, July 2, L993, p. 23.
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improvements in navigation svstems, communications suites, command and
control svstems and a larger naval gun." 34
The navv is addressing the long ignored ASW problem with a training
and development program. The MCYs have been equipped with variable
depth sonar and torpedoes and there is increasing emphasis on ASW in
exercises with nations (e.g. Australia) which can provide realistic training
opportunities. Former Chief of Navy, Commodore Teo Chee Teo commented
on recent efforts in the ASW area:
The RSN has recently acquired an ASW capabilitv with the
commissioning of the MCYs, essential if we are to do the job of protecting
our SLOCs. This is a difficult area of warfare, and we are verv new to it.
Exercising with submarines is also absolutely essential, and during the last
two years we have conducted exercises with the submarines from several
friendly navies... 535
Commodore Teo's successor, Colonel Kwek Siew Jin recently
commented that new naval acquisitions (MCYs, MCMVs and the RSAF
MPAs) would make significant contributions to Singapore's seaward defense
and SLOC protection. He emphasized that one of his priorities in his new
position would be to ensure the development of a "balanced navv."
Expanding, he explained that this means a force that is verv high-tech in
nature and manned by highly trained and motivated people with a full set of
capabilities to meet air, surface and subsurface threats." 36
The infrastructure of the Navv is also being improved. A new naval base
is being built at Tuas in Jurong, to be completed in 1994. The Tuas facility will
53
^"Navy Chief Discusses Creating a Balanced Force," TJie Straits Times, May 5, 1 QQ 3, p.2.
Published in FB1S East Asta Daily Report, May 6, 1993, p. 26.
^-"^Naval Forces Talks to the Chief of the Singapore Navv," Naval Forces, Vol. XII No. 1,
1992, p.13.
53°"Navy Chief Discusses Creating a Balanced Force," The Straits Times, May ?, 1 Q93, p.2.
Published in FB1S East Asia Daily Report, May 6, 1 Q93, p. 26.
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be designed to accommodate the RSN's "cutting ed<re" units, The MCVs and
MCMVs, including repair facilities, supply depots, trainers and
accommodation lor naval personnel." 37
Bilateral and Multilateral Military Cooperation
The Armed Forces of Singapore, as an extension oi the foreign policy of
deterrence and diplomacy, place a high priority on cooperative relationships
with both regional neighbors and extra-regional 'friendly powers." As a small
nation, these relationships are seen as enhancing regional and national
resilience. Singapore maintains bilateral military ties, through various
exercises with all the ASEAN states, (Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Indonesia and Brunei) and extra-regional nations, the United States, the
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand,535 Recent developments in a
few of these relationships bear further scrutiny.
Bilateral military exercises with Malaysia resumed after a two year hiatus
in 1992.539 While bilateral military cooperation between the two will probably
always be limited and subject to the prevailing political winds, this is an
encouraging development. Bilateral exercises have been confined to the air
forces and navies of the two.
Singapore's relationship with Indonesia has flourished recently. Within
weeks of the announcement of that the United States was permanently
leaving Clark Air Base and the Crow Valley instrumented range, Indonesia
and Singapore announced that they would jointly pay for and develop an Air
53
'Guy Toremans, "The Republic of Singapore Navy," Naval Forces, Vol. XII, No. 1, 19Q2, p. 12.
'-^Bilveer Singh, "ASEAN and the New Security Framework in the Asia-Pacific Region,"
Asian Defence Journal, December 1992, pp. lo-19.
"'"Hussin Mutalib, "Singapore in 19Q2," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, February 1993, p.
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Combat Maneuvering Range in eastern Sumatra, for air-to-air combat
training. With a completion date sometime in early 1994, the facility would
greatlv enhance the air combat training of the two countries air forces. The
two have been sharing another site, the Siabu Air Weapons range (for air-to-
ground practice) in Sumatra since 1989. Dr. Yeo, Singapore's Minister of
Defence, stated that use of the new range bv other air forces would be
discussed with Indonesia. 340 Jakarta and Singapore signed an agreement to
combat regional piracy in August 1992 under which the respective navies
would coordinate patrols and give the right of hot pursuit into each other's
territorial waters." ]l In 1990 Singapore and Indonesia set up a Joint Training
Committee (JTC) to guide the development of defense projects between the
two nations. Singapore's Chief of Defence Forces, General Xg Jui Ping,
recently commented on the warm ties that were developing as a result of the
recent bilateral initiatives. Dr. Yeo, Minister of Defence (Singapore) awarded
Indonesian Vice Marshall Rusdv, assistant for general planning to the
Indonesian Armed forces commander, the Meritorious Service Medal for his
"enduring contribution in helping to forge excellent ties between the
Indonesian Armed Forces and the SAF." 542 Somewhat ironically, it was after
the award ceremony, outgoing Malaysian Defence Chief, General Tan Sri
Yaacob Mohamed Zain mooted the similar Joint Training Committee for
Malaysia and Singapore earlier mentioned. 543
-^"Michael Richardson, "Asia adjusts to US-Philippine bases deal," Asia-Pacific Defence
Reporter, September 1991, p. 10.
j4 l"Jakarta, Singapore Reach Landmark Agreement, Asian Defence Journal, September 1992, p.
102.
^•'"Officials Hail joint Exercises With Indonesia," Tiie Straits Times, February 11, 1993.
Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Supplement, February 12 p. 34.
-''""Defense Chief Welcomes Malaysian Joint Committee," Tlie Straits Times, February 11,
1993. Published in FBIS East Asia Daily Supplement, February, 12 p. 33.
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Singapore recently concluded an agreement with Australia to establish a
flying school for RSAF pilots at RAAF Pearce, a base in Western Australia
near Perth. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed in Canberra in
March 1993. The relocation of part of Singapore's Flying Training School
(FTS) to Pearce will alleviate many of the difficulties posed by local airspace
restrictions in Singapore. The professional interaction of the trainees and
instructors of both services was also viewed as a positive benefit of the
move. 344 Australia also announced in May 1993 that it planned to offer use of
its new army training facilities being developed in the Northern Territories to
the SAF. During a visit to Singapore, Australian Chief of Defence Force (CDF),
Admiral Alan Beaumont commented on the increasingly close ties with
Singapore and the mutual benefits of such arrangements. Singapore and
Australia also recently (March 1993) signed a defense science and technology
agreement for increased cooperation in defense research545 . The RSAF and
Singapore Army are permitted to conduct both joint and unilateral training
in Australia. 546
The Australia connection brings up Singapore's (and indeed Southeast
Asia's) only multilateral military arrangement, the FPDA. This
"arrangement" has enjoyed something of a resurgence in the post-Cold War
environment. The FPDA has recently expanded its naval exercises. The yearly
Exercise Starfish' has been broadened to include coordinated operations in
surface warfare, ASW, and anti-air warfare. 547 The FPDA based LADS system
544
"RAAF-RSAF Partnership Gets Stronger," Asian Defence Journal, May 1993, p. 82.
545 Ibid, p. 83.
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"Australia to Offer Air Force New Training Site, Hie Straits Times, May 26, 1993,
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is still the centerpiece of regional air defenses and there has been discussion of
extending the IADS system to cover Eastern Malaysia and including Brunei in
the arrangement.
~
4S To Singapore the main utility of the FPDA is political
and psychological rather than military. It is curious indeed that in its
international promotion booklet, Singapore states that the FPDA, which is
after all a military grouping, is not only an important political and
psychological deterrence [sic] but also provides a real military deterrent
through the LADS..." 49 BG Lee, speaking in 1989 probably highlighted the real
significance the pact once had. Lee remarked that the presence of extra
regional partners who were tied by "other alliances" could not help but
provoke some reaction from these partners allies. 350 In this very thinly veiled
reference to the United States through its ANZUS ties, there is little doubt to
whom he was referring. For Singapore, the utility that the FPDA once had,
the potential to involve the United States in regional security issues, may
now be irrelevant with the signing of the 1990 MOU. Chin Kin Wah, a
lecturer and writer at the National University, had the following remarks
concerning the FPDA:
The FPDA has been unobtrusive but not irrelevant, selectively
revitalized but not expanded. Its durability owes much to its own
flexibility and adaptability. Whether it will go through further renewal or
even expansion will depend on its versatility, relevance and perhaps even
efficacy in a new and more complex setting. 551
While the operational utility of the FPDA may be now largely irrelevant
for Singapore, the value it provides in training opportunities and the utility it
-^See K.U. Menon, "A Six-Power Defence Arrangement in Southeast Asia?," Contemporary
Southeast Asia, Vol. 10, No. 3. December 1988, pp."306 -327,
D^ Singapore Facts and Pictures 1992, p. 114.
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plays in maintaining functional relations with Malaysia through difficult
political periods make it useful enough to be retained and even enhanced.
While of doubtful significance in the event of conflict, the FPDA provides
enough advantages to merit its retention as the new century approaches.
Defense Relationship With the United States
Singapore's strategic location is recognized bv both the United States and
Singapore. The relationship between the two nations is now particularly
germane to US security planners as US forces in Singapore represent the
United States only permanent military presence in Southeast Asia. Since the
closure of Clark and Subic in the Philippines, Singapore has become a more
critical link it the resupplv and support of the US Indian Ocean base at Diego
Garcia. That facility was critical in the execution of both the Desert
Shield/ Storm operation and recent relief efforts in East Africa. Potential
conflicts involving Singapore would certainly involve the United States
diplomatically and perhaps militarily, to bring an end to any confrontation
that might endanger American lives and property or interfere with US forces
operating from Singapore.
The U.S. Navy exercises yearly with the RSN in the 'Merlion' series. The
USAF also conducts exercises with the RSAF. As noted previously, many
RSAF F-16 pilots are trained in the United States. The vast majority of
Singapore's arms imports come from the United States. From 1987-1991
Singapore's total arms imports were valued at $US 1.276 billion. Of that total,
US$1,031 billion, or over 80% came from the United States. This not only
results in significant economic benefit for US defense industries, but also has
armed Singapore with equipment which is interoperable with that of the
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United States. Writing of the acquisition of the E-2C Hawkeves, one analyst
commented:
...the acquisition of these aircraft would have been partly intended to
indicate that Singapore was a reliable friend of the United States, and was
willing to take up a share of the burden of regional defence."2
Still the Singaporeans are not shy about acquiring technology from other
sources. When denied software codes for a new electronic (EW) warfare
system it had planned on purchasing from Litton Systems by the United
States, the RSAF opted to buy an Israeli manufactured Elisra package. 353
In moving to the strategy of "places not bases" as described by the
Commander of U.S. Pacific forces, Admiral Charles R. Larson,554 Singapore
has become a key "place." Singapore's very forthcoming approach, as
exemplified in the 1990 MOU and the Bush-Goh agreement in 1992 has
encouraged similar, if less extensive support agreements from neighbors
Malaysia and Indonesia. Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur announced that US Navy
Ships would be permitted access to repair facilities at Surabaya and Lumut
respectively. 555 Singapore has been at the forefront of lobbying efforts to keep
the United States engaged militarily in the region since the end of the Cold
War.
The Memorandum of Understanding of 1990 and the Goh-Bush
agreement of 1992 between the two nations provides for expanded access to
Naval facilities and for repair and maintenance of US Navy vessels in
Singapore. The MOU provides for the stationing of the Naval Logistics
j52Derek Da Cunha. "Major Asian Powers and the Development of the Singaporean and
Maiavsian Armed Forces," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 13, No, 1, June 1991, p. o2.
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as Depot," Asian Defence Journal, December 1992, pp. 112-113.
373
Command (CTF-73) in Singapore and a small number of permanent Air
Force Personnel to support aircraft movements. While the numbers are
small, the precedent of visible support for the United States military is
significant.
Dr. Yeo, described the context and intent of the agreement:
Over the past decades, the presence of the US militarv has contributed
to regional peace and stabilitv. The ASEAN countries have built upon this
regional stabilitv, resulting in significant economic progress. A U S
withdrawal from the region will leave a vacuum. Regional powers, such
as China, Japan and India will move to fill this vacuum and jockev for
influence or dominance. This makes for a more unstable and contentious
region, diminishing investment potential to global multinationals.
Economic progress is ASEAN will be affected... Such an agreement [the
MOU] was made based on the longstanding policy of access to Singapore
Facilities for friendly countries like the US which contribute towards the
securitv of the region. 556
Singapore, perhaps more than any other regional country views with
extreme discomfort any indication of US militarv disengagement in
Southeast Asia. A further sampling of recent official statements is revealing.
From a ministry of Defence Publication, in which an entire page, separately
titled, "US presence in the region 1 is included;
Singapore believes the presence of benign friendly powers such as the
United States has been important to the region. That is why we have
expressed our support for US presence in the region and we also provide
the US militarv access to our facilities in Singapore.
A Februarv 1993 interview by Seoul-based KBS-1 Korean television of
Prime Minister Goh Chock Tong:
We should help the United States carry on its role in the Asia-Pacific
region. We should increase imports from the United States. If we increase
buying from the United States and provide reasons warranting
investment, the United States will take an interest in protecting its
"°"An exclusive interview with Dr. Yeo...,p.o.
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markets in this region... Therefore, we ought to provide the United States
with a reason for it to maintain its troops here. 55
'
And finally, lest anyone think that the party line of the 'successor
generation'' represents a departure from "old guard" PAP thinking, Lee Kuan
Yew, purveying ^ome "hard truths" in a recent interview with Nayanda
Chan in the Asian Wall Street Journal:
If, over the next 10 vears, America does not drive a substantial stake in
the industrialization and prosperity of East Asia, including ASEAX,
there's bound to be a swing in public opinion on America. It's not the job
of America to maintain the stability and security of the Pacific for the
benefit of Japan and the Asian nations...We must keep cur markets open
for the Americans. If we don't do that we are stupid. The Americans have
opened their markets... and allowed us to develop. It is in our interest to
open our markets to America and make sure that the American
manufacturing and their service sector find markets here. There must be
economic benefits for the American (Security) role.558
Military Strengths and Weaknesses
Strengths
The strengths of Singapore's defense establishment have their roots in
the strength of the political will of the PAP government. This, coupled with
the buoyant economic performance of the economy, which is projected to
grow at least 6% yearly through 1994, 559 will give SAF planners ample
resources to carry out their programs. The overwhelming air superiority the
SAF possesses regionally, particularly with its Hawkeye early warning aircraft,
would give Singapore the ability to gain control of the air rapidly in the case
,D
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of regional conflict. As the British learned in World War II, control of the air
can quicklv translate to control of the sea. The acquisitions of MPA aircraft,
MCVs and MCMVs have enhanced Singapore's seaward defenses vis-a-vis its
regional neighbors and would make it difficult to quarantine the Republic.
The defense relationship Singapore has cultivated with the United States
certainlv represents a strong commitment to regional defense against the rise
of potential hegemons. The other bilateral relationships that Singapore
maintains, and, specifically strengthening ties with Indonesia, are particular
strengths in Singapore's recent policy initiatives. These bilateral ties and the
FPDA assist in training in peacetime and help minimize the chance of
regional conflict. The political weight Singapore carries in ASEAN as well as
the indispensable niche it is carving out for itself in the regional and global
economy also serve to minimize the chances that a potential aggressor would
attempt to influence or change Singapore's political order bv force of arms.
The strong commitment of the nation to develop an significant defense
industrv is a notable strength. This would enable Singapore to continue to
operate militarilv in the face of difficult regional and international political
circumstances.
Weaknesses
There is, as previously discussed, growing dissatisfaction with the
domineering rule of the PAP government. This extends to defense policy,
where there has been growing criticism of conscription, as this delavs voung
men from entering the private economy. There is no indication that the end
of the conscription is being considered nor should one expect such
consideration. As the middle class grows, the political capacity of the PAP to
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continuallv sell the need for the "garrison state" mentality in the absence of a
tangible threat will come increasingly into question. Singaporeans, like
Americans, want their peace diyidend. Size of the defense forces remains a
question that SAF planners must deal with. Earlier efforts at population
control were more successful than anticipated and the shrinking manpower
pool is a real concern. This coupled with expanding opportunities in the
private sector and better educational levels, further exacerbates the problem.
Ironically, the solution to shrinking manpower pools, more reliance on
technological improvements, creates one problem as it addresses another.
The military faces a "brain drain" as it attempts to retain highly trained
officers and noncoms. These elements, who form the core of a mainly
conscript force, have in many cases received extensive training and have
skills that are much in demand in the private sector. The problem is
particularly acute in the Navy and Air Force, which have fewer conscripts
and require more extensive technical skill.
As always, communal political issues remain. The furor o f
discrimination with regard to Malays in the SAF must still be resolved. The
relationship with Malaysia will continue to be cyclical and fraught with
potential dangers, more from mistake than design. The main question for
Singapore to address in the post-Cold War era is whether the internal
pressure to ease the requirements of the "rugged society" will push leadership
toward policies which will weaken the resolve so evident for the past twenty-
eight years. Given the record of the PAP, such an outcome is unlikely. Should
the PAP's power erode to the point where a real opposition emerges as an
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active part of Singapore's political life, however, such a consequence is not
entirely impossible.
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VII. The National Interests of Singapore and the United States
A. Introduction
As a new century approaches, one that manv have already labeled the
"Pacific Century,", Singapore and the United States both face the challenges of
a new and uncertain age. Yoichi Funabashi has argued that the coming years
will witness the "Asianization of Asia." His assessment is that Asia's dynamic
growth, emerging middle class, gradual democratization, ^elf-help discipline,
open regionalism, belf-confidence and healthy optimism can all be positive
factors in shaping the new world order. "b0 Funabashi goes on to stress that
Asia should not delude itself that it can develop solely in regional terms but
rather concentrate on building a truly interdependent world, particularly an
Asia-Pacific community which includes the United States.
The terms that Funabashi describes certainly apply to Singapore. Perhaps
more than any other Asian nation, Singapore has an interest in the
development of an Asia-Pacific community which includes the United States.
In much the same way, with the robust development in East and Southeast
Asia and the economic opportunities there, Singapore provides the United
States with a small but influential potential partner with which to access
these emerging markets. With a similar geostrategic outlook, Singapore's
strong support for the maintenance of a continued United States military
presence in Asia offers many benefits for the United States. The United States
has much to gain by cultivating cordial and productive relations in
Singapore.
560Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. /2, No. 5,
November/ December, 1993, p. 84.
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The relationship of Singapore and the United States is perhaps at the
forefront larger challenges faced bv United States policy-makers with regard to
the rising power of Asia. Economically vibrant Singapore has provided its
citizens with remarkable gains in their standard of living. At the same time,
political openness, assumed bv some to be a logical consequence of prosperity,
has been resisted. Still, Cicero's maxim that the good of the people is the chief
law appears to be equallv applicable to the leaders of the Republic of Singapore
and the leaders in the United States. The difference, it seems, is that in
Singapore the people are viewed in the aggregate and in the United States
thev are viewed more individually . This same contrast is true more broad lv
throughout Asia. The question to be answered as the new centurv approaches
is whether these different viewpoints, which, after all, are directed toward a
similar goal, will stand in the way of productive and mutually beneficial
relationships.
It is entirely appropriate for a nation to stand for a particular set of
principles. Indeed, a nation would be lost without them. When it comes time
to measure accounts, however, it is how these principles are applied and
whether thev contribute to the good of the people that is the true measure of
the success or failure of a government. Singapore and the United States have
adopted very different principles in organizing their societies but both have
achieved success in serving the good of the people. The principles upon
which a nation bases its values and organizes it society are deeply rooted in
the birth experiences which lead to nationhood. The principles of
individualism, freedom, and minimal government influence in the lives of
citizens are entirely appropriate for a nation than was born on a vast and
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empty continent. The United States required a tough breed of individualists
who would strike out on their own to build a nation. Likewise, the principles
of tightly organized and controlled group effort, attention to a strict set of
commonly held iioals and behavioral norms, and sacrifice for the common
good are entirely appropriate for a nation that was born in a small, restricted,
heavily populated urban space. Devoid of resources, ethnically diverse and
vulnerable to influence from its sometimes hostile neighbors, Singapore's
principles were a completely rational response to the challenges they face.
No system of government is perfect and all have their contradictions.
Neither are successful governments static entities. Those who remain so and
fail to address the contradictions that thev contain, do so in violation of
Cicero's maxim and eventually find their way onto history's scrapheap. The
United States faces the contradictions of an increasingly urban society where
the rights of the individual are being challenged in the name of either the
common good or the special needs of one group or another. There are more
and more calls to address the special need of particularistic groups, based on
racial, gender, and even sexual preference lines. In Singapore, rising affluence
and better education have resulted in challenges to the maxims of strict
government control and the notion of the rugged society. Each of these
nations finds its dominant cultural mores under challenge. In the United
States, which has long prided itself on being a melting pot, there are
increasing calls for multi-culturalism. In Singapore, equally proud of its
success as a multi-cultural nation, the calls for the definition of shared
common values sparked some critics to call for a society that is more of a
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melting pot not divided along cultural lines561 . In each country abandoning
or modifying principles that have served well in building successful nations
but which mav no longer be appropriate as these countries move toward a
new century is a painful and difficult process.
In both nations governments wrestle with problems that demand
solutions. That they do so with contrasting styles does not mean that they do
not share common goals and interests. Contrasting does not mean
contradictory. As such, it is of concern to explore those areas in which the
interests of the two nations are largely similar and those issues which might
cause contention between the two. In the areas of economic policy and
defense, the views of the United States and Singapore are largely in
consonance. In the diplomacy and politics there is disagreement and the
potential for conflict of interest.
B. Economics
In the area of economics the United States and Singapore share the most
common interests and hold similar viewpoints on most issues. Prosperity
and participation in the economic boom in Asia is at the forefront of both the
agenda of the United States and Singapore. The importance of the United
States to Singapore is well known. Less well known, perhaps, is the
significant stake that the United States has in Singapore. In 1991 17% of the
United States two way trade with the Asia-Pacific region was with Southeast
Asia. Singapore, a nation of less than three million people, ranked first
among Southeast Asian nations in two way trade, claiming a remarkable 5.8%
of total United States East Asia-Pacific trade. Singapore was the top export
56l See "Playing the Identity Card," PEER, February 9, 1989, p. 35.
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market in Southeast Asia for the United States and took 7.3% of all US
exports to East Asia and the Pacific. Approximately L92,000 US jobs are
generated bv exports to Singapore.-162
The United States Direct investment position (1991) in Singapore was
larger than that in anv other Southeast Asian nation. 563 The United States is
Singapore's largest foreign investor, accounting for 39% of Singapore's total
1991 direct foreign investment (DPI) 304 . United States investment surged 24%
in 1992 to SSI.2 billion. 565 The United States is Singapore's most important
export market, absorbing 23% of Singapore's total exports in 1991. 566 This
aggregate figure is somewhat deceiving, however, as the figure for non-oil
exports is nearly bO%.- 67 The United States imports more from Singapore
than from am' other Southeast Asian nation.568
With such extensive economic ties between the two nations it is clear
that the United States has a significant interest in the Singaporean economy.
Singapore has an even more critical interest in the health and well being of
the US economy. With a total value of trade that is approaching four times its
GDP, Singapore can be counted upon to support international efforts to
liberalize international trade and provide expanded access to markets that are
presently difficult to open.
362Karen Hasselman, "The National Interests of the United States in Southeast Asia: Policy
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United States Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord told an
interviewer from the Far East Economic Rezriew that President Clinton's
efforts to revive the domestic economy in the United States dictated a high
priority for Asia in foreign policy: " there's no region in the world as relevant
to that [reviving the domestic economy] as the Asia-Pacific because it is bv far
the most dynamic region economically and its got the fastest growing
economies. 569 United States efforts to eventually strengthen APEC to become
a more powerful and influential organization for liberalizing the trading
regime in the Asia-Pacific will receive support from Singapore.
APEC's 15 member economies now account for about 50% of the world's
production and about 40% of global trade and will account for more bv the
year 2000.570 Singapore can be expected to use its considerable influence
within ASEAN, where there is some resistance, to lobby for a more vigorous
and effective APEC. Singapore, with its high percentage of trade with the
United States has already responded positively to proposals for a possible link
up between NAFTA and the still developing ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA).571 Lee Kuan Yew, in an article predicting Asia's future, foresaw the
United States opening NAFTA to APEC members by the year 2000 and the
emergence of a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) bv 2008. 572 In the ongoing
disputes between Japan and the United States, Singapore has echoed similar
complaints to those which issue from Washington. In the same article
^%usumu Awanohara and Nvana Chanda, "Uncommon Bonds," FEER, November 18, lQQ 3. p.
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mentioned above, Lee predicted that pressure from a stronger APEC would
eventually force the Japanese to drop its import barriers. 573
With the United States increasingly concerned with Asian trade issues,
Singapore provides Washington with a partner which has a powerful stake in
arguing for market liberalization throughout this dynamic region.
Additionally, Singapore's recent efforts to expand its external economy also
provide a powerful incentive for common efforts to support more formalized
structures for protecting investment and minimizing transaction costs in
emerging economies such as the trade and investment framework proposed
for APEC.574
C. Defense
Singapore's realpolitik orientation in foreign policy and strong defense
posture is well documented. While the efficacy of the "power vacuum"
theory in Asia is still the subject of debate, the Singaporeans have made it
clear that they believe that a precipitous withdrawal of United States military
forces in the Asia-Pacific would be destablizing and probably encourage the
expansion of regional military powers to fill the void. Singapore openly
credits the United States military for contributing to regional stability in East
and Southeast Asia which enabled the takeoff of the economies there.
Singapore's support for the continued presence of United States military
forces was welcomed by Washington and is very helpful in enabling US
forces to continue operations in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean basin.
As Sheldon Simon has argued, a continued presence of US Forces in
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sea lanes which the 7th fleet presently secures. The continued presence of
United States forces dampens the cycle of arms build-ups and provides viable
protection for regional sea and air lanes. At this point, and even as halting
steps are taken bv ASEAN toward forming an organization to discuss regional
security issues, defense ties to a friendly great power are preferable to the
creation of an indigenous ASEAN defense pact. A Japanese military role
commensurate with its economic role in Southeast Asia is still unacceptable
to the region.-''' 5 Singapore remains wary of Japanese Self-Defense Forces
(JSDF) operating anywhere other than in the vicinity of the Japanese islands.
Despite strong support for the US led coalition in the Gulf War, then Prime
Minister Lee was not supportive of JSDF forces being sent beyond home
waters in support of the effort. 576 Many ASEAN members remain very wary
of Chinese intentions.
Admiral Charles R. Larson has maintained that the forward presence of
United States forces performs the following functions;
Forward presence underscores the vitality of existing U.S. alliances; it
promotes new friendships as host nations observe the benefits of training
with U.S. personnel in an atmosphere of trust and confidence; it
encourages and helps to underwrite the stable geopolitical climate
necessary to promote economic growth; it assists not only nation-building
efforts, but the promotion of democracy, by providing a working example
of the American military's apolitical role; and it increases America's as
well as friendly states' military preparedness. Most importantly, forward
presence demonstrates on a daily basis the continued U.S. commitment to
remaining an Asian-Pacific power. 577
5/5Sheldon Simon, "U.S. Interests In Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXI, No. 7, July
1991, pp. 663-664.
''
''"Japan's Cabinet Backs troop Plan," New York Times, October 17, 1990, op. cit. in Simon, pp.
oo9-o70.
-
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Singapore's offer of facilities, accepted bv the United States, provides
access to an excellent location for enabling the United States to continue to
carrv out its forward presence mission. The Pacific Fleet Basing studv
completed bv the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) in May 1993 indicated that
Singapore would benefit significantly from the regional stability factor that
US access to its facilities would offer.578 Katherine Webb, in a dissertation for
the RAND Graduate School, rated facilities throughout East and Southeast
Asia for their utility in supporting American forces in the Asia-Pacific.
Singapore possessed all necessarv facilities and required no further
development or expansion to immediatelv host United States naval forces for
ship repair and supply operations. Likewise, Singapore's abilitv to support
naval magazine operations and naval air maintenance and training existed
and with further expansion provide an excellent alternative to the former
facilities at Subic. 579
The interoperability of equipment possessed by Singapore's armed forces
with those of the United States has already been touched upon. A recent
report indicates that the RSAF is considering the acquisition of McDonnell
Douglas F/A18 strike fighters, which would further enhance this facet of
bilateral military cooperation. 580 In the event of a regional conflict that
threatened common interests, such as a potential aggressor attempting to
close the Straits, Singapore would be a reliable partner in a coalition effort to
resist such aggression.
378Hasselman, p. 98.
579 Ibid, pp. 102-103,
'^"Intelligence," FEER. October L4, 1993, p. 9.
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Singapore offers the United States a valuable partner in regional security
affairs and an excellent location to support its global military strategy. The
world view of Singapore, adamantly supporting the sovereignty of nations,
opposing the changing of recognized borders or governments bv force and
supporting peaceful conditions that allow societies to develop economically
coincides with the principles of the United States. This consonance in world
view and the fact that the United States is viewed bv Singapore as the most
trustworthy of the world's great powers (or least distrusted), in a region it
believes will always be subject to the influence of the great powers, augers
well for continued close cooperation in security efforts. 3S1 With regard to the
issue of maintaining close military to military ties with nations with different
viewpoints on trade, human rights, and democracy Admiral Larson indicated
that while military cooperation was not immune from such issues, the US
military did maintain a degree of independence:
I don't think were totally immune, but I think we're somewhat
independent. We have proved in a lot of areas that in spite of political
differences between countries, we've maintained strong military ties. 3S2
D. Politics
It is in the political arena where Singapore and the United States clearly
part company. Singapore is not about to change its political order to reflect
more a more open and democratic style of government. This issue is really at
the crux of Asian-Western disputes. As recent events have shown, however,
the growth of a real political opposition seems to be underway. How the
government deals with this phenomenon, while of interest to US policy
jS1Lee Kuan \ew, "News from a time-capsule,'' p. 17.
582
"Places, not Bases," FEER, April 22, 1993, p. 22.
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planners, will take place in the context of Singapore's own parameters and as
has been proven before, pressure from without will more likelv hinder than
promote such a process.
The PAP government of Singapore has amassed a rather remarkable
record of progress in its twenty-eight vear tenure (thirty-four years if one
marks from before Singapore's independence) and the strongly authoritarian
rule has attained a significant performance legitimacv. While to outside
observers Singapore appears a prosperous and successful modern societv,
Singapore's leaders continue to view their hard-earned success as tenuous
and fragile. What has been gained can just as easily be lost. Vulnerable to the
vagaries of the world economy, the shifting tides of regional politics and the
ever-present possibility of internal racial difficulties, the governments heavy
hand will continue to provide strong "guidance" to its society. The
government of Singapore continues to maintain strict controls on the local
press. Instances of the regulation foreign publications which publish what the
government considers articles which intrude into Singapore's internal affairs
and refuse to allow it the right of unedited reply continue. There is no
indication that Singapore is prepared to abandon such policies. While there
are those who chafe under such restrictions, it should be pointed out that
Singapore in no way restricts emigration. Anyone who finds living under
PAP rule too onerous is free to leave.
Lee Kuan Yew expressed his opinion on Asian responses to calls for
democracy and human rights issuing from Washington:
Americans generate a lot of cynicism.... When you are scrambling to
make a living, having people preach to you about the sanctity of
individual political rights or the virtues of political pluralism does not
make sense. When America preaches political freedoms for the
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individual, the danger of invasions of personal rights and privacy and so
on, it does not resonate.
There is also a cultural divide here. What Americans consider
important, the hallmarks of a good government or a good society, are not
what Asians consider desirable. [In America] you see drugs, crime,
muggings, infrastructure allowed to go into disrepair. Those are not
indications of a well-run society. That's not what people in Asia want.
Thev want a good government, which means a government that puts
these things right.583
Lee's remarks highlight the difference in ruling philosophy in Singapore
and in the United States. In the United States, the philosophy of individual
freedom dictates (at least in theory) minimal government intervention in the
lives of its citizens. The US model relies upon the citizen to "put things
right," each in accordance with his own design of what that particular phrase
means. In the Singaporean (and perhaps more broadly the Asian) context, the
emphasis is on good government, which, as Lee implies, is able to formulate
and impose solutions on almost all societal problems. The legendary banning
of chewing gum in the island republic is perhaps the most famous example of
the extent to which the government will take its efforts.
The crux of the issue is performance not process. Singapore has no
admiration for democracy as practiced in the United States. Lee has argued
many times of the dangers and poor portability of democratic institutions and
the one-man, one-vote, two part}' system, "It didn't work in France, Germany,
Italy, Canada, Australia, New Zealand."584 Indeed, Lee endorses the view of
Goh Keng Swee that "only the United States' fund of great wealth, robust
strength and talent has prevented the collapse of democracy there."585 The
democratic process here is seen as unwieldy, inconsistent, and slow to
583
*'Can Uncle Sam bounce back?," U.S. News unci World Report, December 21, 1 Q03, p75.
584Minchin, p. 212.
>85Op. at. in Minchin, p. 212.
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respond to pressing needs. At the same time, few in the United States, even
those who call loudlv upon the government to provide solutions for all of
society's ills, would find living in a societv with Singapore's restrictions on
individual freedom much to their liking nor would many endorse it as a
model for others to follow.
With manv interests in common and much to gain from a cordial and
friendlv relationship between the United States and Singapore, two countries
with different visions of how to organize and govern their societies, United
States policy planners would be wise to heed the advice of former Secretary of
Defense and Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger:
Democracy is an organic growth It is not easily made into a transplant.
In the West it has evolved over centuries - and has come to embody an
innate respect for civil liberties. Our efforts at transplanting democratic
forms, let alone the democratic spirit, have been mixed at best
The point is not that we should cease to preach American values or
that we should fail to express delight when other societies move closer to
democracy. The point is that, even before we examine the trade-offs
regarding economic growth or ancillary actions regarding foreign policy or
countless other matters, we must conclude that, at best, the fostering of
democracy is a delicate and quite tenuous guide to policy....
Traditional diplomacy would suggest that we not pick fights, but rather
base our stance toward other states on whether they are antagonistic or
friendly toward us ~ and not on their internal arrangements. Violation of
the traditional tenets of diplomacy will come only at a cost to ourselves. 586
D. Diplomacy
There is substantial agreement between Singapore and the United States
on many international issues. Singapore, as a small state, is a strong supporter
of the United Nations and the application of international law to solve
5S6Schlesmger, p. 21.
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disputes between nations.5*7 Singapore's Tommy Koh has stated Singapore's
position succinctly:
As a small country, our security interests are enhanced when the rule
of law prevails and contrariwise, our security interests are jeopardized
when the rule of might replaces the rule of law.359
There is, however, a substantial disagreement between Singapore and
the United States on the application of diplomatic and economic pressure to
force the pace of change in the internal politics of other nations and to deal
with human rights issues. Recent United States foreign policy initiatives
seem to indicate that this is an increasingly central organizing principle in the
post-Cold War era.
This diyergence in policy is exemplified by Singapore's concern oyer
United States policy with regard to China. Responding to an inquiry on what
he thought about Washington's China policy, Senior minister Lee remarked:
Let's put it this way. You are treating the Russians with kid gloves. But
you are treating China as if it were an aid-dependent Third World country.
Is that sensible? In American politics, it is only in a crisis like Somalia that
there is a concentration of the minds. Otherwise, the process just goes
meandering along, sidetracked of whipped along at a tremendous pace by
the media. I'm not sure the Chinese understand the sometimes haphazard
way of making decisions. 5S9
Lee has urged US policy planners to deal with the Chinese as they are
and dispense with the use of economic levers as diplomatic tools to force
internal reforms, such as the conditionality of Most Favored Nation (MFN)
status. To Lee and the Singapore leadership, this is the height of lunacy, to
punish the Chinese by a method which will harm the United States as much
or more than it will harm the Chinese. Given the huge economic stakes, the
587See Obaid Ul Haq, p. 124-125.
588Ibid, p. 125
'""An Elder Statesman Surveys Asia's Future, "Business Week, November 29, 19Q 3.
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ability of the United States to follow through on such threats is questionable
at best. Should the Chinese fail to acquiese to United States demands, which is
bv no means unlikely, failure to follow through on such a posture will do
damage to US credibility.
This is consistent with Singapore's own policy of never linking trade
and diplomacy when the issue is the form of government that a particular
country operates. It is also consistent with Singapore's own carefully guarded
sovereignty, which brooks no interference in its internal affairs. As Lee put it
with regard to the Beijing government vis-a-vis American pressure tactics,
There will be no conversion on the road to Damascus. They want a deal."
Isolation of China is viewed with great misgiving in Singapore. The course
advocated there is to bring China into the world community now, without
making demands on China's politicians that they view as undermining their
control of China and potentially disastrous for China's internal stability.590 In
the view of Singapore's s leadership, as the Chinese integrate themselves into
the world economy and educate their sons and daughters abroad, in time the
realization will come that they are a part of an interdependent world. While
such a change may take many years, this realization is viewed, in Singapore,
as an inevitable result of integration into the community of nations.591
In the debate over human rights, Singapore and the United States, not
surprisingly, hold very different viewpoints. Yoichi Funabashi in his article
the "Asianization of Asia,"' commented that the United Nations conference
on human rights in June of 1993 made Singapore's Foreign minister Wong
590
"Give Face, Make Deals," FEER, November 18, 1993.
591 Ibid, p. IS.
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Kan Sen (and others) realize the extent of his Asianness for the first time.'592
A Deputy Secretary in Singapore's Ministry of Foreign affairs outlined five
key elements which he believed represented the views of many Asians in the
ongoing debates on the issue of human rights.
First, all discussions between Asians and Westerners on human rights
and freedom should be based on mutual respect.. ..Westerners should stop
lecturing Asians.
Second, the fundamental concern of Western human rights activists is
to end the egregious abuses and improve the living conditions of the 4.3
billion people living in the developing world. Yet the post-Cold War
western campaign to promote human rights will barelv make a dent in the
lives of these people....
Economic development is the only force that can liberate the Third
World....
Third, no one in the West should dream of overthrowing existing
governments in Asia. While sporadic instances of political crackdowns
should be critisised, these governments should not be penalized as long as
their people's lives are improving.
Fourth, both sides should work towards establishing minimal codes of
civilised conduct.. ..both Asians and Westerners are human beings. They
can agree on minimal standards of civilised conduct that both would like
to live under.
Finally, on the difficult issue of press freedom, let me suggest that the
West should not appoint itself the global guardian in this field. Let each
society decide for itself whether it would help or hinder its development if
it decides to have a free press. 593
Schlesinger likewise concludes that the United States should be
extraordinarily cautious in the application of trade sanctions as an instrument
to underscore our disapproval of others who have failed to live up to
American ideals.'594 In an era when US economic policy is based on a desire
to open markets and foster a free trade regime, the repeated and sudden
-^Funahas hi, p. /o.




interference with the flow of trade is a poor way to foster such trade and a
greater international division of labor. ;oq
Singapore certainlv represents one of the most remarkable success stories
in Asian development. The United States would be well advised to pay heed
to the opinions that issue from the island republic. While differences between
the two will alwavs be evident and disagreements will occur, the
singaporeans do have a unique viewpoint to offer US policv makers and an
ability to measure the pulse of others in Asia. From their position as a largely
ethnic Chinese nation in Southeast Asia, Singapore's leaders can offer a
reasoned, if sometimes biased, assessment on regional issues. Well connected
with the rising giant in East Asia, the Peoples Republic of China, and with less
baggage in that relationship than Hong Kong and Taiwan, the opinions of
Singapore's leadership offer a valuable insight into the workings of the Asian
giant. Singapore's legendarv pragmatism offers a useful counterpoint to the
United States' ideological stances on a wide range of policy issues that are
emerging as, perhaps, the American centurv fades and the Pacific Centurv
dawns.
Funabashi poses an important question which applies to United States
relationships throughout Asia and has particular relevance to the
relationship between Singapore and the United States :
Asia will no longer put up with being treated simply as a card; it will
now demand respect as a plaver. Its success stories are likelv to inspire and
provide a voice for original, distinctlv Asian ideas on a host of issues:
human rights; the ctebate over democracy versus economic development;
the relationship of corporate enterprises to the state, individuals to society,
and societv to the state; security in the new world order and the region.
The question facing the United States is whether it will be able to
595 Ibid, p. 25.
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